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1 Introduction and literature review 
1.1 Research puzzle and aim of study 
In June 2016, news services across the world reported that China was about to build the new 
headquarters of the Zimbabwean parliament for free. And this was not the first such gift that 
China had contributed to the political culture of African governments; in 2010 it built the new 
headquarters of the African Union (worth USD 200 million) in Addis Ababa. This fact was also 
commented on extensively across the world media; BBC News observed that “we couldn’t ask 
for a clearer example than this to show that China is to […] increase its influence right across 
the continent” (BBC News 29.01.2012; similar argument, see Diekhans 2012).  
These incidents are illustrative of an ongoing debate about the increasing influence of emerging 
countries – especially China – on the African continent. It also reflects ongoing changes in the 
field of foreign aid, which has for a long time been dominated by an economic relationship 
between rich industrialized states that gave a small part of their gross domestic product to 
poorer, and less industrialized states.1 Today, new trends are emerging. While the financial crisis 
has hit industrialized countries and reduced their commitment to helping other states, emerging 
countries are increasingly involved in the processes of giving aid. Most industrialised countries 
give about 0.30 percent of their gross national income to development projects (Humphrey 
2010).2 In 2014, a total of USD 137 billion was spent by members of the Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) – the institution responsible for reporting on aid from industrialised 
countries  – in bilateral and multilateral aid projects (OECD Stat 2015d). Foreign aid from rich 
countries has comprised an ever increasing flow of money since the 1960s with only smaller 
setbacks in the 1990s and after the financial crisis in 2007. In comparison, the amounts spent 
by so-called emerging donors3 are still rather modest. Whereas exact figures are hard to come 
by, approximately 10 to 15 percent of global aid is distributed by new providers (K. Smith, 
Yamashiro Fordelone, and F. Zimmermann 2010; for the higher estimate, see F. Müller and 
Ziai 2015, 10; Joshua S. Goldstein and Pevehouse 2011). This share has increased dramatically 
over the last ten years, a phenomenon which has not escaped the attention of traditional aid 
                                                 
1 I refer to “foreign aid” as a voluntary transfer of official resources with a grant component of at least 25 percent 
with the objective to promote economic development and welfare (OECD 2008a, 9). This is the definition for 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), a think tank of mostly rich countries and excludes some of the actions undertaken by emerging donors 
(A. Johnson, Versailles, and Martin 2008, 6). For the sake of comparability, this study rigorously uses this definition. 
Whenever other activities from Southern providers are considered it will be specifically stated.  
2 The average of the club of rich donors, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD lies at 0.29 
percent (Klingebiel 2014, 5–7). 
3 The term “emerging donors” refers to two elements: first, it shows that the activities of emerging donors as 
donors of foreign aid are fairly recent, and second, that the category corresponds to another group – that of emerg-
ing markets. The term is ambiguous, as some of these donors have supported developing countries for a long time. 
China is such an example, having supported countries such as Ghana since the 1950s (Brautigam 2010, 7). How-
ever, it is only recently, through their fast economic development, that these donors have begun to influence politics 
of other donors (Rowlands January 2008, 3). The term is equal to “providers of South-South cooperation” and 
“Southern provider”, a terminology used by the DAC. Many studies have also shown that it is not easy to find a 
clear definition of who belongs to the group and who doesn’t (Knodt and Piefer 2012, 37). The following literature 
review and chapter 4 shed further light on this question.  
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givers, and which was often welcomed by recipient countries as a true alternative to funding 
from unloved Western donors.  
These aid flows – whether from traditional4 or emerging donors – are significant for the income 
of many recipient countries. For all developing countries, they amount to 0.68 percent of gross 
national income. However, there is a huge variation between more or less aid dependent coun-
tries. For instance, though aid makes up 4.2 percent of national income for countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, for individual countries such as Burundi it is at an incredible 39.8 percent of 
gross national income (Klingebiel 2014, 7–8). Aid therefore is still a critical factor which defines 
the relationships between richer and poorer nations.  
This increasing trend of spending from Southern providers has not been ignored by academics. 
The bulk of existing research – and of media attention as the above examples illustrate – has 
focused so far on the ambiguous relationship between China and diverse African countries. It 
is often claimed that Chinese development policies mainly provide help for rogue African lead-
ers who would otherwise have been internationally isolated due to their lack of support from 
industrialized states (e. g. Halper 2010a). Few have looked at the tendencies of other emerging 
countries to participate in foreign aid under the principle of South-South cooperation. But the 
reaction of traditional donors to these new trends is perhaps the most neglected question of all. 
How do they adapt their development policies in response to this new, perceived source of 
competition?  
This thesis is looking for answers to precisely this question. It looks at two thematic fields that 
are particularly affected by emerging donors: first, the field of conditionality5 – it is often argued 
(as the literature will illustrate in detail) that emerging donors do not attach political or economic 
conditions to their aid activities while traditional donors do; and, second, that of trilateral coop-
eration6 – the cooperation between a Northern donor, a Southern aid provider and a recipient 
country. This study looks therefore at the reaction of selected traditional donors to their per-
ceived loss of the monopoly on the development paradigm in these two thematic areas.  
The aims of the study are threefold. By illustrating the reaction of three traditional donors – 
namely the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom7 – to the emergence of a new group 
of donors it allows for wider speculation about the potential reaction of traditional forces to the 
emergence of new power centres – development policy being only one of many fields within 
                                                 
4 The term “traditional donor” refers to industrialised countries. The group is congruent with the current 29 mem-
bers of the DAC (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States). This list is not perfect – other countries may qualify as traditional donors that are not a member of the 
DAC (for instance Hungary), while some DAC members may not entirely qualify for the definition given above 
(notably the Republic of Korea) (OECD DAC).  
5 Conditionality refers to aid that is made conditional on the fulfilment of certain conditions before (ex-ante condi-
tionality) or after (ex-post conditionality) the disbursement of aid. Stokke defines conditionality as “the use of pres-
sure by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are 
not met by the recipient” (Stokke 1995a, 12). 
6 Trilateral or triangular cooperation is defined by Langendorf (2012, 25–26) as a cooperation “between DAC 
donors and providers of South-South cooperation to implement development programmes in beneficiary coun-
tries.” Triangular cooperation only started to become a popular concept in the mid-2000s (for a similar definition, 
see Ashoff 2010; Chaturvedi 2012a; Yamashiro Fordelone 2009; Yamashiro Fordelone and Soule-Kohndou 2013).  
7 The chapter on methods gives further insights into why these three cases were selected.  
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international relations that are affected by this shift. This might also lead to interesting hypoth-
eses for the future broader relations between the North and the South, an area which is currently 
central to debates within international relations (IR). Moreover, another aim of the study is a 
theoretical one: in the process of investigating the reaction within traditional donor policy, the 
theoretical prism of discursive institutional change is used, investigated and further developed. 
The study conceptualises each country’s development policy as an institution (following an in-
stitutional approach) composed of narratives, rules, and practices, allowing for a very detailed 
understanding of what is going on in the individual cases (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). Another 
theoretical contribution is the investigation about the influence of ideas on policy change – with 
the field of discursive institutionalism and constructivism as main inspirations (Schmidt 2011).  
Finally – and as the literature review will show in detail – what is currently missing from the 
numerous publications on the broader topic is an empirical study of the actual reactions that 
goes beyond pure speculation. This study fills that gap and provides revealing empirical evidence 
from the three traditional donors.  
The following introductory chapter outlines how this investigation into the changes within tra-
ditional donor policies as a reaction to emerging donors is to be conducted. It begins with an 
overview of the main research questions, hypotheses and theoretical framework that this study 
is embedded in. The third section gives an overview of the existing body of literature on the 
topic and thereby identifies the potential gaps in the research that this thesis aims to fill. The 
final section gives an outline of the study and summarises the structure of the chapters.  
1.2 Framework of this thesis: research questions, hypotheses and methods 
This study aims to close the significant research gap – that the literature review will further 
discuss – when it comes to providing clear answers on the reaction of well-established donors 
to the emergence of new potential rivals. It is empirically driven and looks at the concrete reac-
tions of three traditional donor countries – the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway.  
Starting from this framework, the study investigated the following research questions:  
 How do the three selected traditional donors react towards the increased presence of 
emerging donors?  
This thesis follows the theoretical approach of discursive institutionalism, which holds that ideas 
have the power to effect institutional change (or, indeed, prevent it). It is therefore essential that 
this work first looks at the relevant ideas that traditional donors put forward regarding emerging 
donors in order to address – in a second step – potential changes and reactions within their 
policies. Moreover, the literature review argues that the fields in which these consequences are 
most likely to be felt are that of conditionality and that of trilateral cooperation. Conditionality 
was chosen because it is seen as an area where the main differences persist between traditional 
and new donors. Trilateral cooperation was chosen because it is emphasized in the literature as 
the field in which traditional donors might best be able to influence and socialise emerging 
donors. Therefore, the following more targeted questions were addressed in the empirical chap-
ters:  
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 What are the reigning ideas that exist about emerging donors within the three traditional 
donors’ aid communities?  
 Is there, first, a change in their approach towards conditionality? And second, how do 
they approach trilateral cooperation?  
 Are there common reactions towards emerging donors from the three selected cases? If 
yes, can they be generalised even further (for other traditional donors); if no, how can 
these differences be explained?  
 Can the ideas about emerging donor policies explain potential changes within traditional 
donors’ aid policies?  
The theoretical chapter further expands upon the theoretical hypotheses that are essential in 
addressing the empirical data. One of the biggest theoretical contributions of this study, is that 
it conceptualises the development policy of donor countries as an institution composed of three 
layers – narratives (spoken and informal), rules (written and formal), and practices (what is ac-
tually done) – in order to track down potential changes within these layers and thereby within 
the development policies of the three traditional donors. This model allows for a very detailed 
and empirically driven understanding of what happens in the three selected donor countries and 
allows for comparison between the three cases.  
Moreover, as the next chapter illustrates in detail, the following theoretical assumptions were 
tested in this work:  
 H0: Ideas play a decisive role in explaining institutional change within development 
policy. More precisely, the way emerging donors are perceived plays a decisive role for 
explaining change or the lack of change.  
This general hypothesis was tested in the fields of conditionality and trilateral cooperation. 
Moreover, the following two sub-hypotheses were tested in the two thematic fields:  
 H1: Change is more likely to occur on the layer of narratives than it is on the layer of 
rules or practices. 
The background of this hypothesis lies in the varying properties of the specific layers of the 
development institutions that I investigate. The next sub-hypothesis is more embedded in the 
theoretical assumption that longer established policy fields are less likely to be affected by 
change than newer ones. This is because resistance (for instance from veto players) is less pro-
nounced if the thematic area only recently emerged:  
 H2: Long established policy fields are more likely to be susceptible to path dependent 
behaviour and less influenced by reformative ideas than newer established policy fields. 
In order to test these hypotheses and to find answers to the research questions above, this thesis 
needs to uncover the three theoretical layers within its empirical data: in order to uncover nar-
ratives, extensive research has been conducted on primary documents, mainly speeches and 
annual reports of the three selected donors. To reveal changes within the layer of rules, legal 
texts and guidelines have been studied. Finally, to identify change within the layers of practices 
aid statistics and several statistical indicators have been used. Moreover, this rich empirical data 
was complemented by expert interviews with representatives from the donor countries. Most 
of the empirical data was analysed through the method of qualitative content analysis, while a 
descriptive analysis and simple correlations were used for the quantitative materials. This study 
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analyses the changes in traditional donor policies over ten years – from 2004 to 2014. Chapter 
3 further develops on these methodological issues.  
The next section addresses the relevant academic discussions surrounding the research ques-
tions of this thesis. What has indeed been said about the impact of emerging donors so far?  
1.3 Literature review on emerging donors and their impact 
The concept of development cooperation is said to reflect many realities in the relationships 
between different world powers and between different levels of income across the world (Eckert 
2015; Klingebiel 2014; Lancaster 2007). While foreign aid was often considered a “puzzle” or a 
“tricky” concept in political science, many analysists have come to agree that self-interest alone 
cannot explain foreign aid (Morgenthau 1962; Lancaster 2007). On the contrary, moral consid-
erations also play a decisive part in explaining foreign policy without negating equally influential 
self-interested rationales (Lumsdaine 1993; Degnbol-Martinussen, Engberg-Pedersen, and Bille 
2005; Hook and Rumsey 2015; S. Brown 2012). In the last decade, two major themes have 
dominated the research within the field of development aid: the first concentrates on the use-
fulness of aid for triggering development in recipient countries under the umbrella of the dis-
cussions surrounding aid effectiveness (Easterly 2001, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Easterly and 
Williamson 2011; Bueno de Mesquita and A. Smith 2009; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Bourgui-
gnon and Sundberg 2007; Wright and Winters 2010).  
The second important field of investigation is the one that is studied here: the debate between 
academics and political experts about the emergence of new aid-giving parties. This debate often 
refers to the effectiveness debate when inquiring into how emerging donors can best be inte-
grated into existing structures working together towards a more effective outcome (Mahn and 
Weinlich 2012; Hackenesch and H. Zhang 2013; Rampa and Bilal 2011; Grimm and Hackenesch 
2012; Herbert 2012). Furthermore, this body of literature is often embedded in larger debates 
about the increasing weight of emerging economies in the world (for instance Kappel and Pohl 
2013; Hazard et al. 2009; L. M. Phillips 2008; Hurrell 2006; Komlosy 2013; Kristof 1993; Stähle 
2008b; Schirm 2010; Giese 2013; H. Zimmermann 2007; Nölke 2015b). Aid is often seen as a 
field in which this trend materialises clearly (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b, 19). 
This question of how to study the relations between Northern and Southern states has also 
entered the debates within the field of international relations. While realists insist that coopera-
tive results can only be short-lived, institutionalists and constructivists paint a more positive 
picture of the relationship. This thesis positions itself in the realm between institutionalist and 
constructivist approaches and puts an emphasis on questions relating to institutional change, as 
the theory chapter explains. Moreover, it contributes towards the application of theoretical 
prism to detailed empirical fields, arguing that individual development policies can be framed as 
an institution.   
While some textbooks from the mid-2000s still completely neglect the importance of South-
South cooperation (Nuscheler 2005, 482–85), many recent studies acknowledge the importance 
of new donors (while often stressing that the phenomenon itself is not new, but the scale on 
which it occurs is, see Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013; Engel 2012; Grimm et al. 2008; 
A. Johnson, Versailles, and Martin 2008). For instance, Adriana Abdenur and João da Fonseca 
(2013, 1476–77) argue that one of the major changes in development cooperation in the last ten 
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years is the appearance of new stakeholders in South-South cooperation. Similarly, Chris Alden 
(June 2013b, 8) calls the increasing engagement of an emerging South the “most significant 
development of the 21st century”. Stephan Klingebiel (2014, 16) argues that the inclusion of 
emerging donors, mostly of China, in the follow-up agreement of the Millennium Development 
Goals is essential for its success. Others have also identified new donors in foreign aid to be the 
most important development in the last two decades (see for instance, Tierney et al. 2011; 
Adugna et al. 2011; Soyeun Kim and Lightfoot 2011; Chaturvedi, Fues, and Sidiropoulos 2012; 
Fues, Chaturvedi, and Sidiropoulos 2012). Gilles Carbonnier and Andy Sumner (2012, 4) state 
that emerging donors “erode the de facto oligopoly” of traditional donors.  
Whilst many studies focus on the policies of China in Africa, in general volumes, or in particular 
country case studies (Dittmer and Yu 2010; Men and Barton 2011a; Alden, Large, and Soares 
de Oliveira 2008a; Ampiah and Naidu 2008a; Eisenman, Heginbotham, and D. Mitchell 2007), 
some take other emerging donors into account (Hackenesch 2013). Chaturvedi, Fues, and Sidi-
ropoulos (2012), for example add studies on the policies of India, South Africa, Brazil, and 
Mexico to that of China (Carbonnier 2012; other studies include Stuenkel 2010; for information 
on Russian development assistance, see Larionova, Rakhmangulov, and Berenson 2014; for in-
formation on Mexican assistance, see Lätt 2011; or M. Romero 2012; for information on Turk-
ish development assistance, see Özkan and Turgut Demirtepe 2012; or Ipek 2015). 
When it comes to the specific consequences that the activities of emerging donors trigger, the 
literature can be divided into three main strands of research that structure the following sections: 
first, the biggest bulk of publications addresses the potential positive and/or negative effects of 
the emergence of new players in the field of development cooperation. Second, many studies 
attempt to compare the policies of South-South Cooperation to the better researched field of 
traditional donor policies. Lastly, a minor focus is placed on the consequences of emerging 
donors for traditionally established donors. The ensuing, final section enquires into what has 
been said in this regard over the last decade. However, as will quickly become clear, much re-
search is needed in this area as the majority of studies remain speculative.  
1.3.1 Positive and negative consequences of emerging donors  
The bulk of research focuses on the negative effects of China on the African continent, with 
the main focus, especially in the earlier years of research, seeming to lie on the negative or even 
colonialist attitudes of China regarding Africa (see for instance Alden 2007; Broadman and Isik 
2007; Lee and Melber 2007; Brookes and Shin 2006; Lee 2006; Grill, 14.0.2006; Kazim, January 
16, 2007). Giles Mohan states in an early review of books written on the topic that many publi-
cations were issued despite a clear lack of data on concrete Chinese projects. Most of the earlier 
studies, therefore, referenced each other and reproduced common misconceptions (Mohan 
2008). More nuanced studies on China’s endeavours in Africa appeared shortly afterwards (see 
for instance Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b; Brautigam 2009, 2010; Ampiah and 
Naidu 2008a). These are often structured with particular case studies of specific recipients re-
ceiving support from China or other emerging donors.  
When it comes to the consequences of emerging donors’ involvement in recipient countries, 
there exist two schools of thought, both of which oversimplify underling issues. One of these 
is purely negative and claims that the efforts of emerging donors have a purely detrimental effect 
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on recipients, whereas the other is purely positive and optimistic, arguing that with the emer-
gence of new donors, development can finally be achieved by all recipients (Corkin and Naidu 
2008; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power 2010). What exactly are the arguments of each of these 
schools of thought and how have their arguments changed over time? The following paragraphs 
address these questions.  
Studies arguing that the activities of China and others produce purely positive results are not 
hard to come by. Most such studies agree that the emergence of new players in the field of 
development cooperation has led to an alternative source of funding for recipients which ulti-
mately improves their bargaining position (Abdenur and Fonseca 2013, 1476; African Economic 
Outlook 2011, 15; Chan 2008; Cornelissen 2009; Grimm and Fues 2007; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, 
and Thiele 2011; Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012; Kragelund 2008, 2010b, 2012; Large 
2008b; Pohl 2011; Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010; Shaw 2010; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and 
Power 2010; Tietze 2011; Tull 2005; F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011; The Financial Times, 
August 25, 2010).  
This enhanced bargaining position, some argue, could lead to a “moment” in international af-
fairs for developing countries where they assert themselves (Cheru and Obi 2010). Most em-
phasise however that in order to really enhance recipients’ economies, the recipients rather than 
the donors must begin to define the terms of the deals for themselves (Baregu 2008; Alden June 
2013b, June 2013a; Broadman 2008). In this strand of literature, emerging donors (and most 
studies here focus on China) are not considered to be a competitor or colonizer, but a partner 
for developing countries (Alden 2007, 126–27; Le Pere 2008; Naidu 2007). Through the in-
creased activity between recipients and emerging donors, the terms of trade for recipients are 
thought to improve because of numerous investments of emerging donors in much needed 
sectors (African Forum and Network on Debt and Development 2010). China, and other 
emerging donors, therefore finally treat recipients as an investment opportunity, as Dambisa 
Moyo (2010, 98–113) argues in her book that largely discusses the ineffectiveness of traditional 
aid. Others argue that China could be a model for a “better world” (Amin 2012; for similarly 
positive assessments, see Sautman and Hairong 2007; Schüller and Asche 2007). As the final 
section here on critical assessment will illustrate further, this optimism regarding China’s activ-
ities in Africa has sometimes been called “naïve” (Jakobeit 2009, 595). 
The enhanced availability of resources for recipients has, then, generally been positively as-
sessed. Alongside this positive assessment lie particular arguments about how emerging donors 
could contribute to the development process of their recipients. First, many argue that the local 
population reacts fairly positively to the increased involvement of emerging donors (Carling and 
Haugen 2008; Kragelund 2012; Kopiński, Polus, and I. Taylor 2011), even if some studies accept 
that this positivity often segues into a more sceptical attitude after the initial honeymoon period 
(The Economist 2011b, 2010d; Gaye 2008; Power and Mohan 2008; Chin 2012, 587; S. Romero, 
August 16, 2010). Moreover, many studies raise awareness that one needs to be careful when 
generalising about the impact to recipients as their background differs greatly (A. E. Goldstein 
et al. 2009).  
A second line of argument is that emerging donors, because of their own experience in devel-
oping their country, are better suited to tailoring development projects that actually aim at en-
hancing development, unlike Western projects which are often considered ill-suited to the par-
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ticular needs of recipients (P. Davies 2010; F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011). Another argu-
ment for the greater efficiency of aid from emerging donors comes from the claim that their aid 
has a stronger focus on ownership – on the idea that recipients are themselves responsible for 
their development process. This argument is put forward in Lauren Walshe Roussel’s study 
(2013) about the consequences of emerging donors in Nicaragua. Similarly, Sebastian Paulo and 
Helmut Reisen (2009a) argue that the diaspora of many emerging donors in recipient countries 
actually ensures a stronger supervision of the aid projects than any traditional donor could ever 
hope to achieve.  
The next argument is probably the one that is agreed upon by most studies: that emerging do-
nors actually fill a gap in funding sectors, such as infrastructure projects, that were largely ne-
glected by Western donors for a long time (Adugna et al. 2011, 34–35; Alden, Large, and Soares 
de Oliveira 2008b; P. Davies 2007, P. Davies 2010; Haefliger, February 10, 2010, March 31, 
2011; Kragelund 2008; Tull 2008b). The aid of emerging donors is then often seen as “comple-
mentary” to traditional projects (African Economic Outlook 2011, 106; Kragelund 2010b), each 
group focussing on different investments that are all seen as necessary in the developing context.  
The most balanced view is probably put forward by Deborah Brautigam. She claims that most 
studies – often those focusing on the negative consequences of emerging donors that we will 
now review – are characterised by misconceptions, such as, for instance, an inflated conception 
of the aid volume that emerging donors spend. She argues that, overall, Chinese aid might be 
beneficial for recipients and that the general mistrust towards Chinese projects can be explained 
by the general mistrust within Europe and the United States regarding China’s rise (A. Berger, 
Brautigam, and Baumgartner 2011; Brautigam, August 16, 2010). In her most recent book, 
Brautigam investigates Chinese interactions with the African agrarian sector and writes that 
“more than a decade after ‘China in Africa’ began to hit the headlines, there continues to be an 
enormous gap between what many in the West imagine Chinese intentions in Africa to be and 
the realities” (Brautigam 2015b, 162; similar line of argument, Brautigam 2009, 307, 2008a). 
Nevertheless, these misconceptions might bear some truth about Chinese – and more generally 
emerging donors’ – activities. The next section reviews the most prominent criticisms addressed 
towards South-South cooperation. Many of these views have influenced the perceptions reign-
ing in the political elites of the three traditional donors that this study investigates. This is why 
it is important to review their points in detail.  
The criticism that is most often addressed was first put forward by Moses Naim in an article, 
published in Foreign Policy, called Rogue Aid (2007, 1). The article defines “rogue aid” as “de-
velopment assistance that is nondemocratic in origin and nontransparent in practice; its effect 
typically to stifle real progress while hurting average citizens” and targets Chinese aid in Africa.8 
This highly influential article was often taken as a starting point for future research to argue that 
China, and other emerging donors, would favour nondemocratic regimes which in turn might 
undermine human rights and democratic standards put forward by traditional aid projects 
through conditionality (Gaye 2008; Halper 2010a, 2010b; Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012; 
Mawdsley 2010; The Reality of Aid Management Committee 2010; Sangmeister and Schönstedt 
2010, 152; Scheen, August 22, 2010; Stähle 2008a; Burgis, May 21, 2010; Gill, Morrison, and C.-
H. Huang 2008; Woods 2008). Despite the support for that argument, many studies have 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, Emma Mawdsley and Gerard McCann (2010, 88–89) argue that India’s activities could be similarly 
criticised but are often spared because India keeps a low profile.  
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emerged that argue that this rogue aid might not pose much of a problem for governance (Af-
rican Economic Outlook 2011; Dent 2011b) and that China has shown a remarkable evolution 
towards the principle of non-interference, mostly in dealing with the regime of Omar al-Bashir 
in Sudan. Often, China was accused at the height of the Darfur crisis of supporting the dictator 
and thereby undermining Western sanctions. Nevertheless, many studies have shown that the 
initial position of China – of unconditional support to al-Bashir – evolved into a more careful 
and silent support that in the end pushed the unloved leader to solutions regarding the conflict 
that the West agreed with (Srinivasan 2008; Brautigam 2009, 281–84; Grimm and Fues 2007; 
Dyer, January 24, 2008; Hilsum 2008; Zhao 2011; Large 2008a, 2008c, 2008d; Srinivasan 2008; 
He 2010). In a similar vein, Berger, Brautigam and Baumgartner (2011) argue that China has no 
interest in limiting itself to only dealing with autocratic regimes, which further weakens the ar-
gument of a great threat emerging from China’s behaviour (similar argument for China's stand 
on human rights, see I. Taylor 2011).  
Moreover, further studies point towards the inefficiency of Western conditionality overall when 
it came to improving human rights standards or even to the willingness of the West to support 
dictators, like al-Bashir, Qaddafi and Mugabe (Brautigam 2009, 284–85; Bearce 2013; Coyne 
and Ryan 2008; Soysa and Midford 2012; Zhou 2012) or to the fact that traditional donors only 
use human rights as an argument when their economic interests are threatened rather than be-
cause they care for the human rights situation in remote areas (Breslin and I. Taylor 2008). 
Furthermore, Ian Taylor (2009, 89–112) argues that Chinese policies – in order to be successful 
– require political stability which, in turn, might benefit human rights and good governance 
standards in the country. Similarly, Zehlia Babaci-Wilhite et al. (2013) argue that, on the whole, 
the Beijing Consensus might be more beneficial to recipients than the Washington Consensus 
ever was. Finally, some moderate studies argue that the outcome of Chinese policies on the 
human rights and good governance record of recipients remains uncertain, but do need to be 
studied further (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b, 20–23). Similarly, Dreher, Fuchs 
and Nunnenkamp (2013, 407) argue that there is no evidence to label emerging donors as rogue 
donors.  
Next to the potential political implications of emerging donors, economic problems are often 
mentioned in academic research. First, many commentators direct their criticism at a perceived 
lack of beneficial side effects for local residents (The Economist 2010b; A. E. Goldstein, Pinaud, 
and Reisen 2008; F. Müller and Ziai 2015; Ndulo 2008) as well as unfavourable terms of trade 
for recipients (Gebre-Egziabher 2009). This criticism is often linked to the conceptualisation of 
Southern aid as delivering ready-made concepts instead of transferring knowledge, often leading 
to unsustainable short-lived successes (P. Davies 2010; Russell, January 24, 2008). Second, it has 
been argued that the beneficial flow of money is often coupled with a better access to local 
economies which leads to the importing of cheap goods from emerging donors which could be 
problematic for local industries (Ampiah and Naidu 2008b, 8–10; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009). 
Several case studies tell stories of deindustrialisation because of Chinese imports, for instance 
in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye 2008); about cutbacks in the textile industry in South Africa (Naidu 
2008a); or generally for African manufacturing industries (Brautigam 2009, 308–10; Kamau, 
McCormick, and Pinaud 2009; MacNamara and Green, January 24, 2008; Zafar 2007; Lee 2007). 
But concerning this point, other studies argue differently that these cheap imports won’t be that 
much of a problem for recipient markets, because the Chinese also bring jobs and investments 
to the local economy (African Economic Outlook 2011; Dobler 2008; Brautigam 2008b; Marfa-
ing 2010; M. Davies 2011). Moreover, Ian Taylor argues in his book about China’s new role in 
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Africa that the positive effects of cheap Chinese goods for the local African populations have 
often been overlooked (I. Taylor 2009, 161–85).  
A third negative consequence for the economic development of recipients is the question about 
debt sustainability. Many argue that the funding from emerging donors could lead to an unsus-
tainable rise in the debt of already highly indebted poor countries (Adugna et al. 2011, 34–35; 
Morazán et al. 2012; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power 2010; Brautigam 2009; Wallis and Dyer, 
January 24, 2008). Another concern is the potential detrimental exploitation of natural resources 
in recipient countries. The overall focus lies here on China’s undertakings in the African oil 
sector (Ampiah and Naidu 2008b, 8–10; Clapham 2008; Degnbol-Martinussen, Engberg-Peder-
sen, and Bille 2005; Dieterich, October 20, 2010; Downs 2007; Tull 2005, 2006; D. Curtis 2008). 
Henning Melber (2007, 8) claims for instance that “the new offensive pursued by China […] 
adds to the rivalry and conflicting interests” of other forces. Many argue, however, that further 
studies are needed to truly assess the impact of emerging donors on the natural resources of 
recipient countries (Soares de Oliveira 2008; I. Taylor 2009; Vines et al. 2009). A final concern 
regarding economic consequences is that of land grabbing, which some studies emphasis as a 
significant problem. Nevertheless, other studies argue that this issue is not prominent enough 
and has been exaggerated (Brautigam and Stensrud Ekman 2012; Brautigam 2015b).  
Finally, there is some anxiety around the specific kind of aid Southern providers deliver. One 
concern is that such dealings will lead to increased corruption in recipient countries: Ian Taylor 
argues for instance that there is a tendency for increased corruption in the oil sector when China 
is involved (I. Taylor 2009; Hackenesch and Sousa, March 31, 2010; I. Taylor 2007); others 
argue that China might increase the despotism of some African leaders through favouring those 
regions that the African leaders themselves prefer or originate from (Dreher et al. 2015; Ander-
son, November 19, 2014). Some commentators have argued for a solidification of hierarchies 
in the relationship between Southern donors and recipients because of the aid relationship 
(Mawdsley 2012, 268), and others suggest that the growth rates of emerging donors are them-
selves unsustainable which makes their aid unsustainable, too (Peterskovsky and Schüller 2010). 
Helmut Reisen (2013), however, argues that China’s economic rise is built on strong legs.  
The single criticism that is shared by almost all studies is that there is a lack of transparency 
when it comes to emerging donors’ aid projects which makes their aid and its consequences 
hard to assess (Adugna et al. 2011; African Economic Outlook 2011; P. Davies 2010; ONE 
2010, 21; The Reality of Aid Management Committee 2010; Walz and Ramachandran 2011; 
Corkin 2008; Ogunsanwo 2008). This in turn, the studies argue, would further increase the frag-
mentation of aid and undermine essential initiatives for improving aid effectiveness (Abdenur 
and Fonseca 2013, 1476; Adugna et al. 2011; Kragelund 2008).  
In recent years, this once rancorous debate has calmed down slightly and more and more studies 
argue that some of the concerns were exaggerated (Paulo and Reisen 2009b, 2010). Moreover, 
most state that the negative effects were often coupled with a general misunderstanding of how 
much (or in reality, how little) emerging donors spend on development projects (The Economist 
2016b, 2015; Green, January 27, 2008; Brautigam 2015b, November 03, 2015). Yet, the concerns 
were raised, published and informed many of the policies that this study investigates and there-
fore influenced the empirical field of this study considerably.  
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1.3.2 Same, same but different? Contrasts and parallels between “new” and “old” donors  
Alongside the focus on the positive and negative consequences of emerging donors for recipi-
ents, researchers have dedicated considerable attention and time to studying the differences 
between South-South cooperation and traditional aid relationships. This body of research is 
important for the following study because potential differences in aid giving could lead to one 
group adapting to the other (or distinguishing itself even more).  
There seems to be a consensus that emerging donors’ aid differs significantly from that of tra-
ditional donors. But assessments vary in their views of how important these differences really 
are and what elements are the most different between the two groups. We will begin with the 
authors that emphasise the fact that emerging donors promulgate a radically different aid system.  
Joshua Ramo (2004) famously spoke of a “Beijing Consensus”, a distinct Chinese model of 
economic development that presents an alternative to market-led economic growth. The Beijing 
Consensus, then, is a model not just for China itself, but one that could be applied to many 
other developing countries – much like its rival, the Washington Consensus. The idea of peace-
ful, high-quality growth that avoids privatization and free trade, Ramo argues (2004, 60), “offers 
hope for the world” should other countries adapt a similar attitude to development. While Ramo 
does not mention China’s foreign aid, many people have adapted his concept of a Beijing Con-
sensus – a consensus that is arguably also intensified and enhanced through Chinese aid. More-
over, authors often claim that other emerging donors also abide by the rules of this distinct 
Beijing Consensus. Emerging donors are then presented as a rival group that follow a different 
model to the one offered by Western donors led by American ideology. What characterises and 
unites providers in South-South cooperation? 
The Beijing Consensus arguably follows a different rationale which emphasises a different de-
velopmental model to traditional aid. Development can be achieved, following the Beijing Con-
sensus, through infrastructure and investments, non-interference and mutual benefit, whereby 
traditional aid – or the Washington Consensus – still puts the emphasis on the direct effective 
impact of development assistance, if it is coupled with neoliberal reforms (Brautigam 2011a, 
762; Klingebiel 2014, 20). South-South cooperation brings mutual growth to recipients and do-
nors, without the administrative burden of monitoring (Chaturvedi 2012b; Glennie, October 
28, 2011; Chandy and Homi Kharas 2011; Ying 2007).  
Another point distinguishing traditional donors from emerging donors is that the latter follow 
a more “holistic approach” and implement a “broader and deeper concept” of development, 
whereas Western donors pursue a rather narrowly defined approach to foreign aid (African 
Economic Outlook 2011, 111–12; The Reality of Aid Management Committee 2010, 2).9 More-
over, it is often argued that the relationship between emerging donors is more horizontal than 
the hierarchical relationship between a Western donor and its aid recipient (Cabral, Russo, and 
Weinstock 2014; Hook and Rumsey 2015; Humphrey 2011; Lundsgaarde 2011a; Rowlands Jan-
uary 2008; Paulo and Reisen 2009a, 2009b; Stuenkel 2010). Note however that some studies 
point towards a rising inequality and asymmetries in South-South cooperation “in a relationship 
that has so far been seen from both sides as one of equals” which could lead to rising tensions 
                                                 
9 This difference is also emphasised in Chinese official documents and opinions as interviews within the study of 
Yanbing Zhang, Jing Gu and Yunnan Chen (February 2015) illustrate.  
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(Hackenesch 2013, 26). Nevertheless, the opinion that emerging donors’ provisions are made 
on a more equal level are wider spread than these critical views. Moreover, the equal partnership 
often leads to the assumption that, overall, Southern contributions distinguish themselves from 
traditional aid flows through their emphasis on mutual benefit (Sangmeister and Schönstedt 
2010, 148; Fues, Chaturvedi, and Sidiropoulos 2012) and a more openly expressed self-interest 
in aid affairs (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013; Six 2009).  
The difference in the quality of the relationship is often explained by the differing origins of 
Southern and Northern aid patterns. While many Northern countries started out as former co-
lonial powers, the South can look back on a long history of solidarity between itself and devel-
oping nations, struggling together against the dominance of the powerful industrialised coun-
tries (Alden June 2013b; Alden and C. Alves 2008; Besharati 2013a). Thereby, emerging donors 
have their own experiences to share when it comes to standing up against industrial powers but 
also when it comes to fostering economic development (Robledo 2014; Saravia 2012).  
What makes the comparison between the two donor groups more challenging, and what also 
distinguishes their aid, is the language that they use to define their contributions. While tradi-
tional donors refer to the definition of Official Development Assistance as put forward by the 
OECD, emerging donors do not see why they should stick to this limiting concept and include 
tied aid, turn-key projects, fees, administrative expenses and sometimes loans that have a con-
cessional element of less than 25 percent (Brautigam 2011a, 754–56, 2010; M. Davies 2008; A. 
Johnson, Versailles, and Martin 2008; A. Johnson 2009; Brautigam 2010; Agrawal 2007).  
More concrete differences can be found when looking at the kind of aid emerging donors offer. 
A first difference that is often emphasised is the focus on different sectors. Emerging donors 
arguably focus more on infrastructural and economic projects while traditional donors concen-
trate principally on poverty reduction, health, education, and good governance enhancing pro-
jects; that is, traditional donors focus more on soft policies; emerging donors on hard policies 
(African Economic Outlook 2011, 15; Kragelund 2008; Foster et al. 2009; Pehnelt and Abel 
2007; Rampa and Bilal 2011). This also points to the fact that emerging donors’ aid tends to be 
less fragmented and less changeable than that of Western donors as it follows a broader concept 
of development (Woods 2011; Brautigam 2009, 11). This broader economic focus from emerg-
ing donors often does not distinguish clearly between aid and trade activities; a separation that 
is strictly observed by traditional donors (Wissenbach 2011a, 28–29). This is also linked to the 
fact that non-DAC aid is mostly tied to the provision of their goods while DAC aid at least aims 
to be untied (Kragelund 2008, 567–79; Brautigam 2011a; Cabral, Russo, and Weinstock 2014). 
Similarly, some studies show that in recent years, traditional aid has tended to focus on the 
neediest countries whereas emerging donors do not follow such tendencies but tend to invest 
in resource-rich recipients (Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013). The overall argument, then, 
is that emerging donors follow a more economically oriented development model, intended to 
maximise their own self-interest (Gieg 2010; Alden and A. Christina Alves 2009). Some authors 
however argue that this strong focus on economic benefit on the part of emerging donors might 
be an exaggeration. Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele (2011), for example, 
are more cautious when assessing the stronger focus of emerging donors on economic gain, 
though their figures do not include China or India.  
The distinction between traditional and emerging aid that is emphasised most in academic re-
search is the differing approach to conditionality. Most authors agree that emerging donors 
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follow a strictly non-interventionist approach which refrains from any kind of conditionality 
whereas traditional donors still tend to intervene in the recipient countries through their condi-
tional directives (Brautigam 2009, 135; F. Müller and Ziai 2015, 10–11; Sangmeister and 
Schönstedt 2010, 148; Sautman and Hairong 2007; Walshe Roussel 2013; F. Zimmermann and 
K. Smith 2011; Brautigam 2011a; Chandy and Homi Kharas 2011; Dyer, January 24, 2008; Fues, 
Chaturvedi, and Sidiropoulos 2012; Holsag and Xiaotong Zhang 2008; Roche, July 01, 2012; 
Rowlands 2012; A. Johnson, Versailles, and Martin 2008; Brautigam 2010; African Economic 
Outlook 2011; Power and Mohan 2011; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; Pehnelt and Abel 
2007). Non conditionality and non-interference, then, is often seen as part of the identity of 
Southern providers as Jörg Faust and Christian Wagner (2010) illustrate for the case of India. 
While there is a strong consensus that this is the major difference between the two donor 
groups, it is important to note that many studies also point to the fact that many of the condi-
tions requested by traditional donors are not followed through by themselves or by the recipi-
ents (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2011; Woods 2008). Moreover, Marcus Power and Giles 
Mohan (2011) argue that the non-interference rule from emerging donors might be more flexi-
ble than often thought. As such, research has shown that some conditions apply, for instance 
in Chinese aid when it comes to choosing the recipients. China only provides aid to countries 
following its own One-China principle, thereby negating any kind of representativeness to the 
government of Taiwan (Brautigam 2010; M. Huang and Ren 2012). Moreover, Sven Grimm et 
al. (2010) reveal in their case study on Rwanda that China might be applying strict economic 
conditions. What China – and other emerging donors – seem to refrain from fully is the appli-
cation of conditions regarding environmental or social as well as governmental standards upon 
their aid recipients (Brautigam 2010). As the following chapters argue, this difference – espe-
cially regarding political conditionality – will play a major role in the response of traditional 
donors.  
Other studies also find similarities between the different donor groups (Rowlands 2012; Sato et 
al. 2011). For instance, many argue that any kind of foreign aid always follows a self-interested 
rationale. Thereby, all donors seek commercial benefit and pursue strategic diplomatic goals 
when providing funds to third governments (Brautigam 2009, 15; Mawdsley 2012; Tan-Mullins, 
Mohan, and Power 2010; Soyeun Kim and Lightfoot 2011). The self-proclaimed rhetoric of 
South-South Cooperation insists on a shared identity for developing countries which embraces 
expertise in appropriate development, the rejection of hierarchical donor-recipient relations, and 
emphasises mutual opportunities (Mawdsley 2012, 264), but this often remains on a purely rhet-
oric level, much like the claims from traditional donors that they are sharing their wealth with 
less fortunate countries. Some therefore compare especially Chinese aid with that of former 
colonial powers, such as France, or with high interventionist powers such as the United States 
(Adebajo 2008; Granier 2011; Mawdsley 2012; Yates 2008). Similarly, Dreher, Nunnenkamp 
and Thiele (2011) argue that all donors – from both groups – do not seem to allocate their aid 
to the countries that might deserve it most on merit (less corrupt or very poor countries, for 
example). Similarly, Andreas Fuchs and Krishna Vadlamannati (2013) argue that India’s aid fo-
cuses as little on recipient’s need as that of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Norway. 
The real intentions behind foreign aid from both groups might lie in the preservation of the 
existing hierarchy (for DAC-donors) or on mounting a challenge to that order (for emerging 
donors) (Mawdsley 2012, 265; similar argument that Chinese aid follows the purpose of reduc-
ing Western dominance in the world, see Fues and Ye 2014). Moreover, both donor groups 
might suffer similar problems such as increasing fragmentation in their aid implementation 
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(Lundsgaarde 2013). The division between the two groups thus becomes then “increasingly 
blurred” (Walshe Roussel 2013, 814).  
While some therefore argue that a similar rationale behind aid applies to both established and 
emerging donors, others argue that many differences exist even within the individual groups, 
themselves. Some maintain, for instance, that China’s or India’s conception of aid is more dis-
tinct from that of the West than South Africa’s, which is much closer to the Western under-
standing of foreign assistance (F. Müller and Ziai 2015, 11; Besharati 2013b; Chidaushe 2010) 
and that, generally, common aspects should not be emphasised too much as there exists a strong 
heterogeneity within the group of emerging donors (Rowlands 2012; Sato et al. 2011). One has 
to note, however, that studies which argue that the group of emerging donors is too heteroge-
neous to make common statements about them often include a wide range of actors in their 
definition such as South Korea (Sato et al. 2011) or Russia (Rowlands 2012). 
In summary, this section has shown that many studies have investigated the differences between 
emerging and traditional donors and that most agree that the main difference lies in the appli-
cation of political conditions. What, then, has the academic literature had to say about the con-
sequences of emerging donors’ aid for traditional donors?  
1.3.3 What consequences for traditional donors?  
As the first two sections illustrated, many studies look at the effects of emerging donors on 
recipients and on the differences between their aid and that of traditionally established donors. 
It might be expected that there would also be an equally high academic interest in the conse-
quences of emerging donors on the aid policies of traditional donors. However, this field re-
mains highly understudied. The following section will show that most studies remain very vague 
and tentative on the topic of concrete consequences, though they often concede that it is highly 
likely that some consequences will arise.  
What has been said, albeit cautiously, about the implications of emerging donors for traditional 
donors can be divided into four types of arguments;  
First, some studies argue that the result of the arrival of new donors within the international aid 
game will lead to an increased competition for resources (Wallis and Burgis, June 14, 2010; Gu, 
Humphrey, and Messner 2008; Hackenesch and Ling, June 01, 2009). This could extend to a 
competition over the work force in recipient countries, or over access to valued natural re-
sources, for instance in African countries (Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010, 48–49; Alden and 
A. Christina Alves 2009; Blas and Green, January 24, 2008; Bracho 2015, 27–29; Burgis, June 
14, 2010a; Fues 2013; Kappel 2014; Homi J. Kharas and Rogerson 2012; Lätt 2010; Pehnelt 
2007; Rachman, April 24, 2010; Tierney et al. 2011; Volman 2009; Wu 2012; Habib 2008).10 
Hartmut Sangmeister and Alexa Schönstedt (2010) argue that this could even lead to an excess 
of aid in highly desirable recipient countries. The scenario of increased competitiveness is often 
linked to studies focussing on China’s policies in Africa. As such, Christine Hackenesch (2013, 
                                                 
10 Note that James Lebovic (2005) argues that it plays a decisive role for donors which other donors are present in 
potential recipients. His study only investigates the competition between traditional donors, but can surely be gen-
eralised to competitive forces from emerging donors as well.  
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30) concludes in a study on the relationship between the European Union and China in Africa 
that “China constitutes a considerable competitive pressure on the European aid regime”. Sim-
ilarly, Sanjukta Bhattacharya (2010) argues that the situation will lead to an increased competi-
tion between China and the United States over African oil, a phenomenon that as Christina 
Stolte and Dana La Fontaine (2012) argue could also apply to other emerging donors and other 
traditional forces.  
Altogether more positively, some studies state that emerging donors are largely “complemen-
tary” to Western aid efforts (Klingebiel 2014, 18) and that the existing modalities of aid can 
persist and will not be challenged by emerging donors (Thede 2013; for a study arguing that 
China will not challenge the EU's aid distribution, see Xinghui Zhang 2011). For instance, Pedro 
Morazán et al. (2012, 37) argue that “emerging donors are not necessarily in competition with 
[…] the DAC’s aid model”. Other studies emphasise that the real threat for the international 
aid architecture might come from non-integrated new European donors (Lundsgaarde 2011c).11 
This element of mutual congruence is often pointed to by studies which argue that the differ-
ences in aid distribution (especially in sectoral preferences) could prove beneficial for recipients. 
From this perspective, emerging donors only fill an existing gap and don’t challenge traditional 
donors (Marchal 2008).  
Next to the emphasis on the competitiveness (or, indeed, congruence) of emerging and tradi-
tional donors, other academics argue that there is indeed a need to integrate the former into 
existing international structures in order to avoid negative consequences, such as an increased 
competition over resources or the over-aiding of particular countries. Some studies indicate for 
instance that while a certain weariness exists on the part of Western government and especially 
from the United States, other traditional donors, such as the United Kingdom, work strongly 
for an integration of emerging donors into existing structures (Alden 2007, 107–8; Chaturvedi 
2012b). Nevertheless, many academics are sceptical about the likelihood of a successful integra-
tion into existing structures. Many argue that the international aid architecture – within the 
United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as the Development Assistance Com-
mittee from the OECD and the G20 – are all inadequately equipped to handle the integration 
of emerging donors even though integration is highly desirable in order to guarantee positive 
side effects (Homi Kharas 2011; Paulo and Reisen 2009b, 2010; Tull 2005; Walz and Rama-
chandran 2011, 22–23; Besharati 2013a; Martin 2010). It is feared that the aid of emerging do-
nors – existing outside of the DAC structure – will undermine OECD standards (Klingebiel 
2014, 91–93; Stähle 2008a; Klingebiel 2015). Some argue that the OECD could use two mech-
anisms at its disposal (peer review mechanisms and peer pressure) to include new Asian donors 
in its aid discussions (Paulo and Reisen 2009b). This dialogue between the DAC and emerging 
donors is seen as even more important since the financial crisis further reduced the weight of 
traditional powers (Paulo and Reisen 2010; for a similarly positive outlook on the future, see F. 
Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011; Hackenesch and H. Zhang 2013). The fact that South Korea 
(and to a certain extent Mexico, which obtained observer status) have already been successfully 
integrated into that structure is seen as a positive indicator for the projects’ feasibility (Chun, 
Munyi, and H. Lee 2010). Nonetheless, in more recent years, many have pointed to the extreme 
selectiveness of DAC membership and argued that a wider international forum is needed to 
                                                 
11 Note that this study was conducted before the accession to the DAC of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia in 2013.  
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include emerging donors more directly into the debates without making them conform to re-
strictive DAC standards. The United Nations Development Cooperation Forum, inaugurated 
in 2005, is often seen as the most comprehensive option (Mahn and Weinlich 2012; Hammad 
and B. Morton July 2009). Since its creation in 2011, the Global Partnership for Effective De-
velopment Cooperation is also often referred to as being able to bridge the differences between 
the two donor groups (Klingebiel 2015). Higher integration is desired as increased fragmenta-
tion between the two groups could lead to increased competition and thereby undermine mutual 
understanding. Moreover, this increased fragmentation of the aid community could further un-
dermine the effectiveness of development assistance altogether (Hackenesch and Janus 2014, 
2013; Kragelund 2008; Lundsgaarde 2011a; Betz 2015; Bürcky 2011; Janus, Klingebiel, and 
Paulo 2013; Lundsgaarde 2011b; Rosengren, de Roquefeuil, and Bilal 2013). For instance, Sven 
Grimm et al. argue that increased donor fragmentation in Rwanda undermines the aid efforts 
of all groups and has harmful consequences for recipients (Grimm et al. 2010). Overall, this 
point of view argues that an increased coordination and cooperation could lead to the full benefit 
of all parties involved as the donor groups learn from each other (A. Berger and Grimm 2010; 
Manning 2006; Men and Barton 2011b).  
The majority of studies, however, agree that “[a] single paradigm for international cooperation 
is unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future” (African Economic Outlook 2011, 113) and 
argue that the entry of emerging donors into the aid equation largely leads to a “paradigm shift” 
within the “dominant construction of foreign aid” diminishing the influence of traditional do-
nors (Mawdsley, Savage, and Sung-Mi Kim 2014, 27; Mawdsley 2015). Some argue modestly 
that while the overall amount of aid from emerging donors is not yet significant enough to 
“overshadow the dominance of traditional Western donors, […] the impact of its aid is dispro-
portionate to its size and is likely to grow” (Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012, 530). Others 
put it more bluntly and state, for instance, that China’s involvement in Africa could be seen as 
"another indicator of the West’s putative marginalization on the continent” (Alden, Large, and 
Soares de Oliveira 2008b, 23; similar argument, Halper 2010b; Aguilar and A. E. Goldstein 
2009) or argue that China is so present in many recent studies because it challenges the existing 
aid paradigm (Dent 2011a). Similarly, many conclude that the United States is clearly challenged 
by the aid activities of its rival China, particularly in its backyard South America (N. Phillips 
2010; Noesselt and Soliz Landivar 2013; Nolte 2013). This declining influence is further con-
firmed for the European Union as an influential donor (Grimm et al. 2008; Grimm 2008a, 
2008b; Hackenesch 2010; B. Berger 2006) or of Western donors and the G8 countries more 
generally (Brautigam 2009, 13; Stähle 2008a; N. Phillips 2010; Stolte and La Fontaine 2012; 
Kappel and Pohl 2013; Kappel and Schneidenbach 2006). Similarly, Stephan Klingebiel (2014, 
73; Klingebiel 2013a) argues that emerging donors “reduce the weight carried by the old OECD 
donor group appreciably” and others prophesy the “end of the DAC monopoly on aid” 
(Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010, 151) or the reduction of traditional donors into “netogiated 
existence” (Chin and Quadir 2012, 501) . The Economist writes that “in this world Europeans 
and Americans no longer dominate aid” and that the “rules of aid are being turned inside-out 
and long-standing donors must change, too” (The Economist 2011a). Similarly, Ngaire Woods 
(2008) talked already in 2008 about a “silent revolution” of emerging donors surreptitiously 
challenging the established development policies. She states that “[t]he world of development 
assistance is being shaken by the power shift occurring across the global economy. Emerging 
economies are quietly beginning to change the rules of the game” (Woods 2008, 1205). This 
“challenge to the international aid architecture” (Cabral and Weinstock 2010a, 1), this “Bedeu-
tungsverlust des traditionellen Geber-Nehmer-Verhältnisses” (Krempin 2014, 16) would then 
Introduction and literature review│17 
 
inevitably lead to an adaptation of traditional donors’ aid policies as emerging donors perceiva-
bly “redefine development theories and practices” (Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012, 529). 
The fourth branch of arguments summarises the stand of literature on this particular point.  
How, then, are the rules of the game altered? Some studies argue that traditional donors need 
to adapt their aid policies in a way that is more “attuned” with that of Southern providers 
(Kragelund 2010b, 24). The argument here is that, generally, traditional donors’ aid will become 
more and more like that of emerging donors (A. E. Goldstein et al. 2006; Walshe Roussel 2013). 
Others argue that emerging donors are undergoing a process of adapting their policies to West-
ern standards (Wissenbach 2012; Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender 2013; B. Berger and Wissen-
bach 2007) or simply, that both sides are simultaneously adapting their aid to the other’s model, 
as Christine Hackenesch argues in her study on China and the European Union (Hackenesch 
2009). Peter Baker (July 30, 2015) argues for instance that the West will attempt to increasingly 
sell its aid product as the better alternative to recipients, while others contend that it might 
increase the interest of traditional donors in neglected recipient areas (Tull 2008a) or that tradi-
tional donors will attempt a better coordination within their own group in order to remain com-
petitive with emerging donors (Carbone 2011b, 119). When it comes to concrete examples of 
this adaptation, most studies remain silent. 
One potential consequence that the literature has addressed is a shift in sectoral selection from 
traditional donors. The argument is that donors might think twice before choosing a particular 
sector that they support. The underlying question is whether traditional donors shift their focus 
again towards infrastructure or whether they focus their aid on soft sectors and leave the hard 
policies to emerging donors. These questions are highly interesting but are only raised occasion-
ally (Brautigam 2009, 134–35; Kragelund 2010b; Brautigam 2015a). However, the following two 
consequences that are envisioned by research seem to be more interesting to investigate.  
The reaction that is most predicted, and where some empirical evidence is available, investigates 
the likely increase within trilateral projects – projects between a Northern donor, a Southern 
provider and a recipient country. Most studies simply state that an increase thereof is likely as a 
result of emerging donors (African Economic Outlook 2011, 114; Langendorf 2012, 21; Ab-
denur and Fonseca 2013; Grimm and Fues 2007; Kragelund 2010b; Mawdsley 2010; Morazán 
et al. 2012; F. Müller and Ziai 2015, 10–13; Stähle 2008a; Task Team on South South Coopera-
tion 2010; Brautigam 2011a; Chaturvedi 2012b; Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013; Grimm 
et al. 2010; Hackenesch 2013; Six 2009; Ashoff 2010; Cotterrell and Harmer 2005; Homi J. 
Kharas and Rogerson 2012; Mehda and Nanda 2005; Li and Bonschab 2012; Rosengren, de 
Roquefeuil, and Bilal 2013; Sidiropoulos 2011; Wissenbach 2009; Costa Vaz and Aoki Inoue 
2007; Wischmeyer and KAS 2008). Some studies exist that look at specific trilateral cooperation 
projects, notably the book from Julia Langendorf et al. (2012). Trilateral cooperation is then 
often seen as a way for Northern donors to maintain a certain influence on recipients, but also 
on emerging donors (P. Davies 2007, 97–99, P. Davies 2010; Morazán et al. 2012; Stuenkel 
2010). Adriana Abdenur and João da Fonseca (2013, 1488) argue that trilateral cooperation is 
therefore thought to be embedded in the general struggle “over political, economic and security 
spaces”. Trilateral cooperation might also lead to “developing the full potentials of South-South 
Cooperation” (Morazán et al. 2012, 37). Trilateral projects could be more likely between tradi-
tional donors and emerging donors that share certain values, such as democracy. The Economist 
(2010a) argues that there is a disparity in the treatment of Brazilian development cooperation 
(largely favourable) and that of Chinese development cooperation (largely repellent). Similar 
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enthusiasts claim that trilateral cooperation might overall improve the transparency of aid pro-
jects for both groups and thereby increase aid effectiveness (Chandy and Homi Kharas 2011, 
748–50). While many state that this cooperation is desirable (L. Curtis and Cheng 2011; Farrell 
2012; Lancaster June 2007; Men and Barton 2011c), others point to potential problems within 
trilateral cooperation – for instance, Maurizio Carbone (2011a) points at problems between 
China and the European Union   because of a different understanding of the terms of triangular 
cooperation (for an analysis of the general problems emerging from trilateral projects, see Al-
tenburg and Weikert 2006, 2007). Moreover, Hackenesch (2013) notices that while on the rhe-
torical level of governments many talk about trilateral projects, very rarely are such projects 
implemented in practice.  
The second consequence involves possibly the most dramatic alteration in Western aid policy – 
the field of conditionality. As the previous section demonstrated, the field of (especially political) 
conditionality is considered to be the most striking distinction between emerging and traditional 
donors. The logical conclusion that is then often drawn by the literature is that this particular 
field will also be most profoundly affected when it comes to changes in traditional donors’ aid. 
Most studies limit themselves to stating that traditional donors, such as the World Bank and the 
IMF, fear that their conditionality might be undermined by emerging donors (H. Campbell 
2008). Similarly, Deborah Brautigam (2008a, 31) argues that emerging donors challenge the 
concept of conditionality and that implicitly the West seems to agree that the concept is out-
dated. Further studies state that, for now, aid levels of emerging donors might still be too low 
to truly change the concept of conditionality, but that this might be the case if funds further 
increase (Kragelund 2010b, 19–20; Brautigam 2015a, 2011b).  
Some very limited reactions have been studied empirically regarding conditionality: first, some 
have argued that the Chinese presence in Africa has compromised the ability of the European 
Union and of the United States to push for good governance projects in Africa (Huliaras and 
Magliveras 2008; Jakobson 2009; Hackenesch 2009; Humphrey and Messner 2006; Wallis, Jan-
uary 24, 2008; Wissenbach 2011a, 2011b, 2009; Wu 2012). Some general studies argue that 
through the emergence of new donors, the power of aid conditionality overall has been dimin-
ished (Carbonnier and Sumner 2012, 4; Ssenyange 2010; Lyman 2006). Most of these studies 
are however rather short policy directing papers or devote only a small number of pages to the 
question of the consequences and only tentatively point towards this possible result. No study 
has so far truly assessed the empirical consequences in the field of conditionality. Peter Baker, 
in an article of the New York Times, argued that the tone in Obama’s Africa visit in 2010 was 
less confrontational because of the Chinese presence there (Baker, July 30, 2015). Nevertheless, 
his empirical evidence is restricted to a few statements in Obama’s official speech. Uwe Wissen-
bach (2012, 171–74) looks at the reaction from the European Union and comes to the conclu-
sion that its attitude towards conditionality has softened (from imposing to rewarding condi-
tionality), coupled with an increased focus on ownership which is not dissimilar to the Chinese 
rhetoric. He argues that the EU attempts to engage with China in order to avoid direct compe-
tition. But again, the empirical analysis is rather limited when it comes to analysing the real 
consequences of emerging donors for traditional donor conditionality. 
In conclusion, then, while some studies address the question of the consequences for traditional 
donors in their research, most are content to simply state that emerging donors are a relevant 
challenge to the existing aid regime. Very few, however, actually attempt to offer detailed an-
swers to the question of what these consequences are, focusing instead on other aspects of their 
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empirical findings (see for instance, Mawdsley 2012; Hook and Rumsey 2015; Katti, Chahoud, 
and Kaushik 2009; Lundsgaarde 2011a; Rowlands 2012; Six 2009; Stuenkel 2010; Woods 2008; 
Hammad and B. Morton July 2009; Kragelund 2011; Carbonnier 2012; Bracho 2015; Homi J. 
Kharas and Rogerson 2012; Klingebiel 2014, 69; Ssenyange 2010; Sumner and Mallett 2012; 
Hackenesch 2009; Manning 2006; Men and Barton 2011a). Lauren Walshe Roussel, for instance, 
argues that it is most important to study the impact of emerging donors on the existing aid 
system but claims that the subject is still “poorly understood and the subject of much conten-
tion” (Walshe Roussel 2013, 802). Dane Rowlands (2012, 645) argues that if emerging donors 
don’t challenge traditional donors as a cohesive bloc, “their presence and collective weight still 
have important implications for the architecture of development assistance”, especially in terms 
of the aid effectiveness debate. Hackenesch (2013, 15) argues that there is no study on the real 
implications of differences in rhetoric of Chinese and European officials in the practice of aid 
delivery. Homi Kharas and Andrew Rogerson (2012) look at which donors will be most vulner-
able to challenges by new actors and come to the conclusion that those donors focusing on 
social welfare (UK) and on middle income countries (Norway, USA) are the most vulnerable. 
Anna Rosengreen, Quentin de Roquefeuil and Sanoussi Bilal (2013) look at the strategy within 
the UK, Germany, Portugal, France and Denmark to deal with emerging donors (trilateral pro-
jects), but only assess the reactions within each of these cases in up to three pages which do not 
offer great insight into the empirical reality, but rather read like policy counselling pamphlets. 
Fahimul Quadir (2013) looks at the question of whether rising donors establish a rival regime 
to traditional donors and talks about the potential emergence of a “new aid paradigm that fo-
cuses more on the strategic needs of the partner countries than on advancing the ideological 
interests of donor countries“ (Quadir 2013, 321). Unfortunately, just like the other studies, he 
never develops what this new paradigm looks like in practice except that it is not based on 
conditionality.  
The aim of this study is therefore clear: to shed some light on the empirical consequences caused 
by emerging donors upon the three selected countries and on their development assistance pol-
icies. It takes a closer look at those two areas identified by the literature as the main points of 
difference between emerging and traditional donors, and the areas that will see the greatest 
potential consequences - the fields of conditionality and trilateral cooperation. This study is 
therefore a much needed contribution to recent debates and gives some empirically driven an-
swers to questions that are often posed but equally often left unanswered.  
1.4 Structure of this thesis 
In order to answer the research questions, this study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 sets the 
theoretical frame. This study uses a discursive institutionalist prism to look at highly complex 
empirical findings. As such the theoretical chapter explains how the individual development 
policy of each of the three traditional donors is treated as an institution composed of narratives, 
rules and practices. Moreover, the role of ideas as a trigger to change is explained in detail in 
chapter 2. The chapter further develops hypotheses on whether and how institutional change 
occurs in the three development institutions as a reaction to the policies of emerging donors.  
Chapter 3 develops the methodological approach and clarifies the selection of the three tradi-
tional donors. Moreover, it illustrates what kind of material has been studied and how the ma-
terial has been analysed. Next to an extensive primary document analysis of each of the three 
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selected countries, expert interviews were conducted with representatives of the traditional do-
nor countries. This empirical data complements the primary documents together with an exten-
sive analysis of their aid statistics. The primary documents and the expert interviews were ana-
lysed through qualitative content analysis, while a descriptive approach and simple correlations 
were used for the quantitative material.  
Chapter 4 clarifies the empirical puzzle surrounding emerging donors and gives a short insight 
into their aid activities and motives while contrasting their activities to those of the chosen three 
traditional donors. This is a first empirical introduction into the field that enables the reader to 
contextualise the complex changes within the two fields of conditionality and trilateral later on 
in the empirical chapters. 
Chapter 5 to 7 analyse the reactions of the three traditional donors. Chapter 5 assesses the most 
important ideas defining the perception of emerging donors within the United States, Norway 
and the United Kingdom. This chapter follows the assumption that ideas are the key explanatory 
factor in triggering change in the development policy of each individual donor. Chapter 6 and 
7 are the main empirical chapters of this work. They focus on two fields that are most likely to 
be affected by emerging donors: the field of conditionality (chapter 6) and the field of trilateral 
cooperation (chapter 7).  
Chapter 8 concludes and gives an insight into the potential impact of emerging donors on for-
eign aid policies of individual countries and assesses both the common and differing aspects 
within the reactions of the three traditional donors. Moreover, the concluding chapter discusses 
the empirical and theoretical findings of this work and draws lessons for future studies. 
  
 
2 Theoretical reflections 
The previous chapter gave an introduction into the research puzzle, the framework of this thesis 
and elaborated on the research question of this work: how have traditional donors reacted to-
ward emerging donors? This chapter clarifies the theoretical background against which this 
question is posed in the three empirical chapters. The first section explains why, out of the 
multitude of theoretical approaches in international relations, a discursive institutionalist ap-
proach has been chosen for this study. The second section provides more detail on the defini-
tion of an institution and of its diverse components. This part contributes to the understanding 
of the structure of the empirical chapters and indicates how institutions can be studied up close. 
The remaining part of this chapter clarifies how institutional change can be tracked and how 
mechanisms for change can be identified. This part also elaborates on the importance of ideas 
as the main carriers for institutional change. The chapter concludes with the main hypotheses 
guiding this research which were tested in the three empirical chapters in order to answer 
whether institutional change has taken place within traditional donors’ policies in reaction to 
emerging donors? 
2.1 The usefulness of discursive institutionalism 
Throughout this thesis, I want to ask how emerging donors affect traditional donors’ policies. 
The study therefore looks at the effects on the development policies of several countries as a 
reaction to a group of emerging donors. In order to address this question, an institutionalist 
reasoning is applied with a focus on ideas as the drivers of change.  
The use of this framework suggests itself for the following reasons. Realist and other power-
related approaches frequently fail to explain most of the effects related to issues in foreign aid. 
Realist and neorealist theories paint too grim a picture for the potential of an extended cooper-
ation between different donors. Moreover, realist theories incline to look at individual states as 
identical black boxes, negating differences in national reactions and policies. While this ap-
proach is appealing for producing generalising hypotheses, many other facets of the reaction 
cannot be analysed through this framework. Power does indeed explain some of the engage-
ments in development assistance (and indeed in this study) but the field of development assis-
tance is not necessarily the most relevant one for realist theories, which focuses more effectively 
on security issues and other so-called high politics (for a similar argument, see Lancaster 2007, 
3).  
Some important theories of international relations agree that other factors might be more deci-
sive for explaining the relations between states and thereby depart from the black box thinking 
of realist approaches (see Schimmelfennig 2011). Indeed, many other theories give a more op-
timistic view for explaining relations between states and envision cooperative reasons next to 
power-related rationales. As such, transnational and liberal perspectives might be considered 
suited to this study. There are, however, for the purpose of this study severe limitations to both 
approaches. First, transnational perspectives extend the theoretical view toward the influence 
of transnational actors, such as transnational networks or, in the case of this study, develop-
mental NGOs. The main argument of transnationalism is that the state has to some extent lost 
its grip on international affairs at the expense of new non-state actors (Schimmelfennig 2011, 
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116–20). This reasoning is interesting when it comes to explaining certain aspects of develop-
ment cooperation such as the aid effort of international or local NGOs as well as the rise in 
private public partnerships. However, for the purpose of this study’s research question, the 
influence of transnational actors is minimal. States together with international institutions still 
largely dominate the field of development assistance (Nelson 2008, 321). Moreover, while the 
addition of a new layer of actors is surely an interesting insight into international relations, the 
transnational perspective lacks further concrete theoretical assumptions.  
Liberal perspectives seek to explain the interaction between the national and the international 
spheres. This perspective is better suited to this study, but it does not greatly help us to under-
stand domestic changes as a result of another group of international players (Nölke et al. 2015; 
Lancaster 2007). Moreover, while liberal perspectives explain the influence of national actors 
and procedures on international affairs, they give little insight into the opposite direction; the 
influence of other states on national policies (Moravcsik 1997).  
Critical theories, such as neogramscianist and world system theory approaches, shed some light 
on hegemonic power dimensions and the (im)possibility of change emerging from disadvan-
taged actors (Nölke 2010; Bieler and A. David Morton 2010). This perspective is insightful es-
pecially when analysing how successful emerging donors are in making their voices heard in 
international development institutions, but it is less helpful in analysing the reaction of privileged 
traditional donor policies to them.   
Finally, two metatheories remain: institutionalism and constructivism. This thesis aims at com-
bining both approaches. Constructivist analysts have challenged most of the paradigms in inter-
national relations theory, including the assumption that actors (largely states) operate purely 
according to their own self-interest (A. Wendt 2010, A. Wendt 1992). Their focus is on social 
values and norms that influence a constructed international system based on the perceptions of 
others. However, whereas norms and values play a crucial role in development aid and also in 
the cooperation between donors, self-interest still remains a non-negligible factor in the expla-
nation of donor engagement in developing countries (Hook 2008a, 86). It is therefore necessary 
to work within a framework that combines rational-choice factors with norm-driven motiva-
tions. Combining two metatheories builds upon the works on analytical eclecticism of Rudra Sil 
and Peter Katzenstein (2010).  
The following paragraphs make a case for the choice of combining institutionalism with con-
structivist elements in order to find satisfying answers for the research question of this study.  
First, institutionalism (and to a certain degree constructivism) allows for an identification of 
states as the prominent actors for explaining the research puzzle.12 Following those meta-theo-
ries implies that the rationale for actors’ behaviour is a mix between self-interest and norm-
driven behaviour -– a very convenient combination for explaining foreign aid rationales 
(Lumsdaine 1993; Hook and Rumsey 2015). Second, institutionalism holds that international 
cooperation might be in the interests of actors as absolute gains for both sides are possible. This 
                                                 
12 Note that the perspective of institutionalism often focuses on the influence of international organisations on 
states, but equally focuses on the creation of such organisations because of the desire of states to cooperate on 
certain issue areas (Dingwerth, Kerwer, and Nölke 2009).  
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prism is helpful as it does not negate the possibility for cooperation and adaption of one’s pol-
icies to trends emerging from international institutions or other individual countries (Ko-
remenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b). Third, the institutionalist prism assumes that states act in 
an environment of controlled anarchy where actors are entangled through interdependence. 
This interdependence gives an initial answer towards the agency-structure problem that is very 
prominent in explaining change (Keohane and Nye 2001). Finally, in order to explain change or 
inertia in foreign aid policies, it is crucial to study the influence of ideas on institutional settings, 
the biggest contribution of the constructivist prism to this study but also present in recent in-
stitutionalist works (Keohane 2002; A. Wendt 1992, A. Wendt 2010; W. Richard Scott 2008; for 
an overview of institutionalist analysis with an ideational frame, look at Münch 2016, 28–31).  
Conveniently, combining two metatheories is not to enter uncharted territory. Many scholars 
have attempted the combination of institutionalist and constructivist prisms (for instance, Zangl 
and Zürn 1996; Rosert 2012). From the point of view of this work, the most influential example 
is the body of thought that is framed under the terminology of discursive institutionalism, which 
makes a plea for the increasing impact of ideas and norms to explain policies. The terminology 
was framed by Vivien Schmidt recently (2008), but her work builds upon the research of many 
other institutionalists (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010b; Judith Goldstein 
and Keohane 1995a; J. L. Campbell 2004). Discursive institutionalism positions itself in between 
positivism and constructivism and assumes a rather dynamic behaviour of institutions (Schmidt 
2011, 63). How does discursive institutionalism help us in addressing the research question of 
this study? The following paragraphs make a case for the choice of this middle-range theory.  
To assess the influence of a group of states on another group of states in a particular area, 
discursive institutionalism allows us to conceptualise each individual national donor policy as 
an institution and to conceive of them as embedded in a bigger, but less concrete international 
institution, such as an international regime.13 This study only focuses on the reaction of three 
traditional donor countries. Generalisations towards the trend of the international institution of 
foreign aid can only be made tentatively in the conclusion as many more actors would need to 
be studied to come to concrete findings. Therefore, the first contribution of the theory is to 
allow us to conceptualise each individual donor policy as an institution.  
Defining an institution is a complex task. In an effort, to combine the diverse streams of insti-
tutionalism (historical, sociological and rational-choice), Vivien Lowndes and Mark Roberts de-
fine institutions as political entities that “constrain or shape actors’ behaviour” (Lowndes and 
Roberts 2013, 49). In their useful definition, this happens through three layers that are easily 
identified in the field: the layers of narratives, rules, and practices (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 
                                                 
13 Regimes are here understood in the original definition of Stephen Krasner as a “set of implicit and explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge“ (Krasner 
1982b, 186). Many others have conceived of traditional international foreign aid to be embedded in such an inter-
national regime with the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD as its “institutional home” (Hook and 
Rumsey 2015, 2; Hook 2008a; Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013; Lumsdaine 1993, 127–29). Nevertheless, 
regime theory has faced many criticisms, especially because of an epistemological lack of clarity (Ruggie 2006; 
Strange 1982). Moreover, most of regime analysis concentrates on regime creation rather than regime change. 
When addressing regime change, most authors argue that change is due to external factors, going in the same 
direction as punctured equilibrium rationale in other institutionalist thinking (Cohen 1982; Haas 1982; Little 2014; 
Jervis 1982). Note that the definition of an international regime is very close to the understanding of an interna-
tional institution from Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal (2001b, 762) with the distinction 
that the international institutions also “prescribe, proscribe and/or authorise behaviour.”  
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52–53). Moreover, discursive institutionalism looks at the inherent position of ideas within the 
institutional framework (Schmidt 2008). Section 3.2 further develops on the nature of these 
layers and what they mean within development assistance. This division allows for a more de-
tailed understanding of what is going on in national policies and what the decisive factors for 
inertia or change might be and constitutes the second big contribution of the theory towards 
my thesis. It also serves as a blueprint for looking at data in the three empirical chapters – where, 
in turn, the individual development policies of the three identified traditional donors were ana-
lysed through institutionalist lenses.  
The issue at stake is a complex one that does not allow for the discrimination between self-
interested rationales and norm-driven behaviour. Discursive institutionalism looks at the influ-
ences of ideas and norms without negating the role of self-interested patterns (Schmidt 2010).  
Fourth, discursive institutionalism gives us an indication of how free individual, national actors 
are in adapting their policies. Within the theoretical approach, actors come back into the set-up 
of institutions mainly through their ideas and the narrative that they produce in defending these 
ideas (Schmidt 2008; J. L. Campbell 2004). Other institutionalist thinkers conceptualise the di-
mension between rule-takers and rule-makers (Streeck and Thelen 2005) or in terms of power 
– following Vivien Lowndes and Mark Roberts, actors must have the capacity to act in their 
own right and be able to impose their will on other actors (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 79–81). 
The theoretical prism therefore allows us to identify which actors are powerful agents to adapt 
or constrain institutional change, an element that is further elaborated upon in the section on 
institutional change (3.3).  
The most important function that the theoretical framework must fulfil is to conceptualise the 
change that is taking place within traditional donor policies as a result of the aid policies of 
emerging donors. Ideas are necessary to arrive at satisfying hypotheses of how institutional 
change can be identified and how likely it is to happen. Ideas are conceptualised through dis-
cursive institutionalist lenses as the main driver of, or barrier to, change (Schmidt 2011). The 
long history of institutionalism in dealing with change and inertia further provides useful tools 
to make that change more graphic and tangible (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 
2010b). Similar to the issue of agency and structure, this is further discussed in section 3.3 on 
institutional change.  
But first, a closer look at the theoretical understanding of the institutional set-up and its com-
ponents is necessary, as these serve as the analytical categories for studying institutional change.  
2.2 How to study an institution and its components 
In order to analyse the reaction of traditional donors’ policies to the emergence of new players 
in the field, each donor policy is conceptualised as an institution composed of three layers: rules, 
narratives and practices (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). Before understanding in full the benefits 
of this conceptualisation, let us first turn to a more general definition of institutions.  
The definition of an institution is a core problem of the theoretical prism of institutionalism. As 
Guy Peters (2005, 160) points out, there are three main distinctive approaches on how to define 
an institution, each of which is linked to a particular school of institutionalism. First, normative 
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or sociological institutionalism sees an institution not necessarily as a formal structure but un-
derstands institutions as an “enduring collection of rules and organised practices, embedded in 
structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of indi-
viduals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of […] changing 
circumstances” (March and Olsen 2008a, 3; Peters 2005, 29). More precisely, institutions are 
defined as “constitutive rules and practices prescribing appropriate behaviour” (March and Ol-
sen 2008a, 3). Importantly, for normative institutionalists, institutions prescribe appropriate be-
haviour rather than consequential behaviour (March and Olsen 2008b; Peters 2005, 30).  
The second approach towards institutionalism, historical institutionalism, differs slightly in de-
fining its principle subject. The definition here seems more vague than in other approaches, 
often combining elements from March and Olsen with others used in rational choice ap-
proaches (Peters 2005, 74). Generally, the understanding of an institution is largely constructivist 
in the perspective of historical institutionalism, as the interests of actors are seen to be shaped 
by norms (W. Richard Scott 2008, 32)14. In an international perspective, it is emphasised that 
institutions themselves also shape the preferences of actors and power relations (Keohane 1989, 
382).  
A third perspective on the definition of institutions comes from the rational choice approach. 
The focus here lies on the formal rules of an institution, which in turn constrain the possible 
range of actions from actors involved in a given institution (Peters 2005, 160; W. Richard Scott 
2008, 32–34).  In an international perspective, institutions exist only when they are in the (ra-
tional) interests of the relevant actors and if there is some kind of incentive (such as lower 
transaction costs) for their creation (W. Richard Scott 2008, 34; Hasenclever, Mayer, and 
Rittberger 2004).  
Finally, many have stressed in recent years that focussing on the differences of these approaches 
makes little sense and that there are more common aspects than diverging ones (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010b; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Lowndes and Roberts 2013; P. A. Hall 2010). In their 
book, Lowndes and Roberts (2013) attempt to bridge the apparent gap between the diverse 
institutionalisms calling for a “third phase” institutionalism. Similarly, Vivien Schmidt (2008, 
2011) and John Campbell  (2004) attempt to merge diverse institutionalist approaches and add 
the layer of ideas to the study that is already inherent in most approaches, appending the title 
“discursive institutionalism” to this “newer new institutionalism” (Schmidt 2011, 47; Rayner 
2015). As Brainard Peters (2005, 164) points out, “the fundamental issue holding these various 
approaches […] together is simply that they consider institutions the central component of po-
litical life.” What is therefore necessary is to find a large encompassing definition of institutions 
that can be easily adapted to the empirical case of development policy. Particularly easy to apply 
are definitions that identify several distinct features of the institution in question.15 Richard Scott 
(2008, 48) defines institutions as being “comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cogni-
tive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and mean-
ing to social life.” The main three pillars of institutions that he defines are therefore regulative 
                                                 
14 For a similar pledge to focus more research on norms, see Rosert (2012).  
15 Such definitions are very common among institutionalists. For scholars of international relations, the definition 
of an international regime will spring to mind, with the hierarchical separation into principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures. Note, however, that the distinction between these is often blurred (Levy, Young, and 
Zürn 1995, 273; Krasner 1982b; H. Müller 1993).  
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(through regulative rules), normative (through expectations) and cultural-cognitive (shared un-
derstanding and common beliefs) (W. Richard Scott 2008, 51). Moreover, Scott adds the layer 
of “associated activities and resources.” Others simply make a distinction between informal and 
formal institutions (Orren and Skowronek 1994).  
Similar to this slightly complex definition is another provided by Lowndes and Roberts. They 
define an institution as “shaping the opportunities that all of us have as citizens to make our 
voices heard, to participate in decision-making, and to access public services” (Lowndes and 
Roberts 2013, 4). Moreover, they state that “political behaviour and political outcomes are best 
understood by studying the rules and practices that characterise institutions” (Lowndes and 
Roberts 2013, 7). Similar to the definition of Scott, they combine the defining elements of most 
institutionalist approaches as they refer to rules (satisfying rational-choice based approaches), 
but also look at practices, as well as at narratives, which are discussed later (satisfying historical, 
normative and new discursive forms of institutionalism).16 This division into several easily dis-
tinguished layers makes it easier to study institutions – to visualise their tangible shape and 
change as like “watching a movie” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 134). Development assistance, 
as any other policy field of a government, can be easily conceptualised in this way. As these 
different layers of an institution shaped the empirical focus, the next paragraphs concentrate in 
more detail on what the individual layers mean:  
The first layer consists of rules. Rules are “formally constructed and written down” for instance 
as “clauses in a constitution, terms of references for an assembly, national and international 
laws” and so forth (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 53). This is the same layer as Scott’s regulative 
pillar of institutions and would be the main layer of focus for rational-choice institutionalists 
(W. Richard Scott 2008, 52–54). In the field of development policies, these can be found in 
national laws, official governmental directives, code of conduct of aid agencies and so forth. 
Rules are constantly interpreted by actors and do not need to be adhered to in order to exist 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 54). For the case of foreign aid, this can also contain international 
rules, such as the OECD rule that all traditional donor countries have agreed to give at least 0.7 
percent of their GDP as foreign aid. Without studying the legal frame of each country’s foreign 
aid, it is hard to understand how that policy can or cannot change because of the influence of 
external actors.  
The second layer – narratives – is closely connected to rules. Narratives are “semi-formal and 
spoken” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 63); they can be found in “speeches, mission statements, 
logos, design or style” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 63). The layer of narrative is reminiscent of 
normative or sociological institutionalism, but it is obviously a very important layer for discur-
sive institutionalism as well (March and Olsen 2008b; Schmidt 2008, 2011). Narratives often 
serve to justify the existence of rules. Within development policy, these can be found mainly in 
the speeches of officials related to development assistance. For instance, when the head of state 
makes a comment about how aid should be given or not and which countries should be re-
warded, this is part of the narrative of the institution of development assistance of that country. 
                                                 
16 Note that Lowndes and Roberts decisively exclude the studying of political ideas in their institutionalist approach. 
Nevertheless, it becomes obvious that one cannot ignore ideas when studying practices, but particularly narratives 
of institutions (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 10).  
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Ideas are highly influential on the layer of narratives but was differentiated whenever possible 
in order to maintain theoretical clarity.  
The final layer is that of practices which are “demonstrated through conduct” and consists of 
what actors actually do (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 57). Taken together with the layer of nar-
ratives, this is what Scott meant when he included associated resources and activities in his 
definition (W. Richard Scott 2008, 51).17 In the field of development policy, this is the flow of 
money, the relationships between donors and recipients, the sanctioning of certain behaviours 
and so on. Many other authors refer to the layer of practices as being decisive to understanding 
the institutional set-up (March and Olsen 2008a, 4; Mahoney and Thelen 2010b).  
The following figure summarises the layers of the institution of development assistance. The 
first box indicates the theoretical definition of the layer, the second box below gives some ex-
amples from the field of development assistance.   
 
                                                                                                                 Source: Own compilation based on Lowndes and Roberts (2013). 
The division into layers helps us to conceptualise empirical data when studying the individual 
donor policies and their reaction towards emerging donors.18 Moreover, the different layers fa-
cilitate the study of potential changes within these institutions as some attempts for change 
might stay within softer parts of the institution, such as narratives. Before conceptualising insti-
tutional change, the following section addresses the question of the inherent or external position 
of ideas to the institutional set-up.  
                                                 
17 Note that the two other pillars of Scott’s definition – cultural-cognitive and normative are also both closely linked 
to ideas, but ideas that shape the understanding of the institution in the background of actors’ consciousness. While 
it is more difficult to lay bare these pillars, they become transparent through the study of the three layers of rules, 
narrative and practices.  
18 Note that when studying several national institutions that all show similar patterns in their rules, narratives and 
practices, one might be able to make assumptions upon an international reaction towards emerging donors. As 
only three donors are studied here, these assumptions can only be tentative though.  
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2.2.1 The role of ideas within the institution  
Within discursive institutionalism, ideas play a constitutive role for the initial institution and 
especially for explaining change. Nevertheless, all other institutionalist prisms have developed a 
certain susceptibility to the explanatory power of ideas. Even rational choice institutionalists – 
where, one could argue, the main variable of the studied object is interests – have started refer-
ring to the significance of ideas to explain world politics (Keohane 2002, 5). Judith Goldstein 
and Robert Keohane (1995b), for instance, distinguish between three different type of ideas 
which in turn influences actors’ interests: worldviews (such as religion), principled beliefs (such 
as human rights doctrines) and causal beliefs (for instance monetarist theories of macroeco-
nomics). In their work, these ideas shape policies in three different casual pathways: as 
roadmaps, as focal points and as embedded elements of the institution itself (Judith Goldstein 
and Keohane 1995b; Gofas and Hay 2012, 23–27). This last division is instructive, as it links 
ideas to institutional change as external pressures (as roadmaps or focal points), but allows for 
incremental change as well (as ideas can also be embedded in the institution).  
Ideas have been quite prominent to the theoretical prism of historical institutionalism since its 
initial beginning (Schmidt 2011, 53). The importance of ideas is especially prominent when it 
comes to explaining institutional change (P. A. Hall 2010). Within normative (or sociological) 
institutionalism, there was no prober turn towards ideas as they were always considered im-
portant in shaping the institutional outcome. Nevertheless, Vivien Schmidt divides them into 
analysts who merely consider the importance of ideas in shaping actors’ interests and those who 
consider the importance of the context in which ideas are communicated (Schmidt 2011, 54).  
All of the above are mostly concerned to define the relationship between ideas and interests. 
While rational-choice analysts go only as far as stating that interests are influenced by ideas, 
discursive institutionalists talk about the construction of interests through ideas, thereby equat-
ing the two concepts (Schmidt 2008, 317; Béland and Cox 2011, 10). This constructivist per-
spective, whereby interests are the reflection of ideas, is perceptible in many other studies (Hay 
2011; Guzzini and Leander 2006; A. Wendt 2010). 
It is important to clarify where – within the theoretical division into three layers of the institution 
– ideas come to play a role. It is not hard to find numerous typologies of ideas. Most divide 
ideas into two axes, one of which focuses on the level of consciousness where the actor is 
influenced by the idea: John Campbell, for instance, divides ideas into those that lie on the 
background or on the foreground of the mind of the actor. For Campbell, ideas that lie on the 
background are deeply enrooted within the institution and therefore rarely contested whereas 
ideas that lie on the foreground are on the edge of institutional life and are highly contested as 
they are publicly debated (J. L. Campbell 2004, 93–100). Similarly, in an attempt to find answers 
which fit with all institutionalist approaches, Jal Mehta distinguishes between three kinds of 
ideas, developing from the most visible kind of ideas to the least visible and most hidden: first, 
the narrowest conception as policy solutions, second as problem definitions and finally as public 
philosophies (Mehta 2011, 27).19 Public philosophies in Metha’s understanding are very close to 
                                                 
19 Particularly interesting for this study are ideas as problem definitions as they address the question of “how po-
litical problems get defined” (Mehta 2011, 33).  
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Campbell’s background ideas. Vivien Schmidt comes up with a similar division into “back-
ground ideational” and “foreground discursive abilities” (Schmidt 2011).20  
Before combining these types of ideas with the institutional set-up discussed earlier, another 
layer of complexity is added to the theoretical framework. Campbell discusses another axis to 
distinguish ideas – in his conception of ideas, they can either be cognitive and thereby outcome-
oriented and focused on cause-and-effect thinking or normative ideas that contain values, atti-
tudes and identities (J. L. Campbell 2004, 93). Campbell thus ends up with four types of ideas 
that are briefly described here: the first two, paradigms and public sentiment, lie in the background 
of the consciousness of actors. Paradigms are cognitive whereas public sentiment is normative in 
nature. Both constrain change as they are not openly discussed. The other two, programmes and 
frames lie in the foreground of actors’ consciousness and are publicly debated. Programmes are 
cognitive ideas whereas frames are normative. As both are publicly discussed, they facilitate 
change (J. L. Campbell 2004, 94–100). How do these types of ideas relate to previously explained 
institutional set-up of rules, narratives and practices? Consider figure 2.2 that now includes the 
position of ideas into the institutional set-up composed of rules, narratives and practices. The 
first distinction needs to be made between what is discussed at the foreground and what is 
handled in the background. While all layers have elements of both – some aspects of them being 
discussed openly, it seems natural that the layer of narratives (that is semi-formal and spoken) 
relates best to ideas being discussed at the forefront. Both types of ideas – normative and cog-
nitive – are to be found here. The layer of practices is the one that is least discussed openly and 
where the most influential ideas are the ones lying on the background.21 With rules, the division 
is more complex: while some of the rules are openly discussed before they become rules of the 
institution, they are soon influenced by and influence ideas that lie on the background. Thereby 
a slightly different set-up presents itself to us for understanding the layers of the institution, 
                                                 
20 Note that the background ideational abilities relate to the Metha’s concept of public philosophies and to Camp-
bell’s background ideas mentioned above, whereas both, policy solutions and problem definitions are negotiated 
on the level of foreground discursive abilities.  
21 Some selected aid practices are openly discussed in the media and also in academic literature, nevertheless, this 
is rarely done by the actors themselves that are the only focus of this study. The layer of practices often refers to 
selected ideas in order to justify them but rarely the whole layer of practices is discussed in public.  
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indicating the ideas most represented in each layer – evolving from the ideas lying most on the 
foreground (narratives) to the ones lying most on the background (practices).  
                                                        Source: compiled by author on the basis of Lowndes and Roberts (2013) and Campbell (2004).22 
It is interesting to note that not all ideas about development policies find expression within the 
institutional set-up of development policy.23 Especially within the narrative, new innovative 
ideas help to shape the institutional set-up. New ideas are less influential when it comes to the 
layer of rules and least influential when it comes to practices. Moreover, it is obviously easier to 
track ideas that lie on the foreground and are publicly discussed than ideas that lie in the back-
ground in the sub-consciousness of actors involved in the institution. One example for a nor-
mative background idea (a public sentiment in Campbell’s terminology) is the feeling shared by 
traditional donors that it is their moral obligation to share some of their wealth with poorer, less 
fortunate countries. Similar to this is the (cognitive background) idea that foreign aid should 
also satisfy the interests of the donor country. Both background ideas shape the institution of 
development assistance significantly, especially in practice (Hook 2008b, 154–56).  
One main aspect of the theoretical setting has been clarified so far: how this work conceptualises 
an institution and what role ideas play within that institutional set-up. So far, the theoretical 
reflections make it possible to describe the national development policies as institutions and to 
identify the relevant ideas that shape these institutions. However, this does not help us to explain 
                                                 
22 Vivien Schmidt’s foreground discursive abilities are located within the narratives whereas her background idea-
tional abilities are located within the rules and practices (Schmidt 2010). 
23 Many authors emphasise the role of ideas or ideologies for the giving of foreign aid (Hook 2008b).  
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Figure 2-2: The role of ideas in the institutional set-up 
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how change occurs in these development institutions in response to emerging donors. The fol-
lowing section therefore develops a theoretical framework of how to identify institutional 
change and how to make sense of it. 
2.3 Explaining institutional change 
Historically, institutional change has been understudied in all institutionalist approaches (Peters 
2005, 161–62; Barnett and Coleman). Institutionalist analysis goes beyond the prominent argu-
ment in power-related theories that change is simply a result of changing power structures (Levy, 
Young, and Zürn 1995, 318; Peters 2005, 151), which makes the study of change within the 
institutional framework more interesting but also more challenging. Lowndes and Roberts 
(2013, 112–16) claim that the first phase of institutionalism (until the 1950s) focused on the 
stability of institutions. The second phase (from the 1980s on) saw the division of the theory 
into diverse schools of sociological, historical and rational choice institutionalism. Each school 
of thought conceived change in different terms, but always either through path dependency 
approaches or through the analysis of a punctuated equilibrium (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 
112–16)24. Following Lowndes and Roberts (2013, 202), second phase institutionalism thereby 
followed a concept of institutional change in “stop and go” terms.  
However, a recent development has stipulated specific categories for explaining the exogenous 
and endogenous dimensions that are necessary for a satisfying analysis of change (for a similar 
argument about a new phase in the study of institutional change, see J. L. Campbell 2004; Helfer 
2006; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010a; Schmidt 2008, 2010, 2011).  This 
third phase institutionalism tries to overcome the division into different schools of thought and 
makes an attempt at harmonisation. The claim for harmonisation is that all three schools of 
thought face similar problems when it comes to studying institutional change (J. L. Campbell 
2004). Empirical studies combining diverse institutional approaches exist. For instance, Helfer’s 
(2006) study on change and innovation within the International Labour Organisation directly 
combines the approaches of historical and organisational institutionalism. Helfer combines both 
approaches because he claims that they both share the common assumption that “political ac-
tion is shaped and constrained by historically constructed institutions that exhibit surprising 
durability notwithstanding changes in their economic and political environment or shifts in the 
preferences of actors” (Helfer 2006: 649). Similarly, in their article on endogenous institutional 
change, Greif and Laitin (2004) combine game theory approaches (and hence rational-choice 
approaches) with theoretical insights from historical institutionalism. They apply their theoreti-
cal setting to the case studies of formal governing institutions in early modern Europe and to 
the informal institution of cleavage structure in the contemporary world. These empirical cases 
show that combinations of the different schools of thought have been successfully attempted 
for years. But what does this third phase institutionalism imply for studying institutional change?  
                                                 
24 The study of Koremenos, Lispon and Snidal (2001a, 1078) for instance argues that the equilibrium analysis can 
give an indication of how likely change is to occur as “change can be understood as shortcomings of existing 
equilibria.” Similarly, Krasner (1982a) argues that regimes are most likely to change through external shocks but 
admits that regimes might be able to become interactive variables, altering causal variables and thereby influencing 
change more directly.  
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The next section gives an overview of the existing literature of this third phase of the theory of 
institutional change and the common problems that all institutional approaches face. Campbell 
(2004, 2–10) asserts that all institutional theoretical approaches face three major problems when 
it comes to studying institutional change: the problems of defining change, defining the mech-
anisms that are responsible for understanding institutional change and finally, the role ideas and 
actors play in the process of institutional change. While the next section largely deals with insti-
tutional change in a larger institutional setting, I draw conclusions from the institutional set-up 
composed of the three layers (narratives, rules, practices) at the end of each section in order to 
arrive at a conclusion on what categories are crucial for this research in order to understand 
change within development aid policies of each individual donor. The section also addresses the 
problems with studying institutional change for this research setting and indicates solutions that 
are used to overcome these issues.  
2.3.1 How can one identify change?  
Campbell argues that one has to define the dimensions of the institution in question in order to 
identify two main aspects: first, whether change has taken place at all, and second, whether the 
observation is indicative of evolutionary or revolutionary change. This alters, in turn, the way 
an institution and its change mechanisms are conceptualised (J. L. Campbell 2004, 35–41). The 
previous section (3.2) has defined the institution as being composed of three layers; narratives, 
rules and practices (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 246–76). Moreover, it has clarified how ideas 
play a constitutive role in the institutional set-up. Lowndes and Roberts state that the institution 
is always a work in progress and the layers don’t necessarily have to be congruent, but change 
in one layer might trigger change in the other layers (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 69–75). They 
divide analysists of institutional change into two axes, depending on the role of agency attributed 
by the analysists and whether change is considered to be largely incremental or punctuated 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 116).   
This analysis lends itself to a study of incremental rather than punctuated change. Punctuated 
change could be identified if all three layers of the institution change at once in a short period 
of time. Incremental change would be visible if one or two layers of the institution change. 
Moreover, through the prominent role of ideas, agents come back into the focus. At the centre 
of the analysis stands the change on the three layers within the institution, but without neglecting 
the role of the environment and of actors.  
The second aspect that Campbell urges us to clarify concerning the definition of change is the 
time frame that one seeks to study (J. L. Campbell 2004, 41-17). This might be more difficult 
than it first appears as all social processes follow a different rhythm that is hard to assess for an 
outsider. Campbell offers several options for identifying a time frame: first, the use of a partic-
ular theoretical orientation to limit the time frame. A rational choice framework would for in-
stance focus on decision makers and therefore use a shorter time frame than a study focusing 
on long term change. Another solution is a pragmatic methodological consideration where the 
researcher limits the time frame to the availability of empirical data. A third option is to focus 
on critical events that are crucial for explaining change. However, Streek and Thelen argue that 
critical events are not always indicative of the real, slower change process underway (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005, 19).  
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When it comes to the definition of the time frame that is studied, empirical data indicates that 
a shift of the perceived importance of emerging donors has taken place roughly since the year 
2004 (see literature review in Chapter 1). This work studies the period from 2004 until the end 
of 2014, focusing on several crucial moments within the evolution of development policies. 
These are marked by the Paris Declaration of 2005, as well as the follow-up processes (Accra 
2008, Busan 2011). Moreover, the emergence of the Development Cooperation Forum within 
the framework of the United Nations in 2005 and its biennial meetings are characterised as 
critical moments as they embody a different and more inclusive approach to the debate in in-
ternational development assistance.25 This rationale combines certain of the possibilities that 
Campbell mentions on how to identify a time frame. It refutes the argumentation of Streek and 
Thelen (2005) that change often needs longer periods of time. This is due to the topicality of 
the subject and due to the perceivably sudden emergence of new heavyweights in foreign aid. 
Changes within the traditional donors’ policies towards emerging donors can logically only ap-
pear after the impact of emerging donors had been registered in the international arena. This is 
only possible once those emerging donors had enough money to spend on foreign aid to have 
an impact on the international institutions.  
This focus on the layers of the institution and a rather limited time frame provides an overview 
of what kind of change occurred (revolutionary or incremental) and whether change occurred 
at all.  
2.3.2 The problem of mechanisms: how does change occur?  
When we can identify that change has occurred, we are still no wiser as to how and why that 
change took place. Campbell refers to this common issue as the problem of mechanisms. Two 
concepts are well known for this problem: the processes of path dependency and of diffusion 
(for path dependency, look for instance at Pierson 2000; regarding diffusion look for instance 
at Strang and Meyer 1993; or Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007).26 Both approaches face 
problems, however. Path dependency starts from the assumption that the historical and social 
context of an institution matter and enable or prevent potential change. In a path dependent 
setting, change therefore always comes from inside and is very infrequent. Change emerging 
from a new set of ideas cannot be explained through path dependent approaches. Diffusion on 
the other hand makes the assumption that institutional principles or practises are adapted or 
spread to other institutions with little or no modification (J. L. Campbell 2004, 77–79). Hence, 
in a process of diffusion, change is rather abrupt and requires external involvement to trigger 
change. In this study’s setting, this would imply that traditional donors start simply mimicking 
the behaviours of emerging donors. This is, at best, highly unlikely.  
To illustrate the processes of institutional change, a different explanation is needed, one which 
can deliver satisfying answers to the questions of how and why change occurs in an incremental 
way and allows for external and internal factors to trigger change. Several authors have recently 
                                                 
25 The chapter on methodology further elaborates on the selection of the time frame. 
26 Other models for explaining change exist. For instance, Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein argue that within inter-
national organisations, change happens through norms that undergo a cycle: norm contestation triggered by policy 
failure or external shocks which leads to norm emergence which then is institutionalised and eventually leads to 
norm stabilisation, externalisation and objectification (Park and Vetterlein 2010, 240).  
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ventured into finding new models to explain change. Most prominently, Kathleen Thelen has 
worked with other historical institutionalists on mechanisms of change (see Streeck and Thelen 
2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010a; Thelen 2004)27. Streek and Thelen’s analysis of institutional 
change in advanced political economies has gathered a total of five types that categorise gradual 
but transforming change in institutions. These five mechanisms have been further refined in the 
recent publication of Mahoney and Thelen (2010b). They introduce a theory of institutional 
change that explains change processes through the interaction between features of the political 
contexts and the properties of the institution itself (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 31): In order 
to do this, they first differentiate between institutions with a low level of discretion in interpre-
tation and/or enforcement and institutions with a high level of discretion. That means that some 
institutions make the reinterpretation of their content difficult (low level of discretion) whereas 
the reinterpretation is easier in others. Change in institutions where contending interpretations 
meet little resistance does not require the introduction of new rules to trigger change whereas 
an institution that does not allow for a new interpretation of existing rules, needs to introduce 
new rules to the institution in order to trigger change. This division is combined with the char-
acteristics of the political context. Here, Mahoney and Thelen (2010a, 18–22) ask if the political 
context provides contestants with weak or strong veto opportunities.28 The veto possibilities are 
high when actors have access to means of blocking institutional change. Change is easier if the 
opposition towards change is weak.  
This is a very useful distinction for identifying how change affects the institution depending on 
its features. Nevertheless, it is not easy to position the phenomenon of development aid on 
these axes. Generally, the field of foreign aid is one where the reinterpretation of the institution 
is rather difficult (as with any foreign policy). Therefore, foreign aid is considered to be an 
institution positioned on the left-hand side of figure 2.3 below. Moreover, the notion of path 
dependency comes back into play: it argues that change is significantly more difficult in parts of 
the institution (rules, narratives and practices) that have existed for a long period of time whereas 
it is easier when it comes to newer policies. Regarding the veto players, the history of the policy 
at stake regarding change is crucial to explaining whether high or low veto opportunities exist. 
It is argued that within well-established rules, narratives and practices – such as conditionality – 
there is a strong opposition and mobilisation against change whereas there is less opposition 
and mobilisation in relatively new fields – such as trilateral cooperation. Therefore, the next 
section describes the two mechanisms that deal with the context of an institution where the 
reinterpretation of rules is generally difficult (left-hand side of the figure) – layering and displace-
ment. The other two mechanisms are only briefly touched upon as they are not relevant for the 
empirical chapters. For better illustration, the following table sums up the mechanisms again. 
  
                                                 
27 Kathleen Thelen developed the mechanisms in her book from 2004. However, the mechanisms in that analysis 
are still rather unspecified as Gary Herrigel (2006) points out in his review.  
28 In his review of the book Jeroen van der Heijden (2010) argues that adding the layer of the institutional context 
is the main contribution of Mahoney and Thelen’s new book as it clarifies the conditions for institutional change.  
Theoretical reflections│35 
 


















Characteristics of the institution 
 
Reinterpretation of institution dif-
ficult → new rules introduced 
Reinterpretation of insti-





New rules introduced, old rules 
remain 
Likely to be found within older 
well-established rules, narratives 
and practices 
Example: Conditionality 
Mechanism: Drift  
=> Exhaustion 





Existing rules are replaced by new 
ones 
Likely to be found within newer 
less well-established rules, narra-
tives and practices 
Example: Trilateral cooperation 
Mechanism: Conversion 
Rules remain intact, but 
their meaning and inter-
pretation changes.  
 
Table adapted from Mahoney and Thelen (2010a, 28) and Streeck und Thelen (2005). 
First, the relevant two mechanisms that might occur in institutions such as development assis-
tance are explained on the left side of the figure – where the reinterpretation of rules is difficult. 
Other authors have equally focussed on this kind of environment where new rules need to be 
introduced to trigger change. As such, Campbell follows a similar logic and introduces the con-
cept of translation. This concept allows for a certain adaptation process of institutional practises 
through local entrepreneurs from outside. This inevitably implies the acceptance of new rules 
(Campbell 2004, 80). Campbell’s translation process is therefore similar to the two mechanisms 
described under this category by Mahoney and Thelen, layering and displacement. Both are rather 
loosely linked to the concept of diffusion.  
The mechanism of layering was first introduced by Eric Schickler (2001) and further developed 
by Streek and Thelen (2005) and Mahoney and Thelen (2010b)29. Layering is defined as a process 
in which “new elements [are] attached to existing institutions gradually changing their status and 
structure” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31). Layering introduces new elements or rules while ex-
isting rules remain in place because their reinterpretation is difficult. This means that old rules 
remain, are not neglected, and their meaning or interpretation does not change in impact. Lay-
ering can happen due to internal or external pressures and leads to incremental change. How-
ever, Mahoney and Thelen also clarify that as new elements are introduced, a constant process 
of layering might lead to a more dramatic change over the long run (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 
                                                 
29 Jeroen van der Heijden (2011) discusses the origins of the concept of layering in detail and argues that the concept 
initially derived from the works of Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek (1994).  
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17). Change occurs in the layering process through the mechanism of differential growth. This 
mechanism implies that two similar processes of change occur simultaneously and influence 
each other mutually. Within this study’s setting, layering could happen simultaneously on all 
three layers – rules, narratives and practices – or on individual layers. Layering works within the 
political context of a strong veto against change. Mahoney and Thelen (2010a, 29) identify a 
specific type of actor to trigger the layering process; subversives. Subversives seek to displace the 
institution but do not break rules (largely because the institutional context does not allow for 
this to happen). In order to achieve their goal of replacing the institution (or its content), they 
must work within the system to achieve change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 25–26). Actors of 
change in this mechanism might therefore appear at first to be supporters of the institution. 
This mechanism is likely to be more present in older policy areas – such as conditionality – as 
veto players play a big role and change, generally, is less likely to happen.   
Similar to layering, Streek and Thelen’s second mechanism displacement, works in an institutional 
setting that does not allow for a contending interpretation of existing rules. Displacement con-
sists of a “slowly rising salience of subordinate relative to dominant institutions” (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005, 31). This mechanism comes from the shift in the societal balance of power and 
results often in more abrupt change than layering. Three options can trigger this mechanism: 
first, change can be a result of the rediscovery of alternatives that coexisted next to the institu-
tion in question. Second, displacement can be triggered through the invasion or cultivation of 
foreign institutions or practises or finally, through an invasion that is due to external pressure 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005, 19–22). Existing old rules are simply replaced by new ones in a fast 
and obvious or in a slow, hidden change process (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 15–16). New 
rules are introduced because the contending interpretation of existing rules is impossible. The 
political context is more in favour of change and actors actively advocate for change. These 
actors are referred to as insurrectionaries. While insurrectionaries can appear in any change mech-
anism, they are best suited for the process of displacement because they seek to displace the 
existing institution with a new one. Insurrectionaries do not accept the status quo and do not 
follow rules (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 23–24). The impact of displacement on the develop-
ment aid institution depends on which components are replaced by new ones. For a fundamen-
tal change, all three layers would have to be replaced, whereas if only individual layers of the 
institution change, then change is less radical. As veto players should not be too prominent for 
this mechanism to work, this can only happen in areas where no long-established traditions are 
at work – such as the field of trilateral cooperation.  
Within the right-hand side of figure 2.3, Mahoney and Thelen describe mechanisms that work 
in an environment that allows for contesting interpretation and enforcement of existing rules. 
Change therefore can come entirely from inside through the adaptation of existing rules. Again, 
Campbell has a similar mechanism that he attaches to the idea of path dependency. He defines 
the mechanisms of bricolage as “the process whereby actors recombine locally available institu-
tional principles and practises in ways that yield change” (Campbell 2004, 65). This process of 
change from within fits the picture that Mahoney and Thelen paint for the mechanisms conver-
sion, drift and exhaustion. These mechanisms are unlikely to appear within the empirical data of 
this study as the foreign aid institution has been characterised as resistant to the reinterpretation 
of its content. Nevertheless, in order to give a complete picture of the available mechanisms, 
they are very briefly described here. Conversion is defined as “the redeployment of old institutions 
to new purposes” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31). The rules of the institution themselves do not 
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change, but their meaning and interpretation do (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 17). The political 
context in which this mechanism is at work is one of weak opposition towards change.  
Finally, the last two mechanisms take place in an environment of relative liberty when it comes 
to the possibilities for the reinterpretation of existing rules but in an environment of strong veto 
options. Both the mechanisms of drift and exhaustion describe developments where the rules of 
an institution lose their impact and meaning. 30 Streek and Thelen (2005, 31) define drift as a 
“neglect of institutional maintenance in spite of external change resulting in slipping in institu-
tional practice on the ground”. Old rules are neglected and change in impact or are simply no 
longer enforced, but no new rules are introduced (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 16). This process 
can remain undetected through an apparent external stability. The loss of influence of an insti-
tution can be caused through either a failure to adapt policies despite evolving external condi-
tions or through voluntary inaction of actors (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 24–26; Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010a, 17). Because this process could inevitably lead to a complete loss of meaning for 
the institution, resistance towards this change is high. The process of drift would happen if 
foreign aid were to be made redundant.   
This section has identified two relevant mechanisms that might also be perceptible in the em-
pirical chapters. So far, this work is based on the following assumptions: change is likely to occur 
faster in newer areas of institutional life than in well-established ones. Moreover, both mecha-
nisms – layering and displacement – can occur simultaneously on all three layers of the institu-
tion or on selected ones. Regarding the likelihood of adaption, it is easy to assume that the 
narrative is most volatile towards change, whereas rules and practices are likely to take longer 
to adapt and change – being subject to path-dependent behaviour. What remains unaddressed 
are two elements concerning change: the role of agency and the role of ideas within change. The 
next section deals with these two final aspects.  
2.3.3 The problems of ideas and agency: why does institutional change occur?  
Rational choice analysis encounters boundaries when attempting to study institutional change. 
Change, according to this theory, can only arise if the preferences (interests) of actors change. 
Change, therefore, only comes through a punctured equilibrium and is always abrupt (P. A. Hall 
2010, 205–7). Such theories then often turn to the explanatory power of ideas to explain insti-
tutional change that diverges from their model (P. A. Hall 2010, 211; Schmidt 2008, 317–19). 
Goldstein and Keohane, for instance, accord ideas with the capacity to work as switches or 
mental modes to trigger or slow down change (Judith Goldstein and Keohane 1995b). Campbell 
also notes that the role of ideas in explaining institutional change is important, but warns us that 
such ideas need to be carefully defined (see above). For him, ideas are most influential towards 
institutional change under the conditions of uncertainty when interests are not clearly defined 
(J. L. Campbell 2004, 114–19). In order to affect institutional change, ideas have to be available, 
credible and effective. Moreover, they have to be perceived as legitimate (J. L. Campbell 2004, 
119). Ideas are seen as crucial in explaining the changing interests of actors which in turn then 
                                                 
30 Streek and Thelen include the end of an institution through the mechanism of exhaustion as a separate mechanism, 
defined as the “gradual breakdown of an institution over time” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 29–30). The 2010 pub-
lication of Mahoney and Thelen does not mention exhaustion separately as it is seen as the logical consequence of 
drift occurring over time.  
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changes the institutions they create (Béland and Cox 2011, 11; Hogan and Howlett 2015; Hogan 
and O'Rourke 2015; Weible 2015).  
While some ideas might facilitate change, others might slow it down. As such, many ideas con-
strain institutional change because they determine what actors perceive as reasonable and/or 
appropriate. In Campbell’s definition, ideas lying in the background slow change down whereas 
ideas that are openly discussed and lie in the foreground are more likely to facilitate change. The 
longer an idea has been integrated within the institutional set-up, the more likely it is to hinder 
new change because it attempts to maintain its own validity (J. L. Campbell 2004, 93–100).31 
Structural factors other than the awareness that actors have about the idea’s content, and of 
their history, might be important and “can constrain the production and the dissemination of 
ideas” which in turn affects institutional change (Béland and Cox 2011, 15). Tracking down 
ideas and their impact on institutions is not an easy task. Béland and Cox regret in their study 
that often, the focus is placed on single country studies with the focus on the spread of one 
particular idea (Béland and Cox 2011, 16). As this study investigates the prevalence of prominent 
ideas about emerging donors among three traditional donors, it might contribute to further 
insights into the explanatory power of ideas.32  
Whereas many factors can therefore indicate when ideas are slowing down change, the most 
important aspect is when they foster change. As such, ideas only work for or against institutional 
change when actors take it upon themselves to advocate for them. The agent-structure problem 
arises again: how much are the actors dependent on the structure and/or how much do they act 
freely of the structure but influence the structure through their actions?33 In this respect, Camp-
bell (2004) as well as Mahoney and Thelen (2010b) and Streeck and Thelen (2005) place a heavy 
emphasis on the role of actors or entrepreneurs. Moreover, Vivien Schmidt, in her discursive 
institutionalism puts an emphasis on the way ideas are put forward through discourse – which 
inevitably focuses on actors again (2008, 2010, 2011; Carstensen 2015). Actors might influence 
the dimensions of institutions, they might facilitate or slow down change mechanisms and they 
might influence the relationship of ideas within the institutions (J. L. Campbell 2004, 90–123). 
Campbell (2004, 101–2) states that decision-makers – defined as politicians, bureaucrats or cor-
porate managers – are considered to be the most immediate carriers of ideas affecting institu-
tional change.34  
Whereas Campbell states that decision-makers are the most prominent actors when it comes to 
institutional change, Lowndes and Roberts argue that any kind of actor needs to fulfil two cri-
teria to be successful in the implementation of institutional change: first, the actor needs to have 
                                                 
31 Note that this further confirms the assumption above that the layer of narrative is the easiest to change whereas 
rules and practices change with more difficulty. As background ideas have been identified as playing a constituent 
role in rules and practices, those two layers are more likely to be resistant to change.  
32 Other studies have adapted a similar framework even in the complex field of international relations, for instance 
the work of Craig Parsons explaining the role of ideas in the construction of the European Union (Parsons 2011; 
A. Wendt 2010; Sil and Katzenstein 2010).  
33 S. Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne (2012) argue that any kind of foreign policy research ends upon discussing this 
problem.  
34 Less relevant for this study are the other four types of actors that Campbell identifies: constituents, public voters 
and political elites, working on normative background ideas; theorists, academics, working on cognitive background 
ideas, framers, the spin doctors, working on normative foreground ideas, and brokers, media and public relations 
experts, working on all type of ideas. The most relevant actors within this study are decision-makers, but the influence 
of theorists, constituents, framers and brokers are also considered (J. L. Campbell 2004, 100–107).  
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the capacity to act in her/ his own right and, second, the actor must be able to impose her/his 
will on the environment and on other actors. Through that second quality, the actor shapes the 
content of the institution (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 79–81). Similarly, Streeck and Thelen 
(2005, 14–16) argue that there is an ambiguous relationship between rule-makers and rule-takers 
that is responsible for institutional change. Even if the initial meaning of a rule can be re-inter-
preted through time, it could also be that the initial meaning of the rule was not self-evident. 
There is a cycle of feedback where rule-takers give a positive or negative feedback to the rules. 
This process could lead to the changing of the rule. Moreover, rule- takers have the option of 
non-compliance with rules which could also lead to a change in the meaning of the rule.35  
Focussing on ideas and actors to explain institutional change carries the risk of presenting insti-
tutions as highly volatile. Nevertheless, Vivien Schmidt (2011, 60–61) stresses that the main task 
remains the same: identifying whether ideas are the causal mechanisms triggering a change in 
the institution or not and thereby whether ideas can be considered to be the explanatory varia-
ble. This can only be investigated by focussing on ideas as the explanatory variable.  
This thesis therefore works with a theoretical framework that emphasises the explanatory power 
of ideas – whether these ideas are situated within or outside of the existing institution. Moreover, 
it looks at how these ideas are communicated among actors (mostly decision-makers). It is im-
portant to consider that the position of ideas (as they are also inherent within the institutional 
set-up but might still explain institutional change) might trigger problems in the causality of the 
argument. Nevertheless, this study follows Lars Tønder’s (2012) advice to look for more immi-
nent causality between variables as cause and effect might be very closely related to each other, 
when involving ideas.  
The following section summarises this chapter by putting the underlying hypotheses of this 
work together.  
2.4 Hypotheses guiding this study 
One main hypothesis can be generated from the above theoretical framework: Looking through 
the institutionalist framework, development policies of each country are conceptualised as single 
institutions, constituted by common rules, narratives and practices. In order to assess whether 
change takes place in these individual institutions, one therefore needs to identify potential 
causes for change. This study seeks to substantiate the argument that ideas about the potential 
of emerging donors are the driving mechanism for explaining institutional change. These ideas 
can be conceptualised into foreground and background ideas. Foreground ideas trigger change 
whereas background ideas make institutional change slower. As such, the following hypotheses 
arise:  
 H0: Ideas play a decisive role in explaining institutional change within development 
policy. More precisely, the way emerging donors are perceived plays a decisive role for 
                                                 
35 Lowndes and Roberts further developed this ambiguous relationship between power and agency through the 
introduction of five types of agency (collective, cumulative, combinate, constrained, comabitve) (2013, 104-110). 
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explaining change or the lack of change. Foreground ideas play a main role in triggering 
change whereas background ideas might hinder initiatives towards change.  
The institutional framework allows us to identify changes on several layers. It is argued here that 
changes within the narrative of an institution are easiest whereas rules and especially practices 
tend more towards path-dependent (and change resistant) behaviour. 
 H1: Change is more likely to occur on the layer of narratives than it is on the layer of 
rules or practices.  
The next hypothesis further refines this framework as change is less or more likely depending 
on the nature of the policy field it targets. As such, this theoretical chapter clarified that diverse 
policy fields are more or less susceptible to institutional change. Expressed in the terminology 
of discursive institutionalism, it depends on the prevalence of ideas fostering or slowing down 
institutional change. Fields that have a long tradition in implementation are more likely to be 
based on background ideas slowing down change whereas newer policy fields with less tradition 
are more likely to be based on foreground ideas. Within one single institution (development 
policy), several different settings exist that make change more or less likely within those policy 
fields. This depends on the history of the particular policy field in question – a long established 
policy field tends towards path-dependent inertia whereas newer policy fields are more suscep-
tible to change. Within development assistance, these older routines (such as the policy field of 
conditionality) are more likely to have many veto players and to make the reinterpretation of 
rules difficult. Change, therefore, can only emerge within that field through the mechanisms of 
layering, but is overall less likely than for newer policy fields. For newer policy fields – such as 
trilateral cooperation – fewer veto players exist while the institutional setting remains the same. 
The change mechanism that might be at play here is the one of displacement.  
 H2: Long established policy fields are more likely to be susceptible to path dependent 
behaviour and less influenced by reformative ideas than newer established policy fields.  
The following model (figure 2.4) clarifies the links that are established through these hypotheses 
and was applied to the three empirical chapters. It indicates that the level of analysis happens 
on two different axes: first, it is hypothesised that narratives are more susceptible towards 
change than the layers of practices and rules (vertical squares). Second, it follows that change 
emerges more readily in newer policy fields than in older, well established ones (horizontal 
squares). On the left-hand side you can see the explanatory variable of this thesis, foreground 
ideas as triggering institutional change. Finally, the four squares in the intersection of both indi-
cate the likelihood of institutional change where easy indicates that change is very likely whereas 
very slow indicates that change is unlikely to be triggered by ideas or very slow.  
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Figure 2-4: Model theorising institutional change 
                                         Source: Own compilation based on the works of Schmidt (2008, 2011) and Lowndes and Roberts (2013). 
To exemplify this figure, here is one example of how this theoretical setting could be applied: a 
foreground idea fostering change emerges, targeting a newer policy field (such as triangular de-
velopment cooperation) within the institution of development cooperation of Norway. The po-
tential impact of ideas is stronger on the layer of the narratives than on the layers of practices 
and rules as a reaction towards emerging donors.   
In order to reduce complexity in the figure, the mechanisms that are likely to explain institutional 
change were omitted from the figure. Note, however, that within the older policy field, I hy-
pothesise that the mechanism of layering is likely to be at play whereas displacement can explain 
the change mechanism in the newer policy field. Through layering, new elements are added to 
the existing issue area while the old rules, narratives and practices remain. In the older issue area, 
this would allow for the introduction of new rules despite a high resistance from the veto players 
in the field that are accustomed to the way the institution has worked for a long time. In the 
newer issue area (such as trilateral cooperation), new rules are likely to replace existing ones 
through the mechanism of displacement as the changes are confronted by fewer veto players 
(as the issue area does not yet have many veto players).  
The three empirical chapters can now clarify whether institutional change has taken place as a 
reaction towards emerging donors or not. For this purpose, chapter 5 addresses the question of 
what kind of ideas traditional donors have towards emerging donors, chapter 6 and 7 target two 
issue areas, one of which is older and another one newer, but which are both likely to be affected 
by emerging donors: the field of conditionality and that of trilateral cooperation. The concluding 
section of each empirical chapter makes reference to the theoretical hypotheses elaborated here. 
Moreover, the concluding chapter 8 furthers the implications of the empirical findings for the 
theoretical framework.  
The next chapter briefly describes the case study selection and the analytical approach towards 
the empirical chapters. It clarifies how the underlying changes that have been described here 
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3 Methodological approach 
The research question of this project focuses on the influence of emerging donors on the poli-
cies of traditional donors. This chapter clarifies the methodological approach to this thesis in 
four steps: first, it puts the theoretical hypotheses into a usable framework that can be applied 
to empirical data; second, it justifies the selection of the three traditional donor countries; third, 
it identifies the appropriate empirical data to uncover the three theoretical layers (narratives, 
rules and practices), and finally, it addresses the question of how this empirical data is analysed.  
3.1 Operationalizing theoretical hypotheses 
The previous chapter elaborated on the different layers that were analysed in order to explore 
the institutional framework of each traditional donor. Hence, the dependent variable that I seek 
to explain is the potential change (or lack thereof) within the traditional donors’ policies on the 
three levels of narratives, rules and practices. The main hypothesis of this work is that the inde-
pendent variable (explaining change or lack thereof) can be found in ideas. The way emerging 
donors are perceived plays a decisive role in my theoretical understanding for explaining 
whether or not the individual donor aid institutions change. Moreover, the theoretical chapter 
argued that foreground ideas play a decisive role in triggering change whereas background ideas 
might slow it down. Moreover, the previous chapter has argued that this change is likelier to 
affect the layer of narratives than the layer of rules and practices and that it is easier to trigger 
change in relatively new fields rather than in long established ones. The aim is therefore to find 
relevant ideas that trigger change and others that slow it down. Other intervening variables 
might explain the outcome – this is why an open approach towards the empirical data is required 
for this research process. The following figure summarises the explanatory, possibly intervening 
and explained variables. 
       Figure 3-1: Operationalizing variables 
 
                                                                                  Source: Own compilation 
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3.2 Explication of case study selection 
The selection of specific cases is crucial for the validity and quality of any research design (Burn-
ham et al. 2008, 58; Lauth, G. Pickel, and S. Pickel 2009, 77–78). Generally, case studies have 
been criticized for their limitation to particular cases and their inability to provide generalizable 
conclusions (King, Keohane, and Verba 2012)36. But case studies have the advantage of provid-
ing hidden information on special cases and exposing causal links that remain undiscovered 
through more formal methods (Burnham et al. 2008, 53–55). Moreover, Lauth, Pickel and Pickel 
(2009, 75–78) highlight the possibility of conducting a bottom-up design where studies with 
limited case numbers can be enriched through other studies with more numerous cases. While 
I am aware of the limits of this study’s generalizability, similar enquiries could profit from this 
research outline as many researchers are concerned with the integration (or lack thereof) of 
emerging countries into existing international governance structures.  
In order to address my research question, I had to focus on a selected number of emerging 
donors as well as on a sample of traditional donors. Studying the reaction of all traditional do-
nors simply goes beyond the scope of this work. The selection of the representatives for the 
two donor groups – emerging and traditional – has to follow similar criteria that are further 
expanded upon here.  
First, all selected countries had to be relatively big providers of development assistance in terms 
of overall quantity and in relation to their national income within their own group. Moreover, 
they should be the masterminds behind the agenda-setting on the international scale for their 
relevant group. For that, I considered their commitment to international organisations and 
structures dealing with development assistance. These criteria apply to the selection of donors 
from both groups – emerging and traditional.  
The selection of emerging donors is relatively straightforward; the literature review already sin-
gled out four emerging donors as being the most representative of the group – especially in the 
perception of traditional donors. This study therefore assesses the policies of China, India, Bra-
zil and South Africa and their effect on traditional donors’ policies (see literature review in 
chapter 1 and chapter 4 for detailed arguments why these four are selected). As chapter 4 illus-
trates in further detail, all four satisfy the criteria given above.  
However, the selection of the traditional donors is a more complex process as a huge variety of 
choices presents itself. For the traditional donors I aim for a most different case design 
(MDCD), trying to select traditional donors that have the biggest possible variance in the frame-
work variables that I assume are fixed. This variance will help me to identify whether ideas have 
a potential influence on the development institutions of different donors despite their different 
initial disposition.   
Why then study the United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom? Some studies justify their 
case selection because donors are particularly relevant for a particular region or field of devel-
opment assistance (see for instance, Schraeder, Hook, and B. Taylor 1998, 296). This selectivity 
                                                 
36 Schraeder, Hook, and B. Taylor (1998, 301) apply that criticism specifically to the qualitative case study approach 
towards aid policies when introducing their quantitative study on the policies of Sweden, France, the United States 
and Japan.  
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could lead to bias in the findings as donors concentrating on one particular area might be dif-
ferently affected to donors having a rather broad profile. Therefore, for the most different case 
design, it is most relevant that the framework variables differ greatly.  
As qualitative research enables us to explore the independent variables in more detail through 
the interpretation of data, I do not have to specify these. However, when it comes to the frame-
work variables, one has to fix them as early as possible (Burnham et al. 2008, 62–67). I have 
selected the following framework variables that should vary most in all of my cases so that I will 
be able to get a huge variance in the selection of traditional donors:  
A first set of framework variables looks at the national set-up of aid: who is responsible for 
giving aid? How is the aid giving administered and on which level of government does it play a 
role? Is the system fragmented or centralised? And what are their motives in giving aid? 
As chapter 4 shows in detail, all three donors have a very different set-up regarding the dispen-
sation of aid: Norway has integrated the duties of development cooperation into its foreign 
ministry, the United States divides the responsibility between the foreign ministry and two spe-
cialised agencies for implementation and the UK has a separate ministry for development co-
operation (and arguably the most centralised aid system) (Lundsgaarde 2013). The second 
framework variable that might play a role is the particular form of self-interest that donors fol-
low in their development cooperation. Arguably, the United States follows a strong security 
incentive, whereas the United Kingdom follows a mix between altruistic motives and commer-
cial purposes. Norway, on the other hand, is considered to be a more altruistic donor than the 
other two37. Table 3.1 below summarises these findings.  
 Table 3-1: Qualitative framework variables for traditional donors 
Qualitative distinctions  USA UK Norway 
Institutional set-up Highly fragmented, 
several ministries, 2 
implementing agen-
cies 
Most centralised, aid 
at ministry level, sim-
ultaneously imple-
menting agency 
Integration of aid 
into foreign ministry; 
1 implementing 
agency 
Major interests in aid giving Strong security pur-
pose; also commer-






The second set of quantitative variables concerns the actual aid giving policies. Which country 
gives the most aid? In nominal terms and in terms of GDP? Which spends most on multilateral 
aid? The following table summarises the quantitative framework variables for the three selected 
donors. My cases consist of three donors that fulfil the two general criteria that I equally ad-
dressed to emerging donors (being a big provider in relative or absolute terms and playing a 
significant role internationally) and vary greatly on the framework variables. Table 3.2 summa-
rises the data on the framework variables of the selected cases.   
                                                 
37 Note that purposes in all three cases are always mixed, but the prominence of individual motives varies.  
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Table 3-2:  Framework variables (intervening or spurious) from traditional donors 
Quantitative values  USA UK Norway 
Annual ODA average (in constant USD) 38 29.4 billion 12.9 billion 4.8 billion 
Ratio ODA/GNI 0.19% 0.52% 0.96% 
Bilateral share 84% 42% 67% 
Sectoral focus39 USA UK Norway 
% Social infrastructure & services (education, 
health, government & civil society)  
49.39 42.19 40.22 
% Economic infrastructure (transport, banking, en-
ergy, communication) 
10.19 9.41 9.59 
% Production sectors (agriculture, industry, mining, 
construction, trade policies, tourism) 
6.06 4.31 7.75 
% Multisector (environment protection, other) 4.74 8.45 11.46 
% Commodity aid 3.67 5.12 4.22 
% Debt relief 2.62 9.83 0.60 
% Humanitarian aid 15.59 9.42 11.02 
Regional focus40 USA UK Norway 
% to Africa 29.72 42.38 30.88 
% to Asia 36.27 29.17 21.23 
% to America 8.03 0.60 7.86 
% to Europe 2.26 0.88 4.16 
Income focus USA UK Norway 
% to least developed countries 25.9 23.0 22.0 
% to other low income countries 2.6 2,0 1.0 
% to lower middle-income countries 13.6 17.2 9.0 
% to upper middle-income 20.9 5.0 7.1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            Source: own compilation 
                                                 
38 All data is the average from 2004 to 2014 (OECD Stat 2015a, 2015c, 2015f). 
39 The remaining percentage is unallocated in the statistics. This also applies to regional and income focus.  
40 The percentage to Oceania has been omitted as it was below 1 percent for all three donors.  
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The two tables illustrate that the framework variables vary considerably between the three do-
nors, even though some similarities cannot be excluded (for instance, all give the highest share 
of their aid to least developed countries, but a huge variance can be found in the allocation to 
the upper middle-income countries).41 This choice of donors then represents a huge variety in 
the selection while placing the emphasis on powerful countries that are agenda-setters in their 
own right.42  
The logic for the selection of the time frame derives from the theoretical reflections and from 
the findings of the literature review. Therefore, this study focuses on the period from 2004 to 
2014. Moreover, the literature review also identified two policy fields on which this study con-
centrates (conditionality and trilateral cooperation). The chapter on conditionality focuses on 
aid policies regarding specific recipient countries where the three traditional donors share an 
interest with emerging donors. In order to avoid duplications, the selection of the recipients is 
explained in detail in chapter 6 although this, too, is a methodological decision.  
What kind of empirical data will be studied in order to uncover the changes within the donor 
institutions of the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway? The next section provides 
an answer to this question.  
3.3 Explication of data collection   
This study aims to uncover the potential changes arising within the development institutions of 
traditional donors as a reaction to emerging donors. In order to do this, the theoretical chapter 
has identified two main aspects that are of high relevance for the empirical data that has to be 
examined: first, ideas are arguably the driving force of change in my theoretical setting; this 
suggests a qualitative approach where huge amounts of data had to be tracked in order to iden-
tify the most relevant ideas that could trigger change (or slow it down). Second, the theoretical 
framework sets the stage for exploring the development institutions in question on three differ-
ent layers: narratives, rules and practices. The question, then, is how can these layers be repre-
sented and made visible through empirical data?  
Before we divide the collected material into these categories, here is a first overview of what 
kind of empirical material was studied for this research:  
  
                                                 
41 Homi J. Kharas and Rogerson (2012) argue that all three donors mentioned here (and Germany) focus their aid 
on countries with high growth rates, but equally find that they contribute their biggest share to differing purposes: 
for instance, the United Kingdom gives most aid for achieving the Millennium Development Goals whereas the 
United States was the biggest player in their study on providing global public goods.  
42 The United States is simply very prominent because it is the largest nominal donor, while the United Kingdom 
plays an agenda-setting role in many international institutions, for instance the World Bank. Norway, on the other 
hand is a huge defender of multilateral initiatives, most of all of the United Nations and has one of the highest 
shares in relative terms.  
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Table 3-3: Empirical data for this study 
Dependent variable  Material detail Useful for  













fairs;            




mission for Aid 
Impact, FCO, 
Government 
Chapter 5 (ideas) 
















Chapter 6 & 7 
(narratives, prac-
tices) 




Chapter 6 & 7 
(practices) 
 
The biggest corpus of material consists of primary documents of the three donor countries. In 
order not to miss any important documents, the relevant ministries43 have been looked through 
in detail. Moreover, the search function on the website of the relevant institutions was used with 
the following key terms: “emerging”; “China/ Chinese”, “Brazil/Brazilian”, “South Africa/ 
South African”; “India/ Indian”; “BRIC/ BRICS”; “development/ development assistance/ 
development aid”; “cooperation/ triangular/ trilateral cooperation”; “conditions/ conditional-
ity”; “democracy/ democracy promotion”; “good governance”; “human rights”. A list of all the 
documents analysed for this study can be found in appendix 9.2. In total, 169 documents were 
analysed for Norway, 211 documents for the United Kingdom and 546 from the United States. 
Moreover, interviews were conducted with delegates from the United Kingdom’s Department 
for International Development and from the Norwegian implementing agency (Norad) as well 
as with the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise.44 The interviews were conducted with a 
structured questionnaire (see appendix 9.4) in order to gather the most comparable answers, 
and were anonymised (Bogner 2005; Meuser and Nagel 2009, 2005; S. Pickel et al. 2009, 166–
87; Flick, Kardorff, and Steinke 2010; Turner 2010, 755). The role of experts for development 
aid policies is well documented (for instance, Easterly 2007, 331; Nuscheler 2005, 453–61) as 
                                                 
43 For the relevant ministries, see chapter introducing the donor policies.  
44 Other interviews were conducted with delegates from the OECD Development Assistance Committee, from 
the UN Unit on South-South cooperation as well as with delegates from the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
and Germany’s implementing agency GIZ. In the end, these interviews served as background information to gather 
a thorough understanding of the issues at stake. Similarly, a participatory observation took place in July 2012 at the 
United Nations Development Cooperation Forum in New York. Unfortunately, no interview was conducted with 
representatives from the United States. Following several interview requests, no answer could be gathered in the 
end. This is also why this study relies heavily on the analysis of primary documents and compensates the lack of 
interview material for the USA with extensive material on public hearings.  
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experts are seen as the “bearers of important information” and greatly influence decision-mak-
ing processes (Meuser and Nagel 2009, 470), for the transcribed interviews, see appendix 9.5.  
The purpose is for the first empirical chapter (chapter 5) to uncover the relevant foreground 
and background ideas that might influence institutional change in the policy fields that are stud-
ied in chapters 6 and 7. The following table illustrates how these dominant ideas about emerging 
donors can be collected and analysed.  
 Table 3-4: Uncovering the relevant data for the independent variable: Ideas 
Dependent variable  Foreground ideas (driving change) Background ideas (slowing change 
down) 
Chapter 5: the main ideas about 
emerging donors 
Within the layer of narratives 
(public hearings, meetings, 
official publications, 
speeches, etc.) 
Interview material, literature 
review on driving motives in 
aid, relevant lobby groups 
within the country 
Table 3.4 indicates how the independent variable can be studied in empirical data. In order to 
uncover the dominant ideas harboured by traditional donors with respect to emerging donors, 
a two-fold approach has been taken. First, as the foreground and openly discussed ideas are the 
most relevant to trigger and explain change, the first layer was uncovered through an intensive 
study of materials containing these discussions within development assistance of the three rele-
vant donor countries. Ideas can be found within the layer of narratives: within public hearings, 
minutes of meetings of relevant organisations, public speeches, etc. Second, in order to identify 
background ideas – ideas that might slow down institutional change, a different kind of material 
needs to be taken into account as background ideas are not openly discussed. Therefore, back-
ground ideas were identified through the literature review on motives behind development co-
operation (what is commonly alleged to lie behind the individual donor countries development 
assistance), as well as upon the results of interviews conducted with experts.  
The next table illustrates what kind of empirical data was used to explain the institutional change 
process within the individual donor institutions with respect to the different layers of narratives, 
rules and practices.  
 Table 3-5: Relevant data for the dependent variable: change within the development institution 
Independent variable (change in) Narrative Rules Practices 






Legal texts shaping 
aid; aid contracts, 
etc. 
Aid statistics of 11 
relevant recipient 
countries 





As Table 3.5 indicates, a similar material basis was used for uncovering the layers of narratives 
and rules as for uncovering ideas. Nevertheless, as we see in the section below, the textual cor-
pus was interrogated with different questions for each of the empirical chapters. Moreover, to 
uncover the practices, the approach towards conditionality and trilateral cooperation differed 
slightly: conditionality was analysed in eleven recipient countries for all three donors (on the 
selection process of these recipients, see chapter 6) because it is impossible to cover a broader 
range of recipients for the purpose of this thesis. For chapter 7 (trilateral cooperation), all trilat-
eral projects that have been reported by the national aid statistic services have been identified, 
classified according to the cooperation partner (China, India, Brazil, or South Africa) and trans-
ferred into constant U.S. dollars to allow for comparable results.  
This section has identified the pool of empirical data that was analysed in order to arrive at 
conclusions about the impact of emerging donors upon traditional donors. The last section of 
this methodological chapter clarifies how this pool of data was analysed.  
3.4 Explication of analytical approach 
Both qualitative data – the transcribed interviews as well as the official documents – are sub-
jected to a qualitative content analysis (following the influential work in this field of Mayring 
1997, 2002; complemented by the more praxis-oriented approach of Margit Schreier 2006, 
2012). First, I selected relevant passages of the extensive text material through the simple 
method of building headlines for each section. Then, in a second step, both authors advocate a 
further reduction of text data through the enriching of codes that are deduced from theory (see 
also previous chapter). Coffey and Atkinson (2008, 26-53) propose a similar reduction of data 
through the search for commonalities, differences, patterns and structures in the text materials. 
Mayring refers to this step as the third step in his analytical scheme where the text material is 
clustered. He emphasises that this step already implies a certain level of interpretation and con-
struction of codes. These codes then build the basis for the further analysis of the data (Mayring 
2002, 96).  
In order to make the results of my analysis as transparent as possible, the following passages 
explain in detail how the empirical data was approached. After identifying the essential docu-
ments for the traditional donor in question (see appendix 9.2), all documents were searched for 
a number of key words so that no mention of the emerging donors or their activities was over-
looked (see table 3.6 below). With the help of the coding programme MaxQDA, all these pas-
sages were in a first instance codified with the country in question (for instance, search word 
“China” in U.S. documents were all saved in a provisional code “U.S.”). These coded segments 
were then looked through and relevant passages were classified under more specific codes that 
looked at the structure of the empirical chapters. Moreover, the initial search hits were recorded 
(for instance, within U.S. documents, China was mentioned 7608 times), as were the resulting 
codes (for the above example, 153 codes for chapter 5 on perception, 2 for the general narrative 
on conditionality, 3 for narrative on IMF/conditionality, 20 for narrative on human rights/con-
ditionality; 6 for good governance/conditionality; 1 for budget support/conditionality; 6 for 
general narrative on trilateral narrative, 1 for practice/trilateral cooperation). The tables with the 
hits of the search for key words as well as the resulting codes can be found in appendix 9.3. The 




 Table 3-6: Key word search for coding qualitative data 
Key words Relevant for chapter 
“emerging donors”; “emerging country/ countries”; “emerg-
ing power”, “emerging economy/ economies”; “emerging 
market/ markets”; “emerging” 
Chapters 5 (ideas), chapter 7 (trilateral co-
operation) 
“BRIC”; “BRICS”; “South-South” Chapters 5-7 
“power shift”/”power” Chapter 5 (ideas about a power shift) 
“Brazil”/ “Brazilian”/ “Brazil’s” Chapters 5 (ideas about Brazil); chapter 7 
(trilateral projects with Brazil) 
“China”/ “Chinese”/ “China’s”/ “China-Africa” Chapters 5 (ideas about China); chapter 7 
(trilateral projects with China) 
“India”/”Indian”/ “India’s”/ “India-Africa” Chapters 5 (ideas about India); chapter 7 
(trilateral projects with India) 
“South Africa”/ “South African”/ “South Africa’s” Chapters 5 (ideas about South Africa); 
chapter 7 (trilateral projects with South Af-
rica) 
“conditional”/ “condition”/ “conditionality”/ “conditionally”, 
“unconditional”; “unconditionally”/ “ownership” 
Chapter 6 (general narrative on condition-
ality) 
“democracy”/ “democratic”; “good governance”/ “bad gov-
ernance”; “civil society”; “grassroots” 
Chapter 6 (political conditionality/good 
governance) 
“human rights”/ ”human dignity” Chapter 6 (political conditionality/ human 
rights) 
“budget support”/ “budget” Chapter 6 (political conditionality/ budget 
support) 
“economic governance”; “debt sustainability”, “unsustaina-
ble debt”; “macroeconomic stability” 
Chapter 6 (economic conditionality) 
“IMF”/ “International Monetary Fund”; “WB”/ “World 
Bank”;  
Chapter 6 (economic conditionality/ IMF 
and World Bank conditionality) 
„trilateral“/ „triangular“ / „tripartite“; „cooperation“ Chapter 7 (trilateral projects) 
 
All hits were examined in detail and unnecessary references that did not express perceptive 
statements eliminated. In a second step, the coded segments were examined again and similar 
arguments were taken together in sub-codes which eventually led to the structure of the empir-
ical chapters. Thereby, the empirical qualitative material was highly relevant to find in order to 
enrich the arguments made here about the change within traditional donors’ aid policies. Nev-
ertheless, some additional legal documents or other primary documents that did not figure in 
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the initial search were added if they seemed relevant or other primary documents made reference 
to them.  
For the layer of practices, statistical data was used and analysed. As the empirical data from the 
qualitative research was already extensive, the quantitative data was simply used to confirm or 
contradict the findings of the other two layers (narratives and rules). For chapter 6 (condition-
ality), a slightly more selective approach had to be taken than for chapter 7, simply due to the 
sheer mass of data on conditionality. Taken into account in chapter 6 was the amount spent by 
each individual donor country on 11 selected recipient countries (where all three donors share 
an interest with at least two emerging donors). The section then investigated whether the con-
ditional approach has intensified or lessened with respect to these countries.45 In order to eval-
uate whether a conditional narrative has been pushed through in practice, the section looked at 
indicators from the World Bank (Worldwide Governance Indicators) and at the spending of the 
donor country (in the relevant sectors and generally).  
The first three chapters have identified the research gap, the guiding theoretical hypotheses of 
this work and the methodological framework. The next chapter gives a short introduction into 
the development policies of all (emerging and traditional) donors concerned in this study. This 
next chapter allows us to contextualise the changes that are analysed in the following three 
empirical chapters that attempt to find answers to the research question of this study: how do 
traditional donors adapt their development policy in terms of conditionality and trilateral coop-
eration as a reaction towards emerging donors? 
                                                 
45 In order to establish whether conditionality has increased or lowered in practice, the general trend within the five 
selected Worldwide Governance Indicators was calculated and matched with the trend of the percentage that the 
donor country in question gave to the recipient, see chapter 6 for further details.  
  
 
4 The empirical puzzle: Overview of aid from relevant do-
nors 
Before assessing the impact of emerging donors on traditional donors, the following chapter 
sbriefly examine the character of, first, emerging donors’ aid activities and, second, traditional 
donors’ aid activities. Section 4.3 then addresses the international structures in which both 
groups navigate. Only with this background in place can we assess the change that has occurred 
as a reaction to emerging donors. 
In order to comprehensively depict the development policies of emerging and traditional do-
nors, each section will refer to the same categories in order to maintain a comparative overview 
of these diverse approaches to foreign aid. The following chapter, then, offers a mixture of two 
different structures that have been used in the literature; (I) that of Sven Grimm et al. (2009), in 
which the authors review the differences in the approaches of emerging donors to that of the 
European Union, and (II) that of Carol Lancaster (2007, 18–24) when introducing her case 
studies on five traditional donors.46 Each section reviews the following four categories: (1) the 
relevant actors in governmental foreign aid, the institutional set-up, and their level of fragmen-
tation, (2) the amount of aid disbursed by the actors, (3) the main destinations of aid (a) geo-
graphically and (b) in terms of sectoral support and finally (4) the rationale underpinning aid 
activities; that is, the major ideas (or worldviews in Lancaster’s vocabulary) which shape each 
country’s development assistance. As the literature review indicated, this exercise has been un-
dertaken by many researchers. Consequently, this chapter will be rather brief; its only aim is to 
give an up-to-date review of the current development policies of the actors touched upon in the 
rest of this study.  
4.1 Introducing the policies of emerging donors  
As Michelle Knodt and Nadine Piefer (2012, 38–39) argue, it is rather difficult to clearly define 
who belongs in the group of emerging donors and who does not. Their study includes China, 
India, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa because their common goal is to prove the 
role of these countries in international relations and to expand their role regionally. Others use 
the grouping of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) as a valuable category for analysing 
their donor activities (Armijo 2007; Panda 2013; Rowlands 2012; Rampa and Bilal 2011; Mora-
zán et al. 2012; Chin 2012), while Klingebiel (2014, 35–54) simply draws attention to the huge 
variety of Southern actors. In Peter Kragelund’s (2008) study on non-DAC donors, those coun-
tries which are neither a member of the European Union nor of the OECD most closely re-
semble the definition of emerging donors given in the introductory chapter. Nevertheless, this 
group then still includes a variety of donors, such as Arab donors, other OPEC donors, but also 
the group which is targeted here: a group of countries which have – in the last twenty years – 
increased their own development tremendously through economic growth and have started to 
share this growth with other third countries. Three years after his initial study, Kragelund (2012, 
2011) focused on the impact of four donors within this group: China, India, Brazil and South 
                                                 
46 Note that many other studies focus a similar structure, see for instance (Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010, 39–
43).  
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Africa, the BASIC countries. In fact, many studies talk about these four Southern providers 
when they do extend their focus beyond China (Chaturvedi, Fues, and Sidiropoulos 2012; Car-
bonnier 2012; Saidi and Wolf July 2011).47 The justification for studying this specific group is 
that they share a distinctive form of aid. Other countries, such as Mexico and Indonesia, might 
be recent additions to the group. Nevertheless, as this study investigates the influence of emerg-
ing donors over the last ten years, it makes sense to limit the group to the four emerging donors 
that were already present ten years ago. The next section thus begins with a brief discussion of 
China’s development assistance.  
4.1.1 China’s development assistance  
Prominent actors in Chinese development assistance are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank), and the Ministry of Finance. Most important, however, is 
the Ministry of Commerce with its department of foreign aid as well as the Economic Council-
lors based in Chinese embassies (Alden 2007, 23–27; Brautigam 2009; Kragelund 2010b, 18; 
Morazán et al. 2012, 17; M. Huang and Ren 2012). 
The Chinese Communist Party exercises considerable influence over China’s foreign aid, with 
the Politburo and its standing committee particularly prominent (Zhao 2008). Moreover, the 
Foreign Ministry has to seek input from the National Development Reform Commission 
(NDRC) when reviewing large aid proposals and has to stick to the Five Year Plan as well as 
the yearly national development plans (Chin 2012, 589–93).  
Two other actors play an important role in Chinese aid. The first consists of a group of (partly) 
state-owned firms which are considered to be highly influential (Alden 2007, 37–58; Baumgart-
ner and Godehardt 2012; Moreira 2013). The second has emerged from the institutionalisation 
of meetings between Chinese officials and African heads of states under the auspices of FOCAC 
– the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. These meetings began in the year 2000, take place every 
three years and have often resulted in huge pledges for aid. The first meeting that triggered 
worldwide attention took place in November 2006 when Beijing welcomed 35 African heads of 
state (Chin 2012, 584; Zhou 2012, 153–55; Chun June 2013; Eisenman 2007).  
Generally, Chinese aid emerges from a very fragmented system, which is not dissimilar to that 
of the United States (Brautigam 2009, 116). Despite the strong diversity of actors involved in 
aid (I. Taylor 2009, 3–9; Fijałkowski 2011; Zhao 2008), Dane Rowlands argues that within the 
group of the emerging donors studied here, it is the most centralised aid system (Rowlands 2012, 
639). Despite this contention, however, it is important to acknowledge that the Chinese aid 
system consists of many diverse actors, much like its foreign policy (Godehardt 2011).  
Overall, China is a “modest, mid-sized donor” (Brautigam 2011b, 211). Exact amounts are, 
however, “elusive” (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b, 17–19) and estimates range 
from USD 1.4 billion to 25 billion per year. The highest estimate emerged from a study of the 
New York University Wagner School and was used for a Congressional Research Paper that 
caused much controversy (Lum et al. 25.02.2009, 3). Most studies refer to roughly USD 2 billion 
                                                 
47 Note that Chaturvedi et al. also includes Mexico, Carbonnier et al. does not include India and Saidi and Wolf 
does not include South Africa.  
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per year48 which amounts to the aid of Switzerland or Finland. Gregory Chin (2012, 581) states 
that the real amount lies somewhere in between the conservative estimates of about USD 2 
billion and that of 25 billion.  
Many studies point out that transparency is a big issue in Chinese aid (Brautigam 2009, 163–68). 
The China Statistical Yearbook – the official figures of Chinese budget – “grossly underesti-
mates” the real amounts of aid which, for instance, it pegged at USD 866 million for 2009 (Chin 
2012, 581–83). Through its increasing involvement in aid, China might develop an interest in 
the “systemic functioning of global development financing” which could, in turn, further in-
crease its transparency (Xu and R. Carey 2015). The financial crisis has enhanced China’s share 
of global aid (Cook and Gu 2009; Schüler-Zhou, Schüller, and Brod 2010).  
Chinese development assistance was long believed to follow the “Angola mode”, implying huge 
investments in infrastructural programmes in exchange for access to crude or other resources, 
frequently after exhaustive negotiations between states (Burgis, June 14, 2010b). Nowadays, the 
private sector and private companies play an increasing role. Moreover, the recipients have be-
come much more diversified beyond resource-rich African states. Today, aid goes everywhere 
where China nurtures diplomatic ties (Brautigam 2011b). In total, about 161 countries receive 
assistance from China, which indicates the scale of Chinese aid (Chin 2012, 582).  
A large proportion (between 30 and 50 percent) of that aid goes to Africa, but neighbouring 
countries like Cambodia and Pakistan also get significant shares.49 The share directed to Latin 
America and the Caribbean is negligible but increasing (China's Information Office of the State 
Council 2014; Soliz Landivar and Scholvin 2011). Major partners for aid projects are Angola, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Brazil, and Venezuela (Morazán et al. 2012, 17), but 
also South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, and Ethiopia (Chun June 2013, 15). Nor is China alone 
among emerging donors in concentrating its aid efforts mostly on Africa. Brazil, for instance 
dedicates about 30 percent of its aid to the continent, South Africa even 95 percent (though 
India only gives about 3 percent to Africa) (Chun June 2013).  
Similar to the range of recipients, China has also recently diversified the range of sectors it 
invests in. Whereas investments in the oil sector (and generally the hard sectors of infrastructure, 
textile manufacturing) still receive conceivable attention, other sectors such as soft, social sec-
tors (for instance in health and education) have also received growing attention (Chin 2012, 582; 
Chun June 2013; Dyer, January 24, 2008; Alden 2007, 8–36; Morazán et al. 2012, 17; Foster et 
al. 2009; Kragelund 2010b, 18; Grimm et al. 2010, 61–69). Significantly, China imports about 
46 percent of its oil from Africa (note however that India imports 70 percent) (Obi 2010).  
                                                 
48 USD 1.9 billion or USD 2 billion (Morazán et al. 2012, 17; F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011, 728; Carbonnier 
2012, 201; Adugna et al. 2011, 17–23), up to USD 2.5 billion (OECD DAC 2014a), USD 3 billion (P. Davies 2010, 
5–6; Kragelund 2012, 705), estimates of up to USD 10 billion (Rowlands January 2008). Deborah Brautigam (2010) 
estimates that in 2008, USD 1.4 billion went to Africa alone. In comparison, in the same year the United States 
spent USD 7.2 billion on Africa in ODA and the UK USD 2.6 billion (Brautigam 2009, 172).  
49 Note that numbers vary again. Peter Kragelund (2010b, 5–9) puts the percentage at 44 points whereas the Chi-
nese White Paper from 2014 claims that 51.8 percent go to Africa (China's Information Office of the State Council 
2014). Data from the new aid platform aiddata.org suggests that most projects take place in Cambodia (307), Pa-
kistan (381) and Zimbabwe (334), whereas Angola, Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia all 
have more than 200 projects (AidData).  
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What, then, are the main drivers of Chinese development assistance? First, it is important to 
remember that this is not new; it builds upon a long tradition of anti-colonialism and support 
for other Southern developing countries during the Cold War (Alden 2007, 8–36; Yu 2010; 
Dittmer 2010; Zhou 2012). Titles like “China returns to Africa” emphasise the importance of 
the historic ties that began with the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Alden, Large, and Soares de 
Oliveira 2008a; Haifang 2010). One symbolic example for the relationship between China and 
Africa is the construction of the Tazara railway track in Tanzania that started in 1965 (Monson 
2008; Yu 1988) or a similar dam project in Egypt in 1956 (Chun June 2013, 10–12). Since that 
time, China’s assistance is built upon the Eight principles for China’s aid to third world countries, first 
mentioned by Zhou Enlai in 1961. They were reiterated in the first Chinese white paper on 
foreign aid in 2011 (Information Office of the State Council 2011).50  
The close historical ties cannot negate the fact that solidarity might no longer be the main mo-
tivator for Chinese assistance. While it is important not to overemphasise the importance of the 
economic dimension (a common flaw of the research, which has often failed to strictly separate 
ODA from other economic flows), the quest for new energy resources and new markets for 
products is clearly one of the driving factors (Brautigam 2011b, 216–17; Baumgartner and 
Godehardt 2012). Next to this economic dimension is the political desire to further isolate Tai-
wan and to increase support for Beijing’s One China policy (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 
2008b, 6–10; Kragelund 2010b, 18; Stähle 2008a). Moreover, evidence from aid.data suggests 
that China strongly supports those countries that vote with it in the UN Security Council, im-
plying a significant diplomatic counterpart to Chinese aid policy (The Economist 2016a). What 
is often overlooked is that China was the biggest recipient of aid during the second half of the 
1990s and into the mid-2000s, implying that it might also be eager to share this experience with 
other developing countries (Chin 2012, 593). But this depiction as a benevolent Southern pro-
vider is increasingly compromised by reality (Chin 2012, 586–89). What ultimately defines Chi-
nese aid, and what distinguishes it most clearly from traditional donors, is that it openly follows 
its self-interests (Zhou 2012).  
4.1.2 India’s development assistance 
Emma Mawdsley (2010) argues that DAC donors (in Kenya, the example she uses) should not 
limit their attention to Chinese aid efforts but should also consider India’s contributions. India 
itself is eager to uphold the distinction between its own development cooperation and that of 
China and largely benefits from this lack of attention (Sidiropoulos 2011; Mokry and Destradi 
2011; Destradi and Küssner 2013). Whereas India is often neglected as a case study, some recent 
very good empirical articles exist (Mawdsley and McCann 2010; Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013).  
Similar to China (and the other two cases that we will see), India has a very fragmented aid 
system (Kragelund 2010b, 9–13; Agrawal 2007; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; Stuenkel 
                                                 
50 The eight principles foresee the following: (1) to emphasise equality and mutual benefit, (2) to respect sover-
eignty, (3) to provide interest-free or low-interest loans, (4) to help recipient countries develop independence and 
self-reliance, (5) to build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly, (6) to provide 
quality equipment and material at market prices, (7) to ensure effective technical assistance, and (8) to pay experts 
according to local standards (Chin and Frolic 2007; Chin 2012, 590).  
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2010). The main actor is the Ministry of External Affairs (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013; Cha-
turvedi 2012c; Morazán et al. 2012). Moreover, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, and 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry have become increasingly important with the Ministry of 
Commerce and the Exim Bank nearly replacing the Ministry of External Affairs as the main 
actor (Kragelund 2010b, 18; Large June 2013, 34–35). Similarly, business and trade lobbies have 
become more prominent in Indian foreign policy (Malik and Medcalf; Vines 2010).  
Overall, India is less well organised than China, but better than Brazil or South Africa (Rowlands 
2012, 639). Despite the lack of a conclusive or comprehensive approach towards aid, aid policies 
are important for India (Chaturvedi 2012c, 2012d). Several smaller initiatives are worth men-
tioning: first, ITEC – Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation – which started in 1964 and con-
sists of tied grants and technical assistance. The funds are mostly directed toward neighbouring 
countries with a strong focus on training in the areas of rural development and health projects 
(Chaturvedi 2012c). Second, SCAAP – Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme – also 
began in 1964 with similar aims and modalities than ITEC, but this was directed at 19 African 
Commonwealth countries. Third, the Focus Africa Programme, initiated in 2002, focuses on inter-
net and communication technology, infrastructure and agriculture. Fourth, the TEAM 9 initia-
tive – Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement – started in 2004 and consists of credit 
lines to promote trade and investment; this goes to 9 selected African countries (Kragelund 
2010b, 9–10; Mawdsley 2010; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; Mawdsley and McCann 
2010).51 Finally, modelled on the success of the Chinese FOCAC meetings, from 2008 India has 
engaged in institutionalized India-Africa summits (Price 2011). Additional to these myriad struc-
tures, in January 2012 India set up (after a long period of negotiation) an aid agency under the 
umbrella of the Ministry of External Affairs, called Development Partnership Administration (Cha-
turvedi 2012c; Ministry of External Affairs 2016).52 Some authors see the agency as “the recog-
nition by the Indian establishment that India has arrived as a global player with strategic inter-
ests” (Patel, July 26, 2011).  
As with China, it is difficult to find an exact amount of Indian development assistance. The 
figure is mostly estimated to be around USD 0.5 and 1 billion. This is equivalent to the aid 
volume of Luxembourg and Kuwait and clearly lower than the amount for China (F. Zimmer-
mann and K. Smith 2011, 724).53  
The financial crisis that triggered a slowing down of traditional aid does not seem to have mean-
ingfully affected Indian aid (Economic Advisory Council 2011; The Economist 2010c; Bartsch, 
Gupta, and M. Sharma 2010). On the contrary, it seems that India has gained momentum during 
                                                 
51 The nine countries are Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Sen-
egal and India.  
52 Among the negotiations was also the setting on a particular name for the agency, for instance, for a long time 
the agency was supposed to be called Indian Agency for Partnership in Development (Taneja, July 01, 2012). Other delays 
occurred because it was unclear whether the agency should be under the umbrella of the Ministry of External 
Affairs or that of the Ministry of Commerce (Mitra, June 08, 2010; Patel, July 26, 2011).  
53 For instance, USD 0.75 billion per year, estimate for 2009 flows (Adugna et al. 2011, 17–23; Morazán et al. 2012, 
17), USD 0.5 to USD 1 billion (P. Davies 2010; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; OECD DAC 2014a), strict 
ODA for 2007 USD 547 million (Kragelund 2012, 705); estimates of aid figures from 2006 range up to USD 1.4 
billion (Kragelund 2010b, 18), aid volume for 2009/2010 at about 488 USD million (F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 
2011). 
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the financial crisis (Okonjo-Iweala 2011). Nevertheless, India continues to struggle with consid-
erable poverty issues at home (Ramachandran 5.10.2010).  
Through its own economic growth, India has rediscovered its interest in Africa, (Chaturvedi 
and Mohanty 2007; Aiyar 2011). Nevertheless, most of its aid focusses on neighbouring coun-
tries, with South Asian countries receiving the lion’s share of its aid (Morazán et al. 2012; Fuchs 
and Vadlamannati 2013; Agrawal 2007; Humphrey 2011; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; 
Government of the United Progressive Alliance 2011; Bijoy 2010). A smaller percentage is dis-
tributed to African countries (Kragelund 2010b, 18; Humphrey 2011; Fuchs and Vadlamannati 
2013; Bijoy 2010). The picture is very different when we look at lines of credits, which are mostly 
extended to Sub-Saharan Africa (Humphrey 2011; Chaturvedi 2012c, 2012d, 567–68).  
The principal recipients are Bhutan, Afghanistan (where India is one of the top five donors, 
(Bijoy 2010, 69)), Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka (F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011, 729; 
Ghose 2014, 72). This focus on neighbouring countries is explained by Nitin Pai (April 2011) 
as a “paradox of proximity”; India has a complex relationship with its neighbours because it is 
highly dependent on their stability, but intervening in neighbouring states is hard to sell – which 
makes development assistance a perfect combination of helping and intervening.  
India’s growth rates are highly dependent on the import of oil – as we have already seen, India 
imports 70 percent of its oil from Africa (Obi 2010). Are economic sectors thus the major focus 
of its aid projects? Again, it is useful to distinguish aid from lines of credit. Whereas aid projects 
largely focus on India’s own strength – technological advances – and therefore promote science 
and technology, education and health and lines of credit tend to focus on the power sector, on 
infrastructural projects (railways, engineering and construction) as well as on some agricultural 
projects (sugar production and irrigation projects) (Kragelund 2010b, 18; Mawdsley 2010, 368–
69; Agrawal 2007; Chaturvedi 2012d, 568; Bijoy 2010; Morazán et al. 2012; Price 2011).54 More-
over, India has an increasing role in humanitarian projects, which it (arguably) uses to increase 
its soft power potential (Meier and Murthy 2011; Price 2005).  
India can look back on a long tradition of cooperating with and supporting developing coun-
tries. As head of the non-alignment movement during the Cold War, India has strong historic 
ties with many nations and has a huge diaspora living on the African continent (Chaturvedi 
2012d; Large June 2013; A. Sharma 2007). The beginning of Indian aid activities took place in 
1964, not long after China’s (Sinha 2010). The Panscheel and the Bandung principles guide Indian 
development cooperation up to the present day.55 2003 is often seen as a turning point for India 
to engage more strongly in development projects (Stuenkel 2010).  
The main drivers for Indian development cooperation are manifold. First, there is a desire to 
increase India’s geopolitical influence in relation to China.56 Second, there is a need to find new 
energy resources, and finally, there is a desire to generally increase India’s bargaining position, 
                                                 
54 Note that Andreas Fuchs and Krishna Vadlamannati (2013) challenge that with their data, arguing that still 45 
percent of Indian aid goes to commercial sectors which is indicative of a strong economic interest in aid. Never-
theless, they also show that 15 percent go to water and sanitation.  
55 These principles are (1) mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, mutual non-
interference, (3) equality and mutual benefit, and (4) peaceful co-existence (Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009).  
56 There are also some cooperative projects between India and China in the African oil sector (Obi 2010).  
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most obvious in the ambition to aim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Agrawal 
2007; Naidu 2008b; Sinha 2010; Kragelund 2010a; Naidu 2010; Sahni 2007; D. Sharma and 
Mahajan 2007; Vines and Oruitemeka 2008; Bhattacharya 2010; Mawdsley and McCann 2010, 
86–88; Ghose 2014). The strong economic drive can maybe also explain the paradox that India 
often gives aid to countries that are wealthier in terms of income per capita than itself (Fuchs 
and Vadlamannati 2013, 116–19; Ghose 2013; Large June 2013). 
Overall, India is very careful to distinguish itself from traditional donors – for instance through 
the refusal to be referred to as a donor or through the insistence that it does not wish to promote 
democracy because that is seen as interfering in internal affairs (Sahni 2007; Taneja, July 01, 
2012). As a result, India is much more confrontational in international debates (for instance 
within the debate surrounding the Sustainable Development Goals) with other traditional do-
nors than the other emerging donors presented here (Jiao 2014). By contrast, the next two cases 
presented here are not, in fact, averse to close co-operation with traditional donors.  
4.1.3 Brazil’s development assistance 
Brazil’s foreign aid is closely linked to its foreign policy. Aid was enhanced during the Presidency 
of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (or Lula), who aimed at making Brazil a relevant international player. 
This ambition also included spending significantly more on development projects in third coun-
tries (Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012, 530; Kragelund 2010b, 13–15; ONE 2010, 210; Mug-
gah and Passarelli Hamann 2012; Costa Vaz and Aoki Inoue 2007; Cabral, Russo, and Wein-
stock 2014).  
Within the realm of Southern providers, Brazil had one of the first agencies for managing for-
eign aid – the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC – Brazilian Agency for Cooperation), which 
was founded in 1987 (admittedly to deal largely with the receipt of foreign aid). The ABC is 
subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and played an increasing role in Lula’s presi-
dency but has become less prominent in the wake of Dilma Rousseff’s budget cuts (Kragelund 
2010b, 18; Morazán et al. 2012, 17; Saravia 2012; Burges 2014; Inoue and Vaz 2012; Burges 
2014; White 2013). Despite this institutionalisation, Brazil still does not have the legal frame-
work to officially provide aid, while monitoring and evaluation remain underdeveloped (Cabral, 
Russo, and Weinstock 2014; Sousa 2010). Overall, its system is therefore considered to be more 
diffuse than that of India or China (Rowlands 2012, 640) and to be highly fragmented (Cabral 
and Weinstock 2010b). To illustrate this point, it is sufficient to look into the structure within 
the ABC which has a total of seven not clearly distinguishable sub-departments.57  
Next to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ABC, other influential players are the National 
Bank for Economic and Social Development which provides export financing (a mechanism 
redirecting trade form imports from the industrialised North to the South), largely state con-
trolled Brazilian multinationals (such as Petrobras for oil, Odebrecht for construction and Vale 
                                                 
57 These are: (1) technical cooperation between developing countries; (2) bilateral received technical cooperation; 
(3) multilateral received technical cooperation; (4) cooperation in health, social development, education and pro-
fessional training; (5) donor cooperation in agriculture, energy, biofuels, and environment; (6) general coordination 
of donor cooperation in information technology, e-government, civil defence, urban planning and transportation; 
(7) general coordination of donor or recipient TCDC (Saravia 2012, 118–19).  
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for mining)58 and international financial mechanism (IBSA, BRICS Bank – see below for more 
details) (Burges 2014, 359–60; A. Christina Alves June 2013; Stolte 2012). Moreover, EM-
BRAPA – the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corperation – is a powerful actor in promoting the use 
of biofuels and SENAI (the National Service for Industrial Training) also provides considerable 
amounts for improving the social welfare of people working in industries (White 2013). Overall, 
some commentators fear that Brazil might have overstretched its capacity, especially institution-
ally (A. Christina Alves June 2013).  
Despite the central agency, it is rather difficult to put a clear figure on Brazilian aid. Estimates 
range from USD 85 to 1275 million, but most agree that Brazil spends roughly USD 400 million 
annually.59 With that amount, Brazil gives approximately as much as New Zealand or Poland 
and slightly less than India (F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011, 724). Sean Burges argues, 
however, that most amounts are highly unrepresentative because many of the actual costs are 
integrated by individual ministries and not accounted for as development assistance. Therefore, 
he claims that instead of the often claimed 0.02% of Brazil’s income, a 0.10% or even 0.15% is 
likely to be spent in aid (Burges 2014, 358).  
Unlike India, Brazil spends most of its aid on African countries and gives smaller shares to its 
neighbours. About 57 percent goes to Africa, whereas Latin American countries receive 37 per-
cent. Moreover, funds directed to Africa seem to be increasing (Burges 2014; White 2013). Pri-
ority recipients are Portuguese speaking countries in Africa (PALOP community); most projects 
are directed towards Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Mozambique 
(Kragelund 2010b, 14; ONE 2010, 210). Within Latin America, Mercosur countries (especially 
Paraguay and Bolivia), the Andeans and Haiti are the biggest recipients (Kragelund 2010b, 18; 
Morazán et al. 2012, 17; Stuenkel 2010; Saravia 2012, 129; Inoue and Vaz 2012). Recently, Bra-
zilian initiatives also go beyond the Portuguese speaking community in Africa (Inoue and Vaz 
2012).  
Generally, Brazilian aid is highly demand driven, which owes partly to the difficult institutional 
structure of its foreign aid (Saravia 2012). Sectors in which it invests most are agriculture, energy 
and especially health care, education and technology (Cabral and Weinstock 2010b, 6; White 
2013; Niu 2014; Kragelund 2010b, 13–15; Morazán et al. 2012; Cabral, Russo, and Weinstock 
2014). These are also the fields where Brazil believes it has a valuable experience to share (Stolte 
2012; Inoue and Vaz 2012). The values within Brazilian development cooperation are often 
considered to be rather congruent with European donors (Sousa 2010), a fact which might also 
explain why Brazil is particularly interested in cooperation with traditional donors in trilateral 
projects (Muggah and Passarelli Hamann 2012, 110–12; Rowlands 2012; Sousa 2010; Chaturvedi 
2012a; Saravia 2012, 130–31).  
                                                 
58 Note that the support that these multinationals receive from the Brazilian government is to be considered mod-
erate, if compared to China, argues Lyal White (2013).  
59 The lowest estimate of USD 85 million comes from (P. Davies 2010, 5–6). Kragelund (2012, 705) and (2010b, 
18) estimates USD 356 million, a figure that is also close to that of Zimmermann and Smith (2011, 724), Adugna 
et al. (2011, 17–23). The OECD DAC estimates up to USD 500 million (OECD DAC 2014a). Higher estimates 
of about USD 1 billion are considered by Carbonnier (2012, 201), Morazán et al. (2012, 17), and Cabral and Wein-
stock (2010a). The highest estimate of USD 1.3 billion comes from Sousa (2010). 
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Brazil, like China and India, can also look back on a long history of South-South cooperation 
since its first initiative in 1950 within the National Commission for Technical Assistance (Sara-
via 2012, 118–19). Partly due to its own colonial past and the history of the slave trade, Brazil 
also has close links to Africa (A. Christina Alves June 2013).  
Next to this ostensibly idealistic desire, other more rational explanations can be found for Bra-
zil’s interest in foreign aid. Brazil, like India, is aiming to obtain a permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council, an ambition which could be satisfied more easily if it enlists the sympathies of 
other countries (Cabral and Weinstock 2010a; Seibert 2009). Moreover, Brazil is eager to limit 
the influence of the United States in Latin America (A. Christina Alves June 2013). Sean Burges 
(2014, 370) also argues that through aid, Brazil is learning to create its own international capacity 
(through domestic development plans and through attempts to internationalise firms). This eco-
nomic drive is also fuelled by the fact that 90 percent of Brazil’s imports come from Africa – 
though Brazil has plenty of resources and is therefore less dependent on these imports than 
China or India (Stolte 2012). Much as in the Chinese or Indian cases, then, Brazilian motives 
combine self-interest with altruism (Inoue and Vaz 2012).  
4.1.4 South Africa’s development assistance 
South Africa is the last country from the group of emerging donors that this study will focus 
on. Though it is arguably a late-comer in international aid, South Africa has the advantage of its 
location. As a pivotal power in Africa, its interest in aid is therefore no less pronounced than 
that of the three previous countries.  
Traditionally, the African Renaissance and Development Fund (ARF) was considered to be one of the 
main institutions of South African development assistance. Nevertheless, the ARF only consti-
tuted roughly 3 to 4 percent of the total of South African ODA and urgently needed reform 
because it was considered highly inefficient (Kragelund 2010b, 18; Besharati 2013b; Vickers 
2012, 537–40). The ARF, itself established in 2000, works under the Department for Interna-
tional Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO – previously Department of Foreign Affairs) and 
provides untied grant financing (Vickers 2012, 537–40). Finally, in 2010 South Africa created a 
new agency – the South African Development Partnership – SADPA, as a separate arm of govern-
ment but under the policy directives of DIRCO (Vickers 2012, 551). This new agency, it is 
hoped, could help South Africa to place a “niche role” in trilateral partnerships as a “develop-
ment broker” and as a “gateway to Africa” (Vickers 2012, 537; Alden and Schoeman 2013, 
124).60 Next to SADPA, another fund was created – the Partnership for Development Fund, 
under the shared control of DIRCO, the Finance Ministry, and the management of SADPA 
(Vickers 2012). Moreover, South Africa transfers considerable sums of money through the South 
African Custom Union (SACU) to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland within the world’s 
                                                 
60 Very similar to the creation of the Indian development agency, the creation of SADPA did not come without 
huge controversies, starting with its name which was changed from SAIDA – South African International Development 
Agency, but also asking uncomfortable questions whether South Africa should not be dealing with its own problems 
first (Besharati 2013b; Tapula, Kock, and Sturman, October 21, 2011). Moreover, there were lengthy debates 
whether or not SADPA should be integrated within the Department for International Relations and Cooperation 
or not. The hope still is that the creation of SADPA will also trigger many funds for trilateral projects (Morazán et 
al. 2012, 17; Sidiropoulos 2012a; Grimm 2010). Even though SADPA was officially created in 2010, it took much 
longer to actually start functioning in April 2013 (Alden and Schoeman 2013; Vickers 2012, 536).  
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oldest custom union, even though its future is uncertain (Vickers 2012; Grimm 2010). Before 
the creation of SADPA, the aid system within South Africa was considered to be highly frag-
mented. There is little to suggest that this has changed considerably since SADPA’s creation 
(Sidiropoulos 2012b); hence South African aid, much like Brazil’s, can be considered fairly dis-
organised (Rowlands 2012, 644; Braude, Thandrayan, and Sidiropoulos).  
The estimated amounts of aid given by South Africa are considerably lower than those of the 
other three emerging donors, with similar problems in accounting. Estimates range between 
USD 61 million to 475 million (P. Davies 2010, 5–6).61 In terms of the ratio of development 
assistance in relation to the gross national income, this amounts to a considerable 0.7 percent – 
the target set for DAC donors that Western donors barely reach (Vickers 2012, 536–38).62 
The main recipients of South African aid are its African neighbours (Beaudet, Haslam, and 
Schafer 2012; F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011, 729; Braude, Thandrayan, and Sidiropoulos). 
About 70 percent of its aid goes to members of the South African Development Community 
(SADC) and overall 95 percent remains on the African continent (ONE 2010, 208; Grimm 
2011).63 The biggest recipients are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Comoros and 
Zimbabwe (Morazán et al. 2012, 17). 
The sectoral focus is where South Africa distinguishes itself most from its fellow emerging do-
nors. In fact, as we shall see shortly, South African aid looks much more like the sectoral focus 
of a traditional donor. The main sectors are democratisation, post-conflict resolution, peace-
building and generally humanitarian assistance, but also infrastructure (Kragelund 2010b, 18; 
Morazán et al. 2012; Besharati 2013b; Vickers 2012; Alden and Schoeman 2013). Moreover, 
South Africa seems to be alone among the four emerging donors in preferring multilateral chan-
nels to bilateral aid (Grimm 2011; Sidiropoulos 2012a). Similar to Brazil, South Africa shows a 
strong interest in trilateral cooperation because it needs increasing funds (Sidiropoulos 2012a).  
What characterises the tradition within which South Africa has started to become a regional 
donor? One of the main drivers of South Africa is the feeling that they have to repair a debt to 
their African neighbours because of the atrocities committed under the name of Apartheid. This 
“Apartheid guilt” (Sidiropoulos 2012a, 100) or “guilt complex” (Grimm 2010, 2011) is often 
considered to be highly significant and to explain South Africa’s eagerness to present a new 
image. Nevertheless, this difficult relationship often makes South Africa extremely cautious in 
order not to appear too interventionist (Sidiropoulos 2011; Vickers 2012, 548–50; Besharati 
2013b). The normative drivers behind aid – focusing on democracy promotion, good govern-
ance and conflict prevention – indicate that South Africa also needs stable surroundings in order 
to continue to grow (Besharati 2013b; Vickers 2012; Grimm 2011; Sidiropoulos 2012b). More-
over, it could be indicative of South Africa’s ambitions to become a regional power (Kragelund 
2010b, 15–17) and to become generally more visible (Alden and Schoeman 2013). 
                                                 
61 Most estimate the amount to be around USD 100 million (Adugna et al. 2011, 17–23; Morazán et al. 2012, 17; 
Kragelund 2012, 705; F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011, 729). Considerably lower is the estamite of 57 USD 
million (Carbonnier 2012, 201), whereas the highest estimates is USD 433 million annually (Besharati 2013b, 32).  
62 Sven Grimm (2011) even puts the figure at about 1 percent.  
63 Members of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mau-
ritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.  
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While economic motives and commercial expansion should not be cast aside as a rationale for 
explaining aid (Besharati 2013b; Vickers 2012), South Africa is also particularly eager to share 
its own experience of transition from racial capitalism towards a growing democracy. Moreover, 
just like the other countries, South Africa can look back on a long history as a recipient of aid 
(even though most funds were received by NGOs as the Apartheid government was often 
avoided by Western donors (Besharati 2013b).  
Next to the individual donor initiatives, two multilateral initiatives also deserve to be mentioned. 
IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa dialogue forum) is an initiative which since 2003 has focused on 
increasing trade relations between the three countries, but also on South-South cooperation and 
its coordination (India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum 2011; Lai 15.3.2006; P. Alves 2007; 
Mokoena 2007). All participants share a commitment in their national policies to democracy 
and human rights and to supporting international law, peace and stability, indicating the “dem-
ocratic ethos” of the group (Saravia 2012, 127; Panda 2013, 299). Jagannath Panda (2013, 299–
300) argues that the creation of the BRICS group could have been China’s reaction to IBSA, as 
China plays a leading role in the former while being excluded from the latter. The BRICS have 
recently agreed upon the creation of the New Development Bank, potentially as a rival to the 
World Bank and the IMF (Rowlands 2012).  
In conclusion – despite huge varieties in their constitutional political system – all emerging do-
nors give increasing amounts of aid to an increasing number of recipients. Moreover, what mat-
ters most is the fact that they represent a different model to traditional donors (Kragelund 
2010b, 18–22). All four emerging donors seem to give some money to their neighbouring coun-
tries (although to differing degrees), focus on technical assistance and economic growth as the 
key to development while aiming at a non-interventionist approach to the politics of recipients 
(Morazán et al. 2012, 10–17). All are characterised by a diversity of actors involved in the aid-
giving process, all share considerable institutional challenges and all use project-related aid (Cha-
turvedi, Fues, and Sidiropoulos 2012, 8–9). Moreover, even though the sectoral focus is fairly 
diversified, all still emphasise projects on infrastructure, mostly resource-rich countries, tech-
nical cooperation, and stress the fact that their aid is mutually beneficial (Walz and Ramachan-
dran 2011, 14–20).  
But with this profile of emerging donors in mind, a new question arises; what characterises the 
three traditional donors that this study investigates? The next sections deal with this question.  
4.2 Introducing the policies of traditional donors 
As the three traditional donors – the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom – are the 
main focus of this study’s investigation, the methods chapter further explains the selection of 
these particular cases.  
Many studies have investigated the motives in aid giving of the group of traditional donors. As 
we saw with emerging donors, aid giving fulfils a variety of purposes also for traditional donors 
(Lancaster 2007; seems to be further confirmed by Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp 2014; 
Lancaster 2008, 2009; Nunnenkamp, Öhler, and Thiele 2013). In her study of the domestic 
factors which drive the foreign aid policies of five traditional donors, Carol Lancaster (2007) 
identifies five purposes, two of them altruistic (developmental and humanitarian purposes) and 
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three of them linked to donor self-interest (diplomatic, commercial, cultural purposes) (for in-
stance, S. Brown 2012, 147–48; Hook and Rumsey 2015; Sogge 2002; Hoeffler and Outram 
2011; Berthelemy 2006b, 2006a). Stephan Klingebiel argues that in recent years, aid has become 
more altruistic and mainly aims at the eradication of poverty (Klingebiel 2014, 9–11).64  
The domestic setting is important and can explain aid volatility (Tingley 2010; Travis 2010; 
Kleibl 2013). Jörg Faust (2008, 2011) argues, for instance, that countries with a high domestic 
commitment to accountability, democracy and transparency are likely to spend more on aid. 
While Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (2000) argue that aid is sensitive to democratisation, 
other factors are more relevant for explaining aid patterns in the past, such as colonial history 
or the recipient country’s relationship to the UN. Other studies also argue that UN Security 
Council membership dramatically increases aid flows which in the end harm the recipients 
(Bueno de Mesquita and A. Smith 2010), while others contradict this assertion (Bashir and Lim 
2013). The following sections on the United States, Norway and the UK therefore follow an 
identical structure to that used on emerging donors, focusing on the domestic setting of aid, on 
the amounts spent, the main recipients and sectors and, finally, the official rationale behind aid.  
4.2.1 United States of America: the biggest nominal contributor of aid 
The United States is often considered to be the founder of recent foreign aid initiatives; the 
Marshall fund after the Second World War was the first big scaled aid policy (Lancaster 2007, 
212–15; Wood 1986; North and Foote North 2008). During the period under investigation, 
George W. Bush’s two terms in office lasted from 2001 under Republican rule until 2009 when 
Barack Obama’s democrats took over until 2016.65 
Several positions are important within the U.S. system: the U.S. Secretary of State’s is crucial for 
understanding foreign aid. The position was held by Colin Powell from 2001 to 2005, followed 
by Condoleezza Rice from 2005 to 2008, while under Obama it was occupied by Hilary Clinton 
in the first administration and John Kerry in the second. The position of the Under Secretary 
for Democracy and Global Affairs was held by Paula Dobriansky under the two terms of 
George W. Bush and by Mario Otero under Obama’s first administration. During his second 
term, the post changed into Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and 
Human Rights and is currently held by Sarah Sewall. Within the U.S. State department, since 
2006 there has been a post within the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources which su-
pervises U.S. aid activities. The U.S. Department of State is responsible for approximately 17 
percent of U.S. foreign aid (Lundsgaarde 2013, 4).  
                                                 
64 Other studies indicate that grants do not necessarily go to the neediest countries, slightly contradicting Klinge-
biel’s findings (Johansson 2011). 
65 An interesting study argues that it does not matter which political party is in charge of the US government, but 
what matters is whether Congress and Presidency are occupied by the same party – in which case aid will increase 
(M. P. Goldstein and Moss 2005). For the studied period, this was the case for 108th - 109th Congress (both Repub-
licans, 2003-2007), and 111th Congress (both Democrats, 2009-2011), but not for the 110th Congress (2007-2009), 
when Democrats held complete Congress, but Republicans the Presidency or from 112th to 114th Congress (2011-
2017) when Republicans held the House of Republicans or the complete Congress, but the Democrats the Presi-
dency.   
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Next to the State Department, two other institutions are highly relevant for delivering U.S. aid: 
First, the United States Agency for International Development – USAID. The most prominent 
post within this agency is held by its administrator – currently, Galye Smith (since April 2015) 
after Rajiv Shah, who served during Obama’s first time in office, resigned. Under George W. 
Bush, Andrew Natsios (2001-2006), Randall Tobias (2006-2007) and Henrietta Fore (2007-
2009) served in this position. USAID is responsible for implementing about 50 percent of U.S. 
foreign aid (Lundsgaarde 2013, 4). Despite that high percentage, USAID has recently faced a 
lot of criticism which also led to the creation of a new relevant institution for disbursing aid 
(Picard and Groelsema 2008).  
This new relevant institution is the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), formally created 
in January 2004 by the U.S. Congress. The programme is additional to the undertakings of 
USAID and has the clear mission to reward good performers with a clear set of indicators that 
candidates need to pass in order to be eligible for receiving support from the MCC (Buss 2008). 
The first CEO of the MCC was Paul Applegarth until John Danilovich took over from 2005 to 
2009. Under Obama, Daniel W. Yohannes served until 2014 when Dana Hyde took the office. 
Other ministries which play a role in U.S. aid are the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, 
the Department of Defense as well as the Office of Management of Budget (Lancaster 2007, 
100–105).66 Moreover the Presidency itself can use its power to exploit room for interpretation 
left by Congress for deciding upon the distribution of aid (Höse 2012).67 Other than the official 
governmental agencies and the Congress, lobby groups and business play an increasingly im-
portant role in U.S. aid (S. Hall 2011; Milner and Tingley 2009). Overall, the United States has 
a highly fragmented system (Lancaster 2007, 92–109; Hook 2008a, 96–98; OECD DAC 2006b; 
Epstein 2011; Klingebiel 2014, 221; Kevenhörster 2014, 221).  
On average, the United States has spent USD 29.4 billion annually over the last ten years and is 
the biggest nominal donor in the world.68 In terms of GNI, however, the U.S. fares rather badly, 
with on average of 0.19 percent, very far off the 0.7 target (OECD DAC 2006b; OECD Stat 
2015f). A high percentage of over 80 percent is spent on bilateral aid and only a minor share on 
multilateral aid (a fact that is lamented by the peer review of DAC, OECD DAC 2006b; Milner 
and Tingley 2013)69.  
Top recipients from the United States are the two countries where its soldiers were (or still are) 
fighting the war on terror: Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by Sudan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Kenya, 
West Bank and Palestine, Jordan, and Colombia (OECD Stat 2015b). This statistic gives some 
credibility to the argument that the United States generally does not focus strongly on African 
countries (Schraeder 2001). Together with Norway, the United States has a strong proliferation 
                                                 
66 The Department of Treasury is responsible for multilateral aid whereas the Department of Defense is in charge 
of military assistance (Breuning and Linebarger 2012, 347). 
67 Such presidential initiatives are quite popular and can, at times, be highly influential. Under Bush’s presidency, 
two main initiatives started: the most famous one is the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). More-
over, Bush’s initiative started the Millennium Challenge Account. Under Obama’s presidency, three big initiatives 
started: the Feed the Future (FTF) initiative concentrating on the promotion of a comprehensive approach to food 
security; the Global Health Initiative (GHI), building on Bush’s PEPFAR initiative; and the Global Climate Change 
Initiative (GCCI) aiming at integrating sustainable development in its aid projects (The White House 22.09.2010).  
68 After the financial crisis, foreign policy and especially foreign aid were severely hit by budget cuts (Myers, Octo-
ber 03, 2011). 
69 Multilateral aid is not always considered to be less donor interested as there are possibilities to earmark multilat-
eral funds which makes the donor recognisable (Klingebiel 2013b).  
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of aid recipients. Only the United Kingdom seems to pursue a more targeted approach in the 
choice of its recipients (Birdsall 2008). 
In the last ten years, the United States has spent nearly 50 percent on social infrastructure and 
sectors (with the highest share within this on government and civil society and on reproductive 
health), 10 percent on economic infrastructure and sectors, 6 percent on productive sectors, 
nearly 5 percent on cross-cutting and multisector, 15.5 percent on humanitarian aid, and 2.6 
percent on debt relief (OECD Stat 2015a). 
The U.S. pursues several goals through its aid: first, it is concerned with security issues and 
thereby aid follows a diplomatic rationale (S. Brown 2012, 152; Hook 2008b, 2008a; J. Wendt 
2004; Winters 2013; Woods 2005; Korb 2008; Natsios 2006; Patrick and K. Brown 2006; 
Younas 2008), but equally important are developmental concerns (Lancaster 2007, 62–109; 
Breuning and Linebarger 2012).70 Others argue that, independent of who is in charge of the 
White House, trade and security issues dominate foreign aid decisions (Nuscheler 2005, 489–
99). This seems to be confirmed by a recent ranking (commitment to Development Index from 
2009, published by the Center for Global Development), in which the United States was placed 
only 18th – whereas the UK (9th) and Norway (3rd) both seem to be better committed to devel-
opment purposes (S. Brown 2012, 153). Moreover, public opinion in the U.S. is considered ill 
informed about aid levels and is highly critical of foreign aid (Degnbol-Martinussen, Engberg-
Pedersen, and Bille 2005, 76–79; Gieg 2010).  
The 2002 Foreign Assistance Act enshrined the following five principles in order to guide U.S. 
foreign assistance: (1) alleviation of the worst poverty, 2) promotion of conditions for economic 
growth, 3) encouragement of civic and political rights, integration of DCs into equitable inter-
national economic system and (5) the promotion of good governance through combating cor-
ruption and improving transparency and accountability (U.S. Government 1961; amended 2002, 
19). While the promotion of good governance and human rights is also strongly advocated by 
American academics (Diamond 2008), a study investigating the sensitivity of the U.S. to reac-
tions towards human rights improvements shows that the U.S. tends to react by lowering its aid 
commitments by four percent if there is no improvement or a deterioration, but increases its 
aid by two percent if democracy improves (Hoeffler and Outram 2011, 246–48).  
                                                 
70 As an indication for spending aid for diplomatic purposes, Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele 
(2008) argue that the US uses its aid to put pressure on recipients to vote alongside its own interests within the 
United Nations General Assembly. Moreover, many argue that since 9/11 the focus is more on security issues, 
which leads to an increase, for instance, of aid for fragile states (Harbeson 2008). Other studies indicate that the 
US tends to support the neighbours of its rivals or attempt to promote democracy through its aid (Rudloff, J. M. 
Scott, and Blew 2013; Windsor 2008). 
Generally, the US performs worse than the UK or Norway when evaluating whether its aid policies respond to 
neediness of recipients which could be an argument against a strong developmental purpose in aid (Nunnenkamp 
and Thiele 2006). 
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4.2.2 Norway: the good donor?  
Norway – and more broadly the group of Scandinavian countries – is often considered to be a 
“good donor” (Lumsdaine 1993, 135; Stokke 1989a). For instance, Alesina and Weder (2002) 
illustrate that Scandinavian countries tend to give less money to corrupt governments.71  
From 2004 till 2014, three governments have led Norway: first, a conservative coalition under 
Kjell Magne Bondevik from 2001 till 2005 which incorporated the Liberal Party, the Christian 
Democratic Party and the Conservatives. This was followed by a left-wing coalition (Labour 
party, Socialist Left, and the Centre Party) led by Jens Stoltenberg from October 2005 till Oc-
tober 2013. The elections from October 2013 led to a minority government under Erna Solberg, 
on top of a coalition encapsulating the Conservatives and the Progress Party.  
For many years, Norway had a ministry for international development, but this was abolished 
in 2013 and its responsibilities have since been transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – 
a reversal of the process normally to be found among the emerging donors.72 For the period 
under study, three ministers held the post: first, Hilde F. Johnson from the Christian Democratic 
party from 2001 till 2005, followed by Erik Solheim from October 2005 till March 2012 and 
then, in the year before its abolition, Heikki Holmas, both from the Socialist Left. Other minis-
tries relevant for this study are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs73, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.  
An interesting programme that brings Norway directly into contact with China is its Oil for 
Development initiative, a programme aiming to transfer the knowledge of Norway in the petro-
leum sector to other oil producing developing countries.  
Over the last ten years, Norway spent USD 4.8 billion annually on bilateral and multilateral 
assistance, considerably less in nominal terms than the United States. In terms of total income, 
however, Norway fares much better with a score of nearly 1 percent of its income – way above 
the 0.7 target and the best among our group and the DAC, where it is the top donor in qualita-
tive terms (OECD DAC 2004, 2008, 2013). The share of multilateral aid is at 25 percent, higher 
than for the United States, but still relatively low.  
Norway’s main recipients are Afghanistan, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Tanzania, Sudan, Brazil, 
Mozambique, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia and Somalia (OECD Stat 2015b).  
On average, Norway has spent most of its aid in the social sectors with about 40 percent (with 
the highest share going to civil society and government with almost 20 percent, slightly above 
the United States), about 10 percent on economic infrastructure and services, about 8 percent 
on production sectors, about 12 percent on cross-cutting multisector aid, and 11 percent on 
                                                 
71 Interestingly, Norway itself looks back on a colonial history: it gained its independence from Denmark in 1814, 
only to be under Swedish rule until 1905 (Förster, Schmid, and Trick 2014). 
72 This process was gradual: at first, the Ministry was put under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
with the institutional reform in 2004 (OECD DAC 2008). 
73 The position as Minister of Foreign Affairs was occupied by Jan Petersen (Conservative) from 2001 to 2005, by 
Jonas Gahr Støre (Labour) from 2005 until 2012, in 2012 as an interim by Espen Barth Eide (Labour) and since 
October by Børge Brende (Conservative). 
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humanitarian aid (a much bigger percentage than the United States) (OECD Stat 2015a; Gates 
and Hoeffler 2004).  
Similar to the United States, Norway is committed to a value driven foreign policy because its 
own society and experience are value driven (Stokke 1989b). Hence, Norway claims that its 
development policies are “first and foremost motivated by altruism” and by Norwegian social 
principles (NMFA 2009d, 112). The values of human rights, good governance and the rule of 
law are seen as policies that ensure growth and prosperity for Norway but equally for the devel-
opment countries it targets (Gahr Støre 30.01.2008, 2; Brende 25.03.2014, 4; Norad 2008b, 24). 
The study of Stephen Brown (2012) seems to confirm this value-driven policy. Nevertheless, 
commercial and political motives also play a role, even though a smaller one than for the other 
two donors considered here (Stokke 1995b) and some studies indicate that Norway does not 
seem to distribute its money to the poorest countries (Claessens, Cassimon, and van Campen-
hout 2009).  
Moreover, Norway repeatedly points out that, as a small country, its capacity to change the 
world remains limited. The logical consequence is that it should direct its efforts to selected 
countries and to areas where Norway has a special expertise. The fields in which Norway con-
siders itself to have expertise are climate change, environment and sustainable development; 
peace-building, human rights and humanitarian assistance; oil and energy; women and gender 
equality and, finally, good governance and the fight against corruption. Over time, the focus on 
human rights and good governance has become stronger and more heavily emphasised (NMFA 
2008b, 23, 2009a, 8, 2009d, 113–15, 08.10.2014a, 2014b). But Norway also maintains that its 
development cooperation should safeguard Norwegian interests at home and abroad (NMFA 
2009d, 113–15). Norway’s development aid therefore aims to be efficient, interest based and 
value driven.  
4.2.3 United Kingdom: the European donor?  
The period under study saw four British governments: Tony Blair held the post of Prime Min-
ister from 1997 to 2007 under the leadership of the Labour party. His successor Gordon Brown, 
also from Labour, held office from June 2007 till May 2010, whereupon Labour lost its majority 
to a coalition government led by the Conservative David Cameron and the leader of the Liberal 
Democrats, Nick Clegg. Since May 2015, Cameron’s Conservative party has formed a majority 
government.74  
The UK government is composed of several ministerial departments that are relevant for this 
study: with the Department for International Development (DFID) the UK pushes the issue of 
development onto the ministerial level (again since 1997, beforehand integrated into Foreign 
Office under Thatcher)75. Relevant ministers (within the UK they are referred to as Secretary of 
State for International Development) for our period are Hilary Benn from 2003 until June 2007, 
                                                 
74 Until Cameron resigned after he lost the referendum to the Brexit decision in June 2016. Despite the change in 
governments from Labour-led to Conservative-Liberal Coalition to Conservative-led, there was remarkable stabil-
ity in UK aid policies (Kevenhörster 2014, 117–22).  
75 Interestingly, Ian Hall (2013) shows that every Labour government created a ministry whereas every consecutive 
Conservative government degraded it again. David Cameron is the first who has not followed this pattern.  
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followed by Douglas Alexander from 2007 until May 2010 (both Labour party). Under Cam-
eron, Andrew Mitchell held the post from 2010 till 2012, followed by Justine Greening (both 
Conservatives) who took over in September 2012 until 2016. DFID is seen as the agenda setter 
in aid, next to the World Bank (Nuscheler 2005, 496–97). DFID is responsible for implementing 
86 percent of British ODA, (Lundsgaarde 2013, 4). 
Other important positions within DFID are the office of Permanent Secretary, which is a non-
political civil position. This position was held by Dame Nemat Shafik from 2008 until March 
2011, and finally by Marc Lowcock who took over in June 2011.  
Other relevant departments are the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (around 3 percent of 
ODA), the Treasury (below 1 percent of ODA), and the Department of Energy and Climate 
(around 2 percent of ODA) (DFID 2014e). Moreover, at the time of writing, the UK is still a 
member of the European Union, which has consistently shaped its development policy (Gänzle, 
Grimm, and Makhan 2012; Hoebink 2010a, 2010b; Hoebink and Stokke 2005).76 Generally, the 
UK has the most centralised structure of the traditional three donors and has a “strong unified 
voice” (Brombacher 2009, 14–15). 
On average, the UK has spent USD 12.9 billion on aid in the last ten years. This puts the UK 
on the second rank, somewhere between the United States and Norway in nominal terms 
(OECD DAC 2014b, 108). In terms of aid in relation to its income, the UK has an average of 
0.52 points with a strong increasing tendency.77 Since 2013, the UK has reached the 0.7 DAC 
target and significantly improved its position (OECD Stat 2015b; OECD DAC 2006a). With 
nearly 40 percent, the UK also has the highest multilateral share of all three donors.  
The main recipients of UK aid are Nigeria, India, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Pa-
kistan, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan (OECD Stat 2015b).  
The United Kingdom spends approximately 42 percent on social infrastructure and services 
(within which the highest percentage with 14.29 percent goes toward government and civil so-
ciety), 9.5 percent on economic infrastructure and services, 4 percent on production sectors, 8.5 
percent on multi-sector and cross-cutting, high percentage related to debt relief (about 9.8 per-
cent), 9.5 percent on humanitarian aid (OECD Stat 2015a).  
The United Kingdom is the only country studied here with a relatively recent colonial past 
(Degnbol-Martinussen, Engberg-Pedersen, and Bille 2005, 86–88; Austin 2010). This past has 
influenced British development policies considerably. Still today, most British development aid 
goes to its former colonies (Pacquement 2010). The tradition of giving aid therefore follows a 
certain rationale of a cosmopolitan duty issuing from the times of the Empire with some com-
munitarian foundations (Gaskarth 2013) 
Since 1997, the UK pursues a single purpose in development aid: to reduce poverty (Hook 
2008a; Ireton 2013, 36–98; Morrissey 2009; DFID 1997). This purpose was further embedded 
                                                 
76 Note however, that the policies regarding aid (and for instance conditionality) differ highly within EU member 
states (Steingaß 2015).  
77 Its share improved significantly since 2008 where it spent only 0.43 % of its GNI on ODA and ranked 10th, and 
was third in overall aid in absolute terms, behind the United States and Germany (OECD DAC 2010, 103).  
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into the 2002 International Development Act which made the reduction of poverty a necessary 
element of any British development policy and was further cemented in other government pa-
pers: 2006 with Making governance work for the poor and in 2009 with Building our common 
future (DFID 2006b, 2009d). In the last 10 years, approximately 32 percent of the UK’s bilateral 
aid was dedicated to the least developed countries, and another 13 percent went to other low 
income countries. 21 percent went to lower-middle income countries and only 5 percent to 
upper-middle income countries (OECD DAC 2010, 99, 2014b, 104; Nunnenkamp and Thiele 
2006).78 A quantitative study illustrates that the UK reacts towards improvements in human 
rights (with a five percent increase in aid), towards an improvement in economic growth with 
plus five percent, towards democracy improvements with an increase of 29 percent (Hoeffler 
and Outram 2011). Similarly, a critical data report from ONE, a development NGO, hails the 
UK as the “indisputable overall leader amongst the G7 countries in delivering on its ODA 
commitments” (ONE 2010, 14; Kevenhörster 2014, 332; OECD DAC 2010). Therefore, at first 
glance, there seems to be a congruence between rhetoric and action in British aid (Breuning 
1995). Other influential ideas are those behind the Washington Consensus, good governance 
and a strong support for debt relief (Ireton 2013, 67–99). Moreover, despite regular changes of 
governments, the British seem to have a rather consistent policy regarding aid independent of 
who rules in Westminster (Chaney 2012). While there is therefore a certain tendency to separate 
aid from national interest (for instance by untying), other commercial interests still play a role 
even though a decoupling between aid and trade has largely succeeded (Morrissey 2009). For 
instance, since the financial crisis, there is an increasing rationale in Britain that aid should bring 
“some tangible benefit to British citizens” (Gaskarth 2013, 117).79  
In summary, a number of different motives and purposes lie behind the aid policies of the three 
traditional donors, while all are members of the Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD and therefore publish their aid records publicly. Moreover, as Deborah Brautigam 
(2010) puts it, they all follow certain rules that are characteristic for traditional donors, which 
could define them as a regime. The following section looks very briefly at the international 
context and regulations, within which the aid of traditional (and to a certain extent emerging) 
donors positions itself.  
4.3 The international setting for both emerging and traditional donors  
Deborah Brautigam (2010) argues that the rules and standards of traditional aid are characterised 
by an attempt to be transparent, untying, to protect social and environmental standards and to 
combat corruption and improve governance and make debt manageable.80 Moreover, she de-
fines the institutions and actors (all have an agency or even ministry dealing with aid), all follow 
                                                 
78 Note that the DAC calculation excludes from the percentage the amount that is not income-related. My figures 
include that number in the percentage as they are deduced from the overall spending on bilateral aid.  
79 Moreover, some point out that in 2014 the general role of aid was discussed altogether in the UK despite the 
relative good and stable character in the policies in the last ten years (Klingebiel 2015).  
80 Corruption, for instance, is often seen to cause aid fatigue among the electorate (Bauhr, Charron, and Nasiritousi 
2013). Others argue that what is relevant to explain the support of national constituencies for aid lies in the satis-
faction with their own government and the relative income of the population rather than with recipients’ merits 
(Chong and Gradstein 2008). 
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the OECD DAC definition of ODA, and all use a range of instruments and modalities (technical 
assistance, budget support, projects, programmes, debt relief, etc.).  
The OECD Development Assistance Committee is the “institutional home” of the traditional 
donors (Hook and Rumsey 2015, 2).81 Approximately every four years, traditional donors un-
dergo a review of their development assistance by other members of the DAC in order to effect 
further improvements and to increase donor coordination.82 Moreover, since 2005, several 
meetings have taken place to further improve aid effectiveness. In 2005, the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness was signed by all members of the DAC and by all four emerging donors (as 
recipients). The Paris Declaration follows five main principles: ownership, alignment, harmoni-
zation of donor activities, management for results, and mutual accountability83. The Accra Agenda 
for Action in 2008 and the Busan Declaration of 2011 followed the Paris Declaration (OECD 
2008b). Moreover, in 2014, a further step was taken to include emerging donors into the aid 
effectiveness debate. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation took place in April 
2014 and was the first dialogue where the OECD shared the responsibility with the UNDP in 
order to increase representativeness of the meeting (Langendorf 2012, 23).  
The DAC also has initiated in 2004 specific efforts for attempting to further integrate non-DAC 
donors and to learn from their experiences in development, for instance initiativng the China-
DAC Study Groups since 2009 (OECD DAC November 2005). 
Next to the DAC and the efficiency debate within the Global Partnership, the United Nations 
has its own distinct forum in which it investigates the aid of all of its members. The UN Devel-
opment Cooperation Forum, inaugurated in 2005, holds biannual meetings and hosts discus-
sions about the best way to spend aid. This forum is arguably more inclusive but suffers from a 
its large membership (Mahn and Weinlich 2012) The United Nations Development Program 
also influences aid policies as it receives large amounts of multilateral shares (Stokke 2009, 510; 
Jolly 2005).  
Moreover, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have largely informed the 
policies of the three traditional donors. 84 The follow-up Sustainable Development Goals are less 
important for this study. Another initiative that we will sometimes come across is the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), of which Norway is a member and the United States and 
                                                 
81 DAC can be classified as a regime composed by principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures: prin-
ciple: market driven policies lead to economic growth, norms: concern for welfare of poor states, rules (ODA/GNI 
0.7%; aid to LDCs, grant element vs loans (at about 86%), proportion of untied aid at about 60%), decision-making 
procedures within DAC secretariat, peer reviews, etc. (Hook and Rumsey 2015, 2–6). 
82 Coordination between donors remains difficult as diverging self-interests and high coordination costs often delay 
efforts (Lawson 2013).   
83 From these five principles, the most influential one for this study is ownership. Ownership can be defined as 
“the expression of self-determination, which enables the recipient country to face cooperation partners on equal 
terms” (U. Müller and Langendorf 2012, 84) or as a balance between complete and no participation from the 
recipient country (Leutner and U. Müller 2011). While the impetus put on ownership has recently increased, the 
idea is not new and was previously referred to as “commitment” (Frenken et al. 2011, 13). Ownership is also seen 
as a principle that is shared by both groups – emerging and traditional donors (Tortora 2011).  
84 The MDGs were (1) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (2) to achieve universal primary education, (3) to 
promote gender equality and empower women, (4) to reduce child mortality, (5) to improve maternal health, (6) to 
combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases, (7) to ensure environmental sustainability and (8) to create a global 
partnership for development until 2015. Since September 2015, these eight goals have been replaced with the 17 
SDGs (Manning Febr. 2009).  
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the United Kingdom are candidate countries. This initiative aims at making extractive industries 
more transparent (Rich and Moberg 2015).  
Finally, some general trends are worth mentioning: there is a growing commitment in ODA 
flows, and a slow shift towards low income countries whereby middle income countries still 
receive about 40 percent of the aid (Adugna et al. 2011, 7–10). While these international insti-
tutions inform the three traditional donors, their impact on national aid policies might, as Ngaire 
Woods argues, be increasingly limited (Woods 2010; Naim 2009).85  
4.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has briefly introduced the diverse approaches of the four emerging and the three 
traditional donors. The empirical facts illustrate that the approaches towards development co-
operation are to a certain degree different, when it comes to the two groups. Especially in the 
field of conditionality, significant differences exist. Moreover, the three traditional donors all 
have differing institutional set-ups (for instance regarding fragmentation) that are decisive for 
their selection as most different cases (as the methods chapter explained). We are now equipped 
with the necessary empirical, theoretical and methodological knowledge to turn towards the 
main body of this work: the three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter clarifies the 
independent variable of this study, as well as both the apparent and underlying ideas that pre-
dominate within traditional donors about the aid policies of their potential rivals – emerging 
donors.
                                                 
85 The influence of international institutions on emerging donors is not studied yet. Nevertheless, Anderas Nölke 
(2015a) argues that international financial institutions exert a limited influence on Chinese policies.  
  
 
5 Traditional donors’ ideas about emerging donors 
The previous chapters identified the research gap and developed the theoretical and methodo-
logical approach of this work. Most importantly for the following analysis, the theoretical chap-
ter elaborated several hypotheses that were tested in the three empirical chapters. To reiterate 
the main underlying hypothesis of this thesis: I argue that ideas play a decisive role in explaining 
institutional change within development policy. Therefore, it is most important to collect in a 
first step of the analysis the existing ideas that prevail among traditional donors about the activ-
ities of emerging donors. The next two empirical chapters then trace the role of these ideas in 
the two identified relevant issue areas: conditionality and trilateral cooperation.  
Before we study how ideas play a decisive role in shaping and possibly altering traditional do-
nors’ development cooperation, we first need to analyse what traditional donors think about 
emerging donors. Remember also that foreground (discursive) ideas play a more decisive role 
in shaping institutional change than background (ideational) abilities. This chapter therefore lays 
an emphasis on foreground ideas as they are not only easier to track but also more decisive in 
triggering change. Background ideas, however, are also briefly be discussed, as these might slow 
change down (Schmidt 2011; J. L. Campbell 2004, 94–100).  
How can one analyse the way a country assesses the potential challenge emanating from another 
country’s policy? The emergence of new donors is embedded in the debate about the rise of 
new economic rivals. The chapter therefore examines how this debate is absorbed within the 
national debates of traditional donors, largely on the level of ministerial (or similar) discussions, 
speeches from representatives of development cooperation as well as on the level of implement-
ing agencies.86 In a second step, this chapter focuses on the perceived differences that traditional 
donors identify between their own development policy and that of emerging donors. Lastly, the 
chapter analyses the consequences that derive from traditional donor perceptions of emerging 
donors: what are the main ideas that characterise the conception traditional donors have about 
emerging donors and what consequences do they draw for their own policies?  
This first empirical chapter portrays the findings from the analysis of primary documents and 
expert interviews of the three traditional donors from 2004 until 2014 (for details on time and 
case study selection, see methodological chapter). Each section exposes the ideas on the activi-
ties of emerging donors from the point of view of a traditional donor, starting with the United 
States. Section 5.4 concludes and summarises the findings in order to identify common and 
differing ideas that are decisive for looking at the two thematic fields later on. 
5.1 United States of America: a giant threatened by a new rival?  
Chapter 4 illustrated that the United States of America is the biggest contributor to foreign aid 
in nominal terms, but fares much worse when it comes to the ratio of contributions in relation 
to its gross national income. The following section looks at the ideas that constituted the United 
                                                 
86 Theoretically speaking, this chapter therefore focusses on the layer of narratives, touching upon the layer of rules, 
but only looking at practices to a very limited degree.  
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States’ perception of emerging donors. The first section gives an account of a shift in global 
politics, the second looks at the perceived advantages and challenges emanating from emerging 
donors for the United States, and finally addresses the consequences that the USA draws for 
their own development policies.  
5.1.1 The increasing importance of emerging economies 
Many documents of the United States recognise an increased importance of emerging econo-
mies, especially after the financial turmoil that hit the country in 2007 and 2008, which is often 
described as having led to a “catastrophic recession” (U.S. Government 2010b, 8; similar refer-
ences in USDS 2010d, 13, 2010f, 13, 2011d, 181). But already in 2006, the Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice87 recognised the importance of emerging countries and the need for increased 
American personnel in these countries rather than focusing on old allies, like European coun-
tries (Rice 18.01.2006, 1). The first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Report, a publi-
cation reviewing the successes, but equally the failures of U.S. foreign policy, stated in 2010 that 
“the 21st century centers of global and regional influence, including Brazil, China, India, Indo-
nesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey, define today’s geopolitical landscape” 
(USDS 2010f, 13). All four emerging donors considered in this study are “strategic partners” of 
the United States and seen as “key developing country leaders” (USDS 2012d, 48, 2011f, 24). 
The United States pledges to work for a closer cooperation with all four emerging economies 
(USDS 2009a, 24, 2010a, 20; USDS and USAID 2009c, 39).  
Similarly, the U.S. has voiced a willingness to accept a reform of international financial institu-
tions in order to reflect the increasing economic weight of emerging economies (for instance 
Clinton 28.07.2009, 2). However, the USA is equally wary of losing influence due to their in-
creased weight, for instance in the International Monetary Fund where emerging donors gained 
quotas after the financial crisis. To delay reforms of the IMF or the World Bank is seen as 
dangerous as the U.S. could lose more of its influence when reacting too late:   
“As the United States has delayed approving the 2010 reforms, other countries have 
sought to increase their influence in the institution bilaterally, outside of the IMF’s 
quota-based financial and governance structures in which the United States exercises its 
leadership role.  In 2012, due to the U.S. delay, the IMF secured bilateral borrowing 
agreements with countries such as China ($43 billion), Korea ($15 billion), Brazil ($10 
billion), India ($10 billion), Mexico ($10 billion), and Russia ($10 billion), enhancing 
these countries’ standing and eroding U.S. influence. Congressional approval of the 2010 
reforms is necessary to reaffirm the U.S. leadership position and reinforce the IMF’s 
central position in the global financial system, at a time when emerging economies ex-
plore establishing new and parallel financial institutions” (USDOT 2014, 2).88  
                                                 
87 Note that most of the functionaries mentioned in this study no longer work in the position that is indicated. 
Nevertheless, in order to increase readability, this is not distinguishable from the text. As the year of the statement 
is always referred to, it is easy to assume when their duties ended. Moreover, appendix 9.1 provides a list with all 
of the functionaries mentioned, including their years of service.  
88 Note that within quotes from U.S. publications, the American spelling is kept whereas the rest of this work is 
written in British English.  
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A similar reasoning applies to the U.S. commitment to the World Bank, where the U.S. argues 
that “[i]f the United States Congress does not authorize and appropriate funds […], the relative 
U.S. shareholding in the MDB will become diluted” which could lead to a situation where China 
has “more power over the governance of these institutions” (Weston, C. Campbell, and Koleski 
01.09.2011, 2). 
The above suggests that the U.S. clearly recognises a shift in power and draws two conclusions: 
first, that cooperation with these countries needs to be increased (in strategic partnership – a 
cognitive idea) and second, a certain fear of losing influence (normative idea). The second nor-
mative idea is strongly tied to China’s rise. Already in 2005, when Condoleezza Rice was asked 
about whether China’s rise was a “serious threat” to U.S. interests, she stated that the relation-
ship with China is a “complex one” and that the intensity of the rivalry depends on “what kind 
of force [China] will be” (Rice 10.07.2005, 2). Equally on a normative level, it is possible to 
identify a certain uneasiness in public documents when it comes to the increased weight of 
emerging economies as their values might not be congruent to those of the United States:  
“Emerging powers including Brazil, India, China, and South Africa will continue to ex-
pand their activities and influence on the global stage, and their priorities, actions, and 
preferred outcomes will not always be in accord with those of the United States” (USDS 
2014d, 133).  
The main ideas within the United States regarding the economic rise of emerging powers are, 
therefore, a cognitive recognition of their increasing weight coupled with a willingness to coop-
erate more closely with them, as well as a normative fear attached to the loss of influence of the 
United States in favour of China, and other countries that might not represent American values. 
The next section addresses the U.S. portrayal of emerging economies in the realm of develop-
ment assistance.  
5.1.2 Differing ideas about China’s aid in comparison to other democratic emerging donors 
References to Bob Dylan’s ‘the times are a changing’ are very common in politics. The Vice 
President of the Millennium Challenge Cooperation, Patrick C. Fine, invoked Dylan’s exact 
words in 2012 when referring to the “landscape for development and humanitarian work” where 
“a group of new world powers, led by China, is exerting increasing influence both economically 
and politically” (Fine 06.06.2012, 2). Compared to the other two traditional donors, the United 
States has repeatedly made use of the term “emerging donors”89 or “non-traditional donors”. 
The term was first used in 2009 (USDS and USAID 2009d, 2) and continuously since (see for 
instance USDS 2012d, 288; U.S. Government 2010c, 1–2). A statement of Hillary Clinton, at 
the time Secretary of State, in a keynote speech during the summit on aid effectiveness in Busan 
equally welcomed the efforts of some emerging donors (specifically those of Brazil and Mexico), 
but similarly called for a greater commitment to international aid standards from all donors:  
“All of us must live up to the international standards that the global community has 
committed to […]. That means, for example, helping countries with natural resources 
                                                 
89  The United States refers to emerging donors in total 34 times in all of the documents, the UK twice,  
Norway just once.  
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escape the so-called ‘resource-curse’ that leaves them rich in oil, gold, or other commod-
ities but poor by many other measures. And while national sovereignty is an important 
principle, it cannot become an excuse for avoiding scrutiny of development efforts, not 
if we want results. Transparency helps reveal our weaknesses so we can improve our 
work” (Clinton 30.11.2011, 1–2).  
The reference to national sovereignty and to transparency (or lack thereof) is a hidden criticism 
of some of the activities of emerging donors, mostly of China. Like all traditional donors studied 
here, the United States focuses its attention on the undertakings of China in Africa. China is 
seen as an “influential development actor”, “outbidding and outperforming India”, portraying 
itself as an appreciative power of developing nations and thereby playing the “third world card” 
(USAID 2010a, 1; Genser 03.08.2006, 153; Watson 03.08.2006, 74). Some hold a rather positive 
opinion of China’s influence in Africa and Latin America and consider its engagement as a 
normal consequence of a rising power (Watson 03.08.2006; Brill Olcott 04.08.2006). At times, 
China’s objectives are seen as not “inherently incompatible with U.S. priorities”, a situation of 
no “zero-sum competition with China for influence in Africa”, “[n]or do [they] see evidence 
that China’s commercial or diplomatic activities in Africa are aimed at diminishing U.S. influence 
on the continent” (Christensen 05.06.2008, 1; similar line of argument Wilson 03.08.2006, 82; 
Brill Olcott 04.08.2006, 250; Russel 25.06.2014, 1; Clinton 30.11.2011, 2; Kerry 04.11.2014, 2).   
Nevertheless, while moderate voices exist, it is more common to identify the challenges arising 
from China to the U.S. in Africa (Reeves 03.08.2006, 190; 194; Ratliff 03.08.2006, 166). For 
instance, Donald Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of African 
Affairs claims in his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2012 “there are 
major areas where our interests do not align” (Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 7–8). Hence, the general 
opinion within U.S. publications about the consequences of Chinese development projects for 
recipient countries is rather bleak.90 First of all, the U.S. criticises a lack of transparency (USDS 
2010e, 1–2). Further allegations vary from criticising the use of mainly Chinese labour force and 
to the general fear that there is little positive spill-over effect for recipient economies (Wilson 
03.08.2006, 45–46; C. H. Smith 29.03.2012, 2). To illustrate these negative effects on recipient 
countries, U.S. documents often refer to the Chinese-led construction of the headquarters of 
the African Union:  
“The $200 million building was […] designed by Chinese architects, built of material 
mostly imported from China, built primarily by Chinese labourers, and will be main-
tained by Chinese workers. It is very difficult not to think of all of the lost opportunities 
in the way this project was carried out” (Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 32).  
Another concern regularly expressed is the unsustainable exploitation of natural African re-
sources and the flooding of African markets with a “tsunami” of cheap Chinese exports, and 
the feeding of an unsustainable debt (for the first, see USAID 2006, 6; Wessel 04.08.2006, 199; 
Weston, C. Campbell, and Koleski 01.09.2011, 5; Fortenberry 29.03.2012, 5; for the second 
                                                 
90 To illustrate the importance attached to China’s activities as an emerging donor, it is sufficient to say that two 
congressional hearings have taken place in the observed period on that particular topic. One in 2006 on China’s 
role in the world and one in 2012 on China’s influence in Africa.  
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point, see Wilson 03.08.2006, 51; on debt, see Christensen 27.03.2007, 1; C. H. Smith 
29.03.2012, 1).  
The strongest concern is expressed about China’s support for rogue regimes, most of all the 
“destructive relationship” between China and Sudan (Reeves 03.08.2006, 155–56; Bartholomew 
03.08.2006, 6; Christensen 03.08.2006, 22; USDS 2006d, 1; Rice 27.09.2006, 2; Christensen 
27.03.2007, 1; Jackson Lee 29.03.2012, 6).91 The USA recognises however that China evolved 
from a country undermining international efforts for peace to one essential to the peace talks 
between Sudan and South Sudan (C. H. Smith 29.03.2012, 47). The case of China’s involvement 
to Sudan is therefore often used in U.S. publications to illustrate that China can take the role of 
a more “responsible stakeholder”, a term initiated by Bob Zoellick (Hill 07.06.2005, 2; Chris-
tensen 03.08.2006, 24–25; Natsios 11.04.2007, 6; Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 47; Christensen 
18.03.2008, 1; Office of the spokesperson 24.06.2015, 3). The need for China to assume its role 
as a “responsible stakeholder” is regularly repeated in U.S. publications and pushed for in dia-
logues, like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China and the Dialogue on Global De-
velopment (Shear 10.09.2009, 1; Kritenbrink 13.04.2011, 1; Clinton 2010, 4; Rice 12.05.2005, 2; 
Negroponte 15.05.2008, 1; Office of the spokesperson 12.07.2013, 4, 24.06.2015, 4; USDS 
2014f, 1).  
In order to address these challenges, the U.S. government foresees a closer relationship in de-
velopment cooperation with China. For this purpose, a development counsellor is based in the 
U.S. embassy in Beijing to better understand Chinese foreign assistance and to “encourage 
China to adopt internationally agreed standards on good donorship” (USAID 2010a, 1; equally 
Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 8). Close cooperation in development assistance is confirmed over the 
years (USDS and USAID 2009a, 1, 2011a, 1). Therefore, the United States is careful to strike a 
balance between criticising China on certain issues (like human rights and Taiwan), but without 
allowing these differences “to preclude cooperation when [they] agree” with China (USDS and 
USAID 2003, 7; USDS 2013f, 1, 2015g, 1; similar argument U.S. Government 2010b, 43). Nev-
ertheless, the initiatives for cooperating with China are hesitant at best.  
While most of the attention is focused on China’s endeavours in Africa, a testimony during a 
hearing on China’s role and influence in Africa before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
stresses:  
“it is clear that other rising or emerging powers, above all, the other BRIC countries—
India, Brazil and Russia—are also busy renewing old ties and forging new links with 
Africa, relations which will undoubtedly alter the strategic context of the continent” 
(Pham 29.03.2012, 52).  
The United States places much importance on like-minded donors which anchor their develop-
ment cooperation in a similar drive to spread the benefits of democracy.92 However, the im-
portance paid to those three donors – Brazil, India and South Africa – is still negligible when 
compared to China. The USA pledges to support Indian development programmes, as USAID 
                                                 
91 Other “rogue states” are also in the focus of US attention (for instance Burma, Laos, Zimbabwe, Venezuela) as 
China is seen to give these states “implicit security guarantees”, thereby undermining U.S. goals to promote human 
rights and democracy (Weston, C. Campbell, and Koleski 01.09.2011, 12; Fortenberry 29.03.2012, 6). 
92 This confirms the research of Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley (2011) who argue that ideological factors play 
an influential role in the allocation of US aid.  
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recognises that a new approach for working with emerging economies is needed (USAID 2012b, 
15). America recognises that India is an “indispensable partner” and that USAID is “transform-
ing its relationship with India from a donor-recipient relationship to a peer-to-peer partnership” 
(USAID 2012b, 7; Rollins 30.04.2014, 2; USDS 2013b, 530–31). Moreover, the U.S. recognises 
that India’s contributions to development cooperation are very likely to increase (USAID 2010c, 
2). India is considered to be a good investment for projects that “have strong potential for 
development impact in other countries” (USAID 2012b, 3). Early on, the good relationship with 
“the world’s largest democracy” is considered to be in the national interest of the United States 
and India a “strategic partner” (K. M. Campbell 31.03.2011, 2; Burns 08.09.2005, 1; USDS 
2004a, 452, 2005a, 81, 2006a, 498, 2010b, 576, 2015b, 271). Repeatedly, the publications pin-
point the importance of “shared values of democracy, diversity, and free markets”, and to the 
fact that India is a “rising global power and partner, one whose interests converge in important 
respects with those of the United States” (USDS 2006c, 1, 2007, 584, 2008b, 607, 2010d, 211; 
Clinton 19.07.2011). India, as a “good and strong emerging multi-ethnic democracy” is consid-
ered to be the perfect partner for the U.S., as “there will not be differences about what we are 
trying to achieve: a world that is freer, a world that is more prosperous, and a world that is more 
just” (Rice 27.07.2007, 2; similar line of arguments U.S. Government 2015, 24–25).  
In 2011, India is also declared to be a “U.S. global development partner” (USDS 2011b, 627). 
The narrative is followed by an increasing dialogue between the “the world’s two largest democ-
racies”, for instance where the strategic dialogue, launched in 2009, was expanded in 2015 to 
become U.S.-India strategic and commercial dialogue (U.S. Government 2010b, 43–44; USDS 
2015h, 1; Clinton 04.06.2010, 1). The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) also envisions 
a strategic partnership with India (USMCC 2015c, 2). Moreover, the United States repeatedly 
pledges to support Indian ambitions for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Coun-
cil (Rice 14.04.2005, 2; Kerry 22.09.2015, 2).  
Similar to the positive image of India’s aid activities, public documents refer to Brazil and South 
Africa as “large multi-ethnic, multi-religious democracies”; nations with whom cooperation is 
easy and natural (Rice 27.07.2007, 2). Brazil is seen as a potential partner in the “promotion of 
democratic values in the region” and as a “leader in the hemisphere” (USDS 2003, 452, 2004a, 
472, 2005a, 504; Rice 26.04.2005, 1; U.S. Government 2010b, 44–45, 2015, 27). As in the case 
of India and China, the United States recognises that Brazil has “emerged as [a] significant bi-
lateral donor” (USDS 2010f, 79). Similarly, Condoleezza Rice has expressed approval for Bra-
zil’s help to Haiti, which is considered a “model” for engagement and “where [the USA] could 
not have done what [it] did […] without Brazil’s leadership of the UN forces there” (Rice 
26.04.2005, 1, 13.03.2008, 1). Moreover, the U.S. pays tribute to the work of Brazil in Mozam-
bique where Brazil cooperates with Japan (Clinton 30.11.2011, 2). As in the case of their com-
mitment to India, the U.S. supports Brazil’s pledge for a permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council (Rice 13.03.2008, 1). The relationship with Brazil seems to be slightly more difficult 
than that with India, as Maria Otero, Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, openly 
admits that “we may not always agree”, but overall, the need for more cooperation is stressed 
(Otero 26.03.2010, 2). 
The United States also sees potential in the cooperation with South Africa. It aims at “[l]ever-
aging South Africa’s public and private sectors to advance development on a regional and con-
tinental scale” which “will position South Africa to be a more effective development partner to 
address shared foreign policy priorities in Africa” (USAID 2013a, 7). The U.S. also pledges to 
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support the new South African Development Partnership Agency (USAID 2013a, 4; 7; 16, 
2015c, 2). Although supportive, the U.S. is careful to stress that tremendous challenges remain 
in South Africa, which also explains why it continues to dispense aid to the country (USAID 
2011d, 1). As early as 2004 was South Africa considered to be an “anchor for stability and 
prosperity in the Southern African region” (USDS 2004a, 482). Similar to the relationship with 
India, South Africa has become a strategic partner of the USA, conducting a strategic dialogue 
and therefore evolved out of the donor-recipient relationship and now serves as a “bridge be-
tween the West and emerging power” (USDS 2007, 274, 2008a, 310, 2010b, 170, 2013b, 148, 
2014b, 148, 2015d, 484, 2015i, 1; USDS and USAID 2011b, 26). John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of 
State, considers the partnership to be “true” and “honest” (John Kerry, remarks on global health 
event with partner countries on the side-lines of the UN GA, 25.9.2013; quoted in USMCC 
2013, 23).  
Overall, a lot of attention has been paid to the rise of emerging donors. Generally, a certain 
disquiet is expressed at China’s activities while other (democratic) emerging donors are seen as 
valuable partners. The next section summarises the main ideas that characterise the United 
States’ narrative regarding the rise of emerging donors. Moreover, it elaborates on the conse-
quences that the United States seems to draw within its narrative for its own development co-
operation.     
5.1.3 Consequences for U.S. aid policies 
The previous section illustrates that the U.S. pays attention to emerging donors. Nevertheless, 
the above section also shows that the United States has varying concerns regarding the aid ac-
tivities of China and that of other, more like-minded emerging donors. This split in the percep-
tion is mirrored in the main consequences the USA draws for its own development assistance: 
First, the documents conclude that the United States needs to increase their own visibility in 
foreign aid projects as China is supposedly much more successful in this regard. In a hearing in 
2006, the U.S. Senator for Oklahoma, James M. Inhofe states:  
“China's growing global influence and the impact it has on our national security […] the 
threat continues to grow. […] I have a reason to be in Africa quite often […]  Every-
where I go where there are really big oil reserves, whether it's the Sea of Guinea, or 
Nigeria, or Benin, everything that is new and shiny is built by the Chinese.  I have to say 
what they are doing is smart.  They're smarter than we are because they go in there, and 
I don't care where it is, where you go, you'll see that they are building things. Now, we 
watch this take place over a period of time and it's really disconcerting.  […] I mentioned 
Africa because the saying in Africa is ‘the United States tells us what we need and China 
gives us what we want.’ And that's true” […] (Inhofe 03.08.2006, 11–12).  
Similarly, Hillary Clinton in the position as Secretary of State stated in a 2010 speech that  
“we [the USA] have to be smarter about the story we tell about America’s development 
efforts. It’s discouraging to travel around the world and meet people […], who say ‘I 
don’t know what you spend money on. I never see it. Nobody ever tells us’ […] And 
then what’s deeply discouraging is they say, ‘We know what the Chinese do. We know 
what the Japanese do. We can point to the buildings they build and the roads they’ve 
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laid.’ I want the world to know what the American people are doing to try to fight pov-
erty and provide education and healthcare” (Clinton 06.01.2010, 7).  
The idea of making aid more visible might lead to an increased branding of U.S. aid policy and 
might directly affect policies regarding conditionality. Linked to the idea of making aid more 
visible is the belief that the USA should closely engage with private sectors and needs to extend 
its influence in Africa (Pham 29.03.2012, 52; Hayes 29.03.2012, 66).  
The second main idea that is derived from the perception of Chinese aid activities is that the 
U.S. seems to be convinced that they need to stick more closely to their own principles, such as 
transparency, the promotion of good governance, democracy and human rights – all attributes 
that Chinese aid activities are (perceivably) lacking. Commissioner Carolyn Bartholomew re-
minds the public in 2006 that it is illogical to expect the Chinese government to be interested in 
“promoting transparency, accountability, and open governments elsewhere when it itself is not 
transparent, open or accountable” (Bartholomew 03.08.2006, 42; Donnelly 03.08.2006, 40). A 
frequently invoked example is Angola, which declined a loan from the IMF (attached to condi-
tions regarding transparency and accountability) in favour of a Chinese loan with no strings 
attached (Christensen 03.08.2006, 35). In order to forestall the possibility that “Africa is becom-
ing a lost continent” for the United States because of the attractiveness of China, the USA needs 
to defend these values even more (Fortenberry 29.03.2012, 24–25). Bartholomew states in 2006 
that the Millennium Challenge Corporation has been created precisely for this reason (Barthol-
omew 03.08.2006, 16–17). Similarly, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Thomas J. Christensen, argues in 2008 that it is important to uphold American values:  
“We are concerned that by giving aid without conditions and without coordination with 
the international community, China’s programs could run counter to the efforts by these 
other actors to use targeted and sustainable aid to promote transparency and good gov-
ernance. We believe that such conditional aid programs are the best way to guarantee 
long-term growth and stability in the developing world” (Christensen 18.03.2008, 1). 
Comparable opinions about U.S. goals being “undermined” by China regarding good govern-
ance initiatives and the protection of human rights are expressed throughout the period under 
study here (for instance Weston, C. Campbell, and Koleski 01.09.2011, 2; Yamamoto 
29.03.2012, 8; Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 30). The idea that the USA should stick more to its 
own standards might be influential in the field of aid conditionality as this is mainly where values 
are attached to development policies.  
A third consequence for the United States is that it tries to socialise emerging donors to conform 
to American standards. A great deal of importance is attached to finding some kind of “consen-
sus on development policy issues among traditional and emerging donors” (USDS 2009c, 213). 
Optimistic voices state that “China has even modelled many of its engagement programs after 
very successful U.S. exchanges on the continent”, indicating, that a convergence of policy is not 
impossible (Christensen 05.06.2008, 1). As China’s policies are seen to be less beneficial for 
recipient countries and in greatest need of adjustment, a lot of attention is paid to the need to 
influence China to take a path of good development policies, “including transparency and de-
mocracy” (Wilson 03.08.2006, 47; Christensen 27.03.2007, 1; USDS 2010e, 5; Desai Biswal 
15.11.2011, 3). During the Busan meeting of the OECD effectiveness agenda in 2011, the 
United States emphasised that its “leadership in Busan was critical to increasing the commitment 
of emerging economies – such as India, China and Brazil – to implement effectiveness principles 
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like transparency in their investments” (USAID 2012a, 2012a, 28).93 U.S. publications emphasise 
that “only the United States can provide” this kind of leadership (USDS 2010f, 96).  
Next to the pledge of wanting to commit emerging donors to more transparency, the U.S. also 
repeatedly states that emerging donors should apply other principles derived from OECD’s 
“best practices”, like accountability, and good governance standards, principles that might oth-
erwise be “watered down” (USDS 2010d, 600; Clinton 28.11.2011, 4; USDS 2012c, 639, 2013d, 
552, 2014d, 551; Clinton 14.012011, 3). Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, states in 2008:  
“In general, we believe that China’s economic engagement with the developing world is 
a net positive for China and for the recipient countries, which need assistance, invest-
ment, trade opportunities, and expertise. Instead of trying to undercut China’s efforts, 
we are trying to steer them in the same direction as the efforts by the United States, the 
European Union, Japan and international organizations like the IMF/World Bank so 
that our combined efforts can be most effective (Christensen 18.03.2008, 1; see also 
Christensen 27.03.2007, 1). 
Other issues that are mentioned regularly are the need for untying aid, and an increase in the 
predictability of flows of emerging donors (Clinton 28.11.2011, 5–6, 13.07.2012, 1). The USA 
also insists that not only governmental actors but also firms should stick to global values, like 
social corporate responsibility and transparency (Jaffe 04.08.2006, 269; Reeves 03.08.2006, 176; 
Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 31; Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 8). The idea that emerging donors should 
stick to international (and mainly U.S.) standards might be an influential driving force for change 
in both policy fields: in conditionality as the USA equally pledges that it needs to stick to its own 
values more and in trilateral cooperation as this might be seen as a tool to influence the policies 
of emerging donors more directly.  
In order to achieve a more coherent participation from governmental and private actors in de-
velopment cooperation in emerging economies, the USA pledges to increase resources for more 
collaboration with emerging donors, for instance financing the OECD-led China study group 
to facilitate the cooperation with their biggest rival (USDS and USAID 2009d, 2).  
Whenever values are congruent, the United States shows a willingness to strengthen their rela-
tionship with such countries. As stated in the section 5.1.1, the USA favours collaboration with 
emerging democracies over China. Hillary Clinton justifies this increased relationship with like-
minded countries as follows: “The strategic fundamentals of these relationships – shared dem-
ocratic values, common economic and security priorities – are pushing our interests into closer 
convergence” (Clinton 29.11.2012, 3; similar argument USDS 2013e, 312). Even though this 
cooperation is thought to be easier than that with China, some issues remain also in the coop-
eration with like-minded emerging donors. In order to engage emerging donors efficiently, the 
United States stresses that it needs to “strategic[ally] engage in major multilateral and bilateral 
meetings and international fora” (USDS 2014e, 332). In their annual report in 2014, the U.S. 
pledged to build “more meaningful relationships with emerging or ‘pivotal’ donors such as the 
                                                 
93 Emma Mawdsley (2015, 3–4) argues that several OECD donors emphasied the importance of having especially 
China at the table of negotiations and made “considerable concessions” to achieve the agreement.  
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Arab states, Brazil, China, India, Korea and Turkey (USDS 2014e, 332; similar ambitions ex-
pressed in USDS 2010f, 116). More specifically the U.S. envisions cooperation with Brazil in 
research on agriculture, with India in extending food security and with South Africa in training 
partners to participate more directly in development processes (U.S. Government 2008, 22). 
The idea of increasing cooperation with like-minded emerging donors might be an influential 
force for driving an increased involvement of the United States in trilateral cooperation.  
So far, we have established the foreground ideas that might play a role in facilitating institutional 
change. What about the background ideas that might slow change down? As the chapter on 
theory has shown, it is harder to track background ideas as they are not openly discussed. There-
fore, the motives underlying U.S. aid that were studied and analysed by many researchers was 
used here to exemplify the most important background ideas characterising this aid. As chapter 
4 has argued, most agree that the United States pursue several different goals through their aid: 
commercial motives as well as diplomatic (and strong security) concerns might be factors that 
slow down change considerably (S. Brown 2012; Hook and Rumsey 2015). Another factor that 
might be influential when talking about conditionality is the strong conviction within the United 
States that it needs to spread its democratic values.94  
This section illustrated that the U.S. is very aware of the efforts undertaken by emerging donors, 
mostly by China. Moreover, its foreground ideas can be categorised into two main types: the 
first is linked to the idea that emerging donors (and mostly China) are a concurrent force in 
development cooperation which makes it necessary for the USA to increase its visibility and to 
stick to its own principles, promoting political values, such as good governance, transparency, 
human rights and democracy. Whenever possible, the United States should also attempt to so-
cialise the group of emerging donors to internationally agreed standards, congruent with its own 
values. Both forms of ideas might lead to a change within the field of conditionality. The second 
type is characterised by the willingness to support emerging donors whenever such like-mind-
edness is apparent. Only at this point does the United States envision increased cooperation 
with emerging donors – an aspect that influences their attitude towards trilateral cooperation. 
Change within both fields might be slowed down by background ideas (such as the incentive to 
spread the democratic ideal as well as commercial and diplomatic motives in aid). The next 
section looks at the example of Norway and asks what ideas characterise a much smaller coun-
try’s perception of emerging donors.  
5.2 Norway: a small country’s perception of global power shifts 
The overview on Norway’s development cooperation in chapter 4 shows that it provides the 
smallest amount in terms of overall ODA between the three donor countries, but the highest 
ratio in terms of its gross national income. The following section first gives an account of Nor-
way’s perception of a general power shift, then outlines the differences Norway’s officials per-
                                                 
94 This background idea was underlying the main arguments within the discussion of preferring democratic emerg-
ing donors to China.  
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ceive between their aid and that of emerging donors, and finally elaborates on three main fore-
ground ideas that characterise Norway’s reaction to emerging donors in its own development 
cooperation. 
5.2.1 Perception of a general power shift 
The financial crises since 2007 altered the perception of emerging countries, who came to be 
seen as a real challenge in all three traditional donors. However, the extent to which Norwegians 
talk about that power shift is more extreme than in the other two countries. Exemplifying this 
perception is the statement of an apparently somewhat demoralised Foreign Minister Jonas 
Gahr Støre after the collapse of the WTO Doha talks in 2008, saying that he might have been 
present “at the collapse of a world order” because the United States and the EU are no longer 
in a position to impose their interests on other countries. Now, he argues, “Brazil, India can no 
longer be ignored” and China entered the “circle of major countries that call the shots” (Gahr 
Støre, July 30, 2008, 2). Similarly, a 2011 white paper notes that the “global landscape [is now] 
shaped by a complex, multipolar lack of order” (NMFA 2011b, 19).  
As a logical response to the perceived decline of Western power, Norway plans a more extensive 
cooperation with all four emerging countries (Gahr Støre 10.02.2009, 2, 23.03.2010, 2, 
10.02.2011, 5–6; NMFA 2011c, 14, 2012a, 19–21; Barth Eide 08.02.2012, 2; NMFA 29.11.2013, 
1). Norway has developed individual strategies for all four major emerging powers, first with 
China (2007), then India (2009), Brazil (2011) and finally South Africa (2013) while recognising 
that the BRICS group is very heterogeneous (NMFA 2009d, 35, 2012a, 14; Barth Eide 
08.02.2012, 1). Another indicator of an increased attention paid to emerging countries is the 
increase in diplomatic presences in Brazil, India, and China. In order to liberate resources for 
these new diplomatic agencies, others that were considered to be less important had to be closed 
down; for instance East Timor, Slovenia, Cote d’Ivoire, Nicaragua, Colombia (NMFA 
05.10.2007, 1, 05.10.2010, 1, 02.12.2012, 1). 
A white paper from Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the rise of China and India 
as “new geopolitical centres of gravity” poses both “an opportunity and a challenge for Norway” 
(NMFA 2009d, 36). The four countries are identified as countries in which Norway has “real 
interests” and which should be given priority in Norway’s foreign relations (NMFA 2009d, 126; 
191). Interestingly, from the 19 priority countries with which Norway entertained a closer rela-
tionship in 2009, the BRICS are the only ones that are not neighbouring or Western countries 
(NMFA 2009d, 191).  
Among the four emerging countries, China is considered the most important partner for Nor-
way’s institutions dealing with the issue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade and 
Industry; Norwegian government) and the greatest influence on Norway’s policies (NMFA 
14.08.2007, 17; Gahr Støre 07.05.2009, 1, 25.01.2010, 1, 14.04.2008, 2; NMFA 19.01.2010, 1, 
21.05.2010, 1). Norway’s Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, considers in 2010 that China’s 
power is rising in “every aspect of international relations” and Norway insists that China “must 
take responsibility” and “show its hand” (Gahr Støre 23.03.2010, 3). India seems to be second 
in importance (NMFA 2009f, 15; Gahr Støre 23.03.2010, 3; Barth Eide 12.02.2013, 12). South 
Africa and Brazil are considered in the papers to be less crucial but nonetheless important play-
ers in international relations (NMFA 2009d, 38, 2011a, 4-6, 26; Gahr Støre 31.03.2011, 1).  
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The annual foreign policy address of 2013 summarises Norway’s attitude towards a perceived 
power shift “from the traditional major powers to new, emerging powers”. This “time of tran-
sition”, is seen in the address as a challenge for Norway because “a better organised world” is 
in “Norway’s self-interest” (Barth Eide 12.02.2013, 1). This indicates that Norway is more de-
pendent on a functioning multilateral order than the United States, which can largely rely on 
itself.  
5.2.2 Recognition of the activities of emerging donors 
Norway’s foreign policy institutions clearly see emerging powers as international game changers. 
But how does this translate into ideas about their activities as donors? Are they considered 
fundamentally different? Is their engagement feared or praised? The next sections elaborate on 
these questions.  
In the beginning of the period under scrutiny emerging donors and powers are not mentioned 
at all in the annual foreign policy address to parliament from the Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen 
(Petersen 15.02.2005). Interestingly, in 2006, it is not the global power shift that is mentioned, 
but rather the fact that China and India are increasingly involved in the energy sector in Africa 
(Gahr Støre 08.02.2006, 7). Similarly, in 2006 the Minister of International Development, Erik 
Solheim, refers in a speech to parliament to the donor activities of India and China and notes 
that “[y]ou cannot travel far in Africa today without coming across Chinese investments or 
development projects” (Solheim 16.05.2006, 4). Norway therefore recognised the potential of 
emerging donors earlier than the United States. Even more surprising, Norway talks about the 
potential of emerging donors even before the financial crisis which made the underlying power 
shift more openly observable for all.  
For Norad, the Norwegian development implementing agency, one of the five most important 
changes in the international aid system in the last 20 years is that new actors, such as China and 
India, play a “significant role” (Norad 2009c, 5). These new stakeholders are then seen to chal-
lenge the aid system because they are “eager to establish their own programmes” in development 
cooperation (Norad 2009c, 5). A certain discomfort is expressed when it comes to the opacity 
of projects in general and the amounts of aid that are distributed in particular, but it states that 
“there is little doubt that these countries are of considerable and growing importance” (NMFA 
2009a, 83; similar argument Gahr Støre 30.01.2008, 2).  
Just like in the United States, China’s aid activities in Africa dominate the reporting in Norway. 
In a speech about cooperating with China in the petroleum sector in Nigeria in 2008, the Foreign 
Minister Gahr Støre stated that China’s rise presents “both opportunities and challenges for 
Norway” and claims that the Forum on China Africa Cooperation in 2006 marked a “new and 
historic juncture” (Gahr Støre 30.01.2008, 1). Similarly, a white paper from 2009 on the adap-
tation of Norwegian development policy displays a picture portraying small African children, all 
busy waving Chinese flags. The white paper states next to the picture that “China is playing an 
increasingly dominant role as a development partner in a number of African countries” (NMFA 
2009a, 12). China’s engagement in Africa is seen as a “vivid illustration of a new way of building 
foreign and development policy alliances” (Gahr Støre 23.03.2010, 4). Norway recognises the 
fact that some developing countries welcome China’s engagement “partly as a counterweight to 
years of American and European domination, but also as an important player at the international 
level and in connection with its own poverty reduction” (NMFA 2009a, 12). 
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To a lesser extent, Norway recognises India’s increasing role in development cooperation and 
considers it a “leading actor in [Africa]” (NMFA 2009a, 12). Similarly, South Africa’s and Brazil’s 
engagements are mentioned sporadically but clearly not to the extent of China, or even India 
because their contributions in development cooperation are still considered to be quite low 
(NMFA 2009a, 12). A press release from 2011 celebrates the fact that emerging donors are 
involved in the coordinating efforts of the OECD and endorsed the Busan declaration (NMFA 
01.12.2011, 1). Unlike the United States, Norway does not celebrate its own involvement in 
achieving that result.  
Within Norway’s official narrative, the recognition of an increased involvement of emerging 
donors is often mentioned next to another important recent change within development coop-
eration: the fact that it is becoming increasingly hard to distinguish development policies clearly 
from other fields of foreign policy, such as economic and security policy issues (NMFA 2009a, 
92, 2011b, 20–21, 2012b, 13). Foreign aid is therefore considered to be part of a more global 
scheme, involving especially environmental and energy politics, fields in which Norway has tra-
ditionally had a keen interest.  
5.2.3 Three consequences for Norwegian development cooperation 
This section looks in detail at the foreground ideas that characterise the consequences that Nor-
way draws for its own development policies. It results from the recognition that emerging do-
nors, above all China, are influential players in development cooperation:  
“Norwegian aid efforts are being challenged by an increasingly complex range of actors 
in the countries in which we are involved […]. Certain Asian countries (China in partic-
ular), a number of Gulf states, major private funds and a growing number of NGOs 
have now joined the traditional bilateral and multilateral actors. Partner countries thus 
have more choices open to them. This has many advantages, but can also increase the 
administrative burden and reduce the opportunities for a donor country such as Norway 
to exert an influence. In any case, it makes us think along new lines about both where 
and how we focus our efforts in various parts of the world” (NMFA 2009d, 115).  
This quote conveniently illustrates that Norway’s Foreign Ministry is wary of the increased in-
volvement of emerging donors because it reduces Norway’s ability to “exert an influence” in 
the developing world. Therefore, Norway not only recognises the potential of the rise of emerg-
ing economies and their donor activities (as the previous two sections illustrated), but it equally 
draws conclusions from this for its own development policies regarding the choice of recipients 
and fields of investment.  
Norway’s political actors identify three main challenges rising from the emergence of new do-
nors: first, the need to further integrate emerging countries into existing international institu-
tions regulating development assistance. Second, the concern that the unconditional support of 
emerging donors to developing countries will lead to the undermining of aid conditionality. And 
third, a certain unease that the involvement of emerging donors will lead to an unsustainable 
use of natural resources, especially oil, and produce further economic problems for recipients. 
All three concerns show an ambivalent position towards emerging donors ranging from wel-
coming them to the expression of real concerns about the implications of their policies – for 
Norway and recipient countries.  
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First, the documents show a repeated call for a better integration of emerging donors into ex-
isting international institutions. This need for integration is generally coupled with a welcoming 
of their aid activities (Solheim 16.05.2006, 4; Fagertun Stenhammer 16.05.2007, 1, 04.06.2007, 
2). The following quote illustrates the link between the perceived power shift and the need for 
integration:  
“The influence of the traditional donors in the North will inevitably be reduced by geo-
political shifts. Norway should continue to encourage the BRICS countries and other 
rising economies to clarify their interests and policies towards global multilateral coop-
eration. Over time, we should urge them also to take on larger global responsibilities 
through multilateral commitments” (NMFA 2011c, 18). 
However, Norway’s official documents remain ambivalent as to the successes of this integra-
tion, hinting at suspicions that emerging economies are likely to create their own, rival develop-
ment institutions. If emerging economies show a preference for minilateral forums, other rival 
informal groupings or bilateral cooperation over established multilateral forums, they would 
marginalise the UN as a global institution, a result that the strongly pro-UN Norway wants to 
avoid (NMFA 2012a, 15, 80, 2009d, 35–36, 45, 2009a, 34, 2011c, 16.09.2011, 3; Brende 
09.04.2014, 3; Gahr Støre 23.03.2010, 2–3). Similarly, in the annual address to the Norwegian 
parliament in 2013, the Foreign Minister, Espen Barth Eide, stated that emerging actors are 
gaining influence, but that it is “still unclear whether or not they will fill the power vacuum that 
will arise as the importance of the traditional powers declines” (Barth Eide 12.02.2013, 1). Nor-
way pledges therefore to “work to ensure that emerging powers find their place in the existing 
world order, rather than creating a new one” (Brende 25.03.2014, 5–6). This idea of further 
integrating emerging donors into existing international structures is reminiscent of the United 
States’ call to socialise emerging donors to international standards. However, there is a signifi-
cant difference: while Norway calls for greater integration into existing multilateral structures, 
the United States attempts to influence emerging donors by transforming their policy in a way 
that they are more compliant with U.S. standards and values. The difference is indicative of 
Norway’s differing level of dependency on multilateral institutions when compared with the 
United States.  
Within Norway, a fragmented international development cooperation in which emerging donors 
do not participate in structures established by traditional donors, like the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee, is generally seen as a “risk” and as “a challenge for traditional develop-
ment assistance” (Norad 2014b, 20). Norwegian officials are however even more concerned 
about the need to integrate China in particular (NMFA 2009d, 35). A 2009 white paper states 
that China’s foreign policy “has been based on the principles of regional stability and non-in-
terference” and that China’s engagement in Africa is a “key element of its foreign policy expan-
sion” (NMFA 2009d, 35). But equally, it states that the intention to become a “responsible 
major power” could “come into conflict with the non-interference principle of its foreign pol-
icy” (NMFA 2009d, 35). This statement illustrates Norwegian fears that China could develop 
into a great non-interventionist power. The need for further integration is therefore coupled 
with serious misgivings as to the intentions of emerging donors, particularly that of China. The 
chapter on trilateral cooperation mainly deals with a particular tool for Norway to integrate 
emerging donors into its own policies and can therefore be seen as one Norwegian reply to the 
challenge.  
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The urge to integrate emerging donors into existing structures is symptomatic of the idea that 
the aid activities of emerging donors differ from those of established donors. Hence, the two 
following points illustrate the content of these perceived differences. On the one hand there is 
a concern that the unconditional support of emerging donors to developing countries will lead 
to the undermining of traditional political aid conditionality, and on the other hand, Norway is 
apprehensive of the fact that the involvement of emerging donors will lead to an unsustainable 
use of natural resources, especially oil.  
The emerging donors’ approach towards aid is defined as “different from that of traditional 
development partners, for example in that it focuses far less on the recipient country’s internal 
affairs, such as human rights” (Gahr Støre 23.03.2010, 4). The second major issue raised is 
therefore that of conditionality. In one of the expert interviews conducted, a Norad employee 
referred to their non-interference approach as “unorthodox or a bit of a stretch” that differed 
from Norway’s development cooperation (interview with IX, 2014, October 2, 10'01). A good 
illustration of Norway’s position towards this issue is Sudan. In 2004 at a meeting to find a 
solution to the conflict in Sudan the Minister of International Development, Hilde F. Johnson, 
claimed to be hopeful that China’s presence in the talks would be a positive “sign that change 
[for a more coordinated and comprehensive approach towards Sudan] is underway” (H. F. John-
son 27.09.2004, 1–2). Four years later, the tone was considerably sharper when it came to 
China’s and India’s involvement in Sudan. A policy paper stated that the sanctions of the West 
made cooperation with the local oil companies impossible, opening “a space that China and 
India have exploited for economic gain without regard to human rights issues” (NMFA 2008c, 
21). The paper continued by saying that “while there are signs that China may be re-considering 
its position, the international community must pay attention to securing international consensus 
on the role and use of sanctions if these are to be effective” (NMFA 2008c, 21). The same paper 
stated that  
“[c]onditionality simply cannot work if large developing countries are not on-board – as 
China’s actions in Sudan […] demonstrate clearly” (NMFA 2008c, 28).  
The issue of undermining the West’s conditionality or sanctions goes beyond the situation in 
Sudan. Another white paper illustrates that Norway is wary about the undermining of Western 
conditionality when it comes to China’s engagement in Africa, especially because it threatens 
standards of good governance and human rights:  
“China is outcompeting the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund by offer-
ing loans and agreements with few requirements regarding reform, good governance or 
human rights” (NMFA 2009a, 12).  
During a conference about a shared petroleum project with the Chinese in Nigeria, Norway’s 
Foreign Minister Gahr Støre, states that “as a traditional donor, Norway welcomes [China’s 
increased aid activities]” but emphasises that  
“Chinese aid is sometimes a source of concern to traditional donors. The question is 
raised whether the apparent lack of political strings attached will delay needed economic 
and political reform in African countries” (Gahr Støre 30.01.2008, 1).  
The lack of political conditionality is coupled with an awareness of unbridgeable differences 
about political views as “[Norwegians] cannot take it for granted that emerging economies share 
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all our political views” (Brende 25.03.2014, 5–6) and that this difference could even further 
increase if they are not integrated into the existing system” (Gahr Støre 03.09.2008, 3). This 
difference in the concept of conditionality, in turn, has direct consequences on the “lines about 
both where and how we focus our efforts” (NMFA 2009d, 115). This concern about the under-
mining of (especially political) conditionality could be a decisive force for a change in the policy 
of conditionality as we see in the next chapter.  
Alongside the perceived difference concerning political conditionality, Norwegian institutions 
identify a third issue related to emerging donors’ hunger for natural resources, especially in Af-
rica (see for instance NMFA 2009d, 37; Brende 09.04.2014, 1). Because of its own natural re-
sources, Norway has a keen interest in the petroleum sector and its exploitation. The develop-
ment is not only seen negatively, but clearly portrayed as a challenge for Norway’s approach to 
the oil sector that is largely determined by its Oil for Development initiative. This is based upon 
principles of political conditionality, investing and supporting African oil exploiting countries if 
they follow certain criteria. Interestingly, the initiative started in 2005, the starting point of this 
inquiry. In 2006, the Foreign Minister Gahr Støre talked about China and India’s strong involve-
ment in the energy sector, stating that this is leading to “a new security situation both for Africa 
as a whole and for the African countries that are producers of raw materials” (Gahr Støre 
08.02.2006, 7). The International Development Minister Solheim, stated six days later that he 
has hopes to amplify the positive consequences of these new investments in the oil sector 
through the Oil for Development initiative (Solheim 14.02.2006).  
However, a less positive view is expressed in a subsequent speech by Mr Gahr Støre who refers 
to China’s involvement in Africa, Latin America and in Asia as a “conquest” or as an “unsus-
tainable exploitation of natural resources” (Gahr Støre 25.01.2010, 2; NMFA 2011b, 20–21). 
One of the oil producing countries where China is present is Nigeria. Norway’s publications 
blames China for being active in Nigeria with “no activity on good governance and democrati-
sation in the country” (Norad 2010c, 38). While recognising that  
“China’s role is highly important, however, but rather in terms of oil purchases, some-
times in return for soft credit used to purchase Chinese goods, services, and infrastruc-
ture projects” (Norad 2010c, 53).  
China’s engagement in the petrol sector of development countries is in Norway’s perception 
closely linked to its exporting activities. The misgivings around cheap Chinese goods is also 
expressed in an article about the new world order where the foreign minister says that what is 
feared most in Asian countries is the “Chinese export juggernaut” and that European car ex-
porters might be “swept off the market by Chinese exports” (Gahr Støre, July 30, 2008, 2). A 
similar unease is expressed in a report on policy coherence, in which it is also held that foreign 
labour often implements the projects and that there is no spill-over effect for local communities 
(NMFA 2012c, 26; similar argument in interview with IX, 2014, October 2, 24'39). Therefore, 
China’s activities in the oil sector are seen as a challenge for recipient countries but also for 
Norway as it will be increasingly difficult to retain a certain influence while also maintaining 
certain conditions (interview with VIII, 2014, August 26, 24'22).  
This last idea is also closely linked to a general background idea present in Norway that might 
– following the theoretical hypotheses – slow down institutional change; Norway is eager to 
maintain a certain influence and fears that it might lose this to other powers. Other background 
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ideas derive from the motives discussed in chapter 4: Norway’s development assistance is value-
driven (which might slow down change in the field of conditionality) and is strongly committed 
to values, such as human rights and democracy, but Norway is also eager to stress that it follows 
its own interest and that development assistance has to – in some respect at least – serve these 
interests.  
In conclusion, the main ideas that might foster change (foreground ideas) are the following: 
Norway perceives emerging donors as a challenge and as a source of competition to its own 
development policies. It fears a loss of influence, especially in the field of human rights and 
good governance, but also in oil producing countries. The main foreground ideas that might 
induce a change in the fields of trilateral cooperation and conditionality are twofold: first, the 
idea that further integration into multilateral forums is needed, even though this may be difficult 
(a factor which could be decisive for the field of trilateral cooperation), and second, the idea 
that Western standards are under threat (regarding human rights and good governance and sus-
tainable use of resources) through emerging donors’ activities which might lead to a change in 
Norway’s policy regarding conditionality.  
5.3 United Kingdom: trying to maintain global power status despite shifts 
What ideas predominate within the last case study, the United Kingdom, regarding emerging 
donors? Chapter 4 located British development aid somewhere in between the United States 
and Norway in terms of overall amounts and of ODA/GNI ratio. Moreover, the UK is known 
for its strong support of multilateral cooperation; from our targeted group, it spends the highest 
overall amount on multilateral aid. What does this imply about the United Kingdom’s percep-
tion of emerging donors? To find answers to this question, the subsequent sections are struc-
tured as follows: the first section addresses the sensitivity of the UK regarding the increased 
economic weight of emerging countries. The second section illustrates the British perception of 
emerging donors as a group as well as individual countries. The third section briefly enumerates 
the perceived benefits and challenges, analysing the direct consequences for British develop-
ment cooperation that the UK perceive to result from the rise of emerging donors. These ideas, 
in turn, are argued to be the driving force for triggering change within the British institution of 
development assistance.  
5.3.1 Increased pressure through economic competition with emerging powers 
The UK, like the other two donors assessed here, embeds the phenomenon of emerging donors 
principally within the general debate about their increased economic and political power. Espe-
cially China’s economy coupled with its astonishing growth rates receives a lot of attention in 
the British government’s publications (for instance DFID 2009d, 131; Greening 27.01.2014, 5). 
However, emerging economies are not reduced to their economic impact alone. Beside the fac-
tor of their growing populations their political weight is perceived to have risen considerably 
(Browne 24.04.2012, 2; A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 2). The shift in global power balances is consid-
ered by the Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Jeremy Browne, to be 
a “revolution” in international affairs (Browne 24.04.2012, 2).  
90│Traditional donors’ ideas about emerging donors 
 
The United Kingdom acknowledges that it is affected by this “revolution”. Very much like the 
United States and Norway, the UK has to concede, especially after the financial crises of 2007 
and 2008, that “in a networked world of rising economies and shifts in power, the traditional 
means of influence we have enjoyed in world affairs are eroding” (FCO 2010, 70). Similarly, Mr 
Browne states that ignoring the recent power shift would be “a catastrophic historical mistake” 
(Browne 24.04.2012, 6). Three main consequences result from this for the United Kingdom: 
First, a general need to increase the links with “key emerging countries” (DFID 2007a, 179, 
2008e, 2). The increased cooperation is seen in several areas, of which trade (DFID 2007a, 194; 
UK Government 2012, 1; Browne 24.04.2012, 4), development cooperation (DFID 2007a, 179, 
2009a, 118), and sustainable development (DFID 2008a, 25) are the most important areas. To 
meet that challenge the UK has developed a “BRICS strategy” which is “very much a cross 
government strategy” involving the work of several departments (DFID 2009a, 70, 2008a, 359, 
2013d, 2, 2014b, 121). The second consequence is a repeated call from the government to adapt 
international institutions so that they reflect the new power structures (DFID 2009d, 104). Only 
through a more collaborative approach towards emerging powers and through “grittier, more 
inclusive alliances” can “the consensus the world so badly needs” be achieved (A. Mitchell 
15.02.2011, 6). The last consequence is that all four emerging countries no longer receive sup-
port through British aid. China and Brazil have “graduated from UK aid” in 2011 (DFID 2011e, 
6), while the programmes for South Africa and India are said to run out by 2015 (DFID 2013a, 
71; Greening 09.11.2012, 1).  
5.3.2 Perception of emerging donors as a group and as individual partners 
The first time the UK documents mention “emerging donors” is in 2007, a year after Norway 
(DFID 2007a, 192). In 2008, the UK first refers to the aid activities of Brazil, China and India 
(DFID 2008a, 66, 2008c, 16). It was February 2011 before the topic of emerging donors was 
put on top of the agenda in a speech entitled “emerging powers” by the Secretary of State for 
International Development, Andrew Mitchell. The speech gives valuable clues about the UK’s 
perception of emerging economies, and clearly recognises their potential as donors:  
“Historically, the global debate on poverty was dominated by the rich, OECD donors. 
Today, it’s an issue that’s often championed by emerging powers. Take China. Accord-
ing to the Financial Times, China’s Development Bank and its Export Import Bank 
committed more loans to developing countries over the last two years than the World 
Bank” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 2–3).  
The speech equally elaborates on the “significant” aid contributions made by Brazil, India and 
South Africa (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 6). Other statements confirm the importance that the UK 
attributes to emerging donors: A press release calls for higher integration of emerging donors 
into international structures as they are “major investors in Africa and the developing world” 
(DFID 01.12.2011, 1–2, 29.06.2012, 2). The Permanent Secretary of the Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID), Mark Lowcock, stated in an October 2012 speech about the 
future of international development that the  
“new global age brings with it a new global order. An order which no longer follows the 
tired old rules of the rich and the poor; the donor and the recipient; the first world and 
the third. It is a world in which countries like India, China and Brazil are reasserting 
their presence at the forefront of global progress” (Lowcock 16.10.2012, 6).  
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Therefore, throughout the observed period, but increasingly since 2011, emerging donors’ in-
volvement in “development assistance, trade and investment” is seen as “making an impact in 
developing countries” and emerging donors considered valuable partners in development co-
operation (DFID 2013a, 119, 2014b, 128).  
Each of the four emerging donors receives differentiated attention from the UK. Not surpris-
ingly, the greatest part of that attention is given yet again to China, principally to its activities in 
Africa. Very early on, in the annual report of 2006, a box is dedicated to “Development diplomacy 
in China”. It recognises the Chinese potential to play a significant role in shaping the Millennium 
Development Goals debate because of its “leadership’s push for an increasing presence on the 
international stage”. As a consequence, the UK aims to “integrat[e] a development perspective 
into the policy dialogue between China and the UK” and to  
“work with Chinese government on a limited number of areas of direct relevance to the 
achievement of the MDGs globally. These include China’s aid programme and engage-
ment with Africa, […] and engagement with China on the Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative” (DFID 2006a, 72).  
In the 2008 annual report, another special box is dedicated to China, this time to its activities in 
Africa, confirming the insights from 2006: it states that China is “expand[ing] its economic and 
political links with Africa very rapidly” and that the DFID pledges to work closely with China 
“so that both our efforts support the African vision of development” (DFID 2008a, 37). For 
that purpose, a high-level dialogue with China on Africa has taken place every six months since 
2008, and the first summit in January 2008 was claimed to have “allowed leaders to discuss the 
development relationship and China’s role in tackling global poverty” (DFID 2008a, 66). The 
aim is to “maximise the development benefits of China’s economic relations with Africa” and 
to benefit from the Chinese experience (DFID 2008a, 37, 2009d, 131–32, 2014b, 128–29). Sec-
retary of State for International Development Mitchell’s speech on emerging powers highlights 
the positive impact of Chinese funded infrastructure projects in Africa (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 
6). A speech from the more recent Secretary of State for International Development, Justine 
Greening, indicates stability within the UK’s perception of Chinese activities. She considers the 
UK partnership with China to be “ground breaking”:  
“The UK and China have both been giving assistance to countries in need for more than 
50 years. There are differences in our approach to development but there are also im-
portant similarities. And there is a lot we can learn from each other” (Greening 
02.04.2014, 1). 
But another country’s aid activities receive almost as much attention as China’s; namely, Brazil, 
which is more prominent in the UK’s reporting than in the USA’s or Norway’s. The annual 
report from 2007 refers to “Brazil’s capacity to provide effective technical assistance to Latin 
American countries on HIV/AIDS prevention and control” (DFID 2007a, 192). Similarly, a 
2008 report mentions the evolution of the relationship between Brazil and the UK from bilateral 
aid to a partnership in which the UK aims to strengthen Brazil’s capacity for sharing its manifold 
development experiences (ranging from social protection to climate change) (DFID 2008a, 79). 
Several other documents refer to multiple Brazilian projects (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 6). The aid 
efforts of Brazil receive direct encouragement through a call to better finance research on how 
to use Brazilian experiences for further poverty reduction in other countries outside of South 
America (DFID 24.08.2012, 1). The relationship between Brazil and Africa is portrayed by the 
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Secretary of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, William Hague, as a natural part-
nership:  
“Brazil’s ties with Africa reflect [their] long historical and cultural links. I know that Bra-
zilians of African heritage and African culture play a vital role in [Brazil’s] society, that 
linguistic ties are a special bond with a number of countries in Africa. […] [Brazil’s] 
remarkable record of poverty reduction, growth and development of thriving democracy 
makes you an extremely strong partner for African countries set on the same path” 
(Hague 19.02.2014, 2).  
Alongside this positive portrayal of Brazil’s relationship with the African continent, the UK 
congratulates itself on the continued work with Brazil “on climate-smart agriculture and nutri-
tion in Africa” (DFID 2014b, 129). 
The aid activities of India and South Africa are given less attention. However, just as the United 
States spoke of like-minded countries, both India and South Africa are praised for the fact that 
they share political values with the UK. South Africa is seen as a model for other countries, 
especially because of its democratic ideals and human rights standards. The UK sees itself next 
to South Africa as “members of the world’s community of fellow democracies” (Hague 
14.02.2012, 2). South Africa ranges in the ranks of emerging economies, especially because of 
its “leading role in Africa and for Africa” (FCO 2006, 298; Hague 14.02.2012, 1–3). A report 
from 2013 vouches to support South Africa’s efforts “to deliver effective development results 
both regionally and globally” and a press release claims that the UK will support “South Africa’s 
growing role as a development partner of countries across the continent” (DFID 2014b, 129, 
30.04.2013, 1). South Africa’s aid policies are acclaimed in the realms of wealth creation, UN 
peacekeeping missions, climate change and on health planning (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 6; DFID 
2012a, 64, 2014b, 128). 
For India, a report states that “nowhere will our partnership be more multi-dimensional than 
India […]. The world’s largest democracy and one of the world’s great civilisations, India is now 
at the top table in world affairs” and that India shares the values of “democracy, pluralism and 
tolerance” with the UK (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 4; DFID 2013e, 1). The UK emphasises the 
fact that the relationship with India evolved from an aid relationship to a trade partnership 
(Lunn 2011; Greening 09.11.2012, 1; DFID 09.11.2012, 1). Moreover, the UK envisions further 
cooperation with India’s Development Partnership Administration on development issues, for 
instance to promote India’s model on health financing (DFID 2014b, 128–29).  
5.3.3 Consequences for UK development cooperation 
As the previous sections have shown, the UK paints a rather positive picture of the aid efforts 
of emerging donors. Particular benefits that are perceived are the fact that emerging donors 
share similar experiences with their recipients and therefore might have appropriate ideas on 
how to get countries out of poverty (DFID 2011e, 6; A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 3–4). However, as 
the area of cooperating with emerging donors is rather new, some caution is expressed:  
“And working with them to share, to identify what those lessons might be, and to help 
transfer them, is, you know, a good thing. There are a lot of hypothetical benefits, I 
guess, and that we need to test” (interview with III, 2013, October 9, 13'07). 
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The UK shows a marked reluctance to judge emerging donors too quickly. However, some 
critical comments about the consequences of their activities could be found. One concern is 
reminiscent of a reservation expressed by Norway; that emerging donors could attempt to form 
a rival world order, distancing themselves from what they consider to be “Euro-centric values” 
(Browne 24.04.2012, 7). Human rights are such values, where Great Britain maintains that they 
“are not just Western preoccupations” but “universal” (Browne 24.04.2012, 7). The partnership 
that the UK envisions with emerging donors should not lead to the abandonment of those “core 
British values” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 7–8). However, the UK equally states that in “cases 
where our disagreement is rooted in detail rather than fundamental values we will be pragmatic 
– a peaceful and prosperous world is in all of our interests” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 7–8). There-
fore, while it is seen as a challenge that sometimes the partnership will be based on opposing 
value systems, the overall conclusion is that the UK should cooperate with emerging powers as 
much as it can (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 3). This is a clear difference from the ideas of the United 
States and Norway, both of which seemed more convinced that cooperation is only possible 
when values are congruent. This idea has consequences in the areas of conditionality and in 
trilateral cooperation.  
Another challenge that is perceived to emanate from the increased activities of emerging donors 
is that international development as a field has become “more complex and more crowded”, 
often to the detriment of transparency (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 2). This uncertainty is linked to 
the relative novelty of the partnership with emerging donors, as confirmed by a statement from 
an interviewee (interview with III, 2013, October 9, 7'49). One aspect that many traditional 
donors criticise about emerging donors is their thirst for raw materials in Africa, but the UK 
disagrees with this judgement. At the very end of his speech on emerging powers, the Secretary 
of State for International Development Mitchell, stated:  
“And to those who are waiting for me to address the issue of raw materials in Africa, I 
say that engagement is surely sensible and logical. When we work with people, we pro-
mote openness and, in a modern world, we all learn very quickly that everyone benefits 
from transparency and accountability” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 7–8).  
Generally, this indicates a rather balanced (some might say cynical) view from the UK on the 
aid activities of emerging donors, whereby the UK sees more potential for cooperation than for 
competition. Despite diverging values, the main thread seems to be to cooperate more with 
emerging donors. This has two consequences for British development cooperation: first, the 
UK considers itself capable to increase the cooperation between the two groups of traditional 
and emerging donors. Second, the UK sees itself in a helping position to guide emerging donors 
within the complex field of development cooperation where the United Kingdom has learned 
from a long history.  
The UK has developed a Global Partnership Department in 2010. Its main goal is to “maintain the 
UK at the heart of the ever evolving international architecture by helping to shape and bring 
coherence to DFID’s international objectives” while cooperating with “development partners, 
old and new” (DFID 2011d, 3). This policy decision illustrates the UK’s aim for actively shaping 
the emerging development discourse through close engagement with them and international 
institutions. The aim to enter and shape new alliances is stressed in many documents (for in-
stance DFID 15.02.2011, 1). The speech by the Secretary of State for International Develop-
ment Mitchell from 2011 illustrates that the UK itself has been at the forefront of integrating 
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emerging powers into existing institutional structures surrounding development cooperation (A. 
Mitchell 15.02.2011, 1; similar argument A. Mitchell 09.06.2012, 3). The following quote illus-
trates the urgency with which the UK pursues its involvement in the integration process:  
“Because the defining characteristic of these emerging partners is that they’re not just 
talking about changing our world, they’re actually doing it. I want Britain to be part of 
that change, to be a beacon of influence for rich and poor alike” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 
8).  
One instructive example where the UK is proud of pursuing this policy of integration is the 
Busan High level meeting on aid effectiveness. One of the UK’s priorities for the Busan talks – 
and which the press release announces to be reflected in the agreement – is the increased coop-
eration with new aid donors as  
“[e]merging powers like China, Mexico, Brazil and India are becoming increasingly in-
fluential providers of support and assistance to poorer countries. Richer nations must 
collaborate with emerging powers to share experience” (DFID 01.12.2011, 2).  
Much like the United States, the UK claims to have positively influenced Chinese policies to be 
part of the Busan agreement as a speech after the conference indicates:  
“[The signing of Busan] followed significant work by the UK to ensure China joined the 
partnership, including discussions I held with Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen 
Deming in Beijing immediately ahead of Busan” (A. Mitchell 07.12.2011, 1; similar rep-
resentation of the event DFID 01.12.2011, 1–2).  
The UK therefore attributes to itself a “key role in encouraging emerging economies to partici-
pate in the new Global Partnership” (DFID 2012a, 87). The meeting of Busan therefore repre-
sents a success of British attempts to push for a higher integration of emerging donors (DFID 
2012c, 5, 2013a, 119). This policy of pushing for a higher integration of emerging doors into 
multilateral structures is very similar to the strategy of Norway. Nevertheless, the UK seems to 
be more successful. And, as in the case of Norway, this idea plays a decisive role when it comes 
to trilateral cooperation.   
This need to play an active role in the partnership with emerging donors and in their integration 
process is closely linked to a second strategy that the UK pursues regarding emerging donors. 
This strategy consists of the idea that the UK could “help” emerging donors in their develop-
ment aid policies. Already in 2007, the UK was aiming to “help [emerging donors] to increase 
the impact of their work on poverty reduction” (DFID 2007a, 192). Similar references to “help-
ing emerging economies” in their aid policies can be found throughout the observed period (for 
instance DFID 2008c, 16, 35). Furthermore, the UK intends to “help” individual emerging do-
nors like China, where “DFID has offered support and help to China in reviewing their aid 
management arrangements” and to Brazil where the UK wants to “help [them] join the fight 
against international poverty” (DFID 2008a, 37, 15.02.2011, 1). The UK follows this policy as 
it believes itself to possess valuable and “proven experience in giving aid in the developing 
world” (DFID 15.02.2011, 1). The strategy ranges from offering help and encouragement, to 
direct assistance, to working together to “increase [emerging donors’] effectiveness through 
sharing best practice and disseminating innovations” (DFID 2014b, 128). In 2014, the UK even 
openly admitted that it is trying “to help shape [emerging donors’] impact on development in 
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poorer countries” (DFID 2014c, 16). This effort of helping emerging donors in their aid effort 
is similar to the attempt of the U.S. to socialise emerging donors to their preferences and again 
plays a decisive role in the field of trilateral cooperation, but equally in the chapter on condi-
tionality, because the UK, by “helping” emerging donors, might reproduce its own conditional 
model.  
The last consequence that the UK draws for its own development cooperation policies is to 
adapt its own development cooperation towards a more results-based and effective approach. 
This consequence results from the perception that because new players have entered the field, 
competition in the field of development cooperation has risen. Secretary of State for Interna-
tional Development Mitchell states that  
“This [time of new engaging partnerships with emerging countries] is also the perfect 
time for us here in the UK to reconfigure our development efforts. One of the themes 
of our new narrative will be a relentless focus on results. […] I believe that these new 
partnerships that I have described today can drive a change throughout DFID and 
throughout Whitehall. […] [A]id will be about delivery not doctrine” (A. Mitchell 
15.02.2011, 3, 8).  
The UK also claims that its partnership with emerging donors increases UK aid effectiveness 
as the UK learns from the new partners “who have recent domestic experience of poverty re-
duction” (DFID 2013a, 119). The emergence of new donors has also triggered an internal insti-
tutional reform whereby the National Security Council has been increased through an Emerging 
Powers Sub-Committee that oversees the UK’s strategy “for creating deeper relationship with 
emerging powers across UK policy and programmes” (DFID 2014b, 128). Similarly, the need 
for increasing the effectiveness of aid also results from the fact that some kind of aid might no 
longer be appropriate due to the emergence of new donors. As such, the Independent Commis-
sion for Aid Impact (ICAI) states that the “rise of emerging donors in Africa, who provide 
assistance without the complex processes associated with UK budget support, might create cir-
cumstances in which budget support is no longer appropriate” (ICAI 2012, 20). Similarly, some 
countries will become less dependent on British aid “as a result of improved domestic revenues 
and new investment flows from emerging economic powers like China and India” (DFID 
2014b, 26). Therefore, the UK recognises that its aid needs to adapt and change due to the 
pressure from emerging donors, a phenomenon that is also discussed within the G8 (DFID 
2014b, 123). This idea is comparable to the one in the United States, where a more visible aid 
was requested and influences the issue area of conditionality.  
Next to these foreground ideas that might trigger change within the British development assis-
tance, several background ideas must be mentioned as they might aim at preventing that change. 
Again, they mostly derive from the motives summarised in chapter 4. Since 1997, the UK has 
had a strong developmental focus in its aid which might constrain other forces that want to 
trigger changes within development assistance. Nevertheless, chapter 4 also showed that the 
UK also follows a value-driven development policy, comparable to the ones of the United States 
and Norway, and that its aid is considered to fulfil certain interests, such as commercial and 
diplomatic motives.  
The consequences that arise mainly from the foreground ideas for British policies are threefold 
and might influence the institution of British assistance as follows: first, the UK aims at playing 
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a major role in the integration of emerging donors into existing international forums; second, it 
plans to help emerging donors to adapt their policies to increase aid efficiency and poverty 
reduction; and finally, it adapts its aid policies towards a more results-based and efficient aid 
approach as some of its existing policies are seen to be increasingly redundant because of emerg-
ing donors. The first and second challenges are addressed in chapter 7 when we look at the 
UK’s efforts on engaging in trilateral cooperation with emerging donors. The second and third 
challenges could indicate that the UK attempts to find common ground with emerging countries 
when it comes to aid conditionality. This is further discussed in chapter 6. The following section 
compares the results of this first empirical chapter and sets the stage for the following two 
empirical chapters.  
5.4 Concluding remarks: common and diverging ideas about emerging donors 
The main purpose of this chapter was to elaborate on the dominating foreground (and some 
background) ideas that obtain within the narrative of traditional donors regarding the activities 
of emerging donors. This section found common themes and ideas of the three traditional do-
nors but equally stressed the differences within their perception of emerging donors, as these 
differences are the main basis for explaining a differing pattern in the reaction towards emerging 
donors in the two issue areas – conditionality and trilateral cooperation.  
Let’s begin with the common ideas that all three donors share about emerging economies. All 
three recognise the increasing economic relevance of emerging countries and all of them recog-
nise the relevance of emerging economies as donors. Moreover, all three pay more attention to 
the activities of China than to the other three emerging donors. Nevertheless, within the indi-
vidual appraisal of emerging countries, some differences can be divined; the United States fo-
cuses most of its attention on China and distinguishes their activities from those of like-minded 
countries. Similarly, Norway puts most emphasis on Chinese activities in Africa but also recog-
nises Indian efforts, and talks to a limited extent about South Africa’s and Brazil’s development 
cooperation. The United Kingdom also acknowledges the bigger importance of China but 
equally stresses the significance of Brazil’s development cooperation. South Africa and India 
receive less attention. These differences in the focus of attention might explain a varying readi-
ness to engage with some emerging donors in trilateral projects rather than with others.   
Moreover, what could be influential for explaining change in the field of trilateral cooperation 
is the stated willingness to cooperate more closely with emerging donors that the United States 
and the United Kingdom have both expressed – though to a stronger degree from the United 
Kingdom than the United States. Moreover, both donors share the foreground idea that they 
would like to socialise or help emerging donors in order to “improve” their development assis-
tance. Norway, on the other hand, has also expressed a desire to cooperate more closely with 
emerging donors, but has especially focused on the need to integrate emerging donors better 
into existing multilateral structures. In the case of all three donors, the background ideas that 
might slow down change within trilateral cooperation are the commitment to democratic values, 
which could hinder cooperation especially with China. Moreover, all follow self-interest through 
their aid (with commercial and diplomatic goals paramount, though the United States arguably 
has a stronger focus on security objectives than the other donors).  
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What are the main foreground ideas that could influence the field of conditionality that we 
discuss in detail in chapter 6? All three traditional donors state that the values underlying their 
aid might be undermined by the competition of emerging donors. Nevertheless, the degree to 
which they emphasise this varies immensely, which are decisive for explaining differing reactions 
within conditionality.  
First of all, the same background ideas that we saw in the field of trilateral co-operation are in 
play here, and they might slow down change considerably. Diplomatic and commercial motives 
might again play a role in explaining a relative inertia of the development assistance institutions. 
Even more importantly, the fact that all three donors pursue a value-driven development policy 
could be very influential when talking about conditionality, as these values are perceived to be 
under threat by some donors of our group. This is especially true for the United States, where 
especially political values are seen to be under threat, mostly be China. Similarly, Norway sees 
important political values, such as good governance and human rights, threatened by emerging 
donors. This is less true for the United Kingdom where there is only an urge for more transpar-
ent aid policies by all donors involved. On the contrary, the United Kingdom (as well as Norway 
to a certain degree) welcomes all emerging donors and their activities which could be indicative 
of the desire to adapt their own policies towards the non-conditional model. The United States, 
on the contrary is strongly committed to political values and only welcomes like-minded coun-
tries. Similarly, the United States and the United Kingdom emphasise in their statements that 
there is a need to adapt the policies of emerging donors to their own (or similar) standards. 
Furthermore, the United States and the United Kingdom stress the importance of making their 
aid more results-based (for the UK) and more visible (for the U.S.) – two factors that could also 
be important in explaining institutional change within conditionality of those two donors. Fi-
nally, Norway sees the sustainable use of natural resources under threat – another element that 
could influence its decision-making process concerning its conditional approach. The following 
table summarises the findings.  
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Table 5-1: Summarizing the main ideas influential for conditionality and trilateral cooperation 






threat of political val-
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Motives (commercial and 
diplomatic; also develop-
mental)         
Value-driven policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            Source: Own compilation 
This chapter has laid bare the main ideas that the three traditional donors have about emerging 
donors. The next chapter now looks closely at the first thematic field – that of conditionality – 
and verifies if the above mentioned ideas triggered the expected change, or if (and why) not.  
  
 
6 Changes in conditionality? 
The following two chapters track the influence of the ideas identified in the previous chapter 
on the development cooperation of the three traditional donors. I conceptualise each develop-
ment cooperation as an institutional set-up, composed of narratives, rules and practices. As it is 
impossible to look at governmental development assistance in its entirety, the following two 
chapters look at two thematic fields that are most likely to be affected by the aid activities of 
emerging donors: conditionality and trilateral cooperation.  
Olav Stokke defines conditionality as “the use of pressure by the donor, in terms of threatening 
to terminate aid or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient” 
(Stokke 1995a, 12).95 Several distinctions are useful for understanding conditionality in full: first, 
conditions can be imposed by the donor before (ex ante) or after (ex post) the disbursement of 
funds. Second, conditions can derive from political objectives or from economic considerations. 
The literature review and the previous chapter discussed in detail that traditional donors con-
sider their aid to be largely different to that of emerging donors in regard to political conditions. 
Therefore, this chapter places a particular emphasis on political conditions and only touches on 
economic conditions.96 When discussing political conditions, this chapter focuses on human 
rights, good governance and budget support as a means to ensure that political conditions are 
fulfilled. Economic conditions, on the other hand, are discussed through the position of tradi-
tional donors towards the IMF and the World Bank (as their aid is often highly conditional on 
economic achievements, such as free trade, and market liberalization) and on the level of the 
regulatory quality of the recipient governments. Conditionality is expected to be swayed by the 
emergence of new donors because emerging donors do not make use of conditionality (or are 
perceived to refrain from conditionality), which conceivably challenges this regime. Theoreti-
cally, conditionality is a well-established, traditional field of development cooperation. Follow-
ing hypothesis 2, conditionality is therefore more prone to path-dependent behaviour and is 
unlikely to change abruptly.   
The theory chapter argued that the explanatory power for explaining institutional change lies in 
the ideas that traditional donors have about emerging donors. While the previous chapter iden-
tified the general ideas influencing traditional donors’ policies, the section on the narratives gives 
further insight into how these ideas influence the narrative within the particular thematic field 
of conditionality. Therefore, each section devoted to a particular country first discusses the main 
narratives on (political and economic) conditionality and later identifies whether these official 
                                                 
95 Note that this chapter does not have the purpose of discussing whether any kind of conditionality is useful for 
the process of development. There seems to be a significant debate going on in the literature about that topic (see 
for instance, Öhler, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher 2012; Börzel and Hackenesch 2013; Sorensen 1995; Dietrich 2013; 
Vanheukelom 2012). Similarly, many argue that conditionality on good governance does not work (Brett 2011; 
Hout 2002) or that conditionality generally should be aimed at improving the situation of the poor (Mosley, Hud-
son, and Verschoor 2004). 
96 This increasing focus on political conditions is also confirmed by the literature (see for instance, Dollar and Levin 
2006; Carbone 2010; S. C. Carey 2007, 449–50). Oliver Morrissey (2009, 710) similarly argues that because previous 
conditions (such as the economic conditionality of the World Bank) have faced much criticism, there is an increas-
ing trend towards using more selectivity or “conditionality with a light touch”. Moreover, a study by Gabriella 
Montinola (2010) finds that the economic conditions of the World Bank and the IMF were only successful in 
democratic countries, attributing even more importance to democracy for triggering development.  
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narratives have been implemented in the rules and practices of the individual institutions of 
development cooperation.97  
To study the narrative on conditionality, a similar method to the previous chapter has been used. 
Next to the analysis of selected primary documents and expert interviews, aid statistics and legal 
documents further enriched the method to study rules and practices (for further information, 
see methods chapter). Especially for studying the practices on conditionality, a more selective 
approach was needed. Therefore, the practices are looked at in 11 selected countries where 
traditional donors share an interest with at least three emerging donors. This selection consists 
of countries where all three donors were active over the last ten years (the first three columns 
indicating the rank each recipient reached on average over the period from 2004 to 2014). All 
recipients are at least in the top 20 of recipients, with the exception of Malawi and Nigeria.98 
While the involvement of emerging donors varies considerably more than that of traditional 
donors, what is important for this analysis is whether their presence is significant for traditional 
donors. Another finding can be drawn from the table: all but one of the recipients are located 
in Africa indicating the strong regional focus of all considered donors – emerging or traditional.   
 Table 6-1: Selection of case studies to illustrate practices of traditional donors 
Recipient country USA Norway UK China India Brazil South 
Africa 
Afghanistan   2 1 4 Yes Yes Yes No 
DRC  11 16 9 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethiopia 4 11 3 Yes Yes Yes No 
Malawi 33 8 12 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mozambique 16 6 16 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nigeria 10 50 1 Yes Yes Yes (Yes) 
Sudan/ South Sudan99 3 4 10 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tanzania 15 3 8 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Uganda 14 7 13 Yes Yes (Yes) Yes 
Zambia 18 9 15 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: OECD stats and sources for emerging donors (see literature review for details) 100 
                                                 
97 This division is due to the hypothesis from the theoretical chapter that the layer of narratives is more likely to 
change than the layers of rules and practices.  
98 Nigeria was selected because of its importance for one traditional donor (Nigeria being the UK’s top recipient); 
Malawi was selected because of a considerable involvement of all emerging donors as well as of two traditional 
donors (Malawi). 
99 Note that the rankings are only for Sudan before the separation into Sudan and South Sudan in 2011.  
100 Good indications for China, Brazil and India come for instance from (African Economic Outlook 2011; Krage-
lund 2010b; Morazán et al. 2012, 17; for information about Chinese projects in Africa, see Paulo and Reisen 2010, 
542; Brautigam 2011b; AidData). Note that statements in brackets indicate a modest engagement. See appendix 
9.6 for details on the amount spent by the traditional donors in the 11 selected cases.  
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The chapter addresses the following questions: (1) what is each country’s approach towards 
conditionality during the observed period, (2) does a change regarding conditionality take place 
within the narratives, rules and practices of the aid institutions and (3) to what extent is this 
change related to the emergence of new donors. Section 6.4 compares the results of the three 
cases in order to draw apposite conclusions about the individual national donor policies and the 
role of ideas in explaining the individual changes or inertia. The section also identifies what kind 
of institutional change has taken place in each individual country.  
6.1 United States: Approach towards conditionality  
The last chapter elaborated on the ideas that characterise the official stand of the United States 
regarding emerging donors. Moreover, it identified which ideas are likely to play a role in the 
thematic field of conditionality. From the perception of increased competition, the United States 
drew two main consequences for its own development cooperation: it argued that its aid needed 
to become more visible and to stick more to political, American, values. Moreover, the idea of 
socialising emerging donors towards a more politically motivated aid was expressed. This need 
for socialising donors was felt most keenly in relation to China, which was considered furthest 
away from American values in development cooperation.  
The following analysis takes a closer look, first at the narratives within the United States sur-
rounding conditionality in general, then at political conditionality, before finally touching on 
issues related to economic conditionality. This part gives us an indication of whether the general 
ideas (as mentioned above) take root in the narratives on conditionality. The second part con-
fronts these narratives with the implementation in rules and practices. The following section 
questions whether a change has taken place in the U.S. policy regarding conditionality – narra-
tive and practice – and attempts to link that change to the emergence of new donors.     
6.1.1 Narratives on conditionality  
Position on conditionality in the light of the rise of emerging donors  
In all three donor countries, the issue of conditionality is subject to controversy. This can be 
partly explained by the international debate that largely focuses on the important issue of own-
ership – the idea that recipients need to “exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions” for aid to be most effective 
(OECD 2008b, 3). While the principle of ownership is referred to in all three donor countries, 
the interpretation of ownership differs strongly. The United States show an early commitment 
to ownership but does not use the concept (like other countries that we look at) as contradicting 
conditional approaches. On the contrary, in the official narrative of the United States, ownership 
is seen as complementary to necessary conditions attached to development assistance (USAID 
2004, 6; USDS 2010f, 94, 2015e, 36; Rice 21.10.2008, 1; Clinton 06.01.2010, 2, 30.11.2011, 1–2; 
Fine 06.06.2012, 5; USMCC 2008b, 28, 2008a, 18; U.S. Government 2010e, 1, 2010d, 2). For 
instance, a fact sheet evaluates policy conditionality next to ownership as an effective combina-
tion (USAID 2008, 2). The following quote illustrates that ownership is often grouped together 
with conditions:  
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“While we emphasize country ownership and the responsibility of the country […], we 
don’t leave them on their own. We let the countries take the lead but we don’t passively 
sit by” (USMCC 2004, 5).  
During the ten years that this study observes, the idea that certain conditions lead to better 
growth rates has found support in the United States official narrative, which can be traced back 
to the idea that the United States is thought to stick more closely to its own values and to make 
its aid more visible (or effective) (for instance USAID 2002, 49; USMCC 2004, 5, 2008b, 2; 
USDS and USAID 2014, 31; USDS 2015a, 19).  
Next to a general support for conditional approaches, a shift has taken place from ex-post-con-
ditions towards a stronger selectivity in the choice of recipients (ex-ante conditionality). The 
strategy for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), proclaimed al-
ready in 2002 that “[t]o be successful, international engagement must shift from conditionality 
to selectivity in foreign assistance” (USAID 2002, 49). To attach conditions to aid payments in 
the hope that recipients fulfil them afterwards is judged to be unrealistic (Shah 20.06.2011, 4). 
Stronger conditions attached to the selection process of candidates is seen, on the contrary, as 
enhancing the development process and potentially even benefiting the ownership process as 
seen above (USAID 2004, 17).  
The institution best illustrating this shift towards stronger selection is the Millennium Challenge 
Cooperation, founded in 2003, which rewards worthy recipients for efforts to comply with good 
governance standards and sound economic policies. The preselection process is clearly intro-
ducing strong (political and economic) conditions on potential candidates, but the MCC admin-
istrators are eager to stress that after the selection process has taken place, country ownership 
stands as the most important principle when countries need to develop their own development 
strategies (USMCC 2007a, 3, 2008b, 1). Therefore, ownership is seen to accompany the in-
creased selectivity process (USMCC 2011b, 3–4). The following quote illustrates this complex 
relationship between preselection and ownership: 
“[W]e recognize that country ownership does not mean government ownership and con-
trol in all circumstances, especially in countries whose governments show little commit-
ment to or interest in development or democracy. But it does mean working much more 
closely with and through committed governments and, as much as possible and appro-
priate, consultation with and ownership by those most affected by our programs. […] 
We will promote mutual accountability by prioritizing investments where partner na-
tions have demonstrated high standards of transparency, good governance, and account-
ability – and where they make their own financial contributions to development” (USDS 
2010f, 95). 
MCC official documents demonstrate that countries are very eager to comply to MCC selective 
criteria as, for instance, in 2007 73 percent of all conditions were met on time (USMCC 2007a, 
54; similarly in USMCC 2008a, 13). In 2013, Raj Shah, the USAID Administrator, stressed that 
the MCC’s “emphasis on the conditionality of aid” belongs to the best practices in American 
aid (Shah 20.03.2013, 1–2). The selective process is considered to be a success and labelled the 
“MCC effect”, as it creates an “incentive […] for candidate countries to adopt legal, policy, 
regulatory and institutional reforms” (USMCC 2006b, 30) and is “a catalyst for reforms” (US-
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MCC 2006a, 44; similar argument in USMCC 2007a, 6), implying that MCC practices and stand-
ards start influencing other U.S. institutions. This, again, is closely related to the driving idea 
that American aid should be more visible and effective.  
The other consequence that the United States draws as a reaction to emerging donors is that it 
needs to stick to its own, mainly political values, which calls for a greater emphasis on condi-
tional approaches (as the previous chapter showed). Emerging donors – principally China – are 
seen to be undermining efforts to encourage recipients to reform (whether through ex-post or 
ex-ante conditions). During a congressional testimony in 2012, the Chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights, Christopher Smith, stated that Chinese aid 
undermines incentives to promote good governance models (C. H. Smith 29.03.2012, 3). Simi-
larly, Thomas Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated 
in 2008 that “on occasion, it appears that China’s policies serve to undercut the efforts of others 
to use investment and development assistance to produce improved governance” (Christensen 
05.06.2008, 1). While the tone of the narrative indicates an increase in the selectivity of potential 
candidates, there seems to be a certain wariness that especially in political conditions, China 
could undermine U.S. efforts. The next sections look closer into that argument and illustrate 
how successful the idea of making aid more politically conditional has been.  
Political conditionality 
The documents of the United States indicate that the country is very proud of its own achieve-
ments in terms of political development, referring to itself as a “beacon of freedom” (Barthol-
omew 29.03.2012, 42–43). Therefore, it is unsurprising that the U.S. vouches to “share the U.S. 
democratic experience” (USDS and USAID 2014, 19; similar arguments in USDS and USAID 
2005, 98; USDS 2013e, 460, 2015a, 19; Rice 08.03.2006, 1; Clinton 06.01.2010, 4). Governing 
justly and democratically is considered to be one of the seven central pillars of America’s devel-
opment cooperation and is also seen as being successful (USDS and USAID 2010, 90; USDS 
2015e, 10-11, 30-31). Similar to the other two donors, democracy is seen for the United States 
as a factor for increasing the chances for development, for a more peaceful world which, in the 
end, should benefit the United States itself (Christensen 03.08.2006, 21; USDS 2005d, 200, 
2010f, 10; USDS and USAID 2003, 19–20). Moreover, the narrative hints at a potential threat 
from emerging donors, mostly China, as it is feared that their support for rogue dictators might 
undermine the leverage the U.S. has on them:  
“China makes few, if any, demands in terms of democratic norms and is certainly less 
inquisitive about how African leaders actually use agreed-upon credits – a stance which 
conflicts with the pro-democracy, good governance ethos that we and our traditional 
European partners promote” (Pham 29.03.2012, 51). 
The next sections look in more details at three fields where the U.S. could implement the idea 
of sticking more to its values – first human rights, second good governance, and finally budget 
support.  
104│Changes in conditionality? 
 
Human rights 
The promotion of human rights is seen as an “integral component of foreign policy” and thus 
by extension as a “key tool” of development cooperation (USDS 2009d, 1–2; Dobriansky 
05.05.2005, 2). Human rights are considered to be an “American tradition” and the U.S. sees its 
own responsibility as a democracy to promote the protection of these rights anywhere in the 
world (Dobriansky 05.05.2005, 1; USDS 2012f, 1). Protecting human rights is seen as protecting 
U.S. national security and embedded in the National Security Strategy since 2002 (USDS 2004b, 
1, 2011g, 6; U.S. Government 2010b, 5). Human rights-friendly countries are considered to be 
better cooperation partners, more stable and more peaceful (USDS 2005c, 2). The United States 
is seen in the leading position in “upholding and protecting the values that define America” 
(USDS 2010f, 10). While the United States is careful to stress that it is not “impos[ing] [its] 
values on other countries by force”, it maintains the belief that the values are “cherished by 
people in every nation” (USDS 2010f, 10). Hence, human rights are considered to be core values 
of American society and a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Are these seen as endangered by 
emerging donors?  
Within the United States government, a lot of effort has been put into the analysis of the effect 
China’s support of other nations might have on their human rights record (USDS 2012d, 393; 
Christensen 03.08.2006, 42; Kerry 04.11.2014, 2). In 2008, the U.S. resumed the human rights 
dialogue with China (USDS 2010a, 27). While the USA criticises the human rights abuses that 
are taking place in China, they are also wary of the potential impact China’s approach towards 
human rights could have on their own promotion of human rights (Shear 13.01.2010, 2). Ms 
Carolyn Bartholomew, Commissioner of the United States-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, states in 2012:  
“My former boss, Ms. Pelosi, used to always say she was the skunk at the garden party 
when she would meet with foreign leaders because she would be raising concerns about 
human rights abuses. So I believe that we would continue to do that. I believe that the 
Chinese Government is not doing that. But I think we need to step up our game in 
terms of reaching out and hosting delegations” (Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 46).  
This indicates that the U.S. plans to strengthen their human rights initiatives, even if it antici-
pates that “African countries can depend on China to avoid raising controversial human rights 
issues in the U.N. Human Rights Council, and on occasion, to even support them when they 
are criticized by Western countries” (Shinn 29.03.2012, 73). It seems therefore that the intention 
to strengthen human rights in the selective criteria is closely linked to the assumption that China 
might work in the opposite direction. The U.S. therefore attempts – through a more conditional 
approach – to balance the “Chinese pragmatism” which is thought to imply that countries no 
longer intervene in other countries’ internal affairs, a policy which is considered to be “immoral” 
(Blumenthal 03.08.2006, 272–73).  
Good governance  
Next to human rights, democracy is a value symbolic American value. Good governance – next 
to fair and free election process and a robust civil society – is seen as one of the “three core 
components of a working democracy” which explains why the U.S. puts a lot of effort into the 
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support of good governance in their development cooperation (USDS 2008d, 1). The U.S. doc-
uments define good governance as “including political pluralism and the rule of law, respect for 
human and civil rights of all citizens, protection of private property rights, commitment to 
transparency and accountability of governance, and fighting against corruption” (USMCC 
2015a, 8). The underlying principle in promoting good governance policies through aid policies 
is that good governance leads to more peaceful countries that develop more robustly. It is seen 
as “perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting develop-
ment” (USAID 2002, 5). This explains why the U.S. often makes its aid conditional on good 
governance. It argues that good governance and democracy promotion is “central to U.S. na-
tional security and the global war on terror” (USDS and USAID 2007, 18; similar argument 
already in USAID 2002, 9) and forms a “cornerstone of a broader development agenda” (USDS 
2011e, 366).   
The United States sees itself as the leader worldwide in promoting democracy and good gov-
ernance and wants to keep that position (USDS 2006b, 3). The emphasis on the need to en-
courage good governance and also to condition aid on successful implementation of good gov-
ernance is strong throughout the observed period, and throughout all institutions of U.S. devel-
opment assistance (for instance Rice 21.10.2008, 1; USMCC 2010, 9; Yun 21.03.2013, 1; Shah 
20.06.2011, 2; Higginbottom 04.03.2014, 1).  
The selective approach regarding good governance policies and especially the fight against cor-
ruption – pioneered by the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation – has been 
adopted in other institutions as well. Furthermore, the selective approach, even though it was 
present early on, has expanded over the time. Already in 2002, USAID’s foreign aid strategy 
advocated to tie aid closer to “demonstrations of political will for reform and good governance” 
(USAID 2002, 10). In 2003, USAID and the State department stated that  
“USAID will embrace MCA principles of rewarding good governance and performance 
in our priorities for development resources. Our primary focus will be to provide tar-
geted assistance to those countries creating a sound economic environment, embracing 
democratic governance, and investing in their people” (USDS and USAID 2003, vii).  
Similarly, a 2004 USAID publication claims to give “substantial funding” for “top performers” 
(USAID 2004, 18). Equally, in 2005, the then Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Paula 
Dobriansky, stated that the “MCC’s approach spreads a message that good governance and 
reform minded leaders will be rewarded” (Dobriansky 05.05.2005, 2; similar argument in USDS 
2005a, 71). A fact sheet from the White House claims that the President has “charted a new era 
in development, predicating American aid on results and accountability” (U.S. Government 
2010e, 1). The MCC effect, in turn, seems to be appreciated throughout U.S. official documents, 
claiming that the selective criteria of MCC have “motivated good governance and reforms” 
(USMCC 2008b, 5). In 2010, President Obama’s directive on global development policy took 
on the narrative of his predecessor by claiming that the United States “will give greater attention 
to pursuing policy reforms essential for development, including through [its] diplomatic engage-
ment, as well as through the use of conditionality and performance-based mechanisms, wher-
ever appropriate” (U.S. Government 2010f, 6). The directive also states that this “new approach 
to global development will focus [the] government on the critical task of helping to create a 
world with more prosperous and democratic states” (U.S. Government 2010f, 4). The launch 
of the Quadrennial report in 2010 – a report evaluating U.S. foreign policy – further emphasised 
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the need to concentrate U.S. efforts on worthy recipients (USDS 2010f). This principle is further 
confirmed by the annual letter of USAID which stated in 2011 “to deliver results more quickly, 
President Obama stressed that [American] foreign assistance must increasingly be directed to-
ward countries committed to good governance” (USAID 2011a, 3). The MCC’s approach is 
praised again in 2011 where it is stated that even the willingness to say “no” to partnering with 
countries that do not meet the criteria fosters good governance (USMCC 2011a, 5). Sometimes, 
good governance seems to be the only indicator of MCC that is emphasised:  
“As an innovative and independent United States foreign aid agency that is fighting 
global poverty through economic growth, MCC optimizes the effectiveness of limited 
development resources by partnering only with countries committed to good govern-
ance, designing and leading their own projects, and delivering tangible and sustainable 
results to benefit the poor” (USMCC 2012a, 3).  
While the U.S. selects and rewards countries that it deems to have a good governance record, 
U.S. documents equally stress that when a country does not fulfil the obligations of upholding 
that standard after receiving money, the U.S. needs to respond quickly – by withdrawing money 
from corrupt leaders (for instance USAID 2002, 10). Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, says in 
2010 that “the American taxpayer cannot pick up the tab for those who are able but unwilling 
to help themselves” (Clinton 06.01.2010, 2–3). An example where the U.S. withdrew money 
was Mali after a military government seized control in March 2012 (USMCC 2011a, 21). Simi-
larly, the MCC board discussed the possibility of suspending the contract for Malawi because 
of failures in good governance standards (USMCC 2012d, 3).  
It is obvious that the U.S. attempts to portray itself as sticking very closely to its own principles 
and selective criteria and conditions. However, it also becomes clear from the U.S. publications 
that its actions might not have an impact on the recipients if it acts alone. In 2002, the USAID 
foreign aid strategy stated that “reductions in U.S. assistance will not do much to change the 
behaviour of political leaders if their governments continue to receive significant aid from other 
donors” (USAID 2002, 11, 44). This thought that only international sanctions and standards 
can lead to significant changes in recipients’ behaviour is the most important link to emerging 
donors. A particularly blunt testimony from Donald Yamamoto, the Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs in the U.S. State Department is taken here as an 
example to illustrate the doubts that the United States have regarding China’s influence on good 
governance policies.  China is often blamed for  
“undermin[ing] international efforts to promote good governance, revenue transparency, 
and responsible natural resource management. Corrupt activities by Chinese firms result 
in poor-quality goods and services. We are pushing China to accede to the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention. Chinese foreign assistance is a trade tool favouring Chinese busi-
nesspeople in project bidding and undercutting transparency and fairness. Chinese la-
bour practices and lack of technology transfer and advance training also does not help 
Africa” (Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 8).  
This quote is telling in many ways: first, one sees that the U.S. attempts to socialise China to 
international standards (like the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention). Second, China is blamed for 
“corrupt activities” of its firms, for bad labour practices and for a lack of technology transfer. 
Basically, the statement criticises the whole concept of Chinese aid to Africa. Further on, Yama-
moto points out that there are major differences between Chinese and American approaches 
Changes in conditionality?│107 
 
towards good governance and democratic values (Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 22–23). When asked 
by a member of the Commission to give an example of how China undermines American stand-
ards, Yamamoto stated “that [Chinese] do not share a lot of the areas that we have advocated” 
(Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 22–23). The conclusion for Yamamoto, exemplifying here the ap-
proach of the United States as a whole, is to advocate greater commitment to its standards, most 
importantly to “good governance and democratic values” (Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 28).  
Generally, then, the United States advocates a stronger selectivity, rewarding recipients with 
good governance policies and thereby increasing political conditionality. The general idea of 
sticking more to American values is therefore manifested in the narrative in the field of good 
governance. Moreover, the idea of socialising emerging donors (especially China) is present in 
some of the political areas.  
Budget support  
Budget support – the disbursement of aid funds directly to a recipient government’s budget – 
serves here as an illustration for the political conditions that are required in this tool and to 
support the arguments that were brought forward so far. It can also be argued that through 
budget support donors lose a certain control over the money as the aid is – after disbursement 
– fully in the hands of the recipient government. Therefore a strong support of budget support 
might be indicative of a lessening of conditions attached to aid.101 However, the selection pro-
cess for recipients of budget support might again introduce selective criteria that could be clas-
sified as ex-ante conditions.  
In early publications of the period under study, the use of budget support is generally endorsed. 
For instance, the U.S. government consistently supported the budgets of the governments of 
Pakistan, Jordan and Lebanon. It is, however, interesting to look at the actual terminology of 
that support. Regarding Pakistan, budget support is used to “support continued reforms in the 
education, economic governance, and health sectors” (USDS 2003, 437; similar in USDS 2004a, 
45). In 2005, the reform towards a more “participatory democratic governance” is envisioned 
(U.S. Government 2005, 8; similar in USDS 2006b, 8, 2007, 566). Similarly, for Jordan’s budget 
support, the U.S. pledges that the money is aimed to support “democratisation, accessibility of 
education and health care, and judicial reform” (USDS 2007, 48). Often, therefore, the attribu-
tion of budget support is tied to ex-post conditions, implying that once the money is transferred, 
several initiatives are requested from the recipient (USDS 2007, 128–29).  
Generally, though, budget support is seen in U.S. publications as an ambiguous tool. Especially 
in more recent years, budget support has been used simply to cancel a government’s debt (USDS 
2013b, 493, 2014b, 498). Moreover, statements like the following support the argument that the 
success of budget support in terms of results (for instance regarding reforms) is limited:  
                                                 
101 For a similar understanding of budget support as being a tool that enhances ownership and limits conditionality, 
see Klingebiel (2014, 55–65). 
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“And when we do partner with developing country ministries, it’s critical that we do so 
with great care. Many donors simply write big checks to poor countries and call it de-
velopment” (USAID 2012a, 28).  
Similarly, budget support is thought of to be a tool with “non tangible results” (USAID 2008, 
4). While the unconditional support of another country’s budget is seen as highly problematic, 
it is often referred to as something that might attract recipients to emerging donors, such as 
China. In a hearing assessing China’s role in Africa, J. Peter Pham, Director of the Africa Center 
at the Atlantic Council made the following telling comment in a testimony before the Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives:  
“Mr. Chairman, before coming to this hearing, I hosted an luncheon for an African head 
of state who you brought up earlier, and I actually posed to him the question of what 
would he say if he were in my seat here. If you permit me, this is a quote from him: 
‘Why can’t we find a formula where America makes investments with Africa without 
complicated packaging? We are tired of people asking questions which no answers will 
ever satisfy them.’ […] That China may be doing it for self-interested commercial rea-
sons, but it does give an out for certain people who prefer not to have questions raised” 
(Pham 29.03.2012, 86). 
This quote convincingly illustrates the worries that are attached to the policy of insisting on the 
attachment of conditions to budget support or aid more generally. But it equally shows that the 
United States is very committed to attaching political conditions – regarding good governance 
and human rights – to its aid because it arguably results in better aid. Next to requesting political 
reforms, the U.S. stresses the importance of sound macroeconomic policies before supporting 
a country with budget support. They are referring to the lending policies of the international 
development bank which published guidelines in 2005, stating that budget support is only given 
after “assessments of the applicants’ public financial management systems and identification” 
(USDOT 2012c, 14). These criteria that the USA seems to adapt from international financial 
institutions refer to criteria linked to economic conditionality, that the following section ad-
dresses in more detail.  
Economic conditionality  
The difference between traditional and emerging donors when it comes to political conditions 
is very obvious to any observer. But differences also exist in the realm of economic condition-
ality. While emerging donors refrain from imposing any kind of conditions, there are stronger 
differences when it comes to economic conditionality within the group of traditional donors. In 
order to illustrate the potential changes within economic conditionality towards emerging do-
nors, the following two sections concentrate on the vision of the United States on the economic 
conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank, as those two international institutions are often 
referred to when it comes to economic conditions. The second section focuses on imposing 
macroeconomic conditions that are specific to the United States. Like the section on political 
conditions, the main question addressed here is whether the general ideas about emerging do-
nors (the need to stick to its own values, the call for more visibility and the idea of socialising 
emerging donors) have an influence on the narrative on economic conditionality.  
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Position towards the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
The U.S. is often thought of as the strongest supporter of, or maybe even the gatekeeper to, the 
Bretton Woods institutions. This support is perceptible in publications which mention the two 
sister institutions throughout the ten years observed here. The International Monetary Fund is 
referred to as the “foremost international institution for promoting global financial stability” 
(USDOT 2014, 1; similar statement of support USDOT 2010b, 3, 2011b, 2, 2013b, 2). Similarly, 
the World Bank is seen as a very important institution internationally and the U.S. commitment 
as its “largest shareholder” as essential to maintaining “strong leadership” that provides “signif-
icant leverage – both in financial resources from other donors for development assistance, and 
in adoption of policy and institutional reforms in line with U.S. development goals” (USDOT 
2010b, 15). Within the World Bank, the USA maintains a very high share of the funds (16.4% 
in the IBRD, USDOT 2010b, 16).  
Investments and memberships in these two institutions are seen as “a cost-effective way to 
promote U.S. national security, support broad-based and sustainable economic growth, and ad-
dress key global challenges like environmental degradation, while fostering private sector devel-
opment and entrepreneurship” (USDS 2014a, 123; U.S. Government 2006, 30).  
In the following sections on the United Kingdom and on Norway, we see a prominent criticism 
of the lending activities, and especially the conditional approach of the IMF and the World 
Bank. Within the United States, such criticism is very subdued. On the contrary, throughout the 
last ten years, the United States has remained one of the defenders of IMF and World Bank’s 
economic conditionality. The United States “has been an advocate of conditionality on IMF 
loans and has supported the Fund’s increased focus on results-oriented lending”, while the 
United States, because of its veto power within the IMF, has the possibility to intervene at any 
time (USDOT 2004, 13, 2005, 14, 2009, 19, 2010a, 22, 2011a, 24, 2012a, 22). Several conditional 
approaches have long been endorsed and supported by the United States. For instance, the USA 
supports the conditionality of IMF lending that recipients strengthen the independence of their 
monetary authorities (USDOT 2004, 4, 2007, 3, 2009, 3, 2011a, 4, 2012a, 5, 2013a, 4). Similarly, 
the United States backs the IMF in making its aid conditional on certain good governance per-
formance indicators and request for reforms in various countries (for instance in 2004 in Malawi, 
USDOT 2004, 9; in Kenya and Nigeria in 2005 USDOT 2005, 9; in Ghana in 2011 USDOT 
2009, 17; in Tunisia in 2012 USDOT 2012a, 15; and others, USDOT 2007, 9–10, 2009, 12–13, 
2010a, 17, 2012a, 15, 2013a, 13–14). When the requests of reforms remain unfulfilled the USA 
is a strong advocate for sanctions or the suspension of funds (USAID 2002, 50, 10-11).  
Another conditional approach that the U.S. supports is the request of the IMF for privatization 
(cases involve many countries, for instance, Cameroon in 2004 USDOT 2004, 3; Egypt in 2004 
USDOT 2005, 3–4; Burundi USDOT 2009, 4; Nigeria USDOT 2011a, 5–6; and Tanzania 
USDOT 2012a, 5–6).   
Further on, the United States supports the IMF in requesting poverty reduction strategy papers 
from recipients and that countries undergo reform in favour of macroeconomic stability 
(USDOT 2004, 10, 2005, 10, 2007, 11, 2009, 14, 2010a, 17, 2011a, 18, 2012a, 17, 2013a, 15). 
Regarding markets and liberalization, the United States first endorses the demands of the Fund 
(for instance for Nigeria, USDOT 2005, 14), but equally pushed for a change within the Fund 
to review its work on trade policy, beginning in 2014. While the plan “deemphasizes” trade 
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policy as an element of programme conditionality, it still stresses the need for trade liberalization 
where necessary (USDOT 2011a, 25). In summary, the United States supports and directs the 
Fund’s policy on conditionality but supports strongly the “modernized IMF conditionality”, 
that leads to “more focused” and “tailored” loan disbursements (USDOT 2010b, 7).  
Very similar to this support for the IMF is U.S. support for the World Bank. The United States 
endorsed the review of the Bank’s practices on conditionality in 2005 and 2006, congratulating 
the Bank in 2009 that it has made “significant progress in streamlining conditionality in its de-
velopment policy operations” and “reduced the number of legally binding conditions” (USDS 
2012g, 36). Comparable to the development within U.S. development policy, the Bank endorsed 
pre-selective criteria and thresholds, copying in effect the set-up of the MCC. The U.S. proudly 
stated that “the World Bank designed its new Program-for-Results financing instrument in part 
on MCC’s model” (USMCC 2012b, 25). Similarly, the U.S. has made constant use of the World 
Bank’s indicators, for instance to measure policy reforms, or corruption (USMCC 2012c, 4). 
Moreover, the World Bank reports back that because of the selective criteria of MCC, many 
candidates have queried the Bank on how to improve their scores; for instance, Nigeria, Uganda, 
Tanzania (USMCC 2007b, 73), or Ghana and Indonesia (USMCC 2013, 20) or Togo in 2014 
(USMCC 2014, 4).  
The link to emerging donors is twofold: first, the United States advocates reforms within both 
institutions in order to reflect the changes in economic realities, amplified through the financial 
crisis of 2008. The U.S. especially advocates for a greater representativeness of China (Clinton 
28.07.2009, 2). A quota reform within the IMF is strongly supported by the U.S. government 
“[t]o better reflect today’s global economic realities” (USDOT 2010b, 5, 8). While it argues for 
a higher share of emerging economies, the USA also fights to maintain a share high enough to 
retain its veto power over the Fund’s policies. The first quota change left the U.S. share “virtually 
unchanged at 17.4 percent” (USDOT 2011b, 6, 2012b, 8). Even if the government seems to 
approve of the quota reforms within the IMF, they have not been ratified by Congress, despite 
government publications urging Congress to ratify them in order to “preserve that leadership” 
of the IMF and not to “jeopardize it” (USDOT 2013b, 6–7, 2014, 3; USDS 2013c, 130, 2013e, 
189; Kerry 19.09.2014, 5). While emphasising the strong position within the IMF, the U.S. is 
equally keen to promote the role of the World Bank, especially “in contrast to bilateral invest-
ments from China, which is often the only alternative available”, indicating that the alternative 
is nothing the U.S. should support or encourage (USDOT 2011b, 11).  
This section argued that the U.S. support for economic conditionality is strong, that America 
shapes the lending policies and the conditions attached to their lending policies of the IMF and 
the World Bank. Moreover, it argued that the U.S. is eager to maintain the two multilateral 
institutions under its leadership, also against an increasingly threatening Chinese rival.  
Rewarding sound macroeconomic policies 
As the previous section has already demonstrated, the fact that the United States promotes a 
neoliberal version of capitalism is well documented and influential in development aid.  
The promotion of economic growth and prosperity is linked to the belief that a free and com-
petitive economy works best for the needs of a developing country and is one of seven pillars 
of American development cooperation (USDS and USAID 2010, 4; similar argument in USDS 
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and USAID 2007, 10). Raj Shah, Administrator of USAID, stated in 2013 that “aid should be 
conditional on real commitment to reform – including […] making market-oriented policies” 
(Shah 20.03.2013, 3). John Kerry claimed in 2014 that any foreign policy is inevitably an eco-
nomic policy (USDS 2015e, 11). These statements confirm research on the influential rejection 
of welfare policies or any kind of involvement of the state in the economy (Lancaster 2007, 93–
99).  
The above sections have shown that the general idea of sticking more to American values clearly 
influences the narrative on political and economic aid conditionality. Moreover, it showed that 
the American fear of a powerful China might be the driving force for increased selectivity in the 
choice of good, worthy recipients. The following section now asks whether this increasing nar-
rative for a stronger selectivity is also evident in rules and practices. 
6.1.2 Rules and practices on conditionality  
The following sections investigate whether the ideas prevalent within the United States narrative 
– the general idea of sticking more to its values, of more visibility for its aid efforts, and the idea 
of socialising emerging donors – are influential in the two layers of rules and practices regarding 
conditionality. The theoretical chapter argued that idea-driven change within these two layers 
would be less likely to happen and generally more difficult in is a well-established, traditional 
thematic field, such as conditionality.  
Identifying the rules of the institution of American development cooperation is not difficult. It 
suffices to look into the legal framework within which the United States gives foreign aid. Gen-
erally, not much has changed in the legal framework between 2002 and 2014, with one, signifi-
cant, exception: the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004.102  
The legal set-up of MCC selective criteria with which potential candidates for receiving grants 
are rated gives an indication of what kind of selective criteria the USA deems important for aid 
to be successful. In 2004, at the first MCC selection process, 16 indicators were used to deter-
mine whether a country is electable for MCC support. Generally, the indicators are separated 
into three broad categories: (1) ruling justly; (2) investing in people; and (3) encouraging eco-
nomic freedom. The overall trend consists in an increasing number of indicators that a candidate 
needs to fulfil in order to access MCC funds: while 16 indicators were used in 2004, 21 were 
used to decide whether a country gets MCC support in 2015 (USMCC 2004, 9–10, 2015b, 1–
11). Generally, then, an increase in selectivity can be noted within the rules of the MCC. While 
the ruling justly category remained stable throughout the years with 6 indicators, the category 
investing in people increased from 4 indicators in 2004 to 7 in 2015. Similarly, the category 
encouraging economic freedom increased from 6 to 8 indicators. Moreover, in the small print, 
it is stated in 2004 that in order to pass the selective test, a country needed to score above the 
median in relation to its peers on at least half of the indicators in each of the three policy cate-
gories and above the median on the corruption indicators (USMCC 2004, 9–10). In 2012, how-
ever, while these requirements were upheld, countries also needed to score above average in 
                                                 
102 I refer here to 2002 (even if it is not in the observed period) because this year marked a significant shift in U.S. 
foreign aid policy with the amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act which restored development assistance to a 
more significant area of foreign policy which influenced all of the following years.  
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either the civil liberties or the political rights indicators, further increasing political conditions 
(USMCC 2012c, 20).  
So far, then, everything indicates that a strengthening of conditionality has taken place – on the 
layers of narratives and that of the general rules. More detailed analysis of the specific rules 
related to each issue are further discussed below. Moreover, the next pages bring clarity to the 
question of whether these changes also show results in the third layer – practices.  
As stated in the introduction, 11 countries were selected to look at practices. For the United 
States, the selection consists of their top 2, 3, and 4 recipients. Its top recipient, Iraq, is not 
included in this study because emerging donors are not sufficiently involved here. The following 
table gives an idea of how much aid the U.S. distributed to the selected country in the last year 
that this study takes into consideration – 2014. The overall bilateral aid disbursed by the United 
States in 2014 was USD 27 billion.103  
 Table 6-2: Amount disbursed in 2014 by the United States to selected countries 
Recipient country USA China India Brazil South Africa 
Afghanistan   1898 Yes Yes Yes No 
DRC  379 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethiopia 654 Yes Yes Yes No 
Malawi 179 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mozambique 389 Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tanzania 501 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Uganda 463 Yes Yes (Yes) Yes 
Zambia 316 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                                                                     Source: OECD stats, figures for U.S. from 2014, all in USD millions (constant dollars from 2013) 
The following paragraphs investigate the disbursements to these 11 selected case studies over 
the period of ten years and ask whether the increase in conditionality that was noticeable in the 
layers of narratives and general rules is also present in the layer of practices.  
                                                 
103 Note that from the selected 11 countries, only 5 receive assistance through the MCC: Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia whereas Uganda only received threshold funding. This is already an indication that not all 
countries fulfil the selective criteria (D. Johnson, Goldstein-Plesser, and Zajong 2014, 15).  
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Political conditionality 
The narrative surrounding political conditionality suggests a strong increase in political condi-
tionality, especially in terms of preselection. The next section addresses the question of how 
strongly this commitment is implemented in reality. The next sections look first at the overall 
amount spent by the United States in the field, and then at particular case studies where a rivalry 
with emerging donors exists.   
Human rights  
The narrative surrounding human rights treated the promotion of human rights as an integral 
aspect of U.S. foreign policy. The following section asks if this commitment has been accom-
panied by a relevant shift in the rules and in the funding and whether or not the selective criteria 
are applied in U.S. development cooperation.  
Formally, U.S. development cooperation of any institution – USAID or the MCC or any other 
– is required to abstain from distributing money to “any country which engages in a consistent 
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights” (U.S. Government 1961; 
amended 2002, 59–60). Within the selective criteria of the MCC, political and civil rights are 
indicators to rate potential candidates. Many of the indicators assessing the suitability of candi-
dates for MCC funds relate to human rights. Especially in the first category, many indicators 
look at the respect of political rights (indicators for political and civil rights, but also indicator 
of the rule of law or of freedom of information). The second and third category strongly em-
phasise the importance of economic, social and cultural rights (access to health, education, gen-
der equality). Moreover, since 2012, each successful candidate must pass either the threshold in 
political or in civil rights. Therefore, the importance attached to the respect of civil and political 
rights has increased in the last ten years (USMCC 2012c, 20, 2015b). Similarly, in 2010, the U.S. 
State Department changed the position of Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs 
to the position of Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human rights, as hu-
man rights are seen as “a key priority that reflects American values” (USDS 2010f, 42–43). 
Overall, the rules have born growing testament to the conditionality of foreign aid even though 
the initial importance of human rights was already present in 2002. What, then, about the prac-
tices?  
Within the U.S. budget on foreign aid, the section democracy, human rights and governance is 
particularly relevant here. Within that category, one indicator is dedicated to human rights and 
the rule of law alone. Over the last ten years, significant amounts have been transferred through 
this account. A steady increase took place until 2013 (up to USD 1 billion) with a slight decrease 
in 2014 (USD 636 million) (USDS 2008c, 2009b, 2010c, 2011c, 2012a, 2013a, 2014c). In per-
centage terms this amounts to an average of 2.4 percent spent on the promotion of human 
rights and the rule of law within the foreign aid budget with peaks in relative terms of 3 percent 
in 2012 and 2013. This amounts to a decent share within the budget and is comparable to the 
amounts spent by the UK and Norway. Moreover, with the increasing share within the budget, 
first general figures seem to confirm the increasing narrative on the importance of human rights 
policies. 
In order to assess whether the U.S. also applies its narrative when it comes to being more selec-
tive with its aid recipients in terms of respect for human rights, two indicators are used here: 
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first, we look at the main destinations of U.S. aid and compare those with the ratification of the 
most important human rights treaties. Second, we focus on the indicator for rule of law within 
the 11 selected recipients and whether U.S. spending on these countries is consistent with the 
positive or negative trends of their rule of law indicator.  
The UN office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights rates countries depending on their 
ratification of the most important human rights treaties (UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 2015). The scale is divided into four groups whereby the lowest section is for countries 
that have ratified below four treaties, the highest category is for countries that have ratified more 
than 15 human rights treaties. The United States, arguing in its narrative strongly for the defence 
of human rights, scores itself only in the second category for countries that have ratified in 
between five and nine human rights treaties. It is thereby in the lowest category of our three 
donors as Norway and the United Kingdom are both in the third category (having ratified 10 to 
14 human rights treaties). Moreover, the United States is in the same category as India and most 
interestingly China which it criticises highly for human rights violations. It equally scores below 
South Africa (10 to 14 ratifications) and Brazil (the only country represented here with more 
than 15 ratifications).  
What about the biggest recipients of U.S. aid? Iraq and Afghanistan (first and second biggest 
recipients) score both above the United States with 10 to 14 ratifications. Similarly, Nigeria 
(tenth biggest recipient), the Democratic Republic of Congo (11th biggest recipient), Uganda, 
Tanzania and Mozambique (respectively 14th, 15th and 16th biggest recipient) as well as Malawi 
(33rd biggest recipient) have all ratified 10 to 14 human rights treaties and thereby more than the 
United States itself. From the selected cases above, Sudan, Ethiopia (third and fourth biggest 
recipients) as well as Zambia (18th biggest recipients) are in a similarly low position than the 
United States with 5 to 9 ratifications (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015).104 
Moreover, the United States funds substantial amounts to South Sudan that has (so far) only up 
to four human rights treaties ratifications and scores in the lowest category. This first indication 
seems to contradict a higher preselection in U.S. aid.  
Another relevant way to measure the commitment to implementing the human rights condition 
in aid distributions is to look at the Worldwide Governance Indicators provided by the World 
Bank (World Bank Group 2015). The indicator rule of law assesses the human rights situation in 
recipient countries. This indicator “reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have con-
fidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the policy, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
(World Bank Group 2015). The indicator varies on a scale from 0 points to 100 (top perform-
ers). When looking at the Worldwide Governance Indicators for the rule of law, one notices 
that increased levels of the rule of law indicator do not necessarily indicate a higher spending of 
U.S. aid. Top U.S. recipients, like for instance Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan and the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, all have a rule of law score of below 10 points. Nigeria scores slightly 
better with an average of 11.56 points, but still presides over a dire human rights record. All 
these countries receive funding to improve their human rights records. In Afghanistan, for in-
stance, the percentage spent on the promotion of human rights increased from 3 percent in 
                                                 
104 Other top recipients also are in this low category of 5 to 9 ratifications: Pakistan (fifth biggest recipient), Kenya 
(sixth biggest recipient), Palestine (seventh biggest recipient) and Jordan (eight biggest recipient). Moreover, Co-
lombia (ninth biggest recipient) is in the category above the United States itself (10 to 14 ratifications).  
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2006 of the overall amount spent to nearly 14 percent in 2010. For the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, only 2 percent is spent on average for improving the rule of law, which is similarly low 
in the case of South Sudan which receives 2.2 percent for the rule of law. The cases of Sudan 
and Nigeria are even lower with an average spending of 0.10 (Sudan) and 0.16 percent (Nigeria).  
Countries that fare rather well on the rule of law indicator are Ethiopia (average of 29.58 points, 
increasing trend since 2009), Uganda (with 41.82 points on average, increasing trend overall) 
and Zambia (average of slightly above 39 points, increasing trend since 2010). These improving 
records on the rule of law indicator are not necessarily matched with increasing amounts of aid 
spending as the case of Ethiopia shows: its rule of law indicator improved from 23.7 points in 
2009 to 38.9 points in 2014, while spending decreased from 3.1 percent in 2010 to 2.42 percent 
in 2014. Sometimes, an increase in the rule of law indicator is matched with an increase in funds. 
This is the case for Zambia where a slight increase has taken place in the last four years. Similarly, 
Uganda’s increase in the rule of law indicator are met with an increasing of funds from 1.28 
percent in 2004 and 1.71 percent in 2014.  
Another group of countries equally has comparably high scores for the rule of law indicator but 
with slightly decreasing tendencies (Malawi with an average of 49.63 points and a slightly de-
creasing trend since 2009, Mozambique with 31.95 points on average and a decreasing tendency 
since 2010, and Tanzania (average of 40.60 points, slightly decreasing tendencies since 2004). 
The aid practices illustrate that these decreasing trends are not met with aid cuts but on the 
contrary with increasing funds (an increase for Malawi from receiving 0.37 percent of U.S. aid 
in 2008 to 0.76 percent in 2013, for Mozambique a doubling of aid percentage from roughly 1 
percent in 2008 to 2 percent in 2013). Similarly, funding for Tanzania has almost quadrupled 
despite from 2004 to 2014 (from 0.55 percent to 1.85 percent) despite its decreasing scores in 
the rule of law indicator.  
The human rights situation in Sudan was critical during the Darfur crisis. In 2005, the United 
States claimed that it attempted to influence the Sudanese government and militia leaders 
through diplomatic pressure, media interviews and multilateral engagement (USDS 2005b, 1). 
The rule of law indicator for Sudan is therefore unsurprisingly low for the whole period with 
the lowest points in 2005 but generally with an increase in the indicators (even though they 
remain at a low 9.48 points in 2014. U.S. funding to Sudan was highest during the time when 
the rule of law indicator was lowest (from 2005 till 2010) with above 3.5 percent of U.S. aid. 
Since then the aid to Sudan has decreased to 0.93 percent (in 2014) despite rising levels in the 
rule of law indicator. This decrease was however met by the funding to the newly founded South 
Sudan that received increasing funding from an initial 0.21 percent in 2011 to 2.89 percent in 
2014. Again, this increase in funding to South Sudan cannot be explained by an improvement 
in the human rights situation as the rule of law indicator has constantly decreased (from an initial 
5.63 points in 2011 to 1.00 points in 2014) (World Bank Group 2015).  
From the eleven countries studied here, only two (Zambia and Uganda) show a consistency 
between the rhetoric and the practices while all the others indicate a deviation from the prac-
tices.105 The idea of sticking to and defending U.S.-American values has only very limited con-
sequences in the practices. This section has illustrated that despite a vocal rhetoric on supporting 
                                                 
105 Shannon Blanton and David Cingranelli (2012) also argue that the United States has a very ambiguous relation-
ship towards the role of human rights in their aid allocation (for a similar argument, see Breuning and Linebarger 
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countries that foster human rights, the practices indicate that other factors play a significant role 
in the distribution of aid and that strict pre-selective criteria that were advocated for in the 
narratives and in the rules are not strictly implemented in practice.  
Good governance 
Similar to the set-up of rules regarding human rights, the fostering of good governance is not a 
completely new policy. Since 2002, good governance is anchored as one of the five principal 
goals of U.S. development cooperation policy (U.S. Government 1961; amended 2002, 19). In 
order to implement conditionality on good governance, the U.S. uses several tools: A first im-
portant indicator for selecting countries is the control of corruption (USAID 2002, 9). The 
control of corruption was the only threshold that potential candidates for MCC needed to pass 
to be selected (USMCC 2007b, 74–75, 2008b, 30, 2009, 12). The MCC not only insists on the 
passing of the corruption indicators, potential candidates must also score better than their peers 
in other categories that are related to good governance: for instance the government effectiveness 
indicator assesses the quality of public services, and the quality of the government’s responses 
to internal and external challenges (USMCC 2015b), while the category investing in people assesses 
the government’s involvement in providing necessary services to the public (for instance by 
measuring how much of the GDP is spent on health services, primary education, etc.). The third 
category of encouraging economic freedom also assesses the ruling quality of a government as well as 
its trade policy (USMCC 2015b). When the MCC was created, it was thought to fulfil a “mission 
to reward good performers”, and good performers in good governance in particular (USMCC 
2004, 7, 2006b, 6). 
Comparable to the MCC, USAID divides countries into four categories, each of which requires 
a different approach in order to conduct successful development policies: first electoral democ-
racies with some problems in democratic performance (for instance Bangladesh, Brazil, South 
Africa). For these countries, USAID foresees a strengthening of governance, but largely by using 
government channels. The second group are referred to as quasi-democracies with ambiguous 
regimes (for instance Nigeria). Those countries are thought to need help with the electoral pro-
cess. The third group consists of countries that are classified as electoral authoritarian regimes 
(with truly contested elections Georgie, Kenya, Tanzania or not Azerbaijan, Belarus). Here a 
focus is put on the emphasis of civil society. Lastly, the closed authoritarian regimes (such as 
Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo) where USAID needs to work almost exclusively with 
the civil society and not with the ruling elites (USAID 2002, 9-10, 44-46). Hence, within the 
rules, the rewarding of good governance was strong from the beginning and remains strong 
throughout the observed period. No further strengthening has taken place in this regard despite 
the intensified narrative. What about the last remaining layer – the practices?  
In order to evaluate whether the importance attached to good governance in the narratives and 
in the rules is implemented in practice, it is illuminating to look at the spending on good gov-
ernance by the United States as a share of its overall aid budget. Overall, the United States 
                                                 
2012; Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Easterly and Williamson 2011). Other studies find that human rights play a role 
in development assistance since the end of the Cold War, but without a clear positive relationship between aid and 
human rights standards (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). Furthermore, Christopher Fariss (2010) finds that 
countries with human rights abuses receive more food aid from the USA than other states. The U.S. is not alone, 
however, in this neglect of rewarding or punishing human rights policies, as Richard Nielsen (2013) shows.  
Changes in conditionality?│117 
 
spends 17.20 percent of its aid budget on the sector government and civil society of which 14.25 
percent is directed at specific government and civil society projects whereas the remaining 3 
percent is spent on conflict related governance projects – which are not directly related to good 
governance projects. The share of projects related to government and civil society in general 
within the aid budget is rather unsteady, peaking in 2004 with 18.36 percent and again in 2011 
with 16.42 percent with low points of spending in 2006 (8.07 percent) and in 2008 and 2014 
(with about 13 percent). Overall, compared to the other two donors here, the United States 
contributes the highest share of its aid budget to government and civil society in general, slightly 
ahead of Norway (with 13.25 percent on average) and clearly ahead of the United Kingdom 
(with 10.90 percent on average) (OECD Stat 2015a). While this is congruent with the strong 
narrative within the United States, the unsteady commitment contradicts the narrative that al-
lows us to assume that the United States would strengthen its support for good governance 
projects instead of keeping it steady.  
In order to see whether the narrative on a stronger pre-selection of worthy recipients does in-
deed take place in U.S. foreign assistance, this study uses further Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators. These six useful indicators are provided by the World Bank and attempt to quantify what 
is generally understood by good governance and rates all countries on a scale from 0 (lowest 
possible rate) to 100 (highest possible rate). The indicator on political stability and the absence 
of terrorism is less relevant here as the narrative on good governance of all three donors largely 
refers to the quality of government rather than the security of a country. The rule of law indicator 
was already taken into account in the sections on human rights; the remaining four indicators 
are taken into account here106. The following table briefly summarises the content that is meas-
ured through each indicator:  
 Table 6-3: Definition of World Governance Indicators 
Indicator Content 
Voice and accountability Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media. 
Government effectiveness Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formula-
tion and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. 
Regulatory quality Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
Control of corruption  Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators  
                                                 
106 Note that the indicator for regulatory quality is discussed in the section on economic conditionality.  
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The following table gives an indication of the average score over a period from 2004 to 2014 of 
the 11 selected recipients on all five indicators107. Moreover, the arrow next to the number indi-
cates whether the trend regarding the indicator is positive (↑), negative (↓) or stable in the last 
ten years (→) with the slope of the trendline of the number in brackets. Note that all figures are 
ranks that range between 0 and 100 points, 100 being the best possible result, 0 the worst.    
  
                                                 
107 The figures for South Sudan only take the years since its independence (2011) into account.  
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 Table 6-4: Worldwide Governance Indicators for chosen recipients 
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Source: World Bank World Governance Indicators, average between 2004 and 2014 (own calculations)108 
The next section looks at the tendency in U.S. spending compared to the score on governance 
indicators and asks whether, the proclaimed selective approach has been implemented in prac-
tice. This could be seen if worthy recipients (with high and improving scores in the governance 
indicators) are rewarded whereas bad performers are punished. Several observations can be 
made from the analysis:   
There is a first group of countries where no clear relationship between the governance indicators 
and aid spending can be established. One of these cases is Ethiopia. It received considerable 
shares of U.S. aid in 2008 and in 2010 (both above 3 percent). Since then, the scores had lowered 
to 2.42 percent by 2014. The record of governance indicators for Ethiopia are mixed: whereas 
                                                 
108 The slope is based on the trendline from the entries from 2004 to 2014 and indicates a positive trend (above 
0.5, ↑), a negative trend (below -0.5, ↓), a rather positive trend (between 0.1-0.49, halfway upward arrow), a rather 
negative trend (between -0.1 and -0.5, halfway downward arrow), or rather stable (between 0.09 and -0.09, →).  
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its voice and accountability indicator was highest in 2006 (with 15.9 points) and has lowered 
since, the control of corruption indicator has improved since 2009 to nearly 41 points in 2014, 
together with the government effectiveness indicator. The relationship between the indicators 
and the amounts of aid remains unclear (corruption indicator and government effectiveness 
indicator are rewarded whereas the voice and accountability indicator is ignored).  
A second group contains cases where the narrative of rewarding good performers or punishing 
bad performers is respected in practice: this is the case for Nigeria and Zambia. Nigeria’s gov-
ernance records are mixed: while the voice and accountability indicator has improved since 
2009, the indicator of government effectiveness decreased from 20 points in 2005 to 11.54 
points in 2014, but peaked to 16.27 points in 2013, the control of corruption indicator has 
decreased considerably since 2008 (where it was at a respectable 21 points and ended at a lam-
entable 7.2 points in 2014). U.S. aid levels peaked in 2013, together with the indicator on gov-
ernment effectiveness, possibly pointing towards some congruence. Nevertheless, the corrup-
tion index deteriorated. Another example where good records are rewarded is Zambia: its indi-
cators for voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality as well as the 
corruption indicator have improved or remained relatively high since 2009. In congruence with 
this trend, aid levels of the United States peaked in the last three years (2012 to 2014) at 1.2 
percent of U.S. ODA.  
A third group contains countries that generally have a very low record on governance indicators 
but still receive significant amounts of aid. Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Sudan and South Sudan receive considerable amounts of U.S. funding and generally have a very 
low score on the governance indicators (for the DRC all below 9 points, receives nevertheless 
1.6 percent of U.S. aid and is their 11th biggest recipient; Sudan receives an average of 2.8 percent 
of U.S. aid and scores below 8 points on average on all indicators; similarly, South Sudan scores 
below 7 points on all indicators except for voice and accountability (average of 11.5 points) and 
receives 1.5 percent of U.S. funding; for Afghanistan, indicators for voice and accountability 
score at 12.46 on average, all other indicators score on average below 10 points while Afghani-
stan receives an average of 8.4 percent of U.S. aid). Much of the rhetoric regarding the appre-
hension about China’s involvement in Africa turned around the issue of Sudan. The figures 
show however, that the United States have never abandoned the support of Sudan completely 
despite their official narrative.  
This group, together with Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda and Tanzania finally forms a last group 
of countries illustrating that the United States actually acts contrary to its proclaimed rhetoric 
of rewarding worthy recipients. Aid levels to Afghanistan were highest in 2009 with 11.8 percent 
of U.S. aid going to that country. Since then, the aid levels have consistently been lowered to 7 
percent in 2014. The governance indicators point towards a different trend: all indicators have 
improved considerably since 2011, despite being still on a very low scale of mostly below 10 
points (with the exception of voice and accountability and regulatory quality). This improving 
behaviour of the Afghan government has not been met with increasing funds from the side of 
the United States, even though it is still the second biggest recipient of U.S. aid. Another case is 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, which receives very irregular funding from the United 
States. Aid levels peaked in 2006 with nearly 4 percent and in 2011 with 4.7 percent. Both peaks 
were met with considerable drops in aid spending (to 0.7 percent in 2007 and 1.1 percent in 
2012). The years prior to the first peak in 2006 show an improvement in indicators for voice 
and accountability and control of corruption but a lowering in government effectiveness and 
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regulatory quality. The years prior to the peak in 2011 indicate a decrease in all relevant indica-
tors, therefore not justifying the peak in aid spending. What’s more, since the peak, whereas aid 
levels dropped dramatically in 2012, most indicators have significantly improved.  
The case of the DRC therefore stands in contradiction to the U.S. rhetoric of punishing bad 
performers and rewarding good ones. Compared to the other two donors, the U.S. gives only a 
limited share of its aid (average of 0.5 percent) to Malawi (compared to 2.1 percent for Norway 
and 1.75 percent for the UK). The percentage has increased steadily from 2005 onwards to 0.76 
percent in 2013. Is this increasing aid level due to an improvement in governance indicators? 
When looking at these, we see that with the exception of the voice and accountability indicator, 
all have deteriorated since 2010. Another case for this category is Mozambique. Aid levels to 
Mozambique have peaked in 2013 with 2 percent of U.S. aid. Again, this increase seems to be 
unjustified if we look at the governance indicators which have all decreased since 2010, with the 
exception of regulatory quality which showed a slight improvement. Similarly, South Sudan’s 
indicators have deteriorated since its independence in 2011, and yet U.S. aid has been steadily 
increasing. Two other very similar cases are Tanzania and Uganda, which have shown decreasing 
records on all indicators since 2010 (note that Tanzania’s records are slightly better than 
Uganda’s, especially in the control of corruption index). Despite these grim statistics, aid levels 
from the U.S. peaked in 2013 and 2014 at 1.7 percent for Uganda, and similarly peaked in 2013 
with 2.8 percent for Tanzania (World Bank Group 2015). The table below gives an example 
illustrating that good performers are not necessarily rewarded.  
 Figure 6-1: The example of U.S. fudnign to Afghanistan 





Voice and accountability  13.46 9.39 15.80 -0.1156 
Government effective-
ness 
9.76 4.74 8.20 -0.4412 
Control of corruption 1.46 1.42 6.25 0.0902 
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As % of USA ODA 5.15% 11.19% 7.01% 0.34 
                                                                             Source: Own compilation; data based on World Governance Indicators and U.S. Dashboard 
                                                 
109 The long-term trend indicates the slope of the amount of aid given by the United States over the years. This 
indicates that despite a lowering trend in the indicators voice and accountability and government effectiveness and 
only a slight improvement in the control of corruption index, aid levels in percentage have increased.  
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This section has illustrated that in countries where the United States competes with emerging 
donors it is very far away from its narrative of applying pre-selective criteria for its aid distribu-
tion.110 The idea of enforcing U.S.-American values more in their development policies is there-
fore not reflected in the practices. This also confirms several studies arguing that the United 
States does not reward merit in practice (Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Claessens, Cassimon, and 
van Campenhout 2009). Conditional approaches rewarding good political behaviour are not 
thoroughly implemented in practice despite increasing signs within the narratives and the rules.  
Budget support 
The narrative presented budget support as an ambiguous tool that is to be used only in the 
context of trustful governments. This distrust of the tool can be shown in figures: The United 
States only spends 1.18 percent on average on budget support over the years, whereas the UK 
and Norway spend about 4 percent of their aid on the tool. The highest amount of budget 
support was spent in 2013, but levels have lowered considerably since then. The overall share 
of sectoral budget support is quite low whereas general budget support seems to score quite 
high in relation. This could be indicative of a lower conditionality as sectoral budget support 
requests some kind of steering from the donor whereas general budget support fully supports 
the recipient and trusts the government to deal with the money as it pleases (OECD Stat 2015a).  
When looking at which countries receive the highest share of budget support, it becomes fairly 
obvious that budget support only makes a minor share of U.S. funds and only a minor share of 
U.S. recipients (and none of the selected countries here) receive budget support.111 
Economic conditionality 
Support of IMF and WB conditionality  
The narrative on the IMF and the World Bank indicated a strong commitment from the United 
States towards both institutions. Moreover, it was clear from the narrative that while the United 
States support reforms of the institutions and therefore of their narrative, they are in favour of 
implementing some economic conditions, like macroeconomic stability.  
The levels of funding that the World Bank receives are very high and lie about 35 percent on 
average of all multilateral ODA disbursed by the United States. This percentage lies considerably 
higher than that of Norway (at about 16 percent) or the UK (at about 26 percent). Over the 
years, this share has decreased from an initial 51 percent in 2004 to 39 percent in 2014, indicating 
that the unique focus on the World Bank as an international development actor has vanished. 
                                                 
110 John Harbeson (2008) argues that since 9/11 democracy promotion has become more difficult for the United 
States because of its renewed focus on fragile states, where democracy promotion is particularly difficult. Similarly, 
a study aimed at evaluating the effect of MCC selectivity comes to the conclusion that the results are mixed at best. 
Nevertheless, the study is often referred to as confirming the “MCC effect”. This is indicative of diverging tenden-
cies between the narratives and the practices in US aid (D. Johnson, Goldstein-Plesser, and Zajong 2014).  
111 In the last 10 years, a very limited number of countries has received budget support from the United States: 
Egypt, Jordan, Micronesia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Palau, and the West Bank/ Gaza (USAID 2015a).  
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Nevertheless, and compared to all other donors, the share of the United States is very high and 
fully reflective of the strong commitment evident in the narratives (OECD Stat 2015e).   
Within the IMF, what is relevant to look at are the quotas. These quotas and the equivalent 
voting share for IMF governance were changed through several quota and governance reforms 
that the IMF underwent (largely because of the financial crisis). Today, the United States’ quota 
is at 17.51 (from a previous 17.68 after the 2008 reforms which had increased the quota share 
by 0.29 points). Therefore, while being largely stable, the United States lost some influence 
within the IMF but still maintains its veto right on any major decision (with a voting share after 
the 2010 reform of 16.58 percent of the votes) (IMF 2016, 2008, 2011). In comparison, the 
United Kingdom lost in both rounds of reforms: first from 5.03 percent of the quota prior to 
2008, down to 4.51 in 2010 and finally down to 4.05 percent of the quota toady (with an equally 
decreasing share of the votes: from 4.93 percent prior to 2008 down to 4.05 percent) (IMF 2008, 
2016, 2011). Norway’s share is considerably lower at 0.79 percent of quotas and 0.78 percent of 
the votes and remained largely stable throughout the reform (IMF 2016, 2011).112  
Rewarding sound macroeconomic policies 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation reflects the most recent trends regarding economic con-
ditions in U.S. legislation. Within their selective criteria, one category is devoted to enhancing 
economic freedom in recipient countries. Within this category, six initial indicators were used 
to rate the economic quality of potential candidates in 2003. Since then, two further indicators 
have been added, further enhancing the selective criteria. These indicators measure the govern-
ment’s general ruling quality, their ability to maintain land and property rights, to facilitate the 
credit system and business generally, and to liberate the market for free trade agreements, regu-
late inflation, have sound fiscal policies and finally also to promote gender equality within the 
economy (USMCC 2015b, 7–11). Thereby, within the MCC, rules regarding economic condi-
tions have strengthened, reflecting the narrative regarding the need to implement sound mac-
roeconomic conditions for achieving development.  
In the practices, the indicator that captures the commitment of a government towards macroe-
conomic stability best is the one on regulatory quality. Afghanistan’s score on regulatory quality is 
low, but improving since 2010. Aid levels from Afghanistan have however decreased since 2009, 
indicating that the country is not rewarded for its efforts. The Democratic Republic of Congo 
receives decreasing shares of U.S. aid since 2011. Its score on the regulatory quality has increased 
since then. Ethiopia’s and Uganda’s scores have decreased since 2010 and 2009, but the coun-
tries received increasing funds from the U.S..  Scores for Malawi show a slight lowering in the 
indicator since 2010, but the country received increasing funding levels since 2008. Identical 
cases are Nigeria, and South Sudan, which received increasing funding despite decreasing scores 
on regulatory quality since 2011. Similarly, continuously improving scores are not necessarily 
met with higher levels of funding. Tanzania is such a case where the funding decreased dramat-
ically in 2014 despite improving scores on regulatory quality of the Tanzanian government 
(World Bank Group 2015). All of these cases indicate that there is no clear connection between 
                                                 
112 Note that the quota reform from 2010 was long blocked by the US Congress which accepted the reform only 
in December 2015 (IMF 2015). 
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the indicator of regulatory quality of a government and U.S. funding, despite a strong commit-
ment in the narrative.  
Two cases could be found where the narrative is reflected in practice: Mozambique, where im-
proving scores where matched with increasing funding peaking in 2013; and Sudan’s, where a 
continuously lowering score on regulatory quality was punished with a lowering of aid.  
Again two cases indicate that the narrative is implemented in practice, but the other cases show 
no relation between the amounts of aid and the indicators which depict the economic conform-
ity of recipient governments to “American values”.113  
The theoretical framework predicted that changes within practices (especially within a well-es-
tablished thematic field) will be hardest to realise. Therefore, the idea that the United States has 
to stick more to its own values in the light of emerging donors has influenced the narratives, 
partly influenced the rules, but barely influenced the practices which are likely to stick to path 
dependent behaviour. This confirms some of the theoretical assumptions, but does not explain 
the complete incongruence between practices and narratives. To explain these patterns, other 
theoretical prisms might be more helpful. The concluding part of this chapter elaborates more 
on this issue.  
Generally, the cases indicate that the United States often acts contrary to its claimed narrative 
of rewarding countries with sound macroeconomic policies. In general terms, the reflections on 
the United States have shown that the proclaimed strong preselection is not implemented in 
practice – within political or economic factors. The following sections ask the same questions 
to the other two remaining donors – Norway and the United Kingdom.  
6.2 Norway: Approach towards conditionality 
The previous chapter argued that Norway’s main idea regarding emerging donors was the need 
to emphasise its own political values (similar to the position of the United States). Alongside 
this idea was the desire to prevent the unsustainable use of resources – a topic close to Norway’s 
national interest as an expert in the petroleum sector. Do these main ideas trigger similar results 
to the ones observed in the United States in the narratives on conditionality?  
The two areas where we might reasonably expect Norway to be wary of the influence of emerg-
ing donors are the undermining of political and ecological values. This wariness is expressed in 
the following statement from an interviewee:  
“We are basically willing to cooperate with anybody […] But in practice, I guess, that we 
are somehow more prone to cooperate with what is called like-minded which is a group 
of donors which probably […] have had more or less the same approach” (interview 
with IX, 2014, October 2, 15'38).  
                                                 
113 Similarly, Christopher Kilby (2009) argues that macroeconomic performance in recipients is not a decisive factor 
for US aid distribution, especially when the countries in question are allies.  
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Arguably, then, this could lead to a narrative advocating the use of an increasingly conditional 
approach, similar to what the section on the United States argued.  
6.2.1 Narratives on conditionality  
Position on conditionality as such in the light of the rise of emerging donors 
Norway has an ambiguous position when it comes to the principle of conditionality: on the one 
hand it stresses the positive impacts conditionality can have on the development process, on 
the other hand it also fears the negative consequences conditionality can have on ownership 
which might in turn undermine a successful development process. This leads to a conflicted but 
also well-considered approach towards conditionality. This section illustrates this conflict and 
demonstrates that an intensification of the dilemma has taken place from 2004 to 2014. It seems, 
therefore, that the idea of sticking more to Norwegian values that was identified in the previous 
chapter exists in a certain tension with the opposed idea of stimulating increased ownership in 
the development process.  
A policy guideline issued by the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2004 illustrates the 
dilemma between those two ideas: First, it defends a conditional approach by describing the 
best politician in a recipient country for achieving development to be a person conducting “ef-
forts to improve their administration, be open and transparent, allow room for dialogue and 
participation, promote democracy and human rights and, not least, combat poor governance 
and corruption” (NMOFA WP Fighting poverty 2004: 88). This clear set of values is indicative 
of a conditional approach whereby worthy leaders are rewarded, a view further developed in the 
following statement from the same guideline:  
“development assistance has the greatest impact in countries where the economic policy, 
system of government and other conditions help to foster good development and pov-
erty reduction. […]. The Government therefore supports the work that is being done in 
the World Bank and other financial institutions to adjust the volume of assistance pro-
vided to recipient countries according to the quality of the countries’ development and 
poverty reduction policies, and their capacity and willingness to implement them” 
(NMFA 2004, 122–23). 
However, the same publication indicates an awareness that development processes are often 
more successful if they are home-grown, which confirms the need for ownership and the ab-
sence of conditions:  
“[m]easures to combat corruption (and more generally to promote good governance) 
[…] have little chance of success if they are forced on countries from the outside as a 
condition for loans or grants if the country’s own political leaders do not really wish to 
implement them” (NMFA 2004, 160).  
Contrary to the approach of the United States, the support for ownership is translated into the 
need to refrain from imposing external conditions as reforms cannot be “bought […] by donors] 
(Norad 2005a, 2; NMFA 2004, 15). Other papers similarly evoke the importance of national 
ownership in the following years (see for instance NMFA 2006a, 14-15, 95). A 2007 publication 
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deals with the possible negative effects of conditionality on the poorest within a recipient coun-
try (Norad 2007a, 15). Another policy paper deplores the missing link between conditionality 
and ownership as poverty reduction strategies are seen as  
“another aspect of conditionality driven by external consultants rather than national tech-
nocrats themselves. To improve ownership, development actors must ‘descend’ and sit 
with the government at national, regional and local levels to truly understand develop-
ment priorities to a greater extent than is currently the case” (NMFA 2008c, 2). 
But even if conditionality is seen to harm ownership, the idea that development assistance needs 
to reflect values is not fully abandoned. A 2009 publication mentions conditionality as a way to 
maintain a certain influence over the recipient country. As such, Norway expresses its fears that 
if foreign direct investments, largely issued from emerging donors (see pervious chapter) in-
crease to the detriment of conditional aid, the influence of the donor will be further undermined:  
“However, [an increase of different flows from aid] could also weaken the general polit-
ical dialogue with countries facing major challenges in relation to human rights, corrup-
tion and governance, in addition to extensive poverty problems” (NMFA 2009a, 108).  
Following the same idea, the white paper states that “[a]id without conditions is aid without 
policy and without proper control” while maintaining that “each country should decide them-
selves which policies […] they wish to implement” (NMFA 2009a, 96). The concept that con-
ditionality might help to improve the political conditions in recipient countries on their way to 
democratisation is widely observable in other earlier policy papers (see for instance NMFA 
2006a, 11–12; Norad 2009c, 1; and see section on political conditionality below).  
2011 marks a change in how Norway and others conceive of conditionality after the Busan 
conference, where the concept of ownership was further celebrated:  
“Developing countries are themselves to be responsible for their own development. This 
means that donor countries should issue fewer guidelines as to how development is to 
be achieved” (NMFA 01.12.2011, 1). 
Even though the principle idea behind conditionality seems to be under increasing scrutiny in 
Norway, a 2013 paper talks about the introduction of a more selective approach for recipient 
countries with regard to the Oil for Development (OfD) Programme. The programme states that 
“donor countries will never be able to force through a policy that goes against the wishes of the 
partner country” (NMFA 2013b, 64). But it concludes that Norway “will therefore be stricter 
in its prioritisation when selecting partner countries in the OfD programme” (NMFA 2013b, 
64). Therefore, it appears that ex-post conditions seem to be replaced by higher selectivity and 
therefore stronger ex-ante conditions for aid, just like it was the case for the United States. If 
anything, the conflicts and tensions within Norway regarding conditionality have only increased 
during the observed period. A quote from the 2014 white paper on human rights confirms this. 
One of the requirements for Norwegian foreign policy in the future is to “set […] clear require-
ments for recipients of Norwegian aid as regards their willingness to take steps to promote 
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human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (NMFA 2014a, 11). These requirements can be 
clearly defined as pre-selective conditions.114  
What is the relation between the increasing selectivity and ex-ante conditions, the conflicted po-
sition regarding conditionality and ownership and the emergence of new donors? A paper la-
menting the decrease of conditional aid includes a small text box quoting an African official 
about how much he likes Chinese investments because it is faster and has “no benchmarks or 
preconditions or environmental impact assessments” (NMFA 2009a, 108). This contrasting jux-
taposition leads to the assumption that while maintaining that conditions can be helpful for 
Norway, the country is also aware that China’s non-conditionality might pose a direct threat to 
its sphere of influence (for more details, see chapter 5). Moreover, Norway’s official statements 
raise concerns that conditionality cannot work if large developing countries or emerging coun-
tries are not on board. Similar to the rhetoric emanating from the United States, Norway’s pub-
lications refer to the situation in Sudan where China supposedly undermines conditionality 
(NMFA 2008c, 28). A similar concern is expressed regarding China’s behaviour in the UN Se-
curity Council when it comes to sanctioning countries such as Zimbabwe and Burma. The For-
eign Office states that China increases the difficulty of achieving international agreements 
(NMFA 2009d, 43). Similar to the United States, Norway’s official documents put the emphasis 
on the negative consequences of Chinese aid activities. The impact of other emerging countries 
is not mentioned in detail but the previous chapter on perceptions has shown that Norway is 
aware of their influence in the field of development cooperation.  
Therefore, while there is an increasing awareness of the possible negative consequences of con-
ditionality on the development process, the idea behind conditionality – that certain conditions 
are favourable to development and should therefore be strengthened coupled with a policy fos-
tering stronger selectiveness in the choice of recipients – is still present in the observed publi-
cations over the covered period of time. The difference from the United States is that Norway 
has a conflicted position towards conditionality because of the idea that ownership is very im-
portant. Moreover, there is a concern that emerging donors might undermine established rela-
tionships and the viability of conditions. The next two sections illustrate how this general nar-
rative on conditionality prevails when we take a closer look at political and economic conditions 
that are in place in Norwegian development assistance.  
Political conditionality  
The previous chapter has identified challenges that Norwegian politicians associate with emerg-
ing donors, one of which is the undermining of certain Norwegian standards, such as human 
rights and democracy. In the perception, the challenge to political values was seen as more 
                                                 
114 Conditionality equally requires a certain rigor when a country does not fulfil the conditions attached to aid. 
Norway generally perceives sanctions as not very effective and requires that a “thorough analysis” should be con-
ducted if state authorities fail to perform (NMFA 2004, 144; similar argument Gahr Støre 14.04.2008, 1). Moreover, 
Norway expresses concern that if it boycotts a country, it is possible that other countries will continue their aid 
and therefore undermine Norway’s position (NMFA 2009c, 47). A 2013 publication states that when a country 
“chooses solutions that clearly go against Norway’s advice”, revision of Norway’s involvement is necessary. How-
ever, the paper equally stresses the importance of long-term involvement and that “a setback in the cooperation is 
therefore not necessarily an indication that it should be discontinued” (NMFA 2013b, 64). Regarding sanctions, an 
issue-based approach can be observed over all of the period together with a certain disdain regarding the effective-
ness of sanctions again stressing the need for ex-ante conditions rather than ex-post conditions.  
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prominent than the challenge to economic standards. This section illustrates Norway’s reactions 
towards this challenge.  
Human rights  
As in the case of both Britain and the United States, human rights are considered an important 
pillar of Norwegian foreign policy. The commitment to human rights is illustrated by the award 
of the Norwegian Nobel peace prize, which often goes to defenders of human rights (for in-
stance in 2003 to Shirin Ebadi, in 2010 to Liu Xiaobo, and in 2014 to Malala Yousafzai and 
Kailash Satyarthi). The 2014 white paper on human rights stated that “Norway’s efforts to pro-
mote human rights are integrated in all aspects of its foreign and development policies” (NMFA 
2014a, 9). This emphasis on human rights policies in development cooperation is present 
throughout the observed period (Petersen 15.02.2005, 2; NMFA 2007d, 18, 2007b, 1, 2008b, 
15, 2009a, 18, 2009e, 6; Norad 2011b, 3; Brende 09.06.2014, 1; NMFA 08.10.2014b, 1).  
What are the reasons for the Norwegian insistence on supporting human rights through its 
development cooperation? Overall, the documents consulted elucidate three main reasons why 
development cooperation should be closely linked to respect for human rights: First, Norway 
claims that the promotion of human rights is in its national interest because cooperation with 
countries that respect fundamental human rights is easier to achieve. In the long run, the publi-
cations argue, more countries respecting human rights will lead to a more stable international 
order (Gahr Støre 20.05.2008, 8, 11.11.2008, 2, 14.02.2012, 4; NMFA 2009d, 116). Second, of-
ficial papers defend the point of view that respect for human rights is the only reasonable way 
out of poverty for developing countries. Therefore, a rights-based approach to development 
can, it is hoped, push recipients to help themselves out of poverty (NMFA 2004). A third reason 
for supporting countries that respect human rights is that development cooperation is seen as 
being more productive when recipient countries share the political view of the donor country. 
A white paper states that “[Norway] will only achieve results if the human rights issues that 
[they] promote internationally are in line with [their] bilateral cooperation at country level” 
(NMFA 2012a, 45). This view implies that a country that wants to receive support from Norway 
has to share its political vision. A recipient that goes against the principles that Norway defends 
internationally would therefore compromise the donor’s credibility within the international 
arena.  
Based on the above, we might assume that Norway applies a strong conditional approach to 
development cooperation, requesting recipients to respect or improve their fundamental human 
rights. Nevertheless, the section on the general position towards conditionality argued that Nor-
way’s policy narrative towards conditionality is driven by two contradicting ideas: the im-
portance of ownership and that of the defence of its own values. Is the general conflict regarding 
conditionality and ownership reflected in Norway’s narrative on human rights related develop-
ment policies and has it changed over time? It becomes obvious that a similar uneasiness exists 
when we look at the conditions linked to human rights (though to a lesser degree, as human 
rights values are held up strongly in Norway). Moreover, similar to the United States, the pre-
conditioning of aid regarding the respect of human rights has slightly increased over time but 
has always been strong.   
Throughout the observed period, Norwegian politicians are aware that supporting human rights 
might be seen as some form of conditionality and “contrary to the fundamental prerequisite of 
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‘local’ ownership” (NMFA 2009g, 51). But human rights related aid is equally seen as an oppor-
tunity to “take part in discussions about developments in individual countries” (NMFA 2009a, 
106). Norway’s official narrative tries to portray human rights not as a precondition because 
“human rights instruments constitute a common, normative framework for donors and recipi-
ents alike” (NMFA 2009g, 51–52; similar arguments in NMFA 2009a, 15). Moreover, the ter-
minology of conditionality is often avoided when referring to other international instruments. 
A 2014 white paper states that  
“[w]hen assessing which countries should receive financial support from Norway, im-
portance will be attached to the recipient country’s willingness to govern in accordance 
with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Developments in 
these areas will be significant in determining whether or not Norway can provide finan-
cial support to individual countries, as well as the nature and amount of financial support 
given” (NMFA 2014a, 10).  
Hence promoting human rights is consciously chosen as a direct involvement in the internal 
affairs of recipients and is seen as an ex-ante-condition:  
“[Norwegians] cannot take it for granted that emerging economies share all our political 
views. It is our duty, therefore, to uphold established rules of cooperation and hard-won 
universal human rights” (Brende 25.03.2014, 5–6).  
This quote by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende, argues that it is neces-
sary to uphold human rights in the light of the competition from emerging economies.  
Within Norwegian official papers, the influence of emerging donors on Norway’s development 
cooperation and its resulting focus on human rights for Norway is clearly recognised. As in the 
case of the United States, China receives the lion’s share of attention. Norway’s white papers 
comment that China’s involvement, especially in Africa, might weaken the position of Western 
countries “considerably” (NMFA 2009d, 116). It continues that 
“[t]his shift in the international balance of power in the human rights field is one of the 
most serious challenges to our efforts to promote human rights and democracy. We 
must have the courage to stand up for our principles at the same time as we respond 
pragmatically to a new political reality. […] We must continue to work with our tradi-
tional partners, but we must also engage new states in cooperation and promotion of 
human rights. Our response must be to initiate more strategic and focused efforts vis-
à-vis new alliances of countries and closer cooperation with non-state partners.” (NMFA 
2009d, 116; emphasis added).  
Similarly, Norway’s strategy for cooperation with Brazil states that it is essential that countries 
from the South cooperate with countries from the North to work towards the success of inter-
national human rights protection (NMFA 2011a, 20). These documents illustrate that while 
Norway is aware of China’s influence, it responds by further increasing conditionality in the area 
of human rights with respect to its development cooperation. However, the quote could also be 
indicative of a more pragmatic approach in Norwegian development cooperation, engaging with 
new alliances in order to spread human rights policies.   
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This section has illustrated that a respect for human rights has always been a precondition of 
Norwegian aid, but that this has been emphasised even more in recent times. Human rights are 
considered to be an important part of Norwegian development policies, of which conditionality 
is thus an essential aspect. If any change has taken place, it was a further increase in the support 
of human rights, together with an increasing selectivity prior to the attribution of development 
assistance. Moreover, this increase was directly linked to the threat towards human rights, ema-
nating especially from Chinese aid.  
Good governance  
Another area where Norway might feel threatened by emerging donors is the area of good gov-
ernance. The support for good governance is closely linked to the previous issue of human 
rights. Democracy is even seen as a dimension of human rights (Norad 2011b, 13). The general 
and broad support for democracy yielded in Norway to the support for a broader concept of 
good governance in 2008/2009 (Norad 2010b, 13). This broader concept includes for Norway’s 
publications “the rule of law, independent justice systems, transparent and effective institutions, 
democratic participation and decision-making, property rights and the freedom of expression” 
(Glad Pedersen 24.04.2014, 2). Similar to the narrative within the U.S., good governance is seen 
as a “top priority” in Norwegian development cooperation  (Glad Pedersen 24.04.2014, 2).  
The reasons for supporting good governance policies are very similar to those for human rights: 
According to the logic of Norwegian politicians, supporting good governance will help to sup-
port development and eradicate poverty (NMFA 2005a, 9, 2005b, 3; Norad 2008b, 25, 2009c, 
53; Glad Pedersen 24.04.2014, 2). Closely linked to that argument is the idea that governments 
with a record of good governance will be less corrupt, therefore “[c]hannelling aid to more 
democratic regimes will result in more development for the money spent” (NMFA 2013b, 32; 
similar argument NMFA 2009g, 43). To support good governance would, therefore, prevent 
“major administrative burdens”, especially in highly fragile states (Norad 2010b, xvi). Moreover, 
states with a good governance system might also have a more transparent and accountable trade 
system which could benefit Norwegian exports (NMFA 2007a, 15). 
Instead of using ex-post conditions that have to be fulfilled once the aid is received, Norway 
claims to make use of an increased selectivity through “[g]ood analyses of the state of democ-
racy” before any money is handed over (NMFA 2013b, 2). “The degree of democracy will there-
fore be given even more weight in the prioritisation of bilateral aid” (NMFA 2013b, 32).  
Contrary to the open support for human rights and the conditionality of aid in this regard, the 
field of good governance illustrates a more complex attitude, reflecting the conflict that Norway 
harbours with respect to the concept of conditionality overall. Several issues are raised with the 
support for good governance structures and the precondition of aid on an existing good gov-
ernance system. Norway’s publications raise the issue that imposing good governance structures 
externally might harm processes of local ownership. A 2009 report from Norad states that there 
is only little one can do if authorities are unwilling to promote good governance from their own 
initiative (Norad 2009c, 6). The answer to this problem is that Norway should try to support 
local initiatives instead of government channels (Gahr Støre 10.02.2011, 10; Norad 2010b, xiii). 
What is the link between Norway’s support for good governance measures and the rise of 
emerging donors? The previous chapter has illustrated that Norway is apprehensive when it 
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comes to support from emerging donors for “rogue dictators”. Therefore, their own policies 
and their increased focus could indicate that they try to counterinfluence that trend. Emerging 
donors have a clear opposition towards the inclusion of good governance as selective criteria 
for development assistance, therefore the fronts here appear to be clearly defined.115 
The support in the narrative for good governance runs throughout all of the observed period 
and peaked in 2014 (Høglund 22.05.2014, 2–3; Brende 25.03.2014, 6; NMFA 2004, 381, 2009a, 
88; Norad 2008b, 17, 2005b, 12, 2011d, 96). So even if there is a recognition that it might be 
impossible to impose good governance (and democracy) from outside, the support for good 
governance measures as a goal in development cooperation remains strong and has even in-
creased during the observed period, reflecting the idea that democratic (Norwegian) values have 
to be protected in the light of increased concurrence from emerging donors.  
Budget support  
Budget support is one particular tool donors use to influence recipients’ policies. The arguments 
surrounding budget support therefore serve here as an illustration of Norway’s narrative on 
political conditionality. Norway is eager to state that all countries combine their budget support 
with the fulfilment of certain ex-ante or ex-post conditions. It stated in 2004:  
“Before Norway provides further budget support to a partner country, an assessment 
must be made of the governance situation, the authorities’ willingness to implement 
their poverty reduction strategy, and the quality of public financial management. […] 
Such assessments are normally carried out in cooperation with other donors. As a rule, 
Norway only provides budget support jointly with other donors, one of which is usually 
the World Bank” (NMFA 2004, 106).  
A similar line of argument can be found in a 2008 publication (Norad 2008b, 26). The link 
between budget support and the specific political situation within a recipient country in 2014 is 
expressed as follows:  
“The Government will increase budget support to selected partner countries to 
strengthen their ability to develop well-functioning states with greater capacity to deliver 
public welfare services. Norway will continue to make significant efforts in developing 
the dialogue between donors and partners receiving budget support, with a special em-
phasis on monitoring the development of good governance and improving the underly-
ing conditions for economic development, the business sector and trade” (NMFA 
2014b, 5; emphasis added).  
Budget support is a useful tool to further illustrate the increasing ambiguity within Norway’s aid 
institutions regarding conditionality. Many publications try to emphasise that budget support is 
                                                 
115 One interesting insight in this particular regard is that Norway funds the African Economic Research Consor-
tium (AERC) – a group of researchers working on economics whose position allegedly influences the position of 
African politicians regarding the World Trade Organization, but also Africa’s relationship with emerging donors, 
and most importantly China. Therefore, through the promotion of this institution, Norway indirectly tries to in-
fluence the positioning of African politicians towards China (Norad 2014b, 61) and logically promotes the qualities 
of Norwegian aid.  
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a good form of conditionality because it enhances ownership as it “underpins a country’s devel-
opment strategy” (NMFA 2004, 106). However, the same paper states that “donors monitor 
the use of budget funds” and illustrates that the involvement from donors is seen as necessary 
in order to ensure the success of the measure (similar argument in Norad 2005a, 2). Similarly, 
an interesting quote from 2005 illustrates the awareness that not all “good” conditions will de-
rive from the recipient country, sometimes even when local authorities are involved (Norad 
2005a, 14).  
The wariness of the conflict between successful conditions and ownership becomes most obvi-
ous when budget support includes political conditions. Several publications state that political 
conditions should not be included in budget support policies and that donors need to maintain 
a certain flexibility regarding the recipient countries:  
“The very nature of political conditionality, which covers issues for instance related to 
the Human Rights situation and democratization, makes it difficult to formulate clear 
conditions that leave little margin for interpretation. HR and democratization issues 
should therefore preferably be handled in the context of the political dialogue between 
a partner country and its donors. […] If the recipient country fails to meet the conditions 
connected to the fixed component, it should probably still be an option to delay con-
clusion (disbursement) in order to allow more time to fully implement the agreed actions 
or to await the development of the issues in question” (Norad 2005a, 11, 15).  
This quote indicates that a more pragmatic approach is seen as useful for Norwegian aid. How-
ever, when we look at a 2007 publication, it states that  
“democracy and human rights are underlying principles in the budget support agree-
ments signed with all the countries covered by the study, except Vietnam” (Norad 
2007a, 16).  
In 2009 the conflict between the success of measures and local ownership is even more obvious 
and budget support becomes increasingly based on ex-ante conditions (requiring recipients’ 
plans for poverty reduction, anticorruption offices, transparent and robust financial manage-
ment systems, etc.) (NMFA 2007b, 5, 2009a, 98, 24).  
As in the case of the United States, the overall interest in budget support seems to have faded 
slightly since 2011, as official documents no longer discuss it in detail. However, the previous 
section has illustrated the general conflict of finding a compromise between useful conditions 
and local ownership that Norway tries to implement in all of its development cooperation. 
Moreover, it seems that a more selective approach towards choosing the recipients is adopted 
over time.  
Within political conditionality, the wariness about Norwegian impact on ownership seems to 
have intensified. However, the determination to include certain political conditions in order to 
foster development has not diminished. As an interviewee from Norad stated: “I would say that 
[political conditionality] has increased. That’s why it has become much more complex” (inter-
view with IX, 2014, October 2, 18'04). Generally, the narrative claims that the support for hu-
man rights and good governance policies has increased, together with a claimed increased se-
lectivity of recipients. Therefore, during the observed period, while the conflict between the 
support of ownership and conditionality has intensified, overall an increase in the support can 
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be noted in Norway’s official narrative that is clearly linked to emerging donors’ non-condition-
ality. Nevertheless, the support for an increasing (political) conditionality is less pronounced 
than in the U.S., largely because of the conflicting idea of supporting ownership that plays a 
dominant role in the narrative in Norway.   
Economic conditionality  
Similar to the section on economic conditionality within the United States, this section first 
looks at Norway’s official position towards conditionality within the IMF and the World Bank, 
and then looks at a specific project, the Oil for Development initiative and its conditionality.  
Norway’s position towards IMF and World Bank conditionality 
In contrast to the United States, Norway has a highly critical position towards the international 
lending institutions. In 2005 the newly elected Norwegian government stated in the so-called 
Soria Moria Declaration that its aid should not have privatization and liberalization of markets 
as a (ex-ante or ex-post) condition. This position is partly in conflict with IMF and World Bank 
policies (similar arguments in NMFA 2009b, 4, 2008b, 19, 2011b, 44–45; H. F. Johnson 
24.09.2005, 2). In order to discuss the compatibility of Norway’s position with World Bank and 
IMF conditionalities, the government organised a conference in 2006. The Norwegian contri-
butions to the conference illustrate that, in their view the importance of institutional issues and 
governance has increased within the World Bank while the IMF focuses more on economic 
management (NMFA 2006c, 15). Overall, Norwegian politicians maintained throughout the 
conference a highly critical position towards the IMF and the World Bank (NMFA 2006c, 17). 
A 2007 action plan confirms this criticism stating that “poor countries must not be deprived of 
the right to choose their own strategies” (NMFA 2007a, 9). The idea that ownership is essential 
for local development seems to explain the criticism towards economic conditionality, whereas 
privatization and liberalization seem not to be considered Norwegian values that need to be 
upheld and exported.  
However, the conference report comes to the conclusion that conditionality might be important 
with respect to making the powerful accountable (in the sense of good governance), but should 
not be used to influence policy making as such (NMFA 2006c, 46–47). During a conference in 
2008 on a similar topic the Norwegian State Secretary Roger Schjerva recommended a threefold 
bundle of reforms: first, to streamline conditionality, second, to put a cap on conditions (so that 
fewer conditions are better enforced), and finally, to put the recipients in charge of coming up 
with any conditions (Schjerva 10.01.2008, 1–2).  
The need to further reduce IMF and World Bank conditionalities (mostly their economic con-
ditions) is expressed throughout the observed period with a similar enthusiasm (Gulbrandsen 
25.06.2009, 1; NMFA 2009a, 95, 2013b, 87). Therefore, there is no change regarding World 
Bank and IMF policies, but a highly critical position in favour of ownership. Emerging donors 
similarly criticise IMF and World Bank’s conditional policies. In this regard, this policy field will 
not be one of conflict between Norway and the group of emerging donors. Practice should 
indicate a low and lowering engagement for IMF and World Bank funds and projects.   
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Oil for Development Initiative as illustration of the discourse regarding conditionality 
A special Norwegian programme – the Oil for Development (OfD) initiative – neatly illustrates the 
narrative on political and economic conditionality. Moreover, the OfD initiative works in a field 
that is directly linked to Norway’s competition with emerging donors. Moreover, the previous 
chapter argued that Norway is particularly apprehensive when it comes to the unsustainable use 
of natural resources which – in their view – emerging donors might increase. The OfD initiative 
might also be an attempt to counter the perceived negative effects of emerging donors and is 
therefore highly relevant.  
The aim of the OfD initiative is to support countries with oil resources to build a stable political, 
economic and ecological environment for oil extraction (Norad 2009b, 3). Norway wants to 
play a “clear and key role in the international debate on oil and development” because of their 
own experience, their expertise and the globalization of the Norwegian oil industry (Solheim 
14.02.2006, 3; similar argument in NMFA 2009a, 53). It therefore pledged in 2006 to increase 
bilateral assistance to countries that want to share their experience in the petroleum sector (Sol-
heim 16.05.2006, 14.02.2006). In a 2007 publication, Norad stressed that “petroleum-related 
assistance needs to correspond with Norwegian Development Assistance in general” (Norad 
2007a, 11).  
The programme refers to principles of political conditionality. Norwegian support in the OfD is 
closely linked to good governance principles, following the claim that if a country is well gov-
erned, its oil resources will benefit all of its society instead of just a few corrupt leaders (Norad 
2007b, 8, 2009b, 42, 2010d, 1–5, 2011c, 8; NMFA 2009a, 28; Brende 09.04.2014, 3). A 2012 
annual report emphasises that principles of good governance are “cross-cutting in all assistance 
provided” (Norad 2013b, 3).  
It seems, however, that cooperation with oil rich countries is more important than upholding 
certain human rights standards. A quote from 2008 showed that Norway is willing to uphold its 
cooperation with states that might not share a similar political vision:  
“This means that some of the states that we should and must have dealings with have 
views on human rights, democracy and political governance that are incompatible with 
our own. We must maintain a strong value base in our dialogue with such states” (Gahr 
Støre 20.05.2008, 9).  
Later on the above emphasis on ex-post conditions (achieved through reforms after dialogue) 
seems to be replaced with the focus on greater selectivity for the benefits of ownership:  
“Donor countries will never be able to force through a policy that goes against the wishes 
of the partner country. The government will therefore be stricter in its prioritisation 
when selecting partner countries in the OfD programme” (NMFA 2013b, 64). 
The narrative surrounding Norway’s Oil for Development initiative illustrates vividly the main de-
bates surrounding Norway’s issues with conditionality, including the focus on political condi-
tionality and a shift from ex-post to ex-ante conditionality and thereby towards stronger selectivity. 
Oil is a sector where China in particular is a direct competitor to Norway. The programme was 
launched in 2005, when China started its “charm offensive” with most African oil producing 
countries (Kurlantzick 2007). Moreover, this policy might be the direct result of the idea that 
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emerging donors make unsustainable use of resources that was discussed in the previous chap-
ter.  
How much attention is given to the conditions attached to the programme (especially the selec-
tivity criteria) and that of other – especially political – conditions is discussed in the following 
sections on Norway’s aid rules and practices.  
6.2.2 Rules and practices on conditionality  
The previous section illustrated the Norwegian narrative on general, political and economic 
conditionality. As in the case of the United States, it showed an increase in pre-conditions re-
garding political conventions, like human rights and good governance, while it equally demon-
strated that Norway – contrary to the United States – maintains a critical attitude regarding 
economic conditions attached to aid. In order to evaluate whether the narrative is implemented 
in the rules and practices, the following sections explores two separate areas; (1) the spending 
on, and potential variation in, funding of the particular sectors, and (2) the claimed increased 
selection of recipients according to political indicators. Moreover, regarding economic condi-
tionality, we look at support for the heavily criticised international financial institutions and on 
the spending within the Oil for Development initiative. The same recipients are used to illustrate 
the practices and to simplify comparisons between the donor countries. The following table 
illustrates the spending of Norwegian development cooperation in the eleven selected countries.  
 Table 6-5: Amount disbursed by Norway in 2014 to selected recipients  
Recipient country Norway China India Brazil South Africa 
Afghanistan   128 Yes Yes Yes No 
DRC  38 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethiopia 64 Yes Yes Yes No 
Malawi 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mozambique 61 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nigeria 13.5 Yes Yes Yes (Yes) 




Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tanzania 76 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Uganda 69 Yes Yes (Yes) Yes 
Zambia 32 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                                                                 Source: OECD stats, figures for Norway from 2014, all in USD millions (constant dollars from 2013) 
For Norway, this selection includes its top first, third and fourth highest recipients, but excludes 
its second biggest recipient (West Bank and Gaza Strip) and its fifth biggest recipient (Brazil) 
because emerging donors are not very present in these two countries. To evaluate the spending 
on specific sectors of development aid, one has to take into account the general trend of the aid 
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budget during the observed period. The budget of Norwegian development assistance has in-
creased steadily during this period from USD 3.9 billion in 2004 to USD 5.4 billion in 2014 
(constant prices 2013). The biggest increases took place from 2004 to 2005, 2006 to 2007, 2008 
to 2009 and 2012 to 2013. Stagnation and reductions of the aid budget took place in 2006, 2008, 
and from 2010 to 2012. These stagnations can be regarded as reactions to the financial crises.  
Political conditionality  
Human rights 
The narrative on using human rights as pre- and post-conditions was strong and intensified over 
time. What about the legal framework that represents the rules of the institution?  
Legally, Norway claims to use the implementation of human rights treaties as an ex-ante condi-
tion to enter into aid negotiations – which makes it very similar to the rules of U.S. assistance. 
While there should be a link between human rights treaties and development cooperation, the 
Norwegian government is aware that it has not yet developed a procedure for the implementa-
tion of this policy and that further coordinative efforts are necessary (Norad 2011b, 38, 33-34, 
95). The general conclusion from the evaluation of the link between aid efforts and human 
rights is therefore that “the human rights footprint appears limited” (Norad 2011b, xv). Since 
2011, many steps have been taken to further improve this human rights footprint as a 2014 
publication demonstrates (NMFA 2014a). The precondition of the ratification of human rights 
treaties is in place “at least since the 2008 budget, where it is stated that ‘[t]he Human Rights 
Conventions shall be used methodically to identify state obligations towards their population’” 
(Norad 2011b, 32). As in the case of the United States, since 2008 there has therefore been a 
rule in place making the respect of human rights a precondition for aid. But is this rule and the 
overall narrative implemented in practice?  
If it were, we might reasonably assume that Norway does not maintain development relations 
with countries that have a bad human rights record, and that many resources should be spent 
on maintaining and fostering human rights. First, this section elaborates on the spending of 
Norway on specific human rights related projects, then asks whether human rights are used as 
a precondition for Norway’s aid allocation as the narrative and the rules might lead us assume. 
A first indication of the real commitment towards human rights can be derived from an exam-
ination of spending on the promotion of human rights. The narrative has shown that human 
rights are seen as a high priority. Unfortunately, human rights are not a separate budget section 
in Norwegian aid statistics. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate how much is actually spent on 
the promotion of human rights-related projects annually. Twenty-five percent of projects at-
tributed to the good governance sector were provided in 2004 for projects strengthening the 
respect for human rights (NMFA 2004, 147–48). Overall, this means that approximately two to 
five percent of the overall amount spent on development cooperation has a link to human rights 
(Norad 2011b, xiv, 94). Since 2004, about 10 percent has been spent annually on good govern-
ance projects in the category “government and civil society” (Norad 2015). The importance of 
supporting human rights has increased during the observed period with a first increase in 2007 
and 2008 where the amount channelled through the governments and civil society related hu-
man rights spending increased to USD 71 million (Norad 2011b, 20, 2015). Another leap in 
2010 as well as a budget increase in 2013 confirmed the increasing importance of the policy field 
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and in 2013 the trend was further confirmed by budget increase to promote human rights and 
democracy (Barth Eide 12.02.2013, 2; Brende 25.03.2014, 5; NMFA 28.04.2014, 1, 2014a, 12). 
While the amounts of aid disbursed on human rights have increased, then, the spending in terms 
of percentage of overall aid has remained stable at about two percent since 2010 (Norad 2015). 
Most of the budget within human rights spending goes to civil society (about 44 percent) and 
to the promotion of human rights (37 percent) while 13 percent goes to judicial and legal aid. 
The amount that goes to civil society has steadily increased since 2004 (Norad 2011b, 21). While 
the highest share of human rights related aid is geographically unattributed (28 percent), Asia 
comes second with 24 percent, and Africa still receives about 18 percent, whereas the Middle 
East and Europe only receive minor amounts (Norad 2015). Therefore, a consistent, but not 
increasing share of development aid is attributed to projects related to human rights. The overall 
amount of about two percent of Norwegian aid attributed to human rights is slightly below the 
three percent that the United States were willing to dedicate to the cause. Moreover, in absolute 
terms, the amounts spent by the United States are obviously significantly higher than those 
spent by Norway.  
The above suggest that a non-negligible, but not a huge part of Norwegian development aid is 
attributed to human rights. Identical tools to the ones in the U.S. section are used to analyse 
whether the practices comply with the narratives and rules regarding human rights. A first indi-
cation is the giving of aid to countries that have ratified a high or low number of human rights 
treaties. The second indication is the tendency to reward or punish countries for an improving 
or worsening score in the rule of law indictor within the WGI indicators.   
The UN office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ranks Norway, the self-proclaimed 
champion of human rights, with 13 ratifications of human rights treaties only in the third best 
of four possible categories (similar to the United Kingdom, though better than the United 
States) (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015).  
Of the top ten recipients of Norwegian aid, some countries have only ratified five to nine human 
rights treaties: West Bank and Gaza (second biggest recipient), Sudan (fourth biggest recipient), 
Zambia (ninth biggest recipient), and Somalia (tenth biggest recipient). Moreover, from the se-
lected cases where emerging donors are also active, Norway supports Ethiopia (eleventh biggest 
recipient) which ranks in the same category. Nevertheless, some countries are in an equally high 
category than Norway itself (with 10 to 14 ratifications): Afghanistan (first biggest recipient), 
Tanzania (third biggest recipient), Mozambique (sixth biggest recipient), Uganda (seventh big-
gest recipient), and Malawi (eighth biggest recipient). Moreover, Brazil, the fifth biggest recipient 
of Norwegian aid, scores above the donor country with 15 to 18 ratifications. South Sudan, 
which has received 2.3 percent of Norwegian aid since its independence, fares in the lowest 
category and has ratified fewer than five human rights treaties. Therefore, Norway does not 
strictly impose the ratification of a high number of human rights treaties as a precondition for 
its development assistance to Sudan and South Sudan, China, Ethiopia, and India. Moreover, 
the ratification of treaties alone might not be indicative of the human rights record of a particular 
country (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015).  
Similar to the analysis of the United States, this section now turns to the evaluation of Norway’s 
reaction towards the Worldwide Governance Indicator rule of law. Does Norway punish bad 
performers and rewards star pupils? 
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With respect to some recipients, Norway seems to be true to its narratives and rules and rewards 
good performers in human rights: As such, Tanzania’s bad record in the rule of law indicator 
was punished with a decreasing amount of aid spent on that country, as aid levels have dropped 
since 2008 from 4.15 percent to 1.85 percent in 2014, while its rule of law indicator dropped 
from 44 points to 39 points. Moreover, the top four performers within the rule of law indicator 
from our selected group (Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda – all with an average of above 
or close to 40 points) receive relatively high shares of Norwegian aid (all above 2 percent with 
3.25 percent for Tanzania). Norway’s aid disbursements have not reacted towards these trends 
like its narratives proclaimed. The cases in which Norway actually made good on its aid narrative 
are slightly more numerous than the United States’ but, as the following examples suggest, its 
record is far from perfect. 
Indeed, there are more cases to be found where Norway does not implement its rules and nar-
ratives. First of all, there are some countries with a generally very low score in the rule of law 
indicator: Afghanistan only amounts to on average 0.95 points but is still the largest recipient of 
Norwegian aid. Nor was its improving trend from 2012 to 2014 (multiplying its score by five) 
met with rewards; between 2012 and 2014, Norway has decreased its aid since 2009 from 3.6 
percent to 3 percent (OECD Stat 2015b; World Bank Group 2015).  
Other cases where good performances were not met with increasing amounts of Norwegian aid 
are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda and Zambia. The rule of law indicator 
nearly doubled for the DRC in 2012, but aid levels remained stable. In Ethiopia, while aid levels 
were lowered (from nearly 2 percent in 2006 to 1.54 percent in 2014), the rule of law indicator 
increased. Similarly, aid levels for Uganda (since 2008) and Zambia (since 2011) have dropped 
despite increasing trends in the rule of law indicator.  
Moreover, it is easy to find cases where Norway contradicts its narrative by increasing aid levels 
to bad performers; for example, with respect to Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan. Nigeria re-
ceives overall very low contributions from Norway at about 0.26 percent. Nevertheless, this 
share doubled from 2005 to 0.33 percent in 2014, while from 2008, the rule of law indicator 
deteriorated but remained stable (if low) overall. South Sudan has received increasing levels 
since its independence (from 1.69 percent in 2011 to 2.44 percent in 2014) despite a dramatic 
decrease in the score of the rule of law indicator (from 5.61 points to 1.00 points). Sudan re-
ceives relatively high shares despite the human rights violations during the Darfur crisis where 
at the height of the conflict (with a rule of law indicator of 2.87 points in 2005), Norwegian aid 
was at its highest at about 5 percent. Moreover, increasing trends in the rule of law indicator 
since 2009 have not been met with an increase in funding.   
The narrative on human rights showed an increased interest in promoting and supporting hu-
man rights abroad through a targeted and more selective approach. The rules implemented that 
narrative to some degree, as Norwegian institutions insist that countries that receive its aid 
should have ratified certain human rights treaties. The practice, however, illustrates that Norway 
maintains a fairly widespread human rights portfolio without a clear focus. Moreover, the claim 
that Norway only supports states that have ratified most human rights treaties has been shown 
to be only partly true. While the narrative showed an increasing importance attached to human 
rights, the practices illustrate a relatively strong but steady commitment to human rights efforts 
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but, at best, a mixed tendency when it comes to rewarding good and punishing bad performers. 
Indeed, this was only true in the case of Tanzania.116  
Good governance  
Similar to the narrative on human rights, Norwegian politicians strongly emphasise their coun-
try’s commitment to increasing good governance efforts worldwide. Moreover, the narrative 
claimed that good governance policies are often a precondition before negotiations for devel-
opment assistance can begin. This section explores typical good governance projects that receive 
funding from Norway and confronts the narrative of an increased focus on good governance 
projects with the reality of aid statistics. If Norway used increased selectivity this would need to 
be reflected in the aid statistics as well.    
Good governance is a separate budgetary item for Norwegian development assistance, illustrat-
ing the importance attached to it. Throughout the observed period, about 19.40 percent has 
been attributed to the sector government and civil society, which is higher than for the United 
States or the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, this is largely due to the relatively high spending 
of Norway on conflict, peace and security related aid which amounts to slightly above 6 percent 
of that 19.40 percent. The remaining 13.25 percent are dedicated to government and civil society 
projects in general which is slightly lower than that of the United States (with 14.25 percent). 
The commitment to government and civil society is rather steady throughout the years with late 
peaks in 2013 and 2014 (with above 14 percent) and low scores in 2006 and 2010 and 2011 (all 
below 13 percent). While the overall share is significant if compared to other sectors (only hu-
manitarian aid equally receives more than 10 percent of the overall budget), the figures also 
indicate that there is a slight increase in the spending dedicated to good governance projects. 
This points towards a slight support of the narratives and rules regarding good governance 
support (OECD Stat 2015a).  
The implementation of the promotion of good governance policies is targeted at specific coun-
tries and sectors. It is an ex-ante as well as in some cases an ex-post condition (support for re-
forms). Some projects fund specific sectors – like the promotion of good governance in the oil 
sector, or fisheries (Norad 2010e, 53, 2007b, 8; NMFA 2011b, 33). Many projects are also di-
rected to the promotion of women in political activities (NMFA 2013a, 4, 2012c, 69, 2008a).  
Other Norwegian projects seek to strengthen institutions such as “parliaments, judicial systems, 
ombudsmen, human rights commissions, electoral commissions, the press and media, and civil 
society” (NMFA 2008b, 15). These projects are either promoted through direct funding or 
through capacity building. The programmes focusing on supporting democracy in South Africa 
put a particular emphasis on democratic governance and human rights (Norad 2011b, 79). Sim-
ilarly, the Norwegian government supports governance projects in Zimbabwe (Gahr Støre 
10.02.2009, 8), Guatemala, Mozambique, Nepal, Sudan, India and Afghanistan and Malawi 
(Norad 2010b, xiii, 2006, 8; NMFA 2009f, 21).  
                                                 
116 This relatively poor record in rewarding human rights is confirmed by Scott Gates and Anke Hoeffler (2004), 
but contradicts the DAC Peer review that attributes Norway an increasingly results-based approach (OECD DAC 
2013). 
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Another example of the implementation of good governance policies is the Norwegian Centre 
for Democracy Support. However, this example illustrates how delicate the issue of good gov-
ernance promotion actually is. The centre was built to support specific political parties which it 
deemed to promote better governance, but had to close down in spring 2009 as it was judged 
to have only limited effects and needed further resources to be effective (NMFA 2009g, 43). 
The Norad evaluation of the centre states that political party assistance should be “delinked 
from the goal of poverty reduction and recognised as a field of development cooperation in its 
own right” and that activities in the field of democracy promotion should “not be confined to 
countries that receive development aid from Norway” (Norad 2010b, xvi). An evaluation report 
from Norad from 2011 confirms how difficult it is to actually know what good governance in a 
specific context really consists of (Norad 2011a, 24). The idea that every country has its own 
norms of democracy is widespread among Norwegian politicians, many of whom advocate 
more local ownership and a diversity of approaches towards democracy (NMFA 2013b, 32). 
The link to the idea that ownership is essential for effective development is therefore again very 
influential in the field of good governance and limits conditionality in this regard.  
The remaining question concerns whether or not the pre-selective criteria are really imple-
mented in practice: are good performers rewarded and bad performers punished with the with-
drawal of aid? As in the case of the analysis conducted for the U.S., this section uses the World 
Bank indicators. When comparing the amount of money spent on the major recipients of aid to 
their governance score, several observations can be made.  
First, some countries show mixed results, in which no clear connection between the governance 
indicators and the aid spending can be established. This group consists of Nigeria, Malawi and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nigeria’s figures show decreasing trends in government 
effectiveness and control of corruption, but increasing trends in voice and accountability. This 
is generally met with very stable and very low aid disbursements from Norway (at about 0.26 
percent of Norwegian aid of all aid disbursements). Malawi shows increasing trends for all good 
governance indicators (especially for voice and accountability and government effectiveness), 
but these improvements are not met with an increase in funds but rather with a very stable 
disbursement. The relatively high percentage of aid disbursed to Malawi (at about 2.09 percent 
on average) however rewards the generally good scores of the country (all above 30 points). 
Similarly, the response towards the Democratic Republic of Congo does not confirm or con-
tradict the Norwegian narrative: first of all, the DRC shows unclear trends in its indicators with 
slightly increasing trends in voice and accountability and control of corruption but with decreas-
ing trends in government effectiveness. Norway spends a rather stable amount of 1 percent of 
its aid on this country, which overall has very low scores on the indicators (all below 10 points).  
Second, there are countries where the percentage of aid spending corresponds to their achieve-
ments (or failures) in the governance scores, fulfilling the narrative uncovered in the previous 
sections. The cases here are Sudan, Mozambique and Uganda (which, overall, is more than for 
the U.S. where only two cases fulfilled the narrative). All cases indicate that Norway does, at 
times, punish bad performers: Sudan is the clearest case where the decreasing trends in all three 
indicators (and especially in government effectiveness) are reflected in strong aid cuts. Similarly, 
Mozambique’s situation shows severely decreasing trends in the indicators voice and accounta-
bility and government effectiveness (and similarly decreasing trends for control of corruption); 
the country suffered from Norwegian aid cuts from 2.8 percent in 2004 to 0.9 percent in 2013. 
Finally, Uganda has strong decreasing trends in the indicators for control of corruption and 
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government effectiveness and a stable trend at voice and accountability. These trends are met 
with cuts from 2.44 percent in 2008 to 1.85 percent in 2014.  
Third, there are five out of the eleven countries where, despite an improvement or failure in the 
governance indicators, Norway’s aid responds contrary to what the narrative might suggest. This 
category of country illustrates that Norway neither rewards nor punishes easily. This group is 
slightly smaller than that of the United states, but is still considerable. Tanzania shows decreas-
ing trends in control of corruption and government effectiveness and a slight improvement in 
the voice and accountability indicator. Tanzania is the third biggest recipient of Norwegian aid 
overall and receives 3.25 percent of its aid. Despite the negative trends in two essential indica-
tors, aid flows have actually increased over the ten years. South Sudan has very strong decreasing 
levels in the voice and accountability indicator and has generally very low scores. Nevertheless, 
Norway disburses increasing amounts of aid to that country. Similarly, Afghanistan has decreas-
ing trends in voice and accountability and government effectiveness and a stable level of control 
of corruption. Again, this bad record is met with increasing funds disbursed to Afghanistan, 
contradicting the narrative of selecting its recipients according to good governance standards 
(World Bank Group 2015).  
Finally, the cases of Ethiopia and Zambia illustrate that Norway is not likelier to be inclined to 
reward good performers. Ethiopia has strongly improving scores for government effectiveness 
and the control of corruption, coupled with slightly decreasing scores for voice and accounta-
bility. This strong improvement on government effectiveness and control of corruption is met 
with decreasing aid levels. Moreover, when compared with the United States and the United 
Kingdom, Norway gives only a limited amount to Ethiopia of 1.41 percent on average – despite 
having very high scores in all indicators. The case of Zambia is even clearer: Zambia’s figures 
show a strong improvement in all relevant indicators, that are moreover all relatively high, but 
these efforts have been met by severe budget cuts from 3 percent in 2006 to 0.78 percent in 
2014. The table below illustrates that case nicely.  
 Figure 6-2: Example of Norwegian funding of Zambia 





36.06 42.31 43.40 0.8196 
Government ef-
fectiveness 
20.00 25.24 36.10 1.0325 
Control of cor-
ruption 












As % of Norwe-
gian ODA 
2.43% 2.38% 0.78% -0.18 
                                                               Source: Own compilation on data based on Worldwide Governance Indicators and OECD stats 
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This section has illustrated that good governance remains an important budget post over the 
years for Norway but does not confirm the strengthening of the narrative on good governance 
policies as no increased funding has taken place. Moreover, the section showed that the precon-
dition of good governance that was identified in the narrative does not seem to be strictly ap-
plied in practice as countries are not rewarded or punished for good or bad governance records, 
even though the record of Norway fares slightly better than that of the United States.  
Budget support 
Budget support is a policy that could be considered to stimulate ownership as it is often linked 
to the recipient’s poverty reduction strategies. However, as the narrative section illustrated, Nor-
wegian budget support often includes political conditions. Therefore, it is a field in which Nor-
wegian and emerging donor policies could collide, as the latter provide support without condi-
tions attached.   
The spending on budget support was highest in 2008 with USD 204 million; since then a dra-
matic decrease of general budget support has taken place. In 2013, the amount was a mere USD 
84 million (Norad 2015). The share of budget support from overall ODA decreased from 5 
percent in 2008 to 1.5 percent in 2013, which mirrors the decreasing emphasis put on that aid 
tool within the narrative. The share is lower than that of the United States and slightly below 
that of the UK. Moreover, the share of general budget support is on the decrease, with the 
slightly lower share spent on sectoral budget support on the increase. This suggests an increasing 
reluctance on the part of Norway’s government to support governments as a whole, and allows 
us suggest that an increasing selectivity is at play.  
The implementation process of budget support works through flexible and less flexible condi-
tionalities. A 2005 Norad report stated that the lack of predictability of budget support for 
donors and for recipients alike has triggered a review of the methods implementing condition-
ality. Even though the lack of predictability is “partly deliberate” to “secure that the budget 
support is used as intended” (Norad 2005a, 6), it states that a graduated response might be an 
interesting model. This graduated response foresees a combination between fixed and variable 
components where the fixed components include broad macroeconomic conditions and are 
disbursed in an “all or nothing” form (Norad 2005a, 8). The more flexible components concern 
sectors like health, education and public financial management (Norad 2005a, 8).  
The biggest recipients from our selected eleven countries of budget support were Tanzania (25.5 
percent), Mozambique (16 percent) and Zambia (12 percent). Malawi and Uganda received 
about 5 percent of the overall budget support. Tanzania’s share has diminished quite severely 
since 2011 to USD 14 million in 2013. Malawi received budget support of USD 9 million in 
2013, but funds were frozen due to a corruption scandal in mid-2013 (Norad 2015). Similarly, 
Uganda’s budget support was paused between 2004 and 2013 due to a similar scandal, where 
Norway relied for its evaluation on the judgement of the IMF (NMFA 2004, 154; Norad 2005a, 
18, 2013b, 9, 2015). These countries all have rather high scores in the three indicators (all above 
at least 30 points). Moreover, Tanzania’s scores have diminished as we have seen above and the 
cut in budget support seems to punish this deterioration. Nevertheless, as the section above 
argued, overall funds have not diminished, suggesting that budget support has simply been re-
placed with other funds. Similarly, budget support diminished after a corruption scandal in Ma-
lawi, again suggesting that the tool is flexible and aims to punish bad performers. Overall, the 
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amount of aid spent on Malawi has remained stable – suggesting again that budget support is a 
flexible tool, but that the funds simply flow toward other channels.  
Overall, budget support seems to confirm a higher use of political conditionality as good per-
formers on the good governance indicators are rewarded and no country with a consistently bad 
record received any budget support. This is in line with the narrative on good governance. Nev-
ertheless, a decrease in budget support is often met with an increase in other funds, slightly 
undermining the credibility of the tool.  
Generally, this section on political conditionality has argued that while the rules changed in the 
direction of the narratives and significant amounts were spent on fostering the political situation 
in recipient countries, the narrative support for a stronger selectivity is not actually reflected in 
the distribution of funds. Moreover, when applying the tools of selectivity in relation to the 
performance in countries where Norway shares an interest with emerging donors, no clear re-
lationship could be established, even though the record is slightly better than in the case of the 
United States. This suggests that the idea of refraining from political conditionality in favour of 
ownership might explain this relative reserve evident in the practices.  
The next sections now look at economic conditionality and ask whether the strong hesitance 
that was expressed in Norway’s narrative on economic conditions, such as the ones enforced 
through the IMF and the World Bank, have lead to a low funding of those institutions and an 
absence of implementing economic conditions to Norwegian aid.  
Economic conditionality 
Norway’s funding to the IMF and the World Bank 
The Norwegian narrative on IMF and World Bank conditionality was highly critical, especially 
with respect to the conditions of privatization and liberalization of markets. This critical attitude 
should be reflected in the practice, with a decreasing share of support for IMF and World Bank 
endeavours.  
The World Bank is one of Norway’s partners in development cooperation and therefore the 
accounting of the disbursements to that institution can be easily monitored. The spending 
through the World Bank is at an average of 16 percent of the overall multilateral spending during 
the observed period. Slight peaks of funding took place in 2005 and 2012, while a slightly lower 
commitment can be found in 2007 (with 8.63 percent) and in 2013 (with 8.96 percent). The 
World Bank is with this share the second most important multilateral institution after the United 
Nations through which Norway channels its aid. Moreover, the Global Alliance for Vaccination 
and Immunization (GAVI) which is coordinated by the World Health Organisation and the 
World Bank receives an additional share of nearly 2 percent of Norwegian spending. If we look 
at the amounts disbursed to or through the World Bank, these have steadily increasing from 
USD 189 million in 2003 to USD 500 million in 2013. In comparison, the United States and the 
United Kingdom both spent 34 percent and 25 percent respectively on their multilateral aid on 
the World Bank (OECD Stat 2015e).  
The figures for IMF funding are more difficult to obtain. Overall, Norway has spent below 1 
percent of its aid on the IMF as an implementing agency. However, these figures do not include 
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all contributions that Norway made to the institution. If we look at the projects with the IMF 
as an implementing agency, we find that many projects include IMF conditionality, especially 
macroeconomic conditions. The funding of an IMF-led programme to create and support a 
central bank in Malawi is one example. That funding initially took place in 2007 at the time when 
the conference on IMF conditionality took place. The project continues until today. A slightly 
higher support for IMF projects can be found if we include all data where the IMF is not the 
implementing agency but is related to the project. However, the overall share of IMF related 
funding remains limited which can be explained with respect to the limited quota of 0.79 percent 
that Norway has in the institution (IMF 2016).  
The narrative was equally critical about World Bank and IMF conditionalities. The practice has 
shown that Norway continues to channel relevant amounts of money through the World Bank 
but is more reluctant to fund IMF related projects. When it does, there seems to be no clear 
focus on limiting the support to measures that do not include market liberalization or privatiza-
tion. Compared to the other two donors, the support of Norway is more limited which can be 
explained by its generally ambivalent attitude towards economic conditionality.    
Rewarding macroeconomic stability 
In order to assess whether economic conditions are truly implemented in practice, the previous 
section on the United States looked closely at the regulatory quality indicator of the World Bank. 
What is Norway’s record for rewarding or punishing good or bad performers in this indicator? 
As in the case of human rights and good governance, the record is mixed at best:  
A first group includes countries where Norwegian aid levels correspond to the trend in the 
indicator of regulatory quality: South Sudan has improved its regulatory quality indicator con-
sistently and was rewarded with more aid by Norway. Similarly, Tanzania (while doing badly on 
government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption) has improved its regulatory 
quality and has benefited from aid increases. Moreover, Sudan lowered its regulatory quality and 
was met by a decrease in aid volumes.  
Another group consists of countries with bad, decreasing records that have been met by smaller 
decreases in aid, often even by stable aid levels. This group consists of Uganda, Malawi and 
Ethiopia. Similarly, Afghanistan, Nigeria and the DRC have improving records on the regulatory 
quality indicator that is met by a small increase in aid volumes or by stable aid disbursements.  
A last group consists of cases where no consistency exists between the official narrative and the 
practices: Zambia and Mozambique both have consistently improved their indicator but have 
received lesser shares of Norwegian aid throughout the last ten years (World Bank Group 2015). 
Overall, the trend on the economic variable is therefore slightly better than the ones for political 
conditions, which is surprising considering the strong reservations Norway supposedly holds 
towards the application of economic conditions to its aid.  
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The Oil for Development initiative  
The narrative on the Oil for Development initiative illustrates neatly the shift towards a higher 
selectivity in the choice of recipient countries. Is this narrative implemented in practice? Does 
most of the money go to states that deserve to be rewarded for their record on good governance 
and human rights? While Norad proclaims that the number of recipients of the initiative has 
diminished, the numbers show that they have only decreased from a previous 19 countries in 
2006 to 18 countries in 2013, indicating that no greater selectivity is in place (Norad 2013b, 3, 
2014a, 61). 117  
The cooperation with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, South Africa, Vietnam and Zambia ended. While the cooperation with these coun-
tries ended, new partners have been targeted: Norway started to implement its Oil for Development 
initiative in Cuba in 2010, with Ghana and Lebanon in 2007, with Liberia in 2011, Myanmar 
and Uruguay in 2013, Nicaragua in 2008. The cooperation with Ecuador lasted from 2007 to 
2011, the cooperation with Kenya from 2008 till 2010, the projects with Palestine and Sierra 
Leone lasted only two years. Therefore, instead of a restriction of recipients, a large number of 
new recipients have been targeted while other projects have been stopped.  
One country where China shares Norway’s interest in the oil sector is Angola where a Norwe-
gian company has a share of production (in 2011) of 10 percent (NMFA 2012c, 38; interview 
with VIII, 2014, August 26, 22'47). Other Norwegian companies are present in Angola (Det 
Norske Veritasand Aker Solutions together with about 15 other companies) (NMFA 2012d, 
39). Angola receives 4 percent of the overall spending from the Oil for Development initiative. The 
spending peaked in 2007 (7.5 percent) and again in 2010 (7 percent), but decreased since to 2.6 
percent in 2013, though this still amounts to USD 1.1 million spent on Angola’s oil programme 
(Norad 2015). Angola has a low record on all governance indicators (below 17 points on voice 
and accountability, below 9 points in rule of law and even worse for the control of corruption) 
and has ratified a mere 10 human rights treaties. It does not, therefore, comply with the selective 
criteria that Norway claimed to employ.  
Another country where Norway is in direct contact with China is Nigeria. Nigeria receives over-
all USD 6.8 million in total through its Oil for Development initiative. Similar to Angola, Nigeria 
has a relatively low score on all governance indicators (with slightly increasing tendencies: voice 
and accountability (26.95); rule of law (11.56); with slightly decreasing tendencies for govern-
ment effectiveness (14.65) and control of corruption (12.26), and strongly improving scores on 
regulatory quality (22.38))118 but has ratified 14 international human rights treaties. Norway pub-
lished a report on promoting good governance in Nigeria despite the fact that Nigeria only 
receives 0.2 percent of overall aid (Norad 2015, 2010c). The report states that Norway supports 
the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) and that there is an institu-
tional agreement between the Norwegian Oil Directorate and the Department of Petroleum 
                                                 
117 The initial list of recipients from the Oil for Development initiative consisted of 19 countries. The list included 
Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Iraq, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Ni-
geria, Sao Tome & Principe, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia (Norad 
Report OfD 2013: 61).  
118 In brackets is the average over the last ten years in points.  
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Resources in Nigeria (Gahr Støre 30.01.2008, 2; Norad 2010c, 40). Following the report, the 
OfD cooperation focuses on capacity building (Norad 2010c, 41).  
Angola definitely does not fulfil the pre-selective criteria for the programme, while Nigeria only 
fulfils certain criteria.  
Other countries that have continuously received support through the Oil for Development initiative 
are Sudan and South Sudan (together 11.6 percent of the OfD aid), Uganda (with 11.5 percent 
of OfD aid), Timor Leste with 7.4 percent, Ghana with 6.5 percent and Mozambique with 6 
percent. Sudan and South Sudan have received over the eight years the programme is running 
a total of USD 33 million. Sudan (and South Sudan) is similar to the cases of Nigeria and Angola 
a country where China is increasingly involved in the oil sector.  
Similar to the good governance support overall, the records for the Oil for Development initiative 
in terms of selectivity are mixed. Uganda and Sudan are cases where conditions have definitely 
not played a significant role, whereas Mozambique, Timor Leste and Ghana are cases in which 
there is some congruence between the narrative (and a proclaimed higher selectivity in recipi-
ents) and practice. While Uganda has ratified 12 human rights treaties, its records on the good 
governance indicators has been deteriorating and the overall share of aid has been decreasing as 
well (see section on practice/ good governance). However, the share for the support of the Oil 
for Development initiative has increased from USD 2.1 million in 2009 to USD 8.6 million in 2013. 
Quite a similar trend can be observed for the cases of Sudan and South Sudan. While the indi-
cators are rather low (for good governance and human rights), the support has been steadily 
increasing from 5.2 percent in 2009 to 17.4 percent in 2013, therefore contradicting the narrative 
on a higher selectivity of recipients for this programme. Together with Nigeria and Angola, the 
cases of Sudan and South Sudan suggest that Norway is very eager to be active in countries 
where China also has an interest in the oil sector, irrespective of any conditionality (Norad 2015; 
World Bank Group 2015).  
There are cases from the OfD where congruency exists between narrative and practice: While 
Mozambique has ratified 13 human rights treaties, its governance indicators are deteriorating. 
The level of support from the OfD programme diminished from an initial 10 percent in 2006 
to 1.7 percent in 2012, but an increase in 2013 to 7 percent again. Therefore, there is some 
congruence between the declining levels of governance and a decrease of money from the OfD 
programme. Overall, Timor Leste receives well below 1 percent of Norwegian aid. Within the 
OfD programme, its share is however rather high with 7.4 percent. Timor Leste has ratified 11 
human rights treaties and has a high score on voice and accountability (above 50 points but with 
a decreasing tendency). The score for the rule of law and the control of corruption is however 
rather low. Moreover, the score for the rule of law is deteriorating from 25 points in 2003 to 9 
points in 2013. The share of support from the OfD has decreased from 17 percent in 2006 to 
2.3 percent in 2013. Again, there is some compliance between the narrative of higher selectivity 
and the practice (Norad 2015; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015).  
Ghana, as one of the “donor darlings”119, has a good record in all categories (voice and account-
ability increasing to above 60 points in 2013, only short of 60 points in rule of law and control 
                                                 
119 Ghana is indeed often referred to as the most prominent donor darling in aid circles, see for instance (Lawson 
2013, 5).  
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of corruption; ratification of 12 human rights treaties). The support for Ghana in the Oil for 
Development initiative started in 2008 and has increased from 1.7 percent to 7.5 percent in 2013 
with a peak of even 12 percent in 2011. Ghana is therefore an example where a pre-selection 
could have taken place.  
A main goal of the Oil for Development initiative is to share Norwegian experiences in the exploi-
tation of the oil sector. Next to the selectivity of partner countries, the initiative also stated that 
it wanted to promote good governance within the oil sector. The spending on good governance 
itself within the initiative has however decreased to the benefit of environmental and revenue 
management (Norad 2009b, 72). The Oil for Development initiative is therefore a useful example 
of Norwegian conditionality in which the proclaimed political preconditions are not employed 
to select recipients but other criteria seem to play a more important role. In summary, even if 
some countries exist where selective criteria might have played a role (Mozambique, Ghana, 
Timor Leste) other countries, especially where China is an influential force in the recipient’s oil 
sector (Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan), are examples where Norway has preferred to 
increase its engagement to the detriment of conditionality.  
Overall, the case of Norway shows a conflicted approach within the narrative towards condi-
tionality, in which the idea of fostering ownership instead of imposing external conditions 
seemed to play a strong role in countering the idea that increased selectivity is useful.120 Within 
the practices, the record of Norway is mixed; while it is slightly more consistent than the United 
States in the selection of worthy recipients, factors other than conditionality must play a decisive 
role in explaining which countries are chosen as major aid recipients.121  
6.3 United Kingdom: Approach towards conditionality 
The previous chapter argued that the United Kingdom has a rather positive view of emerging 
donors, seldom expressing even moderate criticism. Nevertheless, the UK perceives the aid 
effort of emerging donors as substantial, and such aid has two consequences for the UK that 
are relevant for this chapter; first, the UK aims to help emerging donors adapt their policies 
and, second, the UK sees a need to make its aid more effective and results-based. Both issues 
are linked to conditionality. Arguably, both indicate that the UK does not insist on imposing its 
conditionality policies anymore, but adapts its own policies to those of emerging donors. This 
section therefore looks at whether these assumptions are true.  
6.3.1 Narratives on conditionality 
Position on conditionality as such in the light of the rise of emerging donors 
The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) claims to have significantly 
changed its approach towards conditionality with 2006 referred to as a turning point for a “new 
                                                 
120 This finding contradicts a DAC Peer Review (2008, 24) that argues that 93 percent within Norway are in favour 
of conditionality.  
121 These findings are confirmed by the literature (Claessens, Cassimon, and van Campenhout 2009; Easterly and 
Williamson 2011).  
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approach” (DFID 2006a, 151).122 The Under Secretary for International Development, Gareth 
Thomas, talked at a conference in Norway about “the right kind of conditionality” that no 
longer requires the implementation of “conservative and neo-liberal” reforms (NMFA 2006c, 
2). Even more than Norway, therefore, the UK focuses increasingly on local ownership and 
considers itself to be quite successful in pursuing this strategy (DFID 2007a, xv, 2007b, 15, 
2009c, 6, 39, 2014b, 124). Similar to the United States, DFID accords itself an influential role 
in shaping the OECD-led Accra conference and its outcome (DFID 2008e, 7; OECD 2008b, 
16). Ownership is seen as a principle that is shared between the United Kingdom and emerging 
donors:  
“The idea is that South-South cooperation support is somehow more determined by the 
priorities of the recipient country government than traditional donors. And I think that’s 
overstated. I think both are supporting governments to achieve what they want to 
achieve for the people” (interview with III, 2013, October 9, 31'42). 
The above suggests that conditionality overall is newly construed in a way that it does not inter-
fere with recipient ownership of aid. However, when we analyse the legal framework, the picture 
gets more complex. The International Development Act from 2002 required only a commit-
ment to reducing poverty as benchmarks for aid, no other conditions were included in the pol-
icy. In 2005, DFID, together with the British Foreign Office and the Treasury, published a new 
policy paper entitled Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality (DFID 2005). This 
policy foresaw the conclusion of a contract between recipients and the UK before aid is deliv-
ered. In this contract, recipients have to commit to three partnership conditions: first, a com-
mitment to poverty reduction and to reaching the Millennium Development Goals; second, a 
commitment to human rights and upholding other international obligations; and finally the ob-
ligation to strengthening financial management and accountability (DFID 2005, iii, 1, 8). Very 
similar to the tendencies within the U.S. and Norway, one could argue that this approach puts 
the emphasis on pre-selective criteria rather than conditions that have to be fulfilled once aid is 
given. This legislation specifically opposes the introduction of specific conditions to measure 
the individual commitment of partner governments as it is seen to contradict the recipients’ 
ownership (DFID 2005, 1,4), but benchmarks to measure successes (once the partnership com-
mitments were clarified) are already included. However, already in 2006, specific conditions 
were reintroduced (DFID 2006c) and further extended in 2009 and 2014 (DFID 2009e, 
2014g).123 The regulation from 2009 stated that if conditions are transparent and well-commu-
nicated they should not undermine the ownership of the recipient country (DFID 2009e, 17). 
2014 saw the introduction of a fourth partnership commitment, a respect for good governance 
as a prerequisite for aid. The proclaimed higher support for ownership is therefore more and 
more accompanied by specific pre-conditions and specific measures that are analysed before the 
aid disbursement and benchmarks to measure successes after the disbursement of money. 
The narrative within the legal framework thus introduces a new, but more complex picture of 
the British stand on conditionality. Generally, the UK is driven to make aid more results-based 
and efficient. The narrative claims that aid is more efficient in stable political and economic 
                                                 
122 This reform process is confirmed by the DAC Peer Review (2006a, 74) which also states that the reform needs 
clarification.  
123 The DAC Peer Review (2010) positively reviews the introduction of the How to Guidance Notes as they improved 
the transparency of UK policies.  
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surroundings, which explains the strong emphasis on pre-selective conditions within British aid. 
A statement from an interview with a DFID representative confirms this:  
“I think it is an observation to say traditional donor approaches have become over time, 
over the last twenty or so years more concerned with the policy environment in which 
aid is provided because basically through experience of realising that small projects 
won’t have a large effect if they are not supported by the right policy environment” 
(interview with III, 2013, October 9, 33'15).  
The pre-selection is not seen as harming ownership of recipients as the policy change has to 
come first from the recipients before, not after, the aid is even distributed. Moreover, for DFID, 
this policy is equally applied by traditional and emerging donors:  
“So, it’s not as if [the conditions] are imposed, they are just restating the agreement that 
was reached before the provision of money according to the government’s priorities 
[…]” (interview with III, 2013, October 9, 32'41). 
In the same vein, DFID’s official publications show an awareness of the important role of eco-
nomic growth and stability for the effectiveness of aid (DFID 2007a, 16). This includes the 
“responsible and sustainable use of natural resources” as a central theme. Legally, this idea is 
embedded in the third partnership commitment which requires a strong financial management 
and sound accountability. This tendency to encourage a high integration into the international 
market was confirmed in 2014 (DFID 2014c, 7). This policy could potentially be in contradic-
tion to the aid efforts of emerging donors.   
Similar to the narrative within Norway, therefore, we can see here a strengthening in the narra-
tive surrounding pre-selective conditionality, despite the official ambitions to foster ownership. 
Conditionality is given a new face – not dissimilar to that shown by the United States – which 
no longer emphasises the need for neoliberal reforms, but the need for a stable political and 
economic environment in which human rights and good governance principles (embedded in 
partnership principles 2 and 4), as well as fiscal stability (partnership principle 3) play an im-
portant role (DFID 2014g). All of these conditions are opposed to what emerging donors apply 
in their aid. Therefore, the previous stated hypothesis that the UK might try to adapt its policies 
to strengthen the cooperation with emerging donors – as the perception chapter hypothesised 
– is not confirmed by this first part on the narratives surrounding conditionality in general. On 
the contrary, we find a strengthening in the conditions that might or might not be related to the 
emergence of new donors. The following sections, elaborating on political and economic con-
ditionality, shed light on the causal link between a change in conditionality and emerging donors.  
Narratives on political conditionality 
Similar to the other two traditional donors, the UK supports democratic efforts in development 
countries. Therefore, we have seen that both other donors are strongly committed (at least in 
their narratives) to political conditionality, because emerging donors are perceived as a poten-
tially undermining factor in that field. The UK is in favour of supporting politically stable coun-
tries as they tend to be friendlier towards Western governments and better trade and investment 
partners (for instance FCO 2008, 98). On the other hand, Mr Mitchell, the Minister for Devel-
opment, stated in 2011 that when Great Britain enters into contact with a country in which there 
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is disagreement on political matters, a pragmatic cooperation should take place as far as possible 
without “compromising our beliefs” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 7). The next three sections show 
in detail how and whether the narrative about political conditionality changed in the period from 
2004 till 2014 and elaborates on the link to emerging donors.  
Human rights 
As in the cases of the United States and Norway, human rights are considered to be an important 
policy tool for the United Kingdom. The narrative refers to governments that respect human 
rights as being likelier to observe their international obligations and to be peaceful and secure 
states (DFID 2005, 8–9; Browne 24.04.2012, 7). Supporting human rights activities is therefore 
seen to be in the self-interest of the UK (FCO 2011).  
Respecting human rights is included in the four partnership commitments that a recipient needs 
to fulfil before the delivery of British aid.124 Monitoring and benchmarks increased since the 
introduction of the policy in 2005 (DFID 2009e; National Audit Office 2008, 5; DFID 2012b, 
6, 2014g). The pre-selective mechanism should assure that UK aid does not reach countries 
where massive human rights violations occur (example of Democratic Republic of Congo where 
sanctions worked, FCO 2006, 221; for further support of sanctions, see FCO 2011, 135).  
Human rights are a topic where the UK largely agrees to disagree with emerging donors. The 
Foreign Office Minister, Jeremy Browne, insisted in a speech in 2012 that, despite criticism from 
the BRICS summits, human rights should not be considered a Western product but a universal 
phenomenon (Browne 24.04.2012, 7). Similarly, the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, listed 
human rights as a challenge in the cooperation with emerging donors:   
“But at the same time these changes [rise of emerging powers] pose challenges that we 
need to overcome. One of these is a difference of opinion over how we protect human 
rights in other countries” (Hague 14.02.2012, 3).  
While the Foreign Ministry seemed to put a stronger emphasis on the differences between 
emerging donors and the UK when it comes to human rights, the Minister for Development, 
Andrew Mitchell, stressed that differences regarding human rights  
“don’t mean we shouldn’t put our global heads together, work for development and, 
where we agree, cooperate” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 3).  
The tension has therefore not been resolved in the observed period, but it is clear for both the 
Ministry for International Development and the Foreign Office that cooperation is easier with 
“like-minded” countries, such as South Africa or Brazil (FCO 2011, 6-7, 26).  
The analysis shows a strengthening in the narrative of human rights related conditions as more 
and more pre-selective conditions have been attached to British aid since 2004. Moreover, it 
shows that the UK is very aware of the differences with emerging donors in the understanding 
                                                 
124 Political and civil rights are included in partnership commitments 2 and 4, whereas economic, social and cultural 
rights are underlying the partnership commitments 1 and 3.  
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of human rights, but prefers to uphold the standards while cooperating as much as possible 
with emerging donors.  
Good governance 
As with the respect of human rights, good governance is seen as an instrument to achieve a 
working democratic order which is thought to emphasis development. Therefore, the reasoning 
behind a support for good governance projects through development cooperation is similar to 
that of supporting human rights and to that of the other two donors. Arguably, a safe political 
order enshrined in good governance structures lowers the threat of terrorist attacks emanating 
from these countries and is therefore directly in the UK’s national interest and its security (FCO 
2007, 88, 2009, 45, 2010, 9, 2012, 29). The Foreign Office is careful to “support the consolida-
tion of democratic transitions without imposing a particular vision of democracy” (FCO 2011, 
26). Democracy is seen as a natural phenomenon “coming from within states”, not a cultural 
phenomenon unique to the West (FCO 2011, 28).  
Logically, then, good governance is seen as an important cornerstone of British development 
policy. A 2006 white paper focused on “how to make governance work for the poor” (DFID 
2006b). Within that publication, good governance was defined as “good politics” and by the 
Foreign Office as “state capability, responsiveness, and accountability” (DFID 2006b, 23; FCO 
2006, 236). In 2007 and 2008, the strengthening of good governance worldwide was put at the 
centre of British aid commitments and as a strategic goal in 2008 (DFID 2007a, 20, 2009a, 7). 
In 2011 accountability (close to the concept of good governance) was introduced in the regula-
tions for budget support as a fourth partnership commitment (DFID 08.07.2011). Since 2014, 
good governance has been embedded fully in development policies as the fourth partnership 
commitment, therefore introducing a selective element, increasing the support for recipients 
that respect good governance standards, but punishing those who don’t (DFID 2014g).  
Emerging donors have a decidedly mixed record when it comes to good governance policies. 
Like-minded countries such as Brazil and South Africa are on board to cooperate with the UK 
to increase good governance worldwide. William Hague claims that there are “exciting oppor-
tunities for Britain and Brazil to work in partnership with African countries” (Hague 19.02.2014, 
2). China and India are not mentioned when it comes to good governance policies. It is clear, 
however, that the UK is critical of especially China’s governance record and wary of the imple-
mentation of Chinese development cooperation to countries that violate good governance 
standards. A statement from the Foreign Minister, William Hague, clarifies that the UK would 
welcome a time when “future African lion economies” supported by the UK rival “Asia’s tigers” 
(Hague 19.02.2014, 4).  
The narrative surrounding good governance strengthened between 2004 and 2014 and the ele-
ment was put more at the centre of British development policies. Moreover, through the recent 
introduction of the fourth partnership commitment, a solid good governance record is a pre-
requirement for receiving British aid. This section also argues that the UK is apprehensive about 
the good governance records of at least two of the emerging donors, namely India and especially 
China.  
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Budget support 
General budget support (or GBS) arguably strengthens a recipient’s ownership if the money is 
distributed to its budget without any conditions attached. Budget support that is directed at a 
specific sector (so-called sector budget support, or SBS) is already a stronger steering tool for 
the donor country. Consequently, the debate surrounding how many conditions should be at-
tached to budget support and whether GBS or SBS is the preferred aid tool offers some insight 
into the narratives surrounding political conditions.  
The UK, and DFID in particular, sees itself as an important provider and a frontrunner in 
shaping budget support internationally (ICAI 2012, 15–16; National Audit Office 2008, 18; 
DFID 2007a, 127, 2006a, 34, 2008a, 93). Generally, the UK supports the idea that donors need 
to align their priorities with recipient countries as much as possible, therefore not imposing 
conditions (DFID 2006a, 34; also interview with III, 2013, October 9, 31'42).  
However, it seems that in many cases, the UK prefers sector budget support to GBS (DFID 
2007a, 125, 08.07.2011, 6; National Audit Office 2008, 23). On the other hand, the UK is not 
shying away from the imposition of economic and political conditions to GBS, as an interviewee 
from DFID confirmed:  
“whether it is budget support happening, there are some clearer requirements of what’s 
expected from the recipient. Usually in terms of public financial management. And on 
top of that there is the political activity about human rights” (interview with III, 2013, 
October 9, 31:42).  
Within budget support, conditions have increased in many ways between 2004 and 2014. In 
2003, three criteria for budget support existed: high poverty levels of the recipient, commitment 
of the government to poverty reduction, and acceptable risks (DFID 2003, 107). Since then, a 
complete catalogue of criteria, as well as graduated response mechanisms, have been added in 
order to establish whether a country qualifies for budget support or not. Since 2005 the require-
ment to fulfil the three partnership commitments have been applied to budget support (DFID 
2005, 15). 2008 saw the introduction of a full catalogue of questions that needed to be asked to 
a recipient country before budget support could be delivered; for instance, an inquiry into the 
likelihood of a good performance from the recipient country on the three partnership commit-
ments (National Audit Office 2008, 35–36; DFID 2008a, 94). Several publications stress the 
importance of conditions attached to budget support (for instance the need to have successful 
strategies countering corruption, DFID 2011b, 2, 2010a, 8, 2009d, 126, 2012a, 33). Since 2009, 
human rights monitoring has increased (see section on human rights) and DFID has begun to 
use tranche mechanisms to more quickly react to breaches in the partnership commitments 
(ICAI 2012, 7–8; DFID 2009f, 21, 6). Equally in 2009, the fourth partnership commitment 
(accountability) is introduced as a necessary pre-condition for receiving budget support (DFID 
08.07.2011, 1–2; good governance was already seen as essential in DFID 2006b, 24). Moreover, 
since 2011, the disbursements are no longer made annually but quarterly in order to ensure 
higher protection in cases of breaches of partnership principles (DFID 08.07.2011, 8).  
This indicates an even stronger pre-selectiveness in budget support than in other UK aid instru-
ments. Moreover, budget support can be quickly withdrawn or lowered if a country breaches a 
condition. Hence, political (and some economic) conditions, like the respect for human rights 
and a functioning accountability system are pre-conditions in budget support (DFID 2006b, 24, 
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08.07.2011). Emerging donors generally refrain from using budget support but certainly attach 
a lower degree of conditionality. A strengthening in the pre-conditionality of budget support 
could indicate a stronger separation from the UK and emerging donor policies.  
This policy, which is considered important in the UK, is under direct threat from emerging 
economies: because African countries have “substantial increases in natural resource revenues 
because of the rise of emerging donors in Africa, who provide assistance without the complex 
processes associated with UK budget support”, there is a fear that UK budget support might 
become obsolete (ICAI 2012, 20). It is therefore interesting to note that despite this imminent 
threat to the usefulness of budget support, the UK has increased conditions attached to the 
policies and seems to be eager to continue to apply the policy – contrary to a diminishing interest 
that the sections on U.S. and Norwegian budget support showed. The section on practices be-
low analyses whether this narrative around a strengthened conditionality is implemented in prac-
tice.  
Economic conditionality 
Private investments and private sector activities are important in order to increase development. 
This is an argument most British politicians would agree with. In order to support the trend 
towards private investments, British development cooperation directly encourages these policies 
(DFID 2014c, 1). However, as previous sections show, stable political conditions are considered 
a pre-requisite for a stable and growing economy (FCO 2013, 112). What economic conditions 
are attached to this narrative?  
Within economic conditionality, we have seen two very distinct approaches: the United States 
largely supporting economic conditionality, while Norway strongly opposed the imposition of 
policy reforms, such as neoliberal reforms, especially free market and trade liberalizations. Nor-
way accompanied its criticism with an strengthening critique of the Bretton Woods institutions, 
the IMF and the World Bank. The UK is less prone to voicing such criticisms, as it is a strong 
supporter of the World Bank and its second biggest contributor (in terms of ODA/GNI); it is 
therefore likely to argue in a similar vein to the United States.  
The UK’s position towards IMF and World Bank conditionality 
Contrary to the United States, which supported the IMF and the World Bank but did not talk a 
lot about their reforms, the UK sees itself at the forefront of attempts to reform the Bretton 
Woods institutions and adapt them to a changed international landscape. This includes support 
for voting reforms in favour of emerging nations. But the proposed need for reform is also 
about a reform of IMF and World Bank conditionality and their requirement that recipients 
need to implement market and trade liberalizations, a policy that the UK no longer endorses.  
Moreover, while the UK stresses the need to reform the institutions’ conditionality (for instance, 
see DFID 2003, 35, 2005, 2, 2006b, 74–76, 2009d, 115, 119), the UK emphasises that reforms 
are ongoing and that the institutions have made major progress in reforming their conditional 
approach. The UK does not pass up the opportunity to make a point of how big its own con-
tribution to this reform was (for instance, DFID 2005, 14, 18, 2008f, 20, 2009d, 116, 2008a, 
111).  
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The UK also sees the Bretton Woods institutions as “essential pillars” to the world of develop-
ment (DFID 2009d, 105), but references to the IMF are becoming less frequent. In contrast, 
the support for the World Bank is still enthusiastic and the UK is seen to have a central role in 
fostering that institution’s ability to have an impact on development (DFID 2009a, 43, 2011a, 
105).  
The proposed founding of the BRICS development bank, first initiated in 2012 but confirmed 
over the years, has brought the Foreign Office to the conclusion that the BRICS institutions  
“are more likely to be complements rather than substitutes for the existing IFIs. The 
initial scale of the proposals is modest. The NDB starts one third the size of the Asian 
Development Bank. The CRA funds available are small relative to country foreign ex-
change reserves in all the BRICS (except South Africa) and 70% of funds are tied to 
compliance in an IMF finance program and its attendant conditionality” (FCO 2014a, 
1).  
This analysis indicates that the UK does not see the BRICS bank as a significant challenge for 
established international financial institutions, or their conditional approach. Overall, the UK is 
supportive of the Bretton Woods institutions, but insists on actively reforming their condition-
ality.  
UK’s definition of sound financial strengthening  
Previous economic conditions stipulated a willingness on the part of the recipient to undergo 
neoliberal reforms in terms of market and trade liberalizations (DFID 2009e, 5). Since 2005, the 
UK has refrained from such policies. However, that does not mean that no economic conditions 
are attached to its aid.  
Since the introduction of the partnership commitments in 2005, countries are required to com-
ply with partnership commitment number 3, requiring that the recipient country strengthen its 
financial management and accountability while actively fighting against corruption (DFID 2005, 
9). This indicates a new set of economic conditions that the UK attaches to its aid. 
Within this category of economic accountability, the UK largely refers to indicators developed 
and maintained by the Bretton Woods institutions, further indicating the trust the United King-
dom has in these institutions (DFID 2007a, 200, 2014g, 16–18). Moreover, each country receiv-
ing UK aid has to complete an Annual Statement of Progress on Fiduciary Risk (DFID 2009e, 
18). Possible conditions that are suggested in order to guarantee sound macroeconomic policies 
from the recipient are the expansion of the volume spent on medicines or an audit scrutiny of 
a particular programme or sector (DFID 2009e, 18). Relevant economic policy conditions are 
fiscal policies, monetary and trade policies, supply side policies (DFID 2009e, 21), while privat-
ization and trade liberalization policies are officially excluded as conditions because “the use of 
these two policies as conditions has been particularly contentious” (DFID 2009e, 21). The 2014 
legislation expands on the third partnership commitment, indicating a further strengthening of 
the conditionality attached to it. Indicators of whether or not a particular recipient country has 
a sound financial accountability (and therefore qualifies for UK aid), are taken from the IMF 
and the World Bank (such as assessments regarding country financial accountability or debt 
management performance)(DFID 2014g, 16–19). A comprehensive government budget, pro-
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poor strategies within the budget, comprehensive and timely accounting, a credible strategy to 
strengthen the financial management by the government and many more indicators are all fac-
tors thought to indicate sound economic policy and qualify the recipient for British aid. In order 
to assess whether a country successfully fights corruption, the UK uses the World Bank Control 
of corruption index, or the compliance with other international standards to tackle corruption 
(DFID 2014g, 16–19).  
Since the introduction of the partnership commitments in 2005, the conditionality within the 
third partnership commitment has been expanded, making the requirements more tangible but 
also more complex. Therefore, the UK has strengthened the narrative surrounding economic 
conditions and introduced more pre-selective criteria for recipients. This stronger focus on pre-
selection is closely linked to the idea that British aid needs to increase its effectiveness (see 
previous chapter).  
Overall, the section on the narratives surrounding conditionality indicates that a strengthening 
of the general narrative, and especially of specific aspects of that narrative such as political and 
economic conditionality, has taken place from 2004 till 2014. Moreover, this can often be linked 
to a fear of loss of British influence due to the emergence of new donors. This seems to run in 
contradiction to the fairly positive narrative surrounding emerging donors in the perception of 
the UK.  
6.3.2 Rules and practice on conditionality  
The following section concentrates on the rules and practices of the United Kingdom’s devel-
opment policies. Some of the main rules were already mentioned earlier, such as the partnership 
commitments. As these mostly concern political (and to some degree economic) conditionality 
they are discussed again below. This section thus attempts to answer the following question; 
how strictly is conditionality applied in the different sectors? How much is spent on proclaimed 
priorities, such as human rights and good governance? Similar to the practice sections of Nor-
way and the United States, this section focuses on countries where the United Kingdom shares 
an interest with emerging donors as well as with the other two traditional donors. For the UK, 
this list includes its top first, third, and fourth recipients, but excludes the second biggest recip-
ient (India). Due to the fact that funds for India will be completely phased out, and India itself 
is one of the emerging donors studied here, this exclusion is logical. Moreover, Bangladesh, Iraq 
and Pakistan are excluded because of a lack of involvement of emerging donors.  
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Table 6-6: Amount disbursed by the UK in 2014 to selected recipients 
Recipient country United Kingdom China India Brazil South Africa 
Afghanistan   328 Yes Yes Yes No 
DRC  256 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethiopia 494 Yes Yes Yes No 
Malawi 93 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mozambique 129 Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tanzania 229 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Uganda 127 Yes Yes (Yes) Yes 
Zambia 140 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                                                                             Source: OECD stats, figures for UK from 2014, all in USD millions (constant dollars from 2013) 
Political conditionality 
The narrative surrounding political conditionality suggests a strong increase in political condi-
tionality, especially in terms of pre-selective criteria, embedded in the partnership commitments 
1, 3 and 4. How strong is this commitment in reality? The next sections look first at the overall 
amount spent by the UK in the field, and then at particular case studies where a rivalry with 
emerging donors is conceivable.   
Human rights 
The section on narratives already mentioned that partnership commitments include relevant 
human rights as preconditions to entering into an aid relationship. Simultaneously, since 2004, 
monitoring has increased to spot and sanction human rights violations. Therefore, the narrative 
is closely linked to this rule. The question that remains, then, is whether these rules are imple-
mented in practice – are political and civil rights, as well as socio-economic rights a precondition 
for receiving British aid? The list of what conditions have to be fulfilled in order to apply for 
UK aid has increased as the narrative section illustrates, including a “Practical guide to assessing 
and monitoring human rights in country programmes”) (DFID 2011c, 13–17).  
Human rights are held up as a “priority area” within British narratives on development aid. 
Similar to Norway, there is no separated reporting on human rights spending in the UK. DFID 
explains this through the widespread inclusion of human rights aspects in many of its activities 
(FCO 2014b, 26). The total amount spent by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on 
human rights includes spending for staff, project work, and bilateral funds. For 2014, the total 
amounts to 38.2 million British pounds (roughly 60 million USD) (FCO 2014b, 26–29). This 
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number has increased dramatically since 2005, when spending amounted to 13.4 million British 
pounds (FCO 2005, 18).  
In the early years of this study, human rights spending was directed through the Global Oppor-
tunities Fund, of 3.5 million British pounds went to human rights, democracy and good gov-
ernance programmes in 2005. A specific human rights fund has been wound down over the 
years (FCO 2005, 18) and replaced by the human rights and democracy programme which spent 
6.5 million British pounds on human rights projects in 2013 and 2014 (FCO 2012, 24, 2013, 
24).  
Priority countries are either countries of concern or countries that offer opportunities to pro-
mote and protect human rights. This overall priority has not changed since 2005 (FCO 2005, 
16). In 2014, recipients of UK support that are located within the eleven selected countries are 
Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan, 
Tanzania and Zambia – basically all except Uganda, Malawi and Mozambique (FCO 2014b, 26–
30).  
It does not seem surprising that the UK has an interest in fostering human rights projects in 
Afghanistan where other emerging donors are also active. The UK supports projects that try to 
prevent sexual violence in conflict-affected countries (FCO 2014b, 27). The UK also attempts 
to strengthen civil society and human rights through a project where it currently spends 20 
million British pounds (30.5 million USD) since 2010 (Development Tracker 2015a). Most of 
the sector aid is distributed to social infrastructure and services, indicating a focus on supporting 
political structures (OECD Stat 2015b). Similarly, the UK supports projects trying to achieve 
universal primary education in South Sudan. The highest share, in terms of sectors from UK 
aid is distributed towards humanitarian aid, but social infrastructure and service come second. 
The same applies to Sudan (OECD Stat 2015b). In Uganda and Tanzania, the highest amounts 
are spent on social infrastructure and services as well as on energy infrastructure for Uganda 
(OECD Stat 2015b). In Tanzania, a human rights related project has been at work since 2012, 
distributing a total of 4.5 million British pounds (around 6.8 million USD). This project con-
centrates on providing women with legal services and supporting the 2015 election in Tanzania 
(Development Tracker 2015b).  
Moreover, the UK uses various instruments in co-operation with the United Nations Security 
Council and the European Union to punish human rights abusers worldwide (freezing their 
assets for instance). In 2014, this policy was applied to individuals in Sudan and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (both countries where China has strong interests) (FCO 2014b, 84).  
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The UK itself is in a relatively high category with 10 to 14 ratification (the same category as 
Norway and above the United States). From its major 20 aid recipients, 13 countries have rati-
fied an equally high amount of human right treaties125. All remaining seven countries have rati-
fied between 5 and 9 human right treaties, from which India (6.44 percent) and Ethiopia (4.08 
percent) are the most important recipients (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015).126  
What is the record for the UK in rewarding or punishing good performers in the rule of law 
indicator of the World Bank? Similar to the cases of Norway and the United States, the UK still 
disburses considerable amounts to countries that have a very low indicator in the rule of law 
(like Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Sudan). There are 
some countries where the UK seems to implement its rhetoric of punishing bad and rewarding 
good performers: Ethiopia is a case where positive trends in the rule of law indicator was met 
with increased British spending. Similarly, the case of Tanzania indicates that a bad record in 
the rule of law indicator is punished with lower amounts of aid.  
Similar to the other two donors, there are also cases where the UK shows only a very weak 
reaction to supposedly strong trends in their recipients’ indicators: as such, Afghanistan and the 
DRC receive a stable amount of money despite slightly improving (and slightly decreasing re-
spectively) records. Similarly, Malawi and Mozambique receive relatively stable funding despite 
severe (for Mozambique) and moderate (for Malawi) decreases in the rule of law indicator. 
Moreover, Uganda’s improving records are not met with an increase in spending but with a 
slight decrease in spending. Finally, there is one group where the UK seems to ignore its narra-
tive on stronger selectivity: this group consists of the cases of Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan and 
Zambia. In the cases of Nigeria, Sudan and Zambia the increasing records in the rule of law 
indicator were met with severe decreases in aid. On the other hand, the bad performer South 
Sudan received increased amounts of funding (World Bank Group 2015).  
This section indicates that practices on human rights policies have increased since 2004, and 
that more money is spent on enforcing these conditions. This is also true in countries where the 
UK is a direct rival of emerging donors that do not include human rights in their portfolio. 
Nevertheless, the section also showed that the UK is still far away from a totally consistent 
application of its pre-selective criteria and of truly rewarding or punishing good or bad human 
right performers.  
Good governance  
There is a strong narrative arguing for using conditions requesting good governance policies. 
Moreover, since 2014, good governance has been included as one of the partnership commit-
ments that every recipient needs to adhere to (DFID 2014g, 2, 18-20).  
                                                 
125 These are in order of importance: Nigeria (8.33 percent of aid), Afghanistan (3.83 percent), Bangladesh (3.44 
percent), Iraq (3.23 percent), Tanzania (3.17 percent), DRC (2.82 percent), Ghana (2.05 percent), Malawi (1.75 
percent), Uganda (1.66 percent), Mozambique (1.48 percent), Sierra Leone (1.29 percent), Nepal (1.28 percent) and 
Rwanda (1.19 percent).  
126 The remaining five countries are, in order of importance Pakistan (3.17 percent), Sudan (2.13 percent), Kenya 
(1.58 percent), Zambia (1.52 percent) and Zimbabwe (1.31 percent).  
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As in the case of human rights, spending on good governance is not indicated separately in the 
figures. However, what is indicated is the spending on government and civil society. The UK 
spends on average USD 1.2 billion per year on government and civil society. That amounts to 
about 15 to 16 percent of its overall spending. From that, approximately 3 percent is spent on 
conflict, peace and security. The remaining 12 percent are then spent on initiatives related to 
government and civil society. These figures are most likely to cover many measures related to 
good governance. Over the ten-year period, the figures have remained largely stable in terms of 
overall amount and in percentage (roughly 11 percent of overall ODA OECD DAC 2014b, 106; 
OECD Stat 2015a). However, 2013 and 2014 saw a sharp decrease of spending, amounting only 
to seven percent of total ODA. Despite the increasing importance of good governance in the 
narratives, the figures don’t seem to match. In comparison to the other two donors, the UK 
spends least on the sector government and civil society and spends less than Norway (with 13 
percent) and the United States (with 14 percent) in terms of percentages of ODA (OECD Stat 
2015a).  
The UK pledges to use at least five percent of its aid on accountability projects (DFID 
22.03.2013a, 3). How does this pledge hold up when we look at the countries where the UK is 
most likely to clash with emerging donors, i.e. our selected 11 countries? All receive significant 
shares, and most often the biggest shares of spending on social infrastructure and services, 
which also include spending on government and civil society – but also includes various other 
posts, such as education and water sanitation (OECD Stat 2015a). Moreover, this share has 
increased over the years. The share in Afghanistan for social infrastructure and services in-
creased from 6 and 7 percent in 2004 and 2005 to 67 percent in 2013. The first figures for South 
Sudan in 2011 indicate that nearly 99 percent was spent on that category. This share has since 
decreased to 38 percent. Since the creation of South Sudan, bilateral aid to Sudan has generally 
decreased quite dramatically. But equally dramatic is the fall of the share spent on social infra-
structure and services, which fell from 62 percent in 2004 to 8 percent in 2013. Since 2011, most 
of the aid has gone toward humanitarian purposes. The share for social services and infrastruc-
ture for Tanzania remained largely stable at about 32 percent, but peaked in 2006/07 and 
2011/12 to 60 and even nearly 80 percent. Tanzania is another example where the spending on 
good governance-related sectors increased dramatically from 16 percent in 2005 to 63 percent 
in 2013. This data shows that the share of aid distributed to good governance purposes in coun-
tries where the UK is in direct competition with countries that do not support good governance 
structures themselves has largely increased (OECD Stat 2015b).  
The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) is a tool that the UK uses to support good 
governance and democracy world-wide. It is a non-departmental public body, sponsored by the 
Foreign Office. The overall goal, in its own words, is to strengthen the institutions of democracy 
and good governance, including respect for human rights (FCO 2013, 37). Throughout the ob-
served period, the FCO founded the WFD with roughly 3.4 million British pounds every year 
(approximately 5.3 million USD) (FCO 2011, 32). In 2013, the programme focused largely on 
the MENA region; that is, areas where emerging donors are not very active (FCO 2013, 34). In 
2012, the foundation supported programmes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where 
China is very active (FCO 2012, 34). In the early years of this study, the WFD was involved in 
Uganda, a country where India and China share the UK’s interest (FCO 2007, 114, 2005, 206).  
The UK uses a tool called Country Governance Analysis (CGA) to assess whether a given coun-
try fulfils the partnership requirements of good governance. This tool was first introduced in 
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2007 (FCO 2007, 25). In order to measure good governance, the UK refers to the following 
indicators: World Bank average CPIA Public sector management and the WB aggregate indica-
tor on voice and accountability (DFID 2010c, 98). From the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
those most closely related to public sector management is that of government effectiveness. 
Therefore, these two indicators receive special attention in the following analysis.127  
As in the case of the other two donors, four different cases of relationships between the gov-
ernance indicators and aid levels have been identified. The first category consists of countries 
where no clear relationship between the governance indicators and the aid levels can be estab-
lished.  
In a first category is South Sudan, which has received increasing amounts of aid (slightly below 
the increase within the U.S. but above that of Norway). This could be indicative of rewarding 
the improving indicator of government effectiveness. Nevertheless, the increase is indeed 
smaller than the increase in aid. Moreover, the control of corruption indicator is stagnating and 
there is a significant deterioration of the voice and accountability indicator. No clear interpreta-
tion is possible here, except that the deterioration within the voice and accountability indicator 
has apparently been ignored.  
There are several countries in the second category, indicating some consistency between the 
narratives and rules of increased selectivity and the practices. One clear case is Sudan, where a 
negative trend in all three indicators is met with decreasing aid levels. All the other cases, how-
ever, exhibit an incomplete degree of consistency, with at least one indicator going against the 
trend. Interestingly, this indicator is in most cases the voice and accountability indicator, sug-
gesting that the UK does not react towards a change in this indicator despite claiming to do so 
in the narrative. These countries are Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda. Nigeria, Uganda, 
and Tanzania all receive less aid in relative terms than ten years ago. All three countries have 
deteriorating levels within the indicators of government effectiveness and control of corruption 
(these deteriorating levels are quite severe for Tanzania and Uganda). On the voice and account-
ability indicator, however, all three countries show improving tendencies which are not reflected 
in the distribution of British aid.128 On the other hand, Ethiopia’s improving government effec-
tiveness and control of corruption indicators have been met with increasing aid levels while – 
again – the slightly deteriorating trend within the voice and accountability indicator remained 
ignored. Another case that could be included in this category is the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Similar to the cases above, there is one indicator where there is no consistency (in this 
case government effectiveness) while the other two indicators (voice and accountability and 
control of corruption) show consistency: aid levels to the DRC have been modestly improving. 
Similarly modest is the improvement on the scores of voice and accountability and control of 
corruption. The slightly deteriorating trend of government effectiveness was however ignored.  
                                                 
127 Note, however that in order to allow for comparability between this section on the UK and that on the USA 
and Norway, the part on good governance also includes the control of corruption indicator, even though that one 
gets repeated attention in the economic conditions, as the UK puts particular emphasis on the fight of corruption 
when looking at whether a country qualifies for having sound macroeconomic finances.  
128 Note that the level of improvement varies: while Tanzania has a high score for improvement of the voice and 
accountability indicator, Nigeria has a modest improvement and Uganda only hints at minor improvements.  
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The third section consists of countries that receive continuous support from the UK despite 
having very low scores on average in the governance indicators. Previous sections on Sudan and 
South Sudan have already commented on their low ratings in all governance indicators. The 
United Kingdom – in comparison to Norway (average 2.77 percent) and the United States (av-
erage 2.88 percent) – spends least on average on Sudan, with 2.13 percent of UK aid, and South 
Sudan (the UK spends only 0.27 percent whereas the United States spend 1.54 percent and 
Norway 0.76 percent). For the Democratic Republic of Congo, the situation is reversed: here, 
the UK is the most generous aid distributor with on average 2.82 percent (compared to 1.6 
percent from the USA and 0.96 percent from Norway).  
The fourth section consists of cases where narratives and practices clash fundamentally. This 
category includes Mozambique, Afghanistan (both in the same category for the United States), 
Malawi, and Zambia (as for Norway). Afghanistan with generally very low indicators make it an 
improbable candidate for rewarding good governance. But the example of Afghanistan is even 
more instructive. The aid for Afghanistan peaked in 2011 and 2012 with 5 percent of the overall 
British aid spent on that country. Since then, aid diminished to 2.9 percent in 2014. The voice 
and accountability indicator has improved since 2012 from 11.3 points to 15.8 points in 2014. 
A very similar tendency can be observed for the indicator on government effectiveness that 
reached an all-time high of 8.2 points in 2014 (which is still a very low score overall). The indi-
cator for regulatory quality peaked in 2012 and remained stable since then at about 11 points. 
All indicators therefore suggest that the situation in Afghanistan is improving. But the aid levels 
of the UK have diminished further. Another case where improving indicators have not been 
rewarded is Zambia: Zambia has strongly improving records in all three indicators but received 
less British aid than 10 years ago. On the contrary, negative trends in Mozambique have been 
met by an increase in funds (even though a modest increase). Finally, Mozambique has strongly 
improving scores in the indicators voice and accountability and government effectiveness, and 
reasonably improving scores in the control of corruption indicator. Nevertheless, its aid was cut 
from a previous 2.2 percent in 2007 to a percentage below 1 percent in 2014 (World Bank 
Group 2015). The following table illustrates the contradiction between the narratives and the 
practices within British aid:  
 Figure 6-3: Example of British funding of Malawi 





33.17 39.91 44.80 0.9786 
Government ef-
fectiveness 
23.41 41.23 25.00 1.0718 
Control of cor-
ruption 
23.90 43.60 25.50 1.9674 











As % of UK ODA 2.23 % 1.23 % 0.89 % -0.06 
                                                                            Source: Own compilation on data based on World Governance Indicators and OECD stats 
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This section illustrated that the narrative of an increasingly selective choice of recipients based 
on good governance criteria has only partly been shown in the practices of UK aid. 129  
Budget support  
The UK sees itself as a “lead General Budget Support donor” and as very influential when it 
comes to harmonisation of budget support (DFID 2012d, 13). The figures largely confirm this. 
In comparison to the other two donors considered here, the UK spends the highest share of its 
ODA on budget support (with an average of 4 percent) while the United States has the lowest 
share with 1.18 percent (OECD Stat 2015a). In 2004, the UK spent USD 642 million on general 
budget support. In 2004, that amounted to 11.3 percent of bilateral ODA. The 2013 figures 
show that the UK spent 924 million USD on budget support, of which 713 USD million went 
toward sectoral support. While the general share of budget support has slightly decreased to 
about 8.8 percent for 2013, the share of sector support has steadily increased since 2010 (OECD 
Stat 2015a). DFID explains the decrease in GBS because it is no longer needed as macroeco-
nomic stability is achieved or it is considered too risky (DFID 2014b, 125). Often, budget sup-
port represents a significant share of aid from about 12 percent (in the case of Nepal and 15 
percent for Sierra Leone) to above 80 percent in the case of Mozambique (figures for 2010-11, 
ICAI 2012, 3). Many countries receive more than 50 percent of their UK aid in GBS (among 
them, Tanzania, Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia).  
Budget support can be easily withheld or withdrawn if a government no longer complies with 
the agreed commitments. The UK reports on this transparently. An astonishing amount of 
countries that were sanctioned by the UK are actively supported by emerging donors, even 
though mostly through other means than budget support. Budget support to Uganda was with-
held because of a corruption scandal in 2007, in 2009-10, in 2012-13, and again in 2013-14 
(National Audit Office 2008, 32; DFID 2011a, 96, 2013a, 115, 2014b, 126), Ghana’s budget 
support was lowered by 10 percent because reforms were not implemented thoroughly enough 
in 2007, and again in 2010-11 (DFID 2007a, 124, 2011a, 96). In 2008-09, budget support was 
suspended for Sudan (political situation, again in 2013-14, DFID 2013b, 7) and Tanzania (cor-
ruption). Budget support to Afghanistan was withheld in 2010-11 and 2011-12 because the IMF 
had suspended a programme because of fiscal instability (DFID 2012a, 91). The mechanisms 
of sanction that are in place indicate that the UK is enforcing its conditionality in budget sup-
port, especially when political conditions are not upheld (example Sudan) or when accountability 
is not respected sufficiently (example Tanzania). This is true in countries where Britain faces a 
direct competition from emerging countries. But as the section above has indicated, budget 
support is then frequently replaced by other funds, undermining the effectiveness of the sanc-
tioning mechanisms.  
                                                 
129 In their study on whether donors reward merit, Anke Hoeffler and Vertiy Outram (2011) come to the result 
that the United Kingdom rewards democracy more so than the United States or Norway, but still not to the extent 
of what its narrative suggests. Similarly, Stijn Claessens, Danny Cassimon and Bjorn Van Campenhout (2009) find 
that the United Kingdom is the donor of the three selected here that sticks more closely to the CPIA indicators 
(similar to the WGI used here), and therefore sticks closest to its narrative.  
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Economic conditionality 
UK’s position towards the IMF and the World Bank conditionality  
Even though the UK still funds more projects through bilateral rather than multilateral projects 
(bilateral share in 2014 was at 59 percent, OECD Stat 2015a), it has, on average, the highest 
share of multilateral aid from the three traditional donors. The share is at 36 percent, with peaks 
of 42 percent in 2007 and 2014 and lows of 24 and 29 percent in 2005 and 2006. Generally, the 
trend shows an increase in multilateral shares. The World Bank is one of the main beneficiaries 
of this trend. From the high spending on multilateral aid, a share of an average 26 percent of its 
multilateral funding is channelled through the World Bank institutions (lion’s share goes 
through EU institutions) (OECD Stat 2015a). The IDA figures second in 2012 only after the 
European Commission as the second biggest recipient of multilateral funds for the UK (DFID 
2014e). In 2013, the IDA was the biggest recipient of multilateral contributions (DFID 2014e). 
While these shares remain behind the share of total ODA that the United States spend on the 
World Bank, the United Kingdom nonetheless (and unlike the USA) is putting increasing 
amounts of money into the World Bank, from 13 percent of its multilateral contributions in 
2004 to 34 percent in 2014.  
The narrative surrounding the Bretton Woods institutions is slightly more positive in the UK 
than in Norway. The UK ascribes itself a leading role in helping the institutions to reform their 
conditional approach. This finding on the narrative is confirmed with the high spending that 
the UK distributes through the World Bank, where the UK remains the leading provider of 
money in terms of gross ODA that is spent on the World Bank over the years. The financial 
support has increased from 348 million USD in 2004 to 2.8 billion USD in 2014. In relation to 
its total ODA, this amounts to 4.2 percent in 2004 and up to a 2014 peak with 15.5 percent 
(OECD Stat 2015a). Throughout the period under observation, the average was 9.5 percent. 
With that share, the UK is well above the average of DAC donors, which is at about 6.6 percent. 
These figures indicate that the UK’s support of the World Bank is unbroken and their faith in 
the institution has increased strongly over time. 
Figures for the IMF are again, much harder to come by. The IMF figures as the 20th biggest 
multilateral recipient of the UK in 2014, with 32 million British pounds disbursed. Moreover, 
as has been argued above, the share of funding to the IMF has decreased over the last period 
because of the quota and governance reforms within the IMF, from 5.03 percent to 4.05 per-
cent, (IMF 2016, 2011).  
Rewarding sound macroeconomic policies 
Similar to the other two countries, we examine here whether or not the UK rewards countries 
that score well on the regulatory quality indicator of the World Bank, as it is the closest indicator 
in terms of measuring macroeconomic stability. Moreover, even though the section on political 
conditionality has already taken the control of corruption indicator into account, we’ll include 
this in the analysis again here – as the UK claimed itself that it makes use of the control of 
corruption index to assess the macroeconomic stability.  
The first group again contains cases where no clear link can be established between UK aid and 
the relevant indicators. Malawi and Mozambique are both examples in which the indicator of 
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regulatory quality does not match the trend of the control of corruption indicator: while for 
Malawi the regulatory quality indicator deteriorated, the same was true for Mozambique for the 
control of corruption while the regulatory quality indicator improved. Both receive a modest 
decrease in aid from the UK over the period of time.  
Five countries show a trend where the narrative seems to have been implemented in practice: 
Sudan’s decreasing levels of regulatory quality and of control of corruption are met with de-
creasing funds. Similarly, increasing tendencies for South Sudan in both indicators was met with 
an increase in British funding. Uganda’s levels of regulatory quality (and control of corruption) 
have decreased dramatically over the last ten years. British aid followed suit but to a lower level. 
Afghanistan and DRC are cases where positive trends have been rewarded with an increase in 
aid.  
Nevertheless, they also appear again, alongside the other usual suspects, in the category with a 
very low indicator for regulatory quality: Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan and South Sudan. Only in 
the DRC is the UK the highest aid giver from our selected three donors. In all other cases, it 
comes second (for Afghanistan after the U.S., for South Sudan after Norway) or last (for Sudan). 
This indicates a certain, if limited, greater selectivity on the part of the United Kingdom.  
Finally, there are the cases where the practices completely contradict the stronger preselection 
that the narratives and rules indicated: Ethiopia showed a negative trend in regulatory quality 
which was met with an increase in funds (the indicator for control of corruption, however, 
improved); Nigeria on the other hand had strong positive trends in regulatory quality but slightly 
decreasing trends in control of corruption and was punished with a severe decrease in British 
aid. Tanzania and Zambia are both examples where increasing trends in the regulatory quality 
were met with a decrease in funds (for the case of Zambia, the control of corruption indicator 
also improved, while for Tanzania this score deteriorated) (World Bank Group 2015).  
Generally, the UK is more responsive to changing indicators than, for example, the United 
States. Nevertheless, there is a no clear tendency to reward or punish bad performers of mac-
roeconomic policies.  
The section on the United Kingdom has illustrated that while the narrative pushes for a strong 
pre-selection process implementing pre-conditions for distribution of aid, the results in the 
practice are, at best half-satisfying, – as was the case with both the United States and Norway. 
The next section makes sense of these results and ties them to the theoretical framework.  
6.4 Concluding remarks: institutional change within conditionality? 
This chapter looked at the policy field of conditionality and asked whether the three traditional 
donors adapt their policies because of emerging donors. This section summarises the findings 
of the chapter and asks which common denominators there are between the reaction of the 
United States, Norway and the United Kingdom.  
All three traditional donors were influenced by the idea that their values (especially political 
values) were under threat by the development aid of emerging donors. This perception was 
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strongest among U.S. politicians, shared by some Norwegian decision-makers and only mod-
estly entered the discussions in British policies. Moreover, the United States and the United 
Kingdom shared the belief that they were in a position to socialise (USA) or help (UK) emerging 
donors to improve their aid records. All three donors shared the background idea of a value 
driven development policy – which was thought to be able to slow down change in the field of 
conditionality.  
The empirical analysis led to interesting and challenging results. As such, the United States 
showed a strong commitment to increasing the selectivity of its recipients in order to better 
reward worthy recipients and put the unworthy candidates on the route to reform. This was true 
in all fields of conditionality that were investigated here: the U.S. claimed to increase its selec-
tivity in human rights, good governance and in economic conditions as well. This was strongly 
reflected within the narratives and also led to changes within some rules of development insti-
tutions (such as the MCC). Nevertheless, the section on the practices showed that these narra-
tives and rules are only partly implemented in the practices in countries where the United States 
shared an interest with emerging donors.  
The United Kingdom is very similar to the picture painted of the United States: the United 
Kingdom also showed a strong commitment to stronger selectivity (and thereby increasing ex 
ante conditionality) within its narratives and rules. Nevertheless, the results in the practices are 
equally mixed in the practices as for the United States. Note however that the initial ideas re-
garding emerging donors were much more positive for the United Kingdom than they were for 
the United States or Norway. It seems, however, that the UK is equally dedicated to uphold the 
rhetoric of a strongly normatively driven foreign aid policy – just like the United States and 
Norway even if the UK equally fails to implement this higher selectivity in its practices.  
Finally, Norway holds a special position regarding conditionality. For Norway, the emphasis is 
led more strongly on ownership which is seen as contradicting the increased conditionality and 
selectivity championed by the USA and the UK. Nevertheless, especially when it came to polit-
ical values (such as good governance and human rights), Norway’s decision-makers showed a 
strong commitment to the cause, but which led to mixed results within the narratives reflecting 
this conflict between ownership and conditionality. Moreover, within the rules and practices, 
there is hardly any evidence of a stronger selectivity that is taken place. Therefore, the change 
within Norway is least pronounced among our three donors studied here.  
Theoretically, this chapter has argued that the ideas are most influential on the layers of the 
narratives, are slightly influential on the layer of rules but barely influence the practices at all. 
This is true for all three traditional donors. Nevertheless, as the paragraphs above illustrate, the 
degree of change, is significantly different in all three traditional donors. The relative inertia in 
the practices could also be explained by the fact that conditionality is a well-established field in 
development cooperation where any change would be met by huge resistance from veto players 
(an argument brought foreward by the theory chapter). This can partly explain the inconsistency 
between the changes within the layers of narratives and rules and that of practices – where 
arguably change would arrive last and be most difficult to achieve. When we refer to the mech-
anisms that explain change, a process of layering has taken place here with new elements 
(stronger selectivity) being implemented in the narratives and rules but not yet implemented 
within the layer of practices. The following table summarises the results of this chapter.  
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  Table 6-7: Summarizing the main empirical findings on conditionality 





threat of political val-
ues (especially from 
China) 
Need to socialise do-
nors to American val-
ues 
Need to make Ameri-
can aid more visible 
Especially political val-




Unsustainable use of 
resources  
Undermining some values 
(like transparency) 
 
Idea to help them, attempts 
to socialise emerging do-
nors to British values 
Need for stronger results-










and diplomatic; strong 
selectivity) 
Value-driven policy 
Motives (commercial and 
diplomatic; also diplomatic) 
Value-driven policy 
Results in the 
narratives 
Strong increase in nar-
rative for a more se-
lective approach  
Mixed results in narra-
tive (especially be-
cause of the emphasis 
on ownership)  
Increase in narrative for a 
more selective approach 
Results in the 
rules and prac-
tices 
Mixed results in prac-
tice and rules 
Rules and practices: 
weak response! 
Mixed results in practice 
and rules 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Source: Own compilation 
Other explanatory factors might play a role in explaining the inertia within the aid practices: the 
direct contact of emerging donors might also be able to explain why policy makers decided to 
maintain aid relationships even in countries where its narratives and rules would no longer allow 
for the disbursement of aid. Moreover, security or diplomatic reasons could lead to the support 
of unworthy recipients. This is especially true in fields where there is a direct competition be-
tween traditional donor and emerging donor – as the case of Norway’s Oil for Development ini-
tative has conveniently illustrated.  
Within the field of conditionality, institutional change has taken place, then, on the layers of 
narratives and rules, but failed to reach the layer of practices. The theoretical framework argued 
that the power of ideas is stronger in a relatively new policy field. The question that remains to 
answer is whether this institutional place truly takes place in the field of trilateral cooperation. 
The next chapter elaborates on this question.   
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7 Changes in trilateral cooperation? 
This chapter focuses on policies – and the changes within these policies – of the three traditional 
donors in the field of trilateral cooperation. Trilateral cooperation130 is here defined narrowly as 
a “partnership between DAC donors and providers of South-South cooperation to implement 
development projects in beneficiary countries” (Langendorf 2012, 25–26). Arguably, trilateral 
cooperation on a bigger scale is a recent phenomenon that increased with the scale of aid activ-
ities of emerging donors (Yamashiro Fordelone 2009; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012).  
The previous two chapters have assessed the principal ideas held by traditional donors on 
emerging donors, and on one of the possible reactions of traditional donors towards emerging 
donors: a change within their own approach to conditionality. Another possible reaction is an 
increasing interest on the part of traditional donors in trilateral activities. Depending on the 
ideas that traditional donors have about emerging donors, change here is more or less likely. A 
donor that generally advocated a stronger cooperation with emerging donors is more likely to 
place more emphasis on trilateral projects than one that is not particularly interested in cooper-
ation.  
While the general interest in trilateral cooperation increased for all three donors observed here, 
there is a huge variety in the importance attached to this particular policy field. The initial in-
crease in interest can be explained by the topicality of trilateral cooperation and the variance can 
be explained by the initial ideas about emerging donors (and different individual emerging do-
nors) that chapter 5 elaborated upon. Moreover, as the theoretical framework suggested, path 
dependent behaviour might be less prominent in a relatively new policy field and therefore the 
weight of ideas might play a bigger role than it did for the better established and institutionalised 
policy field of conditionality.  
The chapter looks at the same three traditional donors as the two previous chapters and uses an 
identical methodological approach to the previous chapter on conditionality. Each section fo-
cuses on a particular country, first looks at the arguments and reasons behind the cooperation, 
and then looks at the layer of rules and practices to see whether the practices are in congruence 
with the narrative. Both parts of each section examine whether a change has taken place in the 
observed period in the areas of narratives, rules and practices on trilateral cooperation from the 
three traditional donors. Section 7.4 compares the results and concludes.131  
7.1 United States of America 
The main ideas that the chapter on ideas identified was the one that the United States should 
foster more cooperation with like-minded countries whereas cooperation with other countries 
(i.e. China) was not strongly envisioned. Moreover, similar to the United Kingdom, the United 
                                                 
130 Note that the terms „triangular“, „trilateral“, and „tripartite“ cooperation are considered synonyms throughout 
this study.  
131 Note that this study does not aim at evaluating the usefulness of trilateral cooperation, similar to the approach 
taken to conditionality. For studies evaluating the usefulness of trilateral projects, see Yamashiro Fordelone 2009; 
Langendorf et al. 2012; A. Johnson 2009; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012.  
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States defended the idea that a socialising of emerging donors needs to take place. The following 
section on the narratives takes a closer look of how these general ideas are influential when it 
comes to concrete trilateral projects with emerging partners.  
7.1.1 Narratives on trilateral cooperation  
The previous two chapters have shown that the United States perceives emerging donors – 
especially China – as a threat. Moreover, the last chapter addressed the question of whether the 
USA reacts to that threat by increasing its conditionality in selected countries. While the narra-
tive seemed to indicate that the U.S. is increasing its preselection and thereby increasing its pre-
conditions, the practice section showed that this principle is not actually implemented in coun-
tries where emerging donors are also active. The following analysis looks at U.S. engagement in 
trilateral cooperation and asks whether a significant change towards that policy field has taken 
place within the observed period. Section 7.1.2 contrasts the narrative with the actual figures on 
trilateral projects.  
Relevance of trilateral cooperation within the official narrative 
The United States do not have a specific directive regarding trilateral cooperation. However, 
references to trilateral cooperation and projects together with emerging donors are relatively 
frequent in official papers and narratives. The stated reasons for engaging in trilateral coopera-
tion are very similar to the reasons given for a general cooperation with and welcoming attitude 
toward certain (democratic) emerging donors illustrated in chapter 5.  
One of the reasons is that the increase in the volume of aid from emerging donors, together 
with a surge in the level of foreign direct investment, leads the U.S. to assume that this type of 
cooperation “will likely continue to grow in importance over the rest of the decade,” which 
makes cooperation with emerging donors more urgent (USAID 2007, 2). In order to better 
understand emerging donors and the possibilities surrounding trilateral cooperation, in 2008 the 
U.S. requested the publication of a research guide by the USAID Knowledge services centre. 
This research guide surveys the relevant research literature on trilateral cooperation at the time 
(Blumel and Nguyen 2008). Also in 2008, the Millennium Challenge Account proclaimed that it 
engages in Mozambique (one of its compact countries) with South Africa and Brazil in order to 
“promote business opportunities” (USMCC 2008b, 62). Emerging donors are therefore also 
seen as being suitable business partners. Marc Lopes, the Deputy Assistant Administrator for 
Latin America and the Caribbean within USAID, stated in a speech that USAID “ha[s] formed 
trilateral cooperation agreements with countries like India, South Africa, Chile and Brazil – be-
cause the more we can be brokers of regional expertise rather than wholesalers of U.S. expertise, 
the better off we are” (Lopes 14.12.2011, 1). This quote indicates that the main rationale for 
supporting trilateral projects is the sharing of knowledge that (democratic) emerging donors can 
provide because of their own experiences. However, during the first years of the observed pe-
riod, trilateral projects do not, on the whole, play a substantial role in the narrative.132  
                                                 
132 Similarly, literature on the topic attributes an increasing interest from the US in trilateral projects since 2009, 
especially with pivotal countries in South America and Africa and within the capacity building and social sector 
(Chaturvedi 2012a).  
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This picture changed in 2012 and the references to trilateral projects in general became more 
frequent. For instance, the Domestic Finance for Development (DF4D) initiative recom-
mended a cooperation with “emerging market countries to explore best practices and triangular 
technical assistance […] in partner countries” (USDS 2012e, 1). More specifically, the U.S. 
pledge from 2012 onwards to increase their cooperation with Asian providers of aid, including 
India and China, through the support of an American NGO – TAF (The Asia Foundation) – 
in order to increase transparency and better coordination between donor groups (USDS 2012c, 
772, 2013d, 682, 2015c, 632). In 2013, a similar benefit of being able to “identify new and inno-
vative approaches to development cooperation” when engaging with emerging donors was 
praised (USDS 2013e, 313). In the same year, USAID dedicated the publication of a fact sheet 
on the issue of trilateral cooperation, endorsing the concept and announcing the launch of 15 
trilateral assistance projects (USAID 2013b, 1).  
A true extension of the narrative on trilateral cooperation took place in the last year of this 
study. Within the congressional budget justification for 2015, trilateral cooperation was men-
tioned repeatedly. The U.S. vouched to engage “new aid providers (such as Brazil, China, Tur-
key, South Africa and Arab donors)” in order to “identify new and innovative approaches to 
development cooperation” and within the framework of Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) to 
“helping partner nations with relatively advanced counterterrorism law enforcement capabilities 
to start training law enforcement in other ATA partner nations” (USDS 2015d, 213, 225, 322). 
This indicates a growing interest from the United States regarding trilateral projects. Moreover, 
in 2014, the U.S. pledged to support trilateral cooperation projects with Latin American donors 
“with strong citizen security models and best practices, such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Co-
lombia” (USDS 2015b, 484).  
The areas of cooperation vary considerably depending on the involved emerging donor. There-
fore, a clear distinction was made in the following section between the specific approaches the 
U.S. government has regarding trilateral projects with the four emerging donors.133  
This introductory section has shown that, after a hesitant start, the willingness of the United 
States to participate in trilateral cooperation increased at the end of the observed period, and 
that the USA it largely uses this kind of cooperation in order to learn from best practices and 
make the best use of its own resources. The next section illustrates what approach the U.S. 
devotes to the specific four emerging donors of this study.  
Narrative on trilateral cooperation with specific emerging donors 
Within the group of emerging donors, it is Brazil that receives the most attention from U.S. 
publications. It is the first country with which the U.S. claim to have undertaken trilateral pro-
jects (USAID 2015d, 1–2). Reasons for cooperation with Brazil on development issues seem to 
be myriad in the U.S. narrative: first, the U.S. sees that Brazil “holds great potential for leader-
ship on cutting edge socio-environmental issues, such as energy efficiency, biofuels production, 
and global climate change”, more generally as a “trendsetter in the region in many respects”  
                                                 
133 Note also that initiatives exist with other emerging donors are mentioned that are not dwelled on further below: 
for instance, the United States pledge to support projects from the African Union as this is seen to promote political 
consensus (USDS 2013b, 201, 2014b, 198). Moreover, the USA envision to enter into the “first-ever partnership 
with Mexico’s development agency” in El-Salvador in 2014 (USAID 2014, 20). 
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and as a “global leader in social and economic development” (USAID 2011c, 1; Lopes 
04.02.2013, 1; USDS 2012b, 751). Moreover, Brazil is seen as a “democratic state that conducts 
itself responsibly in the international system” (USAID 2011c, 1). A cooperation between the 
“two largest democracies and two largest economies” is hence seen as a natural alliance, and 
Brazil as a “natural partner” (USAID 2015d, 1; Otero 26.03.2010, 2). Importantly, Marc Lopes, 
the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean has stressed in a blog 
that Brazil is seen as a “partner who shares our commitment to advancing global development” 
and also, more generally, as a nation which shares the values of the United States (Lopes 
11.02.2011, 1). Cooperating with Brazil in trilateral cooperation is also considered to “increase[e] 
the impact of development-based U.S. assistance throughout the world” (USDS 2013b, 631).  
Therefore, it is not surprising that cooperation with Brazil began as early as 2007 in the field of 
promoting biofuels (U.S. Government 2007). In 2009, repeated pledges appeared that the 
United States “continue to collaborate with Brazil in South-to-South initiatives” (USAID 2011c, 
1). This willingness is confirmed in the following years: in 2010, the Congressional Budget Jus-
tification claimed that the U.S. “will also seek to strengthen its partnership with Brazil in working 
jointly on trilateral development programmes, such as health and food security issues in third 
countries”. Interestingly, the same publication also stressed that this type of cooperation “in-
clude components promoting racial and ethnic equality, improving the status of women, and 
removing barriers to persons with disabilities”, indicating that the U.S. and Brazil share a com-
mon language and priority list in development projects (USDS 2010b, 663). Staff exchanges 
between the two countries’ development agencies – USAID and ABC – began in 2009 and were 
formalised in 2011, further increasing the mutual understanding in development cooperation 
(USAID 2011b, 2; Lopes 11.02.2011, 1). Moreover, in 2012, the congressional budget justifica-
tion stated that  
 “the United States and Brazil are committed to forging a strong partnership that pro-
motes development in other countries, especially in Africa and the Western Hemisphere. 
Innovative trilateral cooperation will prioritise transnational challenges that are of mu-
tual interest, including food security, health, the environment, agriculture, and economic 
development” (USDS 2012b, 751).  
The publication also indicates that this will be a big shift in the relationship between the United 
States and Brazil as it resembles more and more an equal partnership. Another area of cooper-
ation is added in 2013 with envisioning trilateral projects in the field of citizen security (USDS 
2014b, 632; confirmed by USDS 2015b, 367). Further areas of cooperation were added on the 
website of USAID, such as education, women’s issues and social inclusion projects (USAID 
2015d, 1–2). Throughout the years, Brazil has been hailed as a special expert on issues relating 
to agriculture and food (USDS 2012b, 754; confirmed in USDS 2013b, 631).134  
Several recipients are considered as potential partner countries for trilateral projects, with the 
focus lying mainly on sub-Saharan Africa and on South and Central America (USDS 2012b, 
754; confirmed in USDS 2013b, 631). The cooperation with Brazil in Africa is embedded in 
both countries’ “common link with [their] African brothers and sisters” (Otero 26.03.2010, 2). 
                                                 
134 Sachin Chaturvedi’s (2012a) study also indicates a strong focus of the United States on its cooperation with 
Brazil.  
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Concrete projects are envisioned in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique (pilot project of trilateral co-
operation), Haiti, Honduras and Angola (USDS 2012b, 754). The emphasis varies according to 
recipient. For instance, agricultural productivity is the focus in Mozambique, Honduras and 
Haiti, while women’s and children’s health issues are tackled only in Honduras and there is no 
country mentioned where citizen’s security is enhanced, but it is emphasised that projects of 
this kind will take place in Central America (USAID 2015d, 1–2; USDS 2015f, 1).  
Alongside Brazil, a lot of attention is paid to possible projects with South Africa. The first will-
ingness to support the government of South Africa through trilateral cooperation is expressed 
in 2009, slightly after the initiation of trilateral projects with Brazil: the annual congressional 
budget justification in 2009 stated that “the U.S. supports the [South African government] to 
provide development assistance” (USDS 2009c, 156). It further elaborates and claims that the 
U.S. worked for a trilateral project with South Africa in the Democratic Republic of Congo to 
improve local governance mechanisms in the recipient country (USDS 2009c, 156). Experiences 
of working with South Africa in trilateral projects is evaluated as “very positive” and considered 
to be “ground-breaking” (USDS 2010b, 170, 2011b, 188). Similarly, a press release in 2011 stated 
that trilateral programmes should be used to assist South Africa in its efforts to “support peace-
ful transitions in countries emerging from conflict” (USAID 2011d, 2). Moreover, it mentions 
that up to eight recipients were planned but only names Malawi (for agricultural projects) and 
Sudan (for civil servant training) (USAID 2011d, 2). Interestingly, the congressional budget jus-
tification of the same year only talks about seven initiatives and refers to South Sudan instead 
of Sudan, mentioning support for regional policies on gender justice (USDS 2011b, 188). These 
measures are seen as building South Africa’s “capacity to act as a full-fledged donor in the re-
gion” (USAID 2011d, 1). The cooperation with South Africa is also seen as a “capacity building 
mechanism [that] will advance a South-South cooperation model that is an important driver of 
future development assistance in Africa (USAID 2013a, 71–72).135  
Comparable to the reasons of cooperating with Brazil are the ones enumerated for beginning 
trilateral projects with South Africa. South Africa is valued as “a continental leader and a strate-
gic U.S. partner” and is considered to be “well placed to help fellow African states end conflicts 
and consolidate peace” (USDS 2010b, 170; same reference in USDS 2011b, 188). Trilateral co-
operation is seen as an appropriate measure to “build South Africa’s capacity [as a nascent do-
nor] and leverage outside resources” and to extend its regional leadership in Southern Africa 
(USDS 2010b, 170; USAID 2013a, 48).  
The focus of the cooperation lies in conflict prevention and security stabilization, but extends 
to other areas such climate change and an extension of South African agricultural production 
(USAID 2013a, 46–48; for promoting agriculture, also look at USDS 2015d, 21). The U.S. State 
Department also pledges to support South Africa in the creation of its development agency 
(USAID 2010b, i; also USDS 2011b, 188, 2012b, 179; USAID 2013a, 47). The reasons why 
South Africa is regarded as a good partner for trilateral projects becomes more evident with the 
next quote from congressional budget justification for 2013:  
“This [trilateral] programme leverages South Africa’s significant influence in the regional 
and international organizations, while providing a platform for the SAG [South African 
                                                 
135 This project is also mentioned in Chaturvedi’s (2012a) study.  
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government] to enhance its capacity to promote and strengthen democratic norms, in-
cluding respect for rule of law and human rights, and good governance on the conti-
nent” (USDS 2012b, 179).  
The quote demonstrates that the United States sees the cooperation with South Africa in trilat-
eral projects as an extension of its own foreign assistance policies. A 2013 fact sheet confirms 
this by stating that “USAID multiplies its development impact through demand driven devel-
opment initiatives in other countries” for programmes “aligned with USG foreign policy inter-
ests” (USAID 2013b, 1). The country development cooperation strategy for South Africa 
equally praises the country as the perfect partner for trilateral projects as its “developed demo-
cratic systems, regulatory practices, innovative scientific research can assist developing coun-
tries” (USAID 2013a, 46). It is not surprising, therefore, that the U.S. also wants to collaborate 
in the sectors of good governance promotion and election support through trilateral projects 
(USAID 2013a, 46). Similar to its engagement with Brazil, USAID therefore foresees that its 
relationship with South Africa will transition from “a donor-recipient to a donor-to-donor rela-
tionship” (USAID 2013a, 46). Another interesting rationale is hidden behind this change of 
relationship as trilateral projects are seen to “ensure a legacy for the U.S. government’s devel-
opment assistance long after funding ceases” (USAID 2013b, 1).  
The cases of South Africa and Brazil seem to indicate that the United States is an enthusiastic 
supporter of trilateral projects, even though the interest only matures from 2010. The next two 
cases, however, paint a different picture. Chapter 5 focused largely on the negative ideas the 
United States have on Chinese development projects. Nevertheless, some tentative initiatives to 
collaborate with China in trilateral cooperation projects can be identified from 2009 onwards. 
Compared to South Africa and Brazil, these initiatives are rather limited. Talk of trilateral pro-
jects starts with the beginning of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2009 where the U.S. 
envisioned an engagement with China to “promot[e] global sustainable development […] and 
future discussion of cooperation on poverty alleviation around the world” (Shear 10.09.2009, 
2). A factsheet on cooperation with China on international development from September 2010 
referred to several initiatives to collaborate with China in order to “develop a joint working 
relationship between USAID and China on development issues of common and strategic inter-
est to both countries” and to “encourage China to adopt internationally agreed standards on 
good donorship” (USAID 2010a, 1). This quote clearly represents an implementation of the 
idea to socialise emerging donors to Western, American standards. Initiatives are taking place 
particularly in health, agriculture and food security, whereas the latter largely focuses on projects 
with Africa (USAID 2010a, 2). This ambition is further confirmed in 2012, when it was stated 
more precisely that feasibility studies on programs and projects should be undertaken for “joint 
development projects in third countries” in the “field of agriculture, health, and human re-
sources” (Office of the spokesperson 04.05.2012, 2).  
The factsheet from 2010 envisioned agricultural projects in Liberia, Tanzania and Sudan, but 
those projects are never spoken of again (USAID 2010a, 2). Projects that actually appear regu-
larly in U.S. publications are those envisioned with China in East Timor and Afghanistan. The 
very first project of trilateral cooperation between USAID and China in East Timor was “in-
tended to improve the production of income-generating crops to enhance food security and 
nutrition” (USDS 2014f, 1). The motivation for the United States behind this cooperation was 
to “advance mutual interests in development policy and to strengthen cooperation in partner 
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countries” (USDS 2014f, 1). Moreover, the publication stressed that China was very eager to 
continue the project with the U.S. (USDS 2014f, 1).  
In Afghanistan, China and the U.S. agreed to cooperate in 2013 and confirmed this pledge in 
consecutive years (Office of the spokesperson 12.07.2013, 3). In 2015, the USA pledged to 
“promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, China and Afghanistan” (Office of the 
spokesperson 24.06.2015, 3). This dialogue should entail a joint diplomatic training programme 
for Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and to launch new joint training programmes 
for Afghan medical workers and veterinary technicians (Office of the spokesperson 24.06.2015, 
3).  
Based on the experiences of these two projects, the two sides have recently taken decisions to 
further improve their collaboration on development issues. As such, a press release in 2013 and 
2015 confirmed that new projects in these two countries “or others” were planned (Office of 
the spokesperson 12.07.2013, 4, 24.06.2015, 4). Moreover, in 2015, a Memorandum of Under-
standing was signed between the governments of China and the United States to create a mech-
anism intended to help “share progress on joint projects, summarise best practices and lessons 
learned, and discuss new opportunities for cooperation”. Therefore, after a hesitant beginning, 
the U.S. seems to be reaching out to China in order to create moderate shared development 
projects, despite their rather negative perception of Chinese aid activities that the previous two 
chapters elaborated upon. Nevertheless, compared to the narratives regarding trilateral projects 
with Brazil or South Africa, the enthusiasm to collaborate with China is much less perceptible.  
A similar apprehension can be shown towards trilateral cooperation projects with India. The 
first tentative start to trilateral cooperation with India was undertaken only in 2010. This was 
later than for South Africa and Brazil, but remains at the beginning similarly vague to that with 
China. In 2010, an agreement was signed between Prime Minster Singh and President Obama 
(U.S. Government 2013, 5). India is mentioned as a “strategic partner” for the Feed the Future 
initiative. The combined efforts of both countries should supposedly lead to the replication and 
advancement of “innovative solutions to address food security challenges in India and Africa” 
(USDS 2011b, 632; confirmed in USDS 2015d, 26). Equally vague concessions are made in 2012 
with projects that work at reducing poverty in “India and globally” (USDS 2012b, 659). The 
country development cooperation strategy with India aimed to “share Indian development in-
novations proven in India in third countries” (USAID 2012b, 30; similar commitment in USDS 
2013b, 567; and USDS 2014b, 652, 2015b, 274). A statement from a Senior Administration 
Official states that it is likely to see certain countries “like India, moving from assistance to 
trilateral cooperation”, also claiming that the cooperation within the Feed the Future initiative 
in the direction of trilateral cooperation has already started (USDS 2011a, 5).  
A first strategy for implanting this relationship is planned in Afghanistan where the “trilateral 
discussions […] help advance our economic, political, and security objectives” (Desai Biswal 
16.07.2014, 3; also mentioned in USAID 2012b, 9). Moreover, there are several statements of 
collaboration with India on the promotion of the role of women in Afghanistan (USDS 2014g, 
1). Initiatives are not limited to the Asian continent, however, but are thought to extend to 
Africa as well. Candidates for a tentative start of the “triangular partnership” are Liberia, Malawi 
and Kenya where people should be “trained at Indian agricultural institutions” (USDS 2013e, 
50–51; USAID 2012b, 9; confirmed in Rollins 30.04.2014, 2). Moreover, India is seen as a val-
uable partner in fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS in “various African countries” (USAID 
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2012b, 9). Areas in which India is thought to have some kind of leadership are health, food 
security, disaster management and women’s empowerment (USDS 2014g, 1). Nevertheless, 
compared to the other three emerging partners, trilateral initiatives with India remain vague and 
start relatively late. The very broad general idea of needing to cooperate more with emerging 
donors and to socialise them influenced the narrative presented here significantly. The most 
attention is paid to Brazil and South Africa, and an increasing interest is shown in trilateral 
projects with China in the narrative. Generally, after 2009 we can see a growing interest for the 
form of trilateral projects, with a steady increase since then that leads up to today. The following 
section investigates whether this general narrative has been transferred into actual projects.  
7.1.2 U.S. rules and practices on trilateral cooperation 
The rules are to be found in the diverse memoranda of understanding between the United States 
and the various emerging donors: with Brazil they signed a first MOU in 2007 in the field of 
promoting biofuels (U.S. Government 2007), while the MOU of 2011 institutionalised a staff 
exchange between USAID and ABC (USAID 2011b, 2). The cooperation with India was sealed 
with an agreement between Prime Minster Singh and President Obama and through the country 
development cooperation strategy of 2012 (USAID 2012b). In the case of South Africa, coop-
eration has been regulated through the country development cooperation strategy since 2013 
(USAID 2013a). For the cooperation with China, a MOU was signed in 2015 (USAID 2015b). 
All these legal texts indicate that a change has taken place with respect to cooperation between 
the United States and emerging powers within the rules, a change which mirrors the increasing 
emphasis put on trilateral cooperation in the narratives. The next sections elaborate on the 
question of whether these changes also result in higher amounts of funding being dedicated to 
trilateral projects.  
The OECD conducted two surveys in which they interviewed stakeholders on their perception 
of trilateral cooperation. In 2012, the United States appeared as one of the traditional donors 
alongside the United Kingdom and others (such as Germany, Japan, etc.). In 2012, the U.S. 
reported between 10 and 50 trilateral cooperation activities, in the category just above the United 
Kingdom that reported 1 to 10 trilateral cooperation initiatives, whereas Norway is not men-
tioned at all (Yamashiro Fordelone and Soule-Kohndou 2012, 20). Nevertheless, the picture 
looks very different in the 2015 survey, where the United States and the United Kingdom are 
not mentioned among the biggest providers of trilateral projects whereas Norway is mentioned 
(OECD February 2016).  
The track record of the United States within trilateral cooperation is therefore not very clear. 
This might be due to the unspecific nature of U.S. funds reporting, in which no separate trilateral 
projects can be identified. Nevertheless, when project names are known, individual figures can 
be found within the money that is disbursed directly to the recipient. This was undertaken wher-
ever possible. First of all, the figures seem to confirm the strong interest that the United States 
has in cooperating in trilateral projects with Brazil and South Africa.  
In 2007, the U.S. signed the first two memoranda with Brazil regarding trilateral projects. The 
first concerned an advancement of their cooperation on biofuels, where it is clearly stated that 
“the participants intend to work jointly to bring the benefits of biofuels to select third countries” 
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beginning with Central American and Caribbean countries (U.S. Government 2007). The coun-
tries are however not specified in the memorandum. When looking at U.S. aid statistics, only 
small amounts have been spent on biofuels in the regions concerned (for instance USD 100 
thousand on biofuels development projects in Latin America and Caribbean region in 2009, 
USD 170 thousand in 2011 for biofuels outreach were disposed to Brazil directly, increasing 
amounts for biofuels throughout the world of USD 345 thousand in 2012 and USD 535 thou-
sand in 2013, and nearly USD 900 thousand in 2014 (USAID 2015a)). In total, this amounts to 
USD 2.5 million, but we cannot be certain that all of these funds were distributed to third coun-
tries (among which Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay and Lusophone African countries, USDS 2012h, 
1).  
A more confined cooperation project is the second trilateral cooperation with Guinea Bissau. 
In a 2007 speech in Brazil, Condoleezza Rice mentioned that a Memorandum of Understanding 
is formulated between the United States, Brazil and Guinea Bissau to form a cooperation be-
tween “the most powerful country in the world, one of the biggest development countries in 
the world to help one of the poorest and smallest countries in the world” (Rice 30.03.2007, 1). 
Nevertheless, if one looks at the fine print of the memorandum establishing this trilateral coop-
eration it soon becomes clear that no additional funds will be disbursed for the project as it is 
stated that “this Memorandum does not bind any of the Governments to provide funds, the 
provision of which will be subject to the domestic requirements of the contributing Govern-
ment” (U.S. Government 30.03.2007, 1). Moreover, it states that the United States (and Brazil) 
have both already made grants available to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) “to develop 
a project for strengthening legislative capacity in Guinea-Bissau” (U.S. Government 30.03.2007, 
1). These funds amount to USD 4.5 million that were disbursed to Guinea-Bissau from 2006 
till 2008 (USAID 2015a). The memorandum states that the cooperation will cease when the 
pilot project (of coordinating funds to achieve a similar goal, namely strengthening legal capac-
ity) is over, so it is not surprising that no new funds have been allocated to the trilateral coop-
eration in Guinea-Bissau since (U.S. Government 30.03.2007, 3).   
A more general Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the governments of Brazil 
and the United States on the 3rd of March in 2010 regarding the implementation of technical 
cooperation in third countries (U.S. Government 2010a; USDS 2012h). The cooperation is sup-
posed to take place in “selected beneficiary countries, primarily but not restricted to African 
countries and Haiti” (U.S. Government 2010a).  
This general memorandum triggered cooperation on many projects, starting with the piloted 
trilateral food security cooperation in Mozambique (USDS 2013e, 50). Two years later, in 2012, 
a congressional budget justification claimed that projects in Mozambique are still “in early stages 
of implementation” and that monitoring is necessary to evaluate whether these are fruitful or 
not (USDS 2012b, 754). Nevertheless, initial (though modest) funds were distributed to Brazil 
in 2011 specifically for the trilateral cooperation project (USAID 2015a). In practice, the pro-
gramme aims to transport Brazilian experiences in the agricultural sector to Mozambique, in 
particular crop management practices and the nutrition of school children through the National 
School Food Programme (USAID 2015d, 1–2). The project has expanded its reach considerably 
over the years, spending up to USD 2.8 million from 2011 till 2014. Moreover, even though 
figures are still incomplete for the year 2015, a significant increase can already be reported as in 
2015 alone USD 2.6 million were allocated to the project (USAID 2015a). The proclaimed in-
crease that President Obama made public during a visit in 2015 in Brazil seems to have been 
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implemented in practice (USAID 01.07.2016, 1). Moreover, the United States supports a health 
related project fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique. In 2014, USD 540 thousand 
were spent for that purpose (USAID 2015a).  
Projects in Honduras and Haiti followed in 2012 (USDS 2013e, 50–51). Similar to the projects 
in Mozambique, the focus here is on improving agricultural productivity and food security 
(USAID 2015d, 1–2; Tindell 06.03.2013, 1). In Haiti, a total of USD 1.3 million have been spent 
on improving agriculture since 2015 in trilateral efforts (note that figures are still incomplete, 
USAID 2015a, code 130234). The purpose of this money is largely to enhance the country’s 
capacity in research and development in order to further the Ministry of Agriculture’s ability to 
improve planting material, to increase agricultural production and improve nutrition (USAID 
2015d, 1–2). The United States also has trilateral projects with Brazil in Haiti to fight child 
labour through the promotion of job creation within an incentive between the U.S. and Brazil 
on decent work (USDS and USAID 2009b, 48; USDS 2012d, 403). This builds upon a memo-
randum of understanding from 2011 (U.S. Government 2011). These funds were channelled 
through the International Labour Organisation. In 2011, the State Department distributed USD 
990 thousand to the ILO for a project in Haiti to agency of democracy, human rights, and labour 
(USAID 2015a).  
A legal document established in 2012 activities of trilateral cooperation between the two gov-
ernments and that of Honduras (USAID 2012c, 2). Areas of cooperation that were envisioned 
included improving agricultural competitiveness, nutrition, health and renewable energy 
(USAID 2012c, 2, 2015d, 1–2). Similar to the trilateral initiatives in Mozambique and Haiti, 
these projects intended to improve agricultural productivity and aim at the better utilization of 
available technology, increasing crops resistance (USAID 2015d, 1–2). For Honduras, no clear 
traces of trilateral projects can be found in the statistics. Since 2012, about USD 600 thousand 
were spent on the same account (USAID 2015a). It is unclear however, if this is in connection 
with a trilateral project with Brazil or simply a bilateral project of the United States.  
Furthermore, in 2014, the U.S. pledged to provide USD 2 million to the government of Hon-
duras to implement Brazilian projects on renewable energy (USDS 2014b, 676). In 2015, USD 
300 thousand have been spent so far (but reporting is not completed yet). Similarly, the U.S. 
pledged to spend USD 1.2 million in 2016 to the same cause (USDS 2015b, 425). These projects 
aim to facilitate the access to renewable energy for the poor, making, for instance, solar dryers 
accessible (USAID 2015d, 1–2). The projects to improve the health of women and children 
largely aim to introduce eco-stoves, in order to avoid death through open-fire stoves. The new 
stoves also supposedly increase the quality of the air (USAID 2015d, 1–2). No detailed funding 
on this initiative could be found. 
Other projects that are more targeted between the United States and Brazil concern the envi-
ronment and conservation of Peru’s forest (through the Peru forest sector initiative) (USDS 
2012h, 1). The project started in 2011 and is supposed to run until 2016. The United States has 
distributed over USD 10.5 million to the Amazon Forest Sector Initiative to Peru in 2013 and 
2014 (USAID 2015a). Once again, however, it is unclear how much of this is really spent on 
trilateral projects.  
Moreover, there is a one-year counternarcotic pilot programme in Bolivia which began in Janu-
ary 2012 and aimed at “improve[ing] Bolivia’s ability to measure excess coca cultivation and 
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verify progress in meeting coca eradication targets” (USDS 2012h, 1). A total of USD 2 thou-
sand was spent in 2012 on counternarcotic programmes in Bolivia and on further funding added 
in 2013, which suggests that the project never went beyond the kick-off phase.  
Generally, the narrative of a close relationship with Brazil in terms of trilateral projects is con-
firmed through the practices, as many projects have been funded quite considerably (look at the 
table at the end of this section for an overview). Strictly trilateral cooperation projects with 
Brazil amount to a limited USD 8.3 up to 9.3 million. The following table recaps the projects 
and recipients (third partner country). Note that the figures in brackets indicate that not all funds 
might have been used for trilateral projects. All figures are in U.S. dollars.  
  Table 7-1: Trilateral projects between the United States and Brazil 
Third partner country Targeted area Amount spent (in USD) Years of cooperation  
Mozambique Agriculture/ Food security  2.8 million 2011-ongoing 
Health/ AIDS prevention 540 thousand 2014-ongoing 
Honduras Agriculture/ Food security (600 thousand) 
 
2013-ongoing 
Renewable energy 300 thousand 
(pledge 3.2 million) 
2014-ongoing 
Haiti Agriculture/ Food security 1.3 million 2013-ongoing 
Child Labour 
(through ILO) 
990 thousand 2011 
Worldwide Promoting biofuels (2.5 million) 2009-ongoing 
Guinea-Bissau Strengthening legislative capac-
ity 
4.5 million 2006-2008 
Peru Forest Service Initiative (forest 
conservation) 
(10.5 million),  
 
2013-ongoing 
Bolivia Counternarcotics (coca) 2 thousand 2012 
                                                                                                         Source: Own compilation based on figures from U.S. statistic and USAID dashboard 
Within the narrative, the United States envisioned almost as many trilateral projects with South 
Africa as with Brazil. How many of these can actually be put into concrete figures? A 2013 
factsheet on trilateral cooperation claimed that USAID has provided USD 7 million “to support 
South Africa as a regional leader in advancing African economic and social development” 
(USAID 2013b). Several of the initiatives are mentioned; for instance, to improve the adjudica-
tion of gender-based violence in Malawi and Angola, or to address food security issues in 
Mozambique.136 However, the same initiatives were mentioned on the USAID website in 2015, 
                                                 
136 Other initiatives intend to provide help for constitutional development in South Sudan, to build the capacity of 
SADC to respond to climate change, to assess human health risks in transboundary water catchment areas in 
southern Africa and piloting conservation agriculture through a livestock grazing project in Zimbabwe. All are 
discussed further below in detail.  
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where it is stated that only USD 4 million was spent between September 2009 and September 
2013, especially for mitigating conflicts and stabilizing the region (USAID 2015e, 1). The list of 
projects is identical to the one that mentions USD 7 million. In 2013, it was claimed that USD 
1.7 million was used to “enhance South Africa’s capacity to address regional peace and security 
challenges” (USDS 2013b, 148–49). As no clearly identifiable traces of trilateral cooperation 
between the United States and South Africa can be found, the following paragraphs look at the 
funds that were disbursed for projects that match the description, arguing that it is likely that 
part of the funds were funnelled through trilateral projects.  
Starting with the last project – a livestock grazing initiative in Zimbabwe – the United States 
funded a project called “Building livelihoods and food security through interventions in the 
livestock and dairy value chains” in Zimbabwe from 2010 until 2014 and spent USD 5.8 million 
in total. A further USD 2.4 million was spent on conservation partnerships in the Southern 
Africa region. It is impossible to say how much of these funds were used for the collaboration 
with South Africa.  
Indicative of the project assessing health risks in transboundary water catchment areas in south-
ern Africa might be the amount spent by USAID on the Southern Africa Regional Environ-
mental Program (SAREP). In total, USD 8.7 million were distributed to multilateral channels 
for water supply and sanitation within SAREP from 2011 until 2014 and USD 363 thousand 
through channels of South Africa directly in 2014 (USAID 2015a).  
The United States pledged to help the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to 
build its climate change capacity. A regional fund was allocated with USD 550 thousand in 2012 
to build SADC capacity (USAID 2015a).137  
South Sudan received considerable funding from the United States to develop its constitution 
and to support a democratic development. It is unclear which of the projects is tied to South 
Africa, however. Nevertheless, the details that might involve trilateral projects are: South Sudan 
received funding in 2013 and 2014 for about USD 50 million to strengthen its democratic po-
tential. The amount spent on the trilateral cooperation will be a very small portion of this.138  
The collaboration with South Africa in Sudan is also hard to locate. While civil servant training 
has certainly taken place within the BRIDGE initiative in Sudan in 2010, the amount of that 
initiative with USD 15.6 million gives us no indication on the actual amount spent on trilateral 
cooperation with South Africa. On the contrary, it is likely that cooperation was dropped in 
favour of a closer collaboration with South Africa in South Sudan (USAID 2015a).  
                                                 
137 Another USD 1 million was spent in 2014 on SADC, however in the field of building its capacity in the imple-
mentation of the trafficking in persons protocol which was not subject to the trilateral project (USAID 2015a).  
138 Note that the following programmes have been taken into account for the overall figure: the South Sudan Civic 
Participation Project (in total USD 9.8 million), the programme on Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic 
Governance in South Sudan (USD 9.1 million), the programme on Systems to Uphold the Credibility and Consti-
tutionality of Elections in South Sudan (SUCCESS) (in total 3.8 million), the Project on Good Governance in the 
Republic of South Sudan (PROGRESS) with a total of USD 15.2 million and the Building Responsibility for the 
Delivery of Government Services (BRIDGE) with USD 11.4 million). All figures taken from US statistics, aid 
dashboard (USAID 2015a).   
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The United States pledged to support projects to fight gender-based violence in Angola and 
Malawi. The only project that remotely addresses issues of gender-based violence in Malawi is 
an initiative funded through the African Development Foundation, a U.S. NGO. This NGO 
received funds from 2009 until 2013 to the total of USD 1.3 million and cooperated with the 
local National Association of Business Women. It is even more difficult to find U.S. spending 
on gender-related violence in Angola. The only project that was found for the indicated period 
amounts to USD 25 thousand in 2011 to provide gender-based victims in the Norte province 
with assistance. The funds were disbursed through the state department as an emergency relief. 
It is unlikely that this project was what the U.S. government had in mind when it talked about 
trilateral projects with South Africa (USAID 2015a).   
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the U.S. claimed to have collaborated with South Africa 
in the sector of improving local governance. There is indeed a programme called local govern-
ment and decentralization which received about USD 4.6 million between 2008 and 2012. 
Whether or not this project has been undertaken in cooperation with South Africa remains 
unknown, but as it targets a very similar sector, it is likely.   
Finally, regarding the initiatives in improving food security in Mozambique, the only amounts 
that could be found were regional funding to Southern Africa on a project to “enhance African 
capacity to achieve regional food security”. A total of USD 268 thousand were allocated to this 
project in 2009. Another initiative which is implemented throughout the world and specifically 
targets food security in Mozambique is the programme on local and regional food aid procure-
ment pilot project, which received USD 817 thousand in 2012. Mozambique also received fur-
ther funds for food security, such as USD 62 million within the food for progress project since 
2009 and USD 10.7 million as food security assistance over the same period. Other than this, 
the government of South Africa received regular funding of food security programmes, under 
the umbrella of food security assistance. Since 2009 (and until 2014), a total of USD 1.9 million 
were allocated to this. Moreover, a further USD 4.3 million was disbursed from 2009 till 2014 
on improving the agricultural sector within South Africa under the “farmer-to-farmer” project. 
There is, however, no indication if and to what extent these funds have been used on trilateral 
projects in Mozambique. The question remains if any of these funds were involved in trilateral 
financing at all. Generally, even though it is hard to find direct evidence of trilateral projects 
with South Africa, most of the mentioned projects receive some kind of funding from the 
United States even though it is unclear which amount is spent on trilateral initiatives. Generally, 
the above numbers suggest that it is likely that the amount lies somewhere in between the 
claimed USD 4 and 7 million for the overall period (USAID 2015a).139 The following table re-
caps the above mentioned projects and amounts.  
  
                                                 
139 Note that within the table, the initiatives mentioned by the publications assessing US contribution to either 
USD 4 or 7 million are marked with a *.  
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 Table 7-2: Trilateral projects between the United States and South Africa 




Republic of Congo Improve local governance (4.6 million) 2008-2012 
Sudan Civil servant training (15.6 million) FY 2010 
Malawi Improving the adjudication of 
gender based violence* 
(1.3 million) 2009-2013 
Angola Improving the adjudication of 
gender based violence* 
(25 thousand) 2011 






Mozambique Addressing food security is-
sues* 
(7.3 million) 2009-20148700 
SADC Building capacity to respond to 
climate change* 
550 thousand 2012 
Regional Health (water management in 
Southern Africa)* 
(9.1 million) 2011-2014 
Zimbabwe Conservation livestock* (8.2 million) 2009-2013 
                                                                                               Source: Own compilation based on figures from U.S. statistic and USAID dashboard 
The narrative with China suggested a significant reluctance at the beginning of the observed 
period but an increasing interest in trilateral projects at the end of 2014. This recent interest is 
not yet evident in actual projects.140 Of the two projects that were mentioned in the narrative, 
evidence of cooperation could only be found for the case of Timor-Leste. The project with 
Timor-Leste started in 2010 and ended in February 2015. The whole project on improving ag-
ricultural productivity in East Timor amounted to USD 8.3 million in the five-year period, spent 
rather regularly over the years (USAID 2016a, 1–2). From the USD 8.3 million, USD 1.6 million 
was spent on agricultural development, the rest on business support services and information 
(USAID 2015a). It is likely that the USA would use the funds for agricultural development for 
improving food security which is the main aspect of the trilateral project with China. How much 
of those USD 1.6 million was truly spent on initiating trilateral cooperation with Chinese coun-
terparts remains, however, unknown. The only clear figure that the United States themselves 
provide is that 52 farmers participated in a project to improve agriculture, and that those farmers 
“are seeing the benefits of modern farming techniques (USDS 2014f, 1). Figures on the collab-
oration with China in Afghanistan could not be found. The following table illustrates the initi-
atives and amounts.  
                                                 
140 Similarly, a report from the OECD DAC refers to trilateral projects between the United States and Brazil, India 
and South Africa but does not mention any projects with China (Yamashiro Fordelone and Soule-Kohndou 2013, 
17). 
Changes in trilateral cooperation?│181 
 
 Table 7-3: Trilateral projects between the United States and China 




Timor-Leste Agricultural productivity   (1.6 million) 2010-ongoing 
Afghanistan Education of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; health project 
No figures found 2013-ongoing 
           Source: Own compilation, based on figures from U.S. statistics and USAID dashboard 
With respect to co-operation with India, the narrative was slightly more positive than towards 
China. The cooperation with India is indeed on a similar level to that with Brazil, amounting to 
a total of USD 10.9 million. In 2013, USD 3 million was pledged to “sharing proven Indian 
agriculture development innovations with other countries as part of the […] Feed the Future 
initiative” (USDS 2013b, 556). The main focus lies on transferring “innovative agriculture prod-
ucts or technologies” (USDS 2013b, 556; confirmed in USDS 2015b, 26). From the website of 
USAID, it becomes clear that this project encompasses the training of personnel from three 
pilot countries in Africa: Kenya, Malawi and Liberia. The funds were disbursed to the National 
Institute of Agricultural Extension Management in Hyderabad where the training of 219 Afri-
cans took place. A modest amount of USD 680 thousand were distributed in 2013 and 2014. In 
2014, USD 21 thousand were also disbursed to the same institution in Malawi. Another USD 
860 thousand were disbursed in 2015, indicating the funding is likely to increase as it is pledged 
that the project now enters into phase two where agricultural practitioners from 17 Asian and 
African countries will be trained (USAID 2015a, 2016b, 1). Nevertheless, this total of USD 700 
thousand remains far below the pledged USD 3 million. 
The following initiative is also considered to fall within the FTF initiative; the agriculture inno-
vation partnership program, which coordinates the collaboration between American universi-
ties141 and three Indian universities142 in order to adopt “an innovative agricultural education 
curriculum, develop extension management training programs and launch research initiatives” 
(USAID 2016b, 1). According to the U.S. website, this project led to the development of a 
successful curriculum that is now implemented at the Agriculture and Forestry University in 
Nepal and the Liongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources in Malawi. Funds for 
this project were distributed from USAID to Cornell University and amount to USD 5.5 million 
(for projects in India) and USD 4000 (for projects directly in Malawi) from 2011 to 2014. In 
2015, a further USD 500 thousand (to India) and USD 470 thousand to Malawi were allocated 
(USAID 2015a).143  
                                                 
141 Mostly Cornell University, but also Ohio States University, Tuskegee University, the University of California, 
Davis, the University of Georgia, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; for more information on 
the project, see Cornell Website or USAID on AIP 
142 Assam Agricultural University, Jorhat; Institute of Agricultural Sciences at Banaras Hindu University and Vara-
nasi and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel University of Agriculture and Technology in Meerut.  
143 Note that since 2014, funds amounting to USD 1.5 million have been added to the initiative and are channelled 
through the Ashwattha Advisors Private Limited as well as through USAID channels.  
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Another fund that could possibly be used for trilateral projects is the Partnership for Innovation 
and Knowledge in Agriculture (PIKA) – an initiative that intends to link smallholder famer 
organisation to major regional markets. India received USD 1.4 million from 2009 until 2014.  
Also in the field of promoting agricultural productivity is the Cereal System Initiative for South 
Asia (CSISA). This initiative began in 2009 and is co-founded with the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. Following the USAID website, this project aimed at transferring successfully tested 
Indian technologies to Nepal and Bangladesh. No traces of this project could be found in 
USAID statistics.  
While it is surprising that there are no figures on a project that was supposed to start in 2009, it 
is not surprising that no figures are yet available on the recent initiative on India-Kenya Dairy 
Innovation Bridge Programme (IKDIBP) which began in January 2015 and aims at transporting 
the best feed and fodder management from India to Kenya.  
Two trilateral initiatives are aimed specifically at women. The first project aims to enhance the 
role of women in clean energy products and technologies (through the wPOWER project – Part-
nership on Women’s Entrepreneurship in Clean Energy). India received funds amounting to NGO USD 
567 thousand in 2013 and 2014 through the Swayam Shikshan Prayog, while East Africa re-
ceived USD 811 thousand in the same period (USAID 2015a). The second project looks at the 
role of women in Afghanistan. In 2014, a factsheet pledged USD 1.5 million to a project with 
SEWA, an Indian NGO of Self-Employed Women’s Association to mobilise Indian knowledge 
towards Afghan women (USDS 2014g, 1). The programme started in 2011144 and was supposed 
to end in July 2014. Since then, a total of USD 1 million has been spent. Though the official 
project has ended, the Indian NGO continues to receive funds and implements projects in Af-
ghanistan (it has received USD 300 thousand since the end of the project) (USAID 2015a). The 
amount given thus remains somewhat lower than the pledge.  
Another regional initiative aims at integrating energy in order to reduce carbon emissions. The 
South Asia Regional Initiative for Energy Integration (SARI/EI) has existed since 2000. 
Through this initiative, India has received USD 1 million since 2013 and the project is ongoing. 
It aims at accomplishing a strong integration between India and Sri Lanka.  
Generally, the attempts to form initiatives with India have grown in recent years (since 2013) 
and efforts are ongoing to maintain the initial projects. The following table summarises the 
projects between the United States and emerging donors, states where the projects are taking 
place (third partner country), gives indications on what area of cooperation is envisioned and (if 
available) accounts for the figures and the years of cooperation. Note that the figures in brackets 
indicate that not all funds have necessarily been used for trilateral projects. All figures are in 





                                                 
144 As a phase II programme to the Afghan Women’s Empowerment Program.  
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 Table 7-4: Trilateral projects between the United States and India 




Unspecified PIKA, promoting Indian 
knowledge 
(1.4 million) 2009-2012 
Nepal, Malawi Agriculture Innovation Partner-
ship Programme 
5.5million 2011-ongoing 
Afghanistan Afghan Women’s Empower-
ment Programme 
1 million 2011-ongoing 
 
Kenya, Malawi, Liberia Spread Indian agriculture devel-
opment innovations through 





Five African countries wPOWER, women and clean 
energy 
1.4 million 2013-ongoing 
South Asia, especially Sri Lanka South Asia Regional Initiative for 
Energy Integration 
1 million  2013-ongoing 
Source: Own compilation based on (largely from U.S. statistics, U.S. dashboard, see in text for details; note that figures in 
brackets, it is unclear how much of the money was disbursed towards trilateral endeavours) 
The account of the practices indicates that the United States has recently intensified its efforts 
to engage in trilateral projects. Moreover, the USA seem to be more willing to cooperate in 
projects with like-minded countries, such as Brazil, South Africa, and recently with India. The 
projects with China are still very limited. Generally, the amount spent on trilateral cooperation 
is far from extensive, especially if compared to the overall amount that the United States spends 
on development cooperation.  
Overall, the idea of collaborating with like-minded countries has strongly influenced the narra-
tives, some of the rules and has been extended to include China. The cooperation started rela-
tively late in comparison to the other two donors. The slightly tentative start is compensated 
through the increasing amounts that the United States has poured into trilateral cooperation in 
recent years. Moreover, the idea of cooperating with like-minded countries seems to have been 
extended to include China as well. This, in turn, can be explained by the idea of needing to 
socialise emerging donors, especially China, to Western, American values.  Nevertheless, this 
idea seems to be less prominent than the notion of the U.S. increasing its cooperation with like-
minded countries. The low level of funding might be explained by the fact that China is not 
considered a like-minded country and therefore did not benefit from the initial increase in fund-
ing in trilateral projects.  
7.2 Norway  
Unlike the other two donors presented here, Norway did not express the hope of being able to 
socialise emerging donors to their own standards. On the other hand, similar to the United 
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Kingdom and the United States, Norway did accept that an increased cooperation with emerg-
ing donors is necessary. In opposition to the U.S. and the UK, it envisioned this increased co-
operation mainly within multilateral international institutions rather than with its own means.  
7.2.1 Narrative on trilateral cooperation 
The previous two chapters have shown that Norway is influenced by emerging donors. Their 
perception is characterised by a mixture of fear and opportunism. Within the narrative, the 
support for a stronger selective approach (especially including political conditions) was coupled 
with the intention to strengthen recipients’ ownership, while Norwegian practices showed only 
mixed results. The narrative on trilateral cooperation directly relates to the first challenge that 
Norway identified regarding emerging donors: the need for greater cooperation with them 
within multilateral institutions in order to avoid a rival world order. What is Norway’s position 
towards trilateral cooperation? And has this position changed considerably over the last ten 
years?  
Fields for trilateral cooperation  
Compared to the other two donors presented here, Norway generally has a positive but very 
cautious attitude towards trilateral cooperation. Overall, trilateral cooperation did not play a 
decisive role in Norway over the observed period. Moreover, as in the case of the United States, 
Norway does not have a strategy or concept regarding how it wants to engage in trilateral pro-
jects with emerging donors. Nevertheless, the country envisions some projects over the years in 
trilateral cooperation that involve sectors in which Norway considers itself to be an expert (see 
chapter 4 for details on Norwegian development policies). The following list of projects is 
chronological, as triangular cooperation is only mentioned in passing when discussing the link 
between aid and other important fields of cooperation. The chronological overview also enables 
us to identify potential changes in the intensity of the official narrative.  
The first mention of support for South-South cooperation comes in 2004, where Norway stated 
that it can be beneficial to support South-South trade through development measures because 
it might facilitate access to whole regions and foster development processes faster (NMFA 2004, 
49). Especially India, Korea and South Africa are mentioned as now entering such agreements 
with Norway. The promotion of South-South trade is invoked again in 2007 because, it is ar-
gued, this would “lead to more sustainable trade development” through the “breaking-up of the 
North-South trade” (NMFA 2007a, 11).  
Another area where trilateral cooperation is seen as promoting competence-building and as fa-
cilitating South-South cooperation is in the field of cultural cooperation, which is regarded as 
“resource intensive, especially in terms of personnel” (NMFA 2005b, 31). Norad accords itself 
the task of stressing the importance of culture for development efforts, to provide technical 
advice on cultural development efforts and on evaluation. The white paper on cultural relations 
states that the “diversity of new actors and the growing activity in the sector” calls for a closer 
cooperation, involving local embassies (NMFA 2005b, 31). Trilateral cooperation is seen in this 
field to lower costs for Norway as well as for recipient countries.  
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A paper from 2007 mentions trilateral cooperation as a form of cooperation that could be ben-
eficial when dealing with humanitarian issues. The cooperation with emerging countries is seen 
positively because it can foster the exchange of experience “with a view of promoting the dis-
semination of knowledge at regional level” (NMFA 2007c, 6). As an example, the paper men-
tions countries such as “China, Bangladesh, Cuba and Vietnam” which are considered to “have 
important knowledge and experience of risk reduction in relation to natural disasters that could 
benefit others” (NMFA 2007c, 6). Moreover, trilateral cooperation is seen as beneficial in the 
early reconstruction phase as countries that have themselves emerged from conflict can share 
their experiences with others (NMFA 2007c, 54). The Norwegian government therefore decided 
to “give priority to partnerships with China, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cuba on South-South 
cooperation and cooperation with Norwegian centres of expertise on risk reduction and emer-
gency response” (NMFA 2007c, 55). The experiences of emerging countries seem to be the key 
for engaging in trilateral cooperation here.  
There is a slight increase within the usage of the terminology of trilateral cooperation from 2010 
onwards. In 2010, a publication on the Oil for Development Initiative referenced increasing support 
for South-South cooperation, especially for the exchange of knowledge on anti-corruption, spe-
cial issues surrounding the petroleum sector (data and environmental management, legal frame-
work), and on good governance, issues that were of primary importance in the narrative for the 
OfD programme (Norad 2011c, 7).  
In the environmental field, Norway is conscious of the impact of emerging countries (NMFA 
2011b, 20). It has therefore formalised bilateral agreements on environmental issues with Brazil, 
South Africa, China and India (NMFA 2011b, 21). The impact of emerging countries is however 
also felt “increasingly through development-oriented South-South cooperation” (NMFA 2011b, 
20). Norway sees a distinct role for itself in this field, separate from the European Union and 
the United States, because their experience on the delicate relationship between environment, 
economic growth and development is valued, especially in China, but increasingly in Brazil and 
India as well. This cooperation remains in 2011 however largely bilateral in nature but is seen as 
a priority (NMFA 2011b, 37). The implementation of trilateral projects regarding environmental 
protection are only in evidence with Brazil (see below) (NMFA 2011b, 21).  
A 2012 paper on the UN stated that Norway supports the UN’s efforts to facilitate South-South 
and triangular cooperation and that the Norwegian government “considers that the UN should 
engage in dialogue with new actors” (NMFA 2012a, 62) in order to ensure that South-South 
cooperation does not bypass the UN (NMFA 2012a, 19). Norway pledges to “ensure that the 
UN plays a more prominent role in facilitating partnerships between member states, for example 
South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation” (NMFA 2012a, 83). The importance at-
tached to the United Nations shows again how Norway relies on international institutions and 
is the clearest manifestation of the idea that emerging donors need to be better integrated into 
existing multilateral structures.  
Another sector where Norway claims to be promoting triangular cooperation or fostering 
South-South cooperation is the field of sharing the experience of distributive and welfare poli-
cies (NMFA 2013b, 29). Norway sees this to be an area where it has special expertise:  
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“Together with the other countries in our Nordic-Baltic constituency, Norway is a natu-
ral dialogue partner for the banks on tax-related matters, including the taxation of natu-
ral resources. Lessons can be learnt from our own social model, but it will be even more 
important to contribute to South-South learning and to the banks communicating best 
practice in discussions about distribution” (NMFA 2013b, 87).  
The Norwegian government further pledges to “promote […] South-South cooperation be-
tween national and regional social partners in the global South” (NMFA 2013b, 57). It also 
refers to the “experiences from Latin American countries, among others” that could “be of 
interest to more development countries” (NMFA 2013b, 27). The government therefore aims 
to “finance South-South cooperation on the exchange of experience of distribution and welfare 
policies” (NMFA 2013b, 27).  
Finally, in 2014, the government made a statement about the benefits of trilateral cooperation 
in peace-building initiatives, expanding upon its decisions from 2007 on humanitarian issues. 
Norway stated that it would be advantageous to create “new alliances among Northern and 
Southern/emerging power donors and political dialogue between internal and external actors” 
because these could “facilitate the construction of more effective peace-building policies” 
(NMFA 01.10.2014, 1). Projects in the field of peace-building should “involve translation of 
research from both Northern and Southern/ emerging powers into practical policy recommen-
dations” that should be implemented in decision-making centres (NMFA 01.10.2014, 1).  
Generally, the benefits of trilateral cooperation that Norway perceives are that it can save costs 
and it can lead to more effective development cooperation mainly through the sharing of expe-
riences and knowledge (from emerging donors but also from Norway itself). Moreover, Norway 
claims that trilateral cooperation can help to integrate South-South cooperation into the inter-
national arena instead of bypassing traditional and multilateral donors. However, there is no 
overall policy or concept regarding trilateral cooperation in the narrative. While it is mentioned 
more and more frequently towards the end of the period (from 2010 onwards), the support 
behind it remains relatively vague rather than it being a concrete policy direction, and it is less 
emphasised than by the United States.  
Narrative on trilateral cooperation with specific emerging donors 
Other than envisioning general trilateral projects with emerging powers, the Norwegian govern-
ment has specific strategies for all four emerging countries. At least within the narrative, the 
efforts to lure China and Brazil into a trilateral cooperation are more considerable than an en-
gagement with South Africa or India – which distinguishes Norway from the United States, who 
worked more on the relationship with South Africa and was rather reluctant to engage with 
China.  
The Norwegian government stated in its China strategy from 2007 that international coopera-
tion with China is a priority (NMFA 14.08.2007, 1). In 2008 (much earlier than any attempts by 
the United States) a project between China, Norway and Nigeria on oil exploitation was initiated. 
This is seen as highly beneficial and a project report expresses the wish to extend the project 
because  
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“[i]f sustained, it will enhance long-term mutual understanding and cooperation among 
the three countries involved. This momentum should be maintained by embarking on a 
follow-up project, specifically on Nigeria’s expectations and agenda for engaging China 
and Norway in the petroleum sector. An extension of the process to another African 
country is also recommended” (Brandtzæg and Pöyry 2008, 33).  
Therefore, trilateral cooperation is equally seen as a business investment while “improve[ing] 
Nigerian, Chinese and Norwegian policymakers’ understanding of the assistance provided and 
the development philosophy that underpins it” (Gahr Støre 30.01.2008, 1). In a follow-up meet-
ing in Beijing, the Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store stated that he hopes the event 
“will mark the beginning of mutually beneficial cooperation, both bilaterally between Norway 
and China, and trilaterally, together with African partners” (Gahr Støre 30.01.2008, 2). However 
– and in contrast to the United States – Norway also perceives trilateral cooperation as a way to 
increase mutual understanding and to possibly mitigate the negative effects China could have 
on African development. It states that  
“it is impossible to tell exactly how the Chinese engagement has an impact on develop-
ment in African countries. The effects may vary from country to country. And it is dif-
ficult to determine how any single country’s influence leads to a specific pattern of 
change. However, through trilateral research we will gain better understanding – based 
on facts and findings – of how economic growth will benefit African countries” (Gahr 
Støre 30.01.2008, 2).  
In 2009, the government stated its intent to become more involved in trilateral cooperation with 
China, especially because of the controversial Chinese relations with the African continent:   
“The EU, on its part, conducts a development policy dialogue with actors with which 
Norway would like to have closer contact. The tripartite dialogue between the EU, Af-
rica and China is of particular interest” (NMFA 2009a, 106). 
In 2013, a Norad report on sustainable development discussed a project involving a partnership 
between Chinese private sector companies interested in African renewable energy markets, the 
Chinese government, Chinese industry associations and African and Norwegian embassies in 
China. This initiative attempts to “develop business models and instruments to leverage com-
mercial investments” (Norad 2013a, 43). 
With China, Norway seems to be eager to assemble more knowledge on its activities as a donor 
especially in Africa in two main fields that are of particular interest: oil exploitation, where it is 
in direct competition with China in Africa, and work relations, where Norway believes it could 
have an impact on internal developments in China itself.  
Many consider Brazil to be the champion of trilateral cooperation because it is eager to engage 
in such projects. Norway recognises that “Brazil has become a significant bilateral actor, donor 
and cooperation partner for a number of countries in the South and attaches importance to 
South-South cooperation” especially in Africa (NMFA 2011a, 20–21). The active pursuit of 
trilateral projects with Norway seems to come from Brazil itself, as opposed to the narrative 
within the United States, which was very eager to engage Brazil. Norway always stresses that 
“Brazil is interested in closer cooperation with Norway on promoting development in third 
countries” (NMFA 2011a, 21). The benefits for both sides and therefore the division of labour 
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in this cooperation are clearly expressed: “Brazil has expertise and experience in the field of 
development that could be of great benefit to many countries in the South, and Norway has 
long experience as a donor that could benefit Brazil” (NMFA 2011a, 21).  
Norway is actively planning several projects of trilateral cooperation with Brazil. Cooperation 
existed in Angola and Guinea-Bissau and was proceeding in Haiti in 2011. The main focus of 
such cooperation is in the field of climate and forest protection in which Norway plans further 
trilateral projects with Brazil (NMFA 2011a, 21). One such example is the trilateral cooperation 
between the two countries in Mozambique within the UN-led REDD145 programme. The pro-
gramme is supposed to benefit Mozambique because it “can learn from Brazil and embark on 
its own REDD initiative” (NMFA 2011b, 58). This project is supported by Norway’s Interna-
tional Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) since 2007 (NMFA 2011b, 58).  
Moreover, Norway advances the idea of cooperating in countries that are recipients of both 
Norwegian and Brazilian aid on the issue of following up on human rights commitments. Sim-
ilarly, based on Norway’s statements, Brazil shows an interest in issues such as welfare policies 
and global health in third countries. The last field in which cooperation is envisioned is the one 
of promoting efforts for decent working conditions, similar to the project with China (NMFA 
2011a, 21). The type of cooperation illustrates that it is easier for Norway to engage in trilateral 
projects with countries that share its political philosophy.  
Within the narrative, Norway does not seem to plan an engagement in trilateral cooperation 
with South Africa or India on a large scale. The strategies for engaging India (2009) and South 
Africa (2011) focus on issues other than trilateral cooperation. With India, Norway is concerned 
to “strengthen its dialogue and cooperation with India on international political issues” within 
a joint commission and in the major multilateral forums to discuss key areas (such as climate 
change, energy, peace efforts, democracy, human rights, decent work, global health) (NMFA 
2009f, 17). Regarding health issues, Norway and India have established the NIPI (Norway – 
India Partnership Initiative) in the health sector to facilitate the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals 4 (reduce child mortality) and 5 (improve maternal health) – but the goals 
are limited to improving the situation in India and therefore do not include trilateral projects 
(NMFA 2009f, 18). Norway and India have no trilateral projects planned, which could result 
from a mutual reluctance to engage the other country as a donor.  
South Africa is seen as a gateway to the African continent. Therefore, very early on in 2006 – 
almost three years earlier than in the United States – Norway recognised the need “to establish 
lasting cooperative relationships between Norwegian and South African partners” (NMFA 
2006b, 1). Moreover, Norway supported South African efforts in peace processes in Burundi 
and Sudan, focusing on including women in the peace process (Norad 2008a, 100). Norway also 
planned to “strengthen South Africa’s capacity as a donor country in development cooperation 
through cooperation with Norad” (Norad 2008a, 100). Some efforts were thus undertaken by 
                                                 
145 United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
in Developing Countries, a UN initiative under negotiation since 2005, transformed into the REDD+ initiative in 
2007. Since 2008, the UN has its own REDD programme overseeing the diverse implementation processes in 
partner countries.  
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Norway to engage with South Africa on trilateral cooperation but the efforts remain minor from 
both sides.  
Overall, Norway does not have a strategic plan on how to approach trilateral cooperation with 
emerging donors. It seems to be willing to engage countries that share a similar political vision 
(Brazil) and those which are considered to be too important and influential to be left out (China). 
However, generally, the enthusiasm and internal narrative for trilateral cooperation projects in 
Norway is quite low. While the topic receives increasing attention in Norway from 2010 on-
wards, the narrative does not change overall. Throughout the period, trilateral cooperation is 
viewed as a positive addition to other forms of cooperation. But it is considered one form next 
to many others, not as the new alternative for cooperation – which is something of a contrast 
to the two other donors observed here. Do Norwegian practices then show a similarly low level 
of engagement?  
7.2.2 Norwegian rules and practices on trilateral cooperation 
The previous section elaborated on the fact that Norway does not have a consistent strategy 
regarding trilateral cooperation. This factor explains why, within the rules, the only evidence for 
an increase in trilateral projects can be found in the specific country strategies for the four 
emerging donors where trilateral projects are mentioned in passing (NMFA 2011a, 2009f, 
2007d, 29.11.2013).146 This section elaborates on the question of whether the restrained narra-
tives and rules regarding trilateral cooperation is implemented in practice. This could be con-
firmed through an overall low engagement in trilateral projects.  
One first indication that seems to confirm the rather cautious discourse is that Norway is not 
mentioned in the diverse studies of OECD on triangular cooperation as a provider of triangular 
cooperation (Yamashiro Fordelone and Soule-Kohndou 2012; Task Team on South South Co-
operation 2010). Despite a fact sheet on a recent survey from the OECD that states that Norway 
is perceived to be among the top participants in triangular cooperation projects, the OECD 
peer review on Norwegian development cooperation from 2013 does not mention any trilateral 
projects (OECD DAC 2013; OECD February 2016). When asked about the link between his 
section in Norad and emerging donors, a Norad employee said:  
“We are not in much contact with them. […] But we are not in any way, not wanting to 
have any cooperation with them. […] So, we don't mind cooperating with them, but I 
think it hasn't been a natural thing for us to do so far […] But, you know, I don't think 
we have any issues with whom we cooperate. We could cooperate with the Chinese if 
the occasion presented itself” (interview with IX, 2014, October 2, 8'03-8'19; 15'52). 
The interviewee gave the following explanation for this:   
                                                 
146 The DAC peer review from 2013 equally confirms that Norway plans to engage with China, Brazil, and India 
(OECD DAC 2013, 68–72).  
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“You know, it might be that we are operating in different areas of development assis-
tance. You know, they are pretty much into infrastructure, I think, and we are not par-
ticularly into infrastructure” (interview with IX, 2014, October 2, 11'17).  
These quotes then confirm the general narrative: an overall willingness to engage in trilateral 
projects and to cooperate with all countries, but also a certain restrained position towards actu-
ally engaging them. 
While the narrative illustrated a willingness to engage in trilateral cooperation in many sectors, 
the only areas in which actual projects are taking place are in the protection of the environment, 
welfare distribution, peace building and oil extraction, as the following paragraphs illustrate.  
For the cooperation with Brazil, the narrative identified projects with Angola, Guinea-Bissau 
and Haiti. While no figures were accessible on the trilateral cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, the 
amounts for the cooperation with Angola are rather low (USD 1.6 million), while the trilateral 
project with Haiti is funded with USD 4.9 million and thereby constitutes the highest trilateral 
cooperation within Norway’s budget. The cooperation with Brazil is particularly strong in the 
environmental sector, with Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) and 
its support of the UN-led REDD programme. REDD receives a large amount of funding in 
diverse recipient countries (of which about USD 9 million are directed to foster South-South 
cooperation, but do not necessarily include an emerging donor). One example that is clearly a 
trilateral cooperation is Norway’s ongoing support to Brazil’s cooperation with Mozambique, 
where USD 2.3 million has thus far been disbursed. The evaluation of the project has been 
rather positive (NMFA 2012c, 38; Norad 2015). Another ongoing budget post is the general 
support of the Brazilian government in South-South cooperation. The modest amount of USD 
236 thousand have been allocated to this since 2013.  
The projects with South Africa are largely taking place in the sector of humanitarian aid and 
peace-building measures and are much lower in figures than those supporting Brazil. The fund-
ing for South Africa’s initiative in the peace process in Burundi amounted to the small amount 
of USD 2.3 million over the period from 2007 till 2010. While the tripartite cooperation between 
Norway, South Africa and Sudan on police training was delayed twice (in 2008 and 2009), the 
support of the Sudanese police force with the assistance of South Africa amounted to a similar 
amount of USD 2.4 million for the years 2009 and 2010 (Norad 2009a, 100, 2010a, 99, 2015). 
It seems that Norway does not have any ongoing projects with South Africa, which is not wholly 
congruent with the positive view of that country in Norway’s narrative.  
Despite a stronger support in the narrative for co-operating with China than was evident in the 
case of the United States, the amount spent on trilateral cooperation with China is even lower 
than for South Africa. Trilateral cooperation with China has occurred in Nigeria within a project 
that was supposed to “assist Norwegian authorities in developing a basis for a dialogue with 
China on matters related to petroleum investment and development assistance to Africa” (pro-
gramme description within Norad statistics, Norad 2015). The overall funding of that coopera-
tion added up to limited USD 233 thousand. Despite the wishes of several Norwegian authori-
ties for the project to continue and to be applied in other oil producing African countries, no 
follow-up project funding could be found and the last distribution took place in 2008 (Norad 
2015).  
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Norad also cofounded an interesting project between the Confederation of Norwegian Enter-
prise (NHO), the China Enterprise Confederation (CEC) and its counterparts in Uganda, Kenya 
and Ethiopia. NHO’s main role is to “help the African employers’ organisations in getting into 
contact with Chinese companies” (interview with VIII, 2014, August 26, 9'47). Based on an 
interview with a member from NHO, the contact with the Chinese organisations works very 
well in Uganda and in Kenya, but is less intense (also because it is a newer project) in Ethiopia 
(interview with VIII, 2014, August 26, 12'42). The contacts are focussed so far in Eastern Afri-
can countries due to the historic reason of Norway’s involvement in that region, but the contacts 
are equally planned in countries with oil as they are of particular interest for Norway (interview 
with VIII, 2014, August 26, 22'47).  
Trilateral cooperation in Uganda has received the highest share with about USD 1.4 million 
over several years. After an initial funding in 2003, the project took off in 2008 and is still on-
going. While no trace of direct funding for NHO in its activities in Ethiopia could be found, 
the statistics revealed that Norway spent USD 26 000 on a project of the Chinese International 
Poverty Reduction Centre (IPRCC) in Ethiopia in 2011. No figures are available in the statistics 
about a trilateral project taking place in Kenya. It is possible, however, that the NHO founding 
for Uganda is used by NHO for projects in other East African countries (Norad 2015).  
Norad also established several multilateral initiatives to foster South-South cooperation. One is 
in the sector of peace-building where Norway funds the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs to come up with ideas about how to establish a “South-South-North network” involving 
all four emerging donors covered here, but also including Turkey and Indonesia. The total 
amount spent on that project amounts to USD 970 thousand. Moreover, Norway funds several 
smaller projects within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its South-
South-Unit. Together with projects strengthening the capacity of the World Bank in the area of 
South-South cooperation this multilateral funding amounts to a further USD 2.2 million since 
2008 (Norad 2015). The following table gives an overview of the rather limited number of tri-
lateral projects that Norway undertakes with three of the four emerging donors.  
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 Table 7-5: Trilateral projects between Norway and emerging donors 
Emerging donor  Third partner country Targeted area Amount spent (in 
USD) 






2.2 million 2008-2013 
 
Brazil, China, South 
Africa, India and oth-
ers 
Unspecified SSC peace-building 970 thousand 2012-2013 
Brazil Mozambique REDD, environment  USD 2.3 million  2009 – ongoing 
Haiti Community devel-
opment project 
USD 4.9 million 2006, 2008-2009 
Angola Skill sharing and 
transfer 
USD 1.6 million 2005, 2010-2011 
Unspecified Support for Brazil to 
engage in SSC 
236 thousand 2013-ongoing 
China Nigeria Oil sector USD 230 thousand 2007-2008 
Uganda Federation of Em-
ployers 
USD 1.4 million 2008-ongoing 
Ethiopia Conference support USD 26 thousand 2011 
Unspecified Support for UNDP to 
understand China’s 
African policies 
7 thousand 2010 
South Africa Burundi Peace keeping USD 2.3 million 2007-2010 
Sudan  Police force  USD 2.4 million 2009-2010 
Source: Own compilation based on date from NORAD. Note that all figures were converted to USD through the exchange 
date of the year of the date.  
Overall, the practice on trilateral cooperation confirms the general trend in the narrative: while 
isolated projects get sizeable amounts of funding, the total engagement is rather limited. More-
over, one can observe that while there are no projects initiated with India, the narrative suggests 
that Norway is eager to engage more closely with China whereas the practice only shows limited 
projects which suggests that maybe China is less eager to engage with Norway. Brazil is the 
country that receives the biggest support, together with South Africa – in narrative and practices. 
This is very similar to approach of the United States, with both countries having illustrated a 
rather negative perception of emerging donors. Nevertheless, when looking at the amounts 
spent on trilateral cooperation, Norway does not seem to be a major player (despite the percep-
tion of the actors interviewed by the OECD survey on triangular cooperation, OECD February 
2016). The reason here lies in the rather limited range of the main idea that is fostering this 
change: Norway largely agrees that multilateral institutions should be in charge of further inte-
grating emerging donors into the existing world order. Its own role is therefore perceived to be 
Changes in trilateral cooperation?│193 
 
minor, which is essential in explaining the low involvement of Norway, especially when com-
pared to the United Kingdom, as the next section shows.  
7.3 United Kingdom 
The main ideas identified in chapter 5 that could trigger a change within the UK’s policies re-
garding trilateral cooperation are similar to the United States, though with some key differences; 
the United Kingdom did not divide the group of emerging donors into like-minded and other 
countries but indicated its desire to cooperate with all of them, emphasising its desire to “help” 
them and increase their impact in development cooperation overall. How do such ideas affect 
the institution of development assistance within the United Kingdom?  
Within this study, the United Kingdom is the only donor that seemed to welcome emerging 
donors as a positive new element in development cooperation, as chapter 5 has argued. When 
it came to conditionality, the UK – like the other two traditional donors – embraced the narra-
tive of a stronger preselection but only showed limited results in its actual aid figures of this pre-
selective process, suggesting that they might not strengthen conditionality as a reaction towards 
emerging donors. It seems reasonable to hypothesise that a country that goes to some length in 
its official documents and speeches to welcome the aid policies of emerging donors is one that 
is also eager to engage with them in trilateral projects.  
7.3.1 Narrative on trilateral cooperation 
Fields of trilateral cooperation  
Whereas Norway and the United States do not have a specific policy regarding trilateral coop-
eration, the United Kingdom at least has a strategy for engaging emerging markets. Already in 
2005, the Economic Governance Programme – formerly referred to as Strengthening Relations 
with Emerging Markets – stated that all four emerging donors “will become increasingly im-
portant to British interests over the next decade (FCO 2005, 21). Similarly, in the annual report 
of 2006, it is stated that “China’s growing economic and political significance […] will have a 
disproportionate impact on how much progress the development world as a whole will make 
towards achieving the MDGs”, which leads to the conclusion that the UK needs to engage 
China in its policies with Africa (DFID 2006a, 72). The report in the following year endorses 
the idea that Britain is cooperating with “new and emerging donors […] to help them increase 
the impact of their work on poverty reduction” (DFID 2007a, 192; almost identical statement 
in A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 7). The annual report of 2008 further confirms this by stating that the 
UK ought to “develop closer working relationships with new non-OECD donors such as India 
and China” (DFID 2008a, 6). It is not surprising therefore that one of the six strategic objectives 
of DFID (DSOs) is to “develop a global partnership for development (beyond aid)” (DFID 
2008b, 14). Within that DSO, DFID credits itself with having made strong progress from the 
beginning (four initiatives with emerging donors reported in DFID 2008b, 14–15; seven initia-
tives with BRICS countries in DFID 2009a, 118; equally "strong progress" reported on that 
DSO in DFID 2009b, 16). In the 2010 report, a total of seven initiatives with all emerging 
donors of this study except South Africa are mentioned (see below for details on those initia-
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tives, DFID 2009b, 31, 101). The general message that the UK tries to convey through its nar-
rative in this relatively early period is that they work together with “key emerging economies to 
address global development issues more effectively” (DFID 2009d, 132).  
Since 2010, the partnership has been built on a more concrete framework. In that year, DFID 
sets up its “Global Development Partnership Programme” (GDPP) which specifically refers to 
trilateral cooperation as one aspect of the partnership (DFID 2014b, 129). Similar to the policies 
of the United States and Norway, the UK plans to use trilateral cooperation as a means to stay 
engaged with countries that are no longer or soon won’t be recipients of UK aid anymore 
(DFID 2013a, 119). Throughout the period, the UK has strengthened the intensity with which 
it refers to the necessity of embedding emerging donors in global initiatives and thereby the 
necessity for the UK to collaborate with emerging donors (for instance, DFID 2014b, 128). 
Moreover, the UK also openly states that, through trilateral initiatives, it might be able to “help 
shape [emerging donors’] impact on development in poorer countries” (DFID 2014c, 16).  
Although the UK started comparatively early and seems to be particularly eager to engage with 
emerging donors in cooperative projects, its reasons for doing so are very similar to the ones 
identified by the United States and Norway: “newly emerging economies” are seen to be experts 
in technologies that could be directly implanted in developing countries (DFID 2008c, 35). This 
exercise of sharing knowledge and experience is envisioned especially in areas where emerging 
economies are thought to be leaders, such as climate change and agriculture, as well as in terms 
of security cooperation (DFID 2009d, 131; see also A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 3–4; for the idea to 
work with emerging donors in the area of responsibility to protect, see FCO 2014b, 72). The 
UK pledges to “trade in ideas and in expertise” (DFID 15.02.2011, 1–2; similar DFID 
01.12.2011, 1). This exchange is also thought to “ensure aid can make the most difference to 
the lives of poor people” (DFID 29.06.2012, 2).  
Narrative on trilateral cooperation with specific emerging donors 
The UK often mentions all four emerging donors for trilateral projects. At times, specific groups 
of emerging donors are selected for specific projects. As such, regarding research partnerships 
in the areas of trade and transfer of technology for clean energy and water, the UK mentions 
India, China and Brazil (DFID 2008c, 16, 19). In the area of making use of research in the field 
of cleaner, more sustainable biofuels, the UK intends to work with South Africa, India and 
Brazil (DFID 2014d, 1–2). This initiative foresees the sharing of knowledge through participa-
tion in workshops (DFID 2014d). Another project envisions cooperation between South Africa 
and Brazil in Mozambique to help introduce biofuels (DFID 2007a, 47). Moreover, those two 
emerging donors are referred to when it comes to the need to find new partners to promote 
human rights (FCO 2011, 6–7).  
The other two traditional donors spent relatively little attention on the cooperation in trilateral 
projects with China and focused more on countries that were likely to be as dedicated to dem-
ocratic principles as they themselves. The United Kingdom, however, has dedicated considera-
ble resources on inducing China to cooperate – and from an early date. For instance, the UK 
agreed to hold six monthly senior level talks with China on international development issues as 
early as 2006 and confirmed that “the UK is working closely with China so that both our efforts 
support the African vision of development” (see for instance statements in DFID 2007a, 26; 
similarly DFID 2008a, 36). DFID talks about “an excellent working relationship in Beijing and 
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in London on China-Africa issues” (DFID 2008a, 18). Moreover, a stakeholder survey suggests 
that “China [is] now more open towards the UK in its approach to Africa […] wishing to learn 
more about the UK’s approach to overseas aid” (DFID 2008d, 56–57). Similarly, an evaluation 
from 2010 stated that the dialogue with the UK was successful in “influenc[ing] behaviour, 
thinking and policymaking at central levels in the Chinese government” (DFID 2010b, 2). In 
2014, Justine Greening, the Minister for International Development, described the partnership 
between China and the UK as “ground-breaking” (Greening 02.04.2014, 1).  
Reasons for cooperating with China are numerous: in the field of energy, Britain invokes the 
“size and growth of [China’s] global footprint” and the feeling that “if we fail to engage China, 
China’s impact may threaten existing or future development gains in some parts of the devel-
oping world” (Development Tracker 2012h, 1). Other than the necessity to include China in 
future arrangements, the UK also stresses that “China has experiences to share with other coun-
tries” in many fields (Development Tracker 2015b, 1).  
Concrete cooperation is envisioned in the area of exchanging knowledge on agriculture and 
climate change adaptions, for instance with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DFID 2009a, 
47). The cooperation in the DRC is referenced in a speech by Andrew Mitchell in which he 
mentions trilateral cooperation in infrastructure, as a “very successful outcome” (A. Mitchell 
15.02.2011, 6). A dialogue with China in January 2008 “allowed leaders to discuss the develop-
ment relationship and China’s role in tackling global poverty” (DFID 2008a, 66). Several other 
dialogues followed, for instance about the “shape and scale of cooperation programmes on 
water and agriculture”, the UK-China Development Dialogue, the UK-China Sustainable Agri-
culture Innovation Network or the UK-China Food security plan as well as international co-
hosted conferences, such as the one in January 2010 focusing on food security and agriculture 
(DFID 2009b, 31). The country assistance plan (CAP) for China foresees cooperation with 
China on “important international development issues, focussing on sustainable development, 
climate change and China’s engagement in Africa” (DFID 2010b, 1).  
When DFID closed its bilateral aid relationship with China in March 2011, it began working 
even more intensively on initiating trilateral projects (DFID 22.03.2013b). At the same time, the 
UK signed a memorandum of understanding with China and its Development Bank “to en-
hance the impact, quality and sustainability of investments made by the UK and China in Africa” 
(DFID 2014b, 129). Several projects derive from this memorandum: The first of these is the 
AgriTT Project (Working in Partnership with China to Accelerate Agricultural Technology 
Transfer to Low Income Countries) which started in 2012 and aims at “sharing of successful 
experience in agricultural development, especially from China, with other developing countries 
in order to improve agricultural productivity and the food security of poor people” (DFID 
2014a, 1).  
Initial projects in in the AgriTT programme were planned for instance in Malawi (enhance tilapa 
production) and Uganda (maize and cattle value chains; cassava production), and one other 
country in Southeast Asia, later identified as Cambodia (DFID 2014a, 2014f). Later, projects 
with Tanzania (Chinese rodent management), Rwanda (pest control for vegetables), Cambodia 
(rice value chain development; mobile internet technology), Ethiopia (improve productivity), 
Ghana (transformation of organic waste) as well as several studies intended to improve aqua-
culture sectors (for instance in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria) were added to the programme (DFID 
2014f; for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2013e, 2012g).  
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Engaging other important donors, even some that are not “traditionally like-minded” is envi-
sioned in Sudan (DFID 2013b, 3). Also in 2013, DFID launched a new programme entitled 
“Sharing and Learning on Community-Based Disaster Management in Asia”, directing the de-
velopment cooperation firstly towards Nepal and Bangladesh as trial cases (DFID 14.01.2013, 
2013a, 119; for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2015g, 2014f). 
Only two days later, on January 16, 2013, DFID launched another project in the area of global 
health. The project is intended to “build capacity for DFID and low income countries to learn 
lessons from China’s unparalleled success in reducing infant, child and maternal mortality rates, 
disease prevention and control, and China’s health development and health sector reform” 
(DFID 16.01.2013, 1, 22.03.2013b; for further information on the project, see Development 
Tracker 2015b, 2015c). Learning from China in the areas of “reducing infant, child and maternal 
mortality rates, disease prevention and control and health sector reform” is thought to have 
beneficial effects for low-income countries (DFID 2014b, 129). 
During a visit to Beijing in 2014, Justine Greening pledged to “work together more closely” 
with China on development, indicating a strong commitment to trilateral projects with China 
(Greening 02.04.2014, 2). A relatively recent project that the UK engages in with China aims to 
jointly assess how trade, investment and aid-for-trade can be beneficial for poverty reduction in 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa and Kenya (Greening 02.04.2014, 4). Throughout the observed 
period, the United Kingdom places a strong focus on cooperation with China and this interest 
in cooperation seems to even increase over time. Especially in comparison to the other two 
donors, the UK is the first to fully recognise the potential of China whereas Norway and the 
United States first had to abandon their prejudges before engaging China at all in trilateral pro-
jects.  
Brazil, the country that received most attention for trilateral projects from the United States and 
Norway, is second in the United Kingdom’s narrative. The UK is quick to attribute Brazil with 
regional leadership on health issues, in particular related to the fight against HIV/AIDS in Latin 
America (DFID 2006a, 85). The UK therefore pledges to help spread Brazilian knowledge in 
this area to other Latin American countries, such as Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador (DFID 2006a, 
90). In 2007, the UK agreed to spread the knowledge about the Brazilian Bolsa Familia project 
(a project targeting poor families and ensuring that their children receive education and health 
services) to six African countries, one of which is Kenya (DFID 2007a, 112–13; A. Mitchell 
15.02.2011, 5). In the annual report of 2008, DFID states that its “programme has evolved from 
bilateral aid to a partnership with Brazil, to help strengthen Brazil’s ability to share its develop-
ment experience as a policy leader on climate change, biofuels, HIV & AIDS, inequality analysis, 
and social protection”. In particular, the programme foresees a collaboration in Ghana (DFID 
2008a, 79).  
Formally, the UK-Brazil Working Group on Africa was established in 2009 “with a view on 
joint working on African issues” (DFID 2009b, 31). This led to the support of Brazil’s assistance 
to the African Union and five African countries on Brazil’s design of social protection policies, 
building on the experiences of the Bolsa Familia project (DFID 2009a, 47). Moreover, since 
2012, a strategic dialogue between the UK and Brazil has taken place in order to enhance “bi-
lateral discussions” (FCO 18.01.2012, 1). In the same year, a press release announced the in-
creased collaboration with Brazil on development issues because it could lead to “lessons being 
learned and adapted for low income countries” (DFID 24.08.2012, 1–2). The programme fo-
cuses on research into Brazil’s impact in Africa in four main areas: agriculture, institutions, social 
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programmes and economic spheres (DFID 24.08.2012, 1–2). The collaboration with Brazil also 
foresees the co-hosting of international events, such as collaboration on the Olympic Hunger 
Event in August 2012 and the Nutrition for Growth Event in June 2013 (DFID 2013a, 119, 
2014b, 129). That cooperation with Brazil on African issues is one of the cornerstones of this 
relationship becomes clear from a speech by William Hague, the then Foreign minister, stating 
that “there is immense scope for us to do more together and achieve more together by working 
side-by-side in foreign policy, perhaps nowhere more so than in Africa” (Hague 19.02.2014, 1). 
Cooperation is envisioned in the areas of peacekeeping, where Brazil is considered to be an 
expert because of its experiences in Haiti and Lebanon, as well as strengthening food security 
and increasing agricultural productivity (Hague 19.02.2014, 1–3). The cooperation with Brazil is 
often praised because of the essential similarity of the two political systems, which enables the 
UK to work with Brazil in Africa on issues close to the UK development agenda, like good 
governance and stability, economic development, repeating similar appraisals to those of the 
United States and Norway, all referring to the similarities between the governments’ approaches 
towards development (Hague 19.02.2014, 4).  
The relationship between India and the United Kingdom is a difficult one, characterised by a 
charged post-colonial narrative. The UK is careful to underline how highly it thinks of a close 
relationship with India. Nevertheless, as Mitchell stated in 2011, the UK also recognises that 
“nowhere will our partnership be more multi-dimensional than India” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 
4). In 2012, India proudly declared that it would stop receiving aid from the UK. Justine Green-
ing, Minister for International Development at the time, insists that the relationship with India 
will change but that technical cooperation with India to “maintain a hub of development exper-
tise within India” will be continued and that the UK and India “will work together to help other 
poor countries learn from India’s experience on areas like trade, food security, climate change 
and health” (DFID 09.11.2012, 1). The framework paper from 2013 clarifies the content of the 
cooperation slightly by stating that “technical cooperation will continue after 2015, focusing on 
policy cooperation and skills exchange in areas such as growth, trade and investment, education 
and skills, health, and governance” (DFID 2013c, 2; similar DFID 2013e, 4).  
Nonetheless, there is a certain vagueness when it comes to trilateral projects and the concrete 
content of the desired collaboration. The area in which this cooperation does seem to take place 
is research. In 2008, the UK planned to cooperate with the Indian pharmaceutical industry to 
lower the price for HIV and malaria drugs (DFID 2009a, 47). Similarly, the pledge in 2009 was 
to cooperate largely with non-governmental Indian actors to foster development – in India and 
elsewhere (DFID 2009b, 31; confirmed by A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 5–6; DFID 2013a, 119). A 
press release from the end of 2013 then finally made more concrete the kind of trilateral coop-
eration that the two countries want to undertake: it aims to create a “global research partnership 
between India and the UK (more precisely between DFID, Research Councils UK and DBT) 
to fund “trilateral research partnerships addressing major global challenges on health, food se-
curity and women” (British High Commission 13.11.2013, 2–3). The initiative also builds upon 
the UK India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI), which was set up in 2006 (British 
High Commission 13.11.2013, 2–3; DFID 2013e, 3). Through the Global Development Part-
nership (GDPP), the UK has supported the closer cooperation with Indian pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in African countries (South Africa and other countries) (DFID 2014b, 129). In 
2013 the UK also agreed to collaborate with India’s Development Partnership Administration 
through the UK-India Global Development Dialogue (DFID 2014b, 129).  
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From the four emerging donors, the UK pays least attention to South Africa as a potential 
partner in trilateral projects, but still values the country as a “leader in Africa and for Africa” 
(FCO 2006, 298). In 2006, DFID launched a plan for the Southern Africa Region which enables 
it to benefit from South Africa’s expertise in the area (DFID 2006a, 45). In June 2007, the UK 
launched a small research initiative together with South Africa and Sierra Leone called “Research 
into Use programme” which intends “to put the best agricultural and natural resources research 
into widespread use” in Malawi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Nigeria (DFID 2008a, 
22). Similar to the other emerging donors, the DFID’ bilateral programme in South Africa runs 
out in 2015, “reflecting a new relationship between the UK and South Africa” (DFID 2014b, 
77, 30.04.2013, 1). The UK remains however vaguely committed to “working together with 
South Africa to deliver effective development results both regionally and globally” (DFID 
2014b, 129).  
Overall, the UK seems to be strongly committed to engaging in trilateral cooperation in their 
narrative, which reflects the general idea of cooperating with all emerging donors and helping 
them to pursue more effective development policies.147 The UK mostly envisions cooperation 
with China and Brazil, with minor initiatives with India and South Africa. Does the practice 
confirm this ostensibly strong commitment?  
7.3.2 British rules and practices on trilateral cooperation 
The rules within the development cooperation of the UK largely reflect the increasing emphasis 
put on trilateral cooperation identified in the narrative. Most of it is institutionalised within the 
Global Development Partnership Programme that specifically foresees engaging in trilateral co-
operation with emerging countries. Moreover, further Memoranda of Understanding structure 
the planned projects on trilateral cooperation (for instance, UK Government 2013).   
Within the 2012 survey of the OECD on trilateral cooperation, the UK had reported between 
1 and 10 trilateral projects, scoring slightly below the United States (which was in the category 
between 10 and 50 projects), but still above Norway (which is not mentioned at all by the report) 
(Yamashiro Fordelone and Soule-Kohndou 2012, 20). In the more recent survey, the UK is not 
mentioned under the top activists in trilateral cooperation whereas Norway is, despite the hesi-
tant reactions regarding emerging donors that we have seen in the sections on Norway. The 
following section contradicts these findings and illustrates that the UK follows through with its 
narrative and pushes for many trilateral projects with all emerging donors, including China.  
As in the case of the other two donors, it is not easy to find exact data on trilateral cooperation 
that is separated from other initiatives involving emerging economies. This, however, is only 
true for the early period (up until 2010). In 2010, the UK adopted the UK Aid Transparency 
Guarantee, a policy that requires the publication of any aid transfer. Recently, a new website, the 
Development Tracker, publishes figures on every development related activity that the UK fi-
nances and makes access to figures of trilateral projects comparatively easy.  
                                                 
147 This increased interest on the part of the UK is also noted in the literature (Knodt and Piefer 2012, 43; Binding 
and Kudlimay 2013).  
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The UK initially had figures on its spending on the Global Partnerships Programmes that started 
in 2009. The Global Partnerships department has received rising figures from an initial USD 3.1 
million in 2010/11 to USD 14.5 million in 2014/15 (DFID 2011a, 145, 2012a, 201, 2013a, 224, 
2014b, 235, 2015, 151). How much of this money is spent directly on trilateral projects remains 
unknown.  
Contrary to the other two donors, the biggest share of the contributions to trilateral cooperation 
goes to China. Early on, the UK disbursed considerable amounts of money to engaging China 
in development policies. In the last ten years, the UK spent a remarkable USD 44.6 million on 
trilateral projects with China. Comparing this figure to the mere USD 1.6 million that Norway 
spent indicates that the UK holds a genuine interest in cooperating with China (Development 
Tracker 2012g, 2012d, 2012h, 2015f, 2015b).  
The narratives indicated that the UK started to plan projects with China at a relatively early 
stage. This remains true when we look at the practices and the actual disbursement of funds. 
Already in 2004, the UK spent USD 6.5 million to initiate trilateral projects with China. Among 
those projects are peacekeeping initiatives, a small pilot water project between DFID and China 
in Tanzania and other multilateral initiatives, such as the funding of the China-DAC study 
group. Within the UK statistics, these projects all appear under the heading of “Working with 
China on International Development Issues” in Africa and on global public goods (for further infor-
mation on the project, see Development Tracker 2012g). The budget post accounts for projects 
that were pushed through from 2004 until 2011. The complete figure of this account amounts 
to USD 7.2 million. In the later years, this included first roundtables with China on collaborating 
in health projects as well as further trilateral peacekeeping training projects with African coun-
terparts.  
Many further initiatives accompanied this early glut of trilateral projects. For example, the UK 
financed a study to investigate the emerging relationship between China and Africa from 2007 
until 2011 with USD 1.2 million. Two similar smaller studies were also funded: one ran from 
2010 till 2014 with USD 158 thousand to investigate China’s role in fragile states, the other was 
founded in 2012 and 2013 with USD 71 thousand to investigate the Chinese role in the conflict 
surrounding South Sudan.  
Another project that attempts to level the ground for future trilateral cooperation with China 
consists in the funding of China’s role within the United Nations Development Programme, 
where the UK has spent USD 214 thousand so far (for further information on the project, see 
Development Tracker 2012h). The project is ongoing and a total of USD 1.6 million has been 
earmarked for investment in this cooperation. Another ongoing project attempts to strengthen 
the role of “successful emerging economies” and to learn developmental lessons from Chinese 
and Brazilian experience for low income countries. This cooperation kicked off in 2012 and is 
funded with USD 70 thousand for the Chinese component. 
These initial projects led the way for further more concrete trilateral projects. One which at-
tempts to make use of Chinese lessons from adapting to climate change to other countries 
kicked off in 2009 and is still ongoing. So far, USD 5.1 million has been spent. Another concrete 
example of making use of Chinese knowledge can be found in the area of water management, 
where a project ran from 2011 until 2013 and was funded with USD 120 thousand in order to 
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implement Chinese expertise in selected developing countries to improve their water resources 
management.  
The biggest projects with China started after the signing of the memorandum between China 
and the UK to enhance their cooperation in the area of development in 2011 – the same year 
that the UK stopped its bilateral programme in China. In 2012, the ambitious Working Partnership 
with China to Accelerate Agricultural Technology Transfer to Low Income Countries began. The project 
intends to invest an ambitious USD 15 million of which USD 7.8 million have been spent. The 
project is proceeding in many different African countries and in Cambodia and adapts strongly 
to the specific contexts of the recipient country. For instance, the two pilot projects targeted 
Uganda – where the focus is on the production of cassava as well as the development of an 
effective value chain for maize and cattle – and Malawi – where the production of fingerling is 
enhanced (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2012g, 2013e). 
Projects with many other countries are also in process (for instance with Ghana in the area of 
organic waste management, with Ethiopia in general agricultural development, in Tanzania for 
rodent management, in Rwanda for biologically based pest production, and in Cambodia where 
the rice value chain is in the focus of the collaboration).   
Another large project, the International Development Support Project, is more general in nature and 
aims at improving the “understanding of China and its international development impacts” and 
“exposes Chinese officials and aid practitioners to new ways of approaching international de-
velopment policy and implementation” (Development Tracker 2015f, 2). In more concrete 
terms, since 2012 the programme has aimed at fostering the exchange between British and Chi-
nese aid practices through workshops, trainings and conferences in China, in the UK, but also 
in other, common recipient countries. Thus far, the project has been funded with USD 8.3 
million, while a total of USD 17 million has been approved. In 2013, several smaller projects 
are proceeding with limited funding of a total of USD 51 thousand. They include a project that 
aims at increasing the collaboration with China in infrastructure in Africa (USD 17 thousand), 
the collaboration on limiting the outbreak of the foodborne disease (with USD 7 thousand) and 
the financing of a common workshop to limit antimicrobial resistance (USD 17 thousand) (for 
further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2015f).  
The two big projects that best characterise the rise in cooperation in trilateral projects between 
China and the United Kingdom are, however, Sharing and learning on community-based disaster man-
agement in Asia and the Global health support programme. These two initiatives, launched within days 
of each other, are both ongoing and ambitious in aims and funding. The disaster management 
project aims at increasing the collaboration with China in Asia – particularly in Bangladesh and 
Nepal – and has been allocated USD 9 million, of which USD 3.4 million has already been spent 
(for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2014f, 2015g). The global 
health support programme aims at strengthening the effectiveness of China’s contributions to 
health governance and strengthens the cooperation in disease prevention and control, particu-
larly of malaria and polio. This project has been allocated a total of USD 20 million, of which 
USD 9.9 has been spent so far (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 
2015b). All of the big projects foresee a constant exchange between British and Chinese aid 
experts and aim at influencing Chinese development policies, but all stress that they also want 
to learn from their Chinese counterparts. Another smaller project was launched in 2014 with a 
scoping study on the increased exchange in research between researchers from Africa, China 
and the UK to deliver agricultural innovation in Africa. The project has a budget of USD 494 
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thousand of which most has already been spent (for further information on the project, see 
Development Tracker 2012g). To illustrate that the UK continues to be very eager to remain 
engaged with China in trilateral cooperation, it is worth mentioning that another project began 
in 2015 which focuses on the usage of Chinese experience and knowledge for developing coun-
try. A total of USD 5 million is planned for that project. The following table summarises the 
trilateral projects between China and the United Kingdom.  
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Table 7-6: Trilateral projects between the UK and China 
Third partner country Target area Amount spent (in 
USD) 
Years of cooperation 
Unspecified Working with China on Interna-
tional Development Issues 
7.2 million 2004-2011 
Unspecified Financing of several studies on 
China in Africa 
1.3 million 2007-2011 
2010-2014 
2012-2013 
Unspecified Global Knowledge on Climate 
Change Adaptation: Lessons 
from China 
5.1 million  2009-2016 
Unspecified Supporting integrated water 
resource management in de-
veloping countries 
120 thousand  2011-2013 
Unspecified Development lessons from 
successful emerging econo-
mies for low income countries 
70 thousand  2012-2013 
African countries 
 
Diverse projects (infrastructure; 
food safety, antimicrobial re-
sistance) 
51 thousand  2013 
Unspecified Working with UNDP on China 
in the world 
214 thousand  
(project for 1.6 mil-
lion) 
2011-ongoing 
Unspecified International Development 
Support Project 
8.3 million  
(project for 16 mil-
lion) 
2012-ongoing 
Malawi, Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia, 
Tanzania, Rwanda, Nigeria and 
Cambodia 
AgriTT 7.8 million  
(project for 15 mil-
lion) 
2012-ongoing  
Asia (Bangladesh, Nepal) Disaster management (natural 
disasters) 
3.4 million  
(project for 9 million) 
2013-ongoing 
Africa, for instance Tanzania Global Health Programme 9.9 million  
(project for 20 mil-
lion) 
2013 -ongoing 
Unspecified Scoping study: Working in part-
nership with researchers from 
Africa, China and the UK to de-
liver agricultural innovation in 
Africa 
495 thousand 2014-ongoing 
Source: Own compilation based on data found on UK development tracker 
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The cooperation with China is impressive, especially compared to the limited engagement of 
the two other traditional donors. That said, the UK’s engagement with Brazil is also far from 
negligible. In total, the UK spent USD 35.2 million on trilateral projects in the last ten years. 
The cooperation with Brazil did not begin as early as co-operation with China. An initial South-
South learning programme started in 2008 to enhance the knowledge of Brazilian expertise in 
the area of social protection. The programme lasted from 2008 until 2011 and received a rather 
modest USD 212 thousand. Another project was financed through the World Bank with USD 
312 thousand and aimed at improving the Africa-Brazil agricultural innovation marketplace. An 
even smaller amount of USD 70 thousand was disbursed for a project to work with Brazil as an 
emerging economy on global development. The first considerable amount of USD 2.5 million 
was allocated through the Global Development Partnership Programme where initial shared 
agendas were identified to promote trilateral projects with Brazil. The project started in 2009. 
Cooperation was envisioned among other countries in Kenya. This initial project eventually led 
to the much bigger programme of Building Brazil’s development impact in low income countries that 
kicked off in 2012 and is an ongoing initiative (for further information on the project, see De-
velopment Tracker 2012a, 2014a). Many research projects and concrete trilateral projects, such 
as the social development and poverty reduction project under the UK-Brazil partnership for na-
tional social development or the project between Brazil and Africa to work together to reduce poverty and 
promote gender equality and empowerment of women and girls. These include various recipients, such as 
Uganda (social protection), Pakistan (education) and Southern Africa (health). Other recipients 
include Gambia, Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya and Ethiopia. This ambitious undertaking is 
funded with a further USD planned USD 9.9 million of which USD 4.8 million have already 
been spent, and it was enhanced in 2012, a year after Brazil and the UK signed a memorandum 
of understanding in June 2011 to increase their trilateral partnerships. Very similar to the coop-
eration with China, this memorandum was the starting point for many big trilateral projects. 
One of those is the same that was used for China, the programme that attempts to draw devel-
opment lessons from successful emerging economies for low income countries (for further information on the 
project, see Development Tracker 2015d). Within this project, Brazil receives a much higher 
share than China, with USD 1.6 million. It aims to identify further interesting areas in which the 
UK can support Brazil in its development efforts. Another ongoing project similarly aims at 
enhancing Brazil’s global and regional engagement (for instance in the BRICS meetings or the 
G20) with a total of USD 2.6 million. Many of these resources are disbursed directly to Oxfam, 
a British NGO. Another, smaller project consists of the funding of the African Day round table 
which happened in 2013 and cost USD 12 thousand. Similarly, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office spent USD 19 thousand in 2014 to create the innovation dialogue to foster cooperation 
with Brazil in development relations.  
By far the biggest example of British trilateral cooperation with Brazil is one that works on 
climate-smart agriculture, called Africa-Brazil Partnership on climate-smart agriculture and food security. 
This also began in 2012 and was earmarked with a total of USD 22 million (which makes it the 
biggest trilateral project of the UK overall) of which slightly more than half (USD 11.3 million) 
has been spent. Many ventures are planned through this initiative; one of them continues the 
2009 project on Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace, another aims to increase 
food security in Africa, especially in Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique and Togo 
(for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2012b, 2014b).  
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 Table 7-7: Trilateral projects between the UK and Brazil 
Third partner country Target area Amount spent (in 
USD) 
Years of cooperation 
Unspecified South-South learning on social 
protection 
136 thousand 2008-2011 
African countries Africa-Brazil Agricultural Inno-
vation marketplace 
312 thousand 2009 
Unspecified Cooperation with large emerg-
ing economies on global devel-
opment issues 
70 thousand 2009-2012 




2.5 million 2009-2014 
African countries African Day Round Table 12 thousand 2013 
Unspecified Innovation dialogue for discus-
sions on development rela-
tions 
19 thousand 2014 
Unspecified Development lessons from 
successful emerging econo-
mies for low income countries 
1.6 million  2012-ongoing 
Diverse recipients, funded through 
Oxfam 
Brazil global and regional en-
gagement (BRICSAM/G20) 
2.6 million 2012-ongoing 
Diverse recipients (for instance, 
Uganda, the Gambia, Mozambique, 
Kenya, Pakistan) 
Building Brazil’s development 
impact in low income coun-
tries 
4.8 million 
(project for 9.9 mil-
lion) 
2012-ongoing 
African countries (Senegal, Niger, 
Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Cameroon, Zambia, Madagascar, 
Benin, Togo, Kenya) 
Africa-Brazil Partnership on Cli-
mate-smart Agriculture and 
Food security 
11.3 million 
(project for 22 mil-
lion) 
2012-ongoing 
                                          Source: Own compilation based on data found on UK development tracker 
While the narrative surrounding trilateral projects with China and Brazil suggested that many 
projects were planned, the narrative surrounding trilateral cooperation with India and South 
Africa was much more restrained. The only initiative that was mentioned for engaging South 
Africa in trilateral cooperation was the Research into Use programme. Nevertheless, several other 
projects could be found in the statistics that might have a similar spill-over effect for the same 
reason as the one envisioned by Research into Use.  
As such, the UK funded a project to strengthen South Africa’s response to HIV/AIDS with a 
considerable amount of USD 82.5 million from 2003 until 2010. Most of the project almost 
certainly went directly to South Africa and it is therefore difficult to count this project as a 
trilateral initiative. Similarly, a project called Strengthening South Africa’s Revitalised Response to AIDS 
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and Health started in 2009 and is ongoing with a total of USD 52.5 million planned for the 
project. But again, most resources will stay within South Africa’s national borders.  
The Research into Use project began in 2006 and lasted until 2012 with a total of USD 66.2 million 
spent over the years(for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2013c). 
The project intended to increase research on renewable natural resources and to communicate 
the results of research to the poorest people. While the overall assessment of the project is 
positive, it remains unclear how much of the 66.2 million has been used to fund research in or 
for South Africa and to what extent this money has been used for trilateral projects.  
There are two projects that can be unambiguously described as trilateral projects between the 
UK and South Africa. The first one is the South African Partnership on Global Economic Governance 
where the UK supports South Africa’s participation in G20 discussions and in other multilateral 
conferences discussing development cooperation, expressly stating that the intent is to share 
South African experiences. A total of USD 1.9 million has been disbursed for that programme 
since 2012 (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2012f, 2015h). 
Similarly, the UK finances the South African Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation since 
2012 and has spent USD 5.9 million on this (Development Tracker 2012e, 2013d). While the 
amount of money spent on trilateral projects that include South Africa is more limited than the 
contributions to China or Brazil, the cooperation has steadily increased and the UK remains 
actively involved in attempting to shape South Africa’s development cooperation.  
 Table 7-8: Trilateral projects between the UK and South Africa 
Third partner country Target area Amount spent (in 
USD) 
Years of cooperation 
Largely only to South Africa itself Strengthen South Africa’s re-
sponse to HIV/AIDS 
(82.5 million) 2003-2010 
Research facilities all over the world Research into Use  (66.2 million) 2006-2012 
Largely only to South Africa itself Strengthening South Africa’s 
revitalized response to AIDS 
and health 
(52.5 million) 2009-ongoing 
 South African Partnership on 
Global Economic Governance 
1.9 million 2012-ongoing 
 South African Partnership for 
Effective Development Coop-
eration 
5.9 million 2012-ongoing 
                                                                                                              Source: Own compilation based on data found on UK development tracker 
The narrative regarding India was even more restrained than that with South Africa, potentially 
because of the charged historical relationship between India and the UK. What is striking when 
looking at the statistics between the UK and India is that there are no early initiatives of engaging 
in trilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, there are several big initiatives put in place since 2010, 
which amounts to an astonishing total of USD 43.5 million spent on projects that involve Indian 
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development cooperation. Many of the projects are not, however, trilateral projects in a strict 
sense. 
The first project is the TERI Partnership Africa Component that was located within the India 
Partnership Framework. A total of USD 13.9 million has been disbursed for TERI in 2010 (for 
further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2011). The initiative aimed at 
facilitating clean energy access and improved policies of sustainable development. Of that 
amount, USD 1.5 million comes from the account for Global Development Partnership Pro-
gramme for activities in Africa and can therefore be counted as a trilateral project. The narrative 
indicated that most trilateral initiatives were attempted in the field of research. The UK India 
Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI) is the most prominent result of that exchange. 
Throughout the years, a total of USD 10.2 million has been disbursed in 2013 and 2014 even 
though the initiative is ongoing for much longer (for further information on the project, see 
DFID 2014h). Another project in the area of research is the Global Research Partnership which 
received USD 905 thousand of a total budget of USD 8.2 million. The project started in 2012 
and is ongoing. It largely aims at increasing research projects between India, the UK and other 
developing countries (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2014c). 
The Knowledge Partnership Programme also began in 2012 and USD 11.8 million of the planned 
USD 14.8 million has already been disbursed. The project aims at strengthening development 
policies, programmes and practices in developing countries through the generation and dissem-
ination of knowledge using Indian expertise. Several areas of cooperation are envisioned, such 
as climate change, food security and resource scarcity; growth and trade; health and disease 
control as well as women and girls (for further information on the project, see Development 
Tracker 2013a, 2014e). The most recent initiative in the field of research is the INVENT pro-
gramme (Innovative Ventures and Technologies for Development) which aims at supporting technolog-
ical and business innovations for the benefit of the poor in India, as well as in Africa and South 
Asia. A high share of the funds (a total of USD 8.9 million) of overall planned USD 57.2 million 
is devoted to technical assistance to support knowledge-sharing between India and developing 
countries. A further USD 2.6 million is planned for the replication of proven Indian innovations 
to developing countries. In total for the whole project, USD 6.7 million has been spent, of which 
approximately a fifth can be attributed to trilateral projects (therefore USD 1.3 in the table) (for 
further information, see Development Tracker 2014d).   
There is another British-funded project that aims to enhance the relationship between India and 
Africa – this supports Indian trade and investments for Africa, and it has thus far received USD 
11.3 million of a planned USD 31.3 million. The project kicked off in 2013 and is ongoing. 
Nevertheless, it largely aims at facilitating African exports to India and can therefore not be 
counted as a trilateral project in development cooperation (for further information, see Devel-
opment Tracker 2015i). If we calculate the total that has been spent on proven trilateral projects, 
it amounts to a considerable amount of USD 25.7 million which is much higher than what is 
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 Table 7-9: Trilateral projects between the UK and India 
Third partner country Target area Amount spent (in 
USD) 
Years of cooperation 
Unspecified DFID TERI Partnership Africa 
Component 
1.5 million 
(total 13.9 million) 
2010-2014 
Unspecified UKIERI (UK India Education 
and Research Initiative) 
10.2 million 2013-2014 
Unspecified Global Research Partnership 
programme 
905 thousand 
(project for 8.2 mil-
lion) 
2012-ongoing 
Unspecified Knowledge Partnership Pro-
gramme 
11.8 million 
(project for 14.8 mil-
lion) 
2012-ongoing 
Unspecified Innovative Ventures and Tech-
nologies for Development (IN-
VENT) 
1.3 million 
(project for 12.5 mil-
lion) 
2013-ongoing 
Unspecified Supporting Indian Trade and 
Investment for Africa 
(11.3 million;  
Project for 31.3 mil-
lion) 
2013-ongoing 
                                                                                                                   Source: Own compilation based on data found on UK development tracker 
Next to the impressive cooperation in trilateral projects with all emerging donors, the UK is 
also committed to strengthening their multilateral power potential. One initiative intends to 
facilitate access to high quality health commodities, such as vaccines and HIV/AIDS medicines, 
and cooperates with China, India and South Africa, as the “key emerging power suppliers” (De-
velopment Tracker 2012c, 5). Since 2011, a total of USD 67.5 million has been spent on the 
ongoing project, which has a total budget of approximately USD 95 million. This projects largely 
funds research with the aim of making health commodities cheaper to the benefit of the three 
countries themselves but also with the intention of transferring these cheaper commodities to 
other developing countries. The highest share of funds is attributed to India’s contribution. As 
recipient countries, Uganda has been identified (for further information, see Development 
Tracker 2013b). 148  A second interesting multilateral initiative that the UK supports is the 
GROW campaign, which is undertaken by Oxfam, a British NGO. The initiative aims at im-
proving agricultural activity worldwide and to prevent land grabs and minimise negative conse-
quences resulting from climate change. Since 2011, the UK has financed the GROW campaign 
in Brazil, South Africa and India with a total of USD 1.9 million. All of these campaigns aim at 
fostering the potential of emerging donors in enhancing agricultural productivity in third recip-
ient states (for further information, see Development Tracker 2015e).  
                                                 
148 Note that since 2015, all funds are disbursed through Human Development Department rather than through 
the country departments which makes it much harder to identify trilateral projects in this.  
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 Table 7-10: Trilateral projects between the UK and multiple donors 
Third partner country Target area Amount spent (in 
USD) 
Years of cooperation 
India, South Africa, Brazil GROW Campaign of Oxfam, 
enhancing agricultural produc-
tivity 
1.9 million 2011-ongoing 
India, South Africa & China Market-Shaping for Access to 
Safe, Effective and Affordable 
Health Commodities 
(57.5 million) 
(project plans with 
94.5 million) 
2012-ongoing 
                                                                                                                   Source: Own compilation based on data found on UK development tracker 
Overall, the UK puts an impressive amount of resources into collaborating with emerging do-
nors in trilateral projects. Among the three donors observed here, it has the strongest narrative 
and follows through in the practices of its development cooperation. Their idea – of cooperating 
from the beginning with all emerging donors in order to “help them” – seems to have fostered 
a faster change than in the two other countries. The next section compares the results of all 
three traditional donors regarding trilateral cooperation and elaborates on the theoretical link.  
7.4 Concluding remarks: institutional change within trilateral cooperation? 
Several general conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. First, it seems that whenever a 
bilateral country programme runs out, the incentive for the traditional donor is to initiate trilat-
eral cooperation. Expressed in relation to the total amount of bilateral and multilateral aid, only 
minor percentages are distributed through trilateral projects. Nevertheless, all three traditional 
donors spend increasing amounts on this form of cooperation. While this is true in the narrative, 
there is more ambiguity within the practices concerning the funding of trilateral projects. This 
difference can be explained through the explanatory variable of this study – ideas. Depending 
on the weight of the idea for fostering trilateral cooperation or not, the practices invariably 
follow suit. The following table summarises the amounts spent by the traditional donors on 
trilateral projects.   
  Table 7-11: Summarizing trilateral projects of all three traditional donors 
Traditional 
donor 
Ideas China Brazil India  South Africa 
USA Cooperating with like-
minded countries 
Socialise them 
1.6 million 8.3-9.3 million 10.9 million 4-7 million 
Norway Integrate EDs into multi-
lateral structures 
1.7 million 9 million None 4.7 million 
UK Cooperating with all EDs 
Help them 
44.6 million 35.2 million 25.7 million 7.8 million 
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It seems therefore that the most influential and powerful idea that triggered the biggest change 
in trilateral cooperation is the one of a general willingness to cooperate with all emerging donors 
and to help them integrate into the system of development assistance. These ideas, which are 
perhaps most prevalent within the United Kingdom, have not only led to an increasing narrative 
surrounding the support for concrete trilateral projects, but also to a change within the rules 
and practices of the development cooperation of the United Kingdom. The UK started to view 
trilateral cooperation early on as a positive new phenomenon that enabled them to maintain a 
good relationship with countries where there would no longer be a bilateral aid relationship. 
What is striking in the case of the United Kingdom is that they engage with all emerging donors 
in trilateral cooperation irrespective, of the potential similarities between democratic emerging 
donors and themselves. Even more, the strongest collaboration takes place between the UK 
and China, indicating that the UK sees cooperation with China as more important than potential 
other projects. The positive perception that the UK generally brought towards emerging donors 
had an effect on its activities regarding trilateral cooperation.  
The second most influential ideas are those present in the narratives of the United States: the 
cooperation with like-minded countries and the willingness to socialise them to U.S.-American 
standards has fostered strong, if somewhat belated results in the narratives and has followed 
through in the rules and practices (even though to a lesser degree than in the case of the United 
Kingdom). The United States narrative towards trilateral cooperation varied depending on the 
diverse donors. While it was rather hesitant towards China, it was more positive regarding India, 
Brazil and South Africa. Nevertheless, the overall amount of aid disbursed in the practices to 
trilateral cooperation is minimal at best. Especially when compared to overall aid figures of the 
United States and to the commitment of the United Kingdom, the engagement can only be 
considered small. Moreover, in the practices, it becomes clear that the United States does not 
cooperate much with China and that the negative anticipation it has regarding that country’s 
development cooperation keeps it from engaging fully in trilateral projects. The United State 
seems to be more willing to engage with like-minded emerging donors that share democratic 
principles. But even here, cooperation remains rather limited if compared to the United King-
dom. Nevertheless, in recent years, the United States seems to have picked up the general trend 
of collaborating more with all emerging donors – the initial ideas have therefore been adapted 
through exchanges and dialogues.  
Finally, within Norway, the ideas that there is a need to further integrate emerging donors into 
existing multilateral structures has only led to minor incentives within the narratives and even 
lower incentives in the layers of rules and practices regarding trilateral cooperation. The narra-
tive and practice illustrate that, while Norway stresses that it finds the idea of trilateral cooper-
ation engaging, its narrative focuses on projects with either countries that are too important to 
ignore (China), or that have a similar political vision to its own (Brazil). The rules also illustrated 
that no general policy is formulated within Norway’s aid policies as to how to engage in trilateral 
cooperation. The practice confirmed the tentative approach of Norway regarding trilateral co-
operation. Isolated projects receive funding, especially with Brazil, while China and South Africa 
only receive very limited amounts for trilateral projects. Generally, the engagement of Norway 
in trilateral cooperation has remained low and not increased, despite a slightly increasing pres-
ence of the topic in the narrative from 2010 onwards. This hesitance can only be explained by 
the fact that Norway lays the responsibility for integrating emerging donors into existing struc-
tures upon multilateral structures rather than upon itself – in contrast to the United States (with 
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the idea of socialising emerging donors) and the United Kingdom (with the idea to help them 
integrate).  
Theoretically speaking, ideas about emerging donors and their activities have been highly influ-
ential for explaining the change within trilateral cooperation. It seems therefore that the hypoth-
esis that change is easier to trigger within a newly established field is confirmed by the findings 
of this chapter. The hypothesis that change is easier within the layers of narratives than it is on 
the layers of rules and practices could be further confirmed within the cases of the United States 
and Norway. Moreover, the mechansims of displacement could be identified as existing rules 
(of an aid relationship between the three traditional donors and of all four emerging donors) 





8 Concluding remarks 
This study had three core aims. The first of these was to make a contribution to the general 
debate about the form of cooperation or conflict between established powers and new power 
centres. The second aim was theoretical: an attempt to link the contributions of institutionalist 
and constructivist theoretical prisms and illuminate this relationship regarding (a) the potential 
explanatory power of ideas and (b) the study of institutional change with the theoretical setting 
of an institution composed of three layers (narratives, rules and practices). The final aim was to 
make an empirical contribution to a field that is often speculated about, but rarely concretely 
investigated: the reaction of traditional donors to the emergence of new donors. This concluding 
chapter examines the findings of this study in detail and addresses its three aims in reverse order. 
The last aim (empirical findings) is addressed in the first section. The second – theoretical – aim 
is addressed in the following section. Finally, the first aim (a contribution to the general debate 
on cooperation) is addressed in the last section that discusses the lessons learned from this study 
for further studies on similar topics. 
8.1 Summary of the findings of the study 
This thesis set itself as a goal to find answers to the following main research question:  
 How do the three selected traditional donors react towards the increased presence of 
emerging donors?  
This question was further subdivided into four guiding questions:  
 What are the dominant ideas that exist about emerging donors within the three tradi-
tional donors’ aid communities?  
 Is there, first, a change in their approach towards conditionality? And second, how do 
they approach trilateral cooperation?  
 Are there common reactions towards emerging donors from the three selected cases? If 
so, can they be generalised even further (for other traditional donors); if not, how can 
these differences be explained?  
 Can the ideas about emerging donor policies explain potential changes within traditional 
donors’ aid policies?  
In order to answer these questions, chapter 2 established the theoretical hypotheses that guide 
this study. It first explained how each individual donor policy was conceptualised as an institu-
tion, composed of narratives, rules and practices, thereby rendering the study of institutional 
change more tangible and easier to track. The chapter further argued that the main explanatory 
variables which trigger institutional change are ideas; that change is more likely to happen on 
the layers of narratives than on the layers of rules and practices, and that change is likelier to be 
triggered in a newly established policy field rather than a well-established one. The following 
chapter gave the reasons for choosing the three traditional donors (through a most-different-
case design), the material (primary documents, expert interviews, and aid statistics), as well as 
the interpretative method (qualitative content analysis with the support of the coding pro-
gramme MaxQDA). Chapter 4 then introduced the empirical puzzle and briefly presented the 
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development policies of the four relevant emerging donors and the three cases studied here: the 
aid institutions of the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom. The chapter illustrated 
the institutional set-up of the three donors and drew out the differences between their respective 
aid policies. Finally, chapter 5 to 7 provided the empirical core of this study, addressing the 
question of what kind of ideas predominate in the three traditional donor countries about 
emerging donors (chapter 5), and what kind of institutional change took place within the field 
of conditionality (chapter 6) and trilateral cooperation (chapter 7). The following sections sum-
marise the empirical and theoretical results of this thesis.  
8.1.1 Empirical findings: New players – same game?  
This thesis examined two policy fields – conditionality and trilateral cooperation – and asked 
whether institutional change has taken place in these areas because of emerging donors.  
Institutional changes within conditionality 
The main influential ideas that arguably influenced the change process within conditionality 
were discussed in chapter 5. All three traditional donors evidently feared that the values under-
lying their aid might be undermined by the competition of emerging donors. Nevertheless, the 
degree to which they emphasise this varies immensely, which is decisive for explaining differing 
reactions within conditionality.  
In the case of all three donors, the principle background idea that might slow down change 
within conditionality (and trilateral cooperation) was a commitment to democracy, which pos-
sibly led to a defence of conditional approaches. Moreover, all pursued self-interest through 
their aid (with commercial and diplomatic goals paramount, though the United States arguably 
had a stronger focus on security objectives than the other donors). Even more importantly, the 
fact that all three donors pursue a value-driven development policy proved to be very influential 
in the layers of narratives and rules of conditionality, as these values were perceived to be under 
threat by some donors of our group. This was particularly true for the United States, where 
especially political values are seen to be under threat, mostly by China. Similarly, Norway saw 
important political values, such as good governance and human rights, threatened by emerging 
donors. This was less true for the United Kingdom where there was only an urge for more 
transparent aid policies by all donors involved. 
The United States and the United Kingdom emphasised in their statements that there is a need 
to adapt the policies of emerging donors to their own (or similar) standards. Furthermore, the 
United States and the United Kingdom stressed the importance of making their aid more re-
sults-based (for the UK) and more visible (for the U.S.) – two factors that explained the insti-
tutional change within conditionality of those two donors. Finally, Norway saw the sustainable 
use of natural resources under threat – another element that influenced its decision-making 
process with respect to conditionality.  
Chapter 6 then analysed in detail the reaction of traditional donors within the field of condi-
tionality. Overall, change was most present on the layers of narratives (as the theoretical hy-
potheses had suggested) and somewhat detectible on the layer of rules, where especially the 
United States and the United Kingdom advocated an increased selectivity in the choice of their 
recipients. On the whole, this was implemented for those two donors within the rules (for the 
Concluding remarks│213 
 
UK within their partnership principles and for the United States in the selective criteria for the 
MCC). For both donors, more emphasis was put on the criteria of respecting human rights and 
good governance approaches in their potential recipients. Norway, on the other hand, had a 
torn attitude towards conditionality because it also emphasised the idea of ownership, which it 
saw largely in opposition to the more paternalistic concept of conditionality. Nevertheless, Nor-
way showed some support for political conditions (especially those representing its own values, 
such as human rights and good governance). Within the layer of narratives and rules then, the 
difference in the reaction can be explained by the ideas attached to emerging donors and espe-
cially to conditionality itself.   
In the practices, however, there was no implementation of this stronger selectivity of political 
conditions. Norway, just like the United States and the United Kingdom, disbursed their money 
widely across the 11 selected countries where the three donors shared an interest with emerging 
donors. This can only partly be explained with the input of ideas – which would lead us to 
expect strong differences in the reactions of the three donors – but such change can only be 
found within the layers of narratives (and partly rules). Within the practices, however, a different 
rationale needs to be used to explain the increasing ignorance of the narratives that aim for a 
greater selectivity. Despite the strong narrative, the direct competition with emerging donors in 
the 11 selected countries seems to have frozen the relations that the donors maintained with the 
recipients prior to the policy change and money continued to flow whether or not the conditions 
of selectivity were respected in most cases. Only rarely, then, were conditional approaches truly 
followed through in practice. Other explanations could be the security or diplomatic rationale 
behind aid distribution that slow the process of implementing strict conditionality down con-
siderably – especially, it seems, when emerging donors are also present. This is also true for 
Norway, where the Oil for Development initiative clearly advocated for greater selectivity which in 
the end was not realised in the practices – in a field where emerging donors are a direct threat 




Table 8-1: Summarizing the main empirical findings on conditionality 





threat of political val-
ues (especially from 
China) 
Need to socialise do-
nors to American val-
ues 
Need to make Ameri-
can aid more visible 
Especially political val-
ues under threat 
 
Strong emphasis on 
ownership  
Unsustainable use of 
resources  
Undermining some values 
(like transparency) 
Idea to help them, attempts 
to socialise emerging do-
nors to British values 
Need for stronger results-










and diplomatic; strong 
selectivity) 
Value-driven policy 
Motives (commercial and 
diplomatic; also diplomatic) 
Value-driven policy 
Results in the 
narratives 
Strong increase in nar-
rative for a more se-
lective approach  
Mixed results in narra-
tive (especially be-
cause of the emphasis 
on ownership)  
Increase in narrative for a 
more selective approach 
Results in the 
rules and prac-
tices 
Mixed results in prac-
tice and rules 
Rules and practices: 
weak response! 
Mixed results in practice 
and rules 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Source: Own compilation 
Within the field of conditionality, then, the explanatory power of ideas comes up against its 
limits. Some institutional change has taken place within the layers of narratives (and rules for 
the UK and the USA), but the practices have barely changed at all. This adding of another layer 
to previously existing rules and practices is well captured with the theoretical mechanism of 
layering that was at place here (but only on the layers of narratives and rules while practices 
remained largely untouched). A continued process of layering could lead to a change of all layers 
if the process continues – which means in practice that if the narratives and rules continue to 
push for higher selectivity among recipients this might well be implemented in practices – this 
process is however likely to remain theoretical as we have seen that other explanations are rele-
vant when it comes to the implementation of conditionality.  
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Institutional changes within trilateral cooperation 
Chapter 5 elaborated in detail on the main ideas held by the United States, Norway and the 
United Kingdom about emerging donors in general which could be influential for triggering 
change in trilateral cooperation. It showed that all three recognise the increasing economic rel-
evance of emerging countries and the relevance of their donor policies. Moreover, all three paid 
more attention to the activities of China than to the other three emerging donors. Nevertheless, 
within the individual appraisal of emerging countries, some differences can be divined; the 
United States focused most of its attention on China and distinguished Chinese activities from 
those of like-minded countries. Similarly, Norway put most emphasis on Chinese activities in 
Africa but also recognised Indian efforts, while neglecting South African and Brazilian develop-
ment cooperation. The United Kingdom similarly acknowledged the bigger importance of 
China but equally stressed the significance of Brazil’s development cooperation. South Africa 
and India received less attention. These differences in the focus of attention could explain a 
varying readiness to engage with some emerging donors in trilateral projects rather than with 
others.   
Moreover, what could be influential for explaining change in the field of trilateral cooperation 
is the stated willingness to cooperate more closely with emerging donors that the United States 
and the United Kingdom have both expressed – though to a stronger degree from the latter. 
Both donors share the foreground idea that they would like to socialise or help emerging donors 
in order to “improve” their development assistance. Norway, on the other hand, also expressed 
a desire to cooperate more closely with emerging donors but especially focused on the need to 
integrate emerging donors better into existing multilateral structures. The same background 
ideas that we saw in the field of conditionality were in play here, and they could slow down 
change considerably. 
Chapter 7 then addressed the question of whether these ideas really triggered institutional 
change within the field of trilateral cooperation. All three traditional donors spent increasing 
amounts on trilateral projects and often trilateral cooperation seemed to replace the cooperation 
whenever a bilateral aid relationship ran out, indicating that, indeed, institutional change had 
taken place. The strongest emphasis was put forward within the narratives, where especially the 
United States and the United Kingdom emphasised their willingness to engage in trilateral pro-
jects.  
The most influential and powerful idea that triggered the biggest change in trilateral cooperation 
was the general willingness to cooperate with all emerging donors and to help them integrate 
into the system of development assistance. These ideas, which are perhaps most prevalent 
within the United Kingdom, have not only led to an increasing narrative surrounding the sup-
port for concrete trilateral projects, but also to a change within the rules and practices of the 
development cooperation of the United Kingdom. The UK started to view trilateral cooperation 
early on as a positive new phenomenon that enabled them to maintain a good relationship with 
countries where there would no longer be a bilateral aid relationship. What was striking in the 
case of the United Kingdom was that they engaged with all emerging donors in trilateral coop-
eration, irrespective of the potential similarities between democratic emerging donors and them-
selves. Even more striking is that the strongest collaboration took place between the UK and 
China, indicating that the UK saw cooperation with China as more important than potential 
other projects. The positive perception that the UK generally brought towards emerging donors 
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had an effect on their activities regarding trilateral cooperation. Interestingly, the emphasis 
within the chapter on ideas was put upon China’s and Brazil’s aid activities whereas India and 
South Africa received less attention. A similar picture can be painted of the actual trilateral 
projects where South Africa receives least funds of all. This further confirms the potential of 
ideas to trigger change in this newly established field.  
The second most influential ideas were those present in the narratives of the United States: the 
cooperation with like-minded countries and the willingness to socialise them to U.S.-American 
standards has fostered strong, if somewhat belated results in the narratives, which has generally 
also been implemented in the rules and practices (even though to a lesser degree than in the 
case of the United Kingdom). The United States’ narrative towards trilateral cooperation varied 
depending on the diverse donors. While it was rather hesitant towards China, it was more pos-
itive regarding India, Brazil and South Africa – further confirming the importance of ideas about 
their aid activities for the actual engagement with them. Nevertheless, the overall amount of aid 
disbursed in the practices to trilateral cooperation is, at best, minimal. Especially when com-
pared to overall aid figures of the United States and to the commitment of the United Kingdom, 
the engagement can only be considered small. Moreover, in the practices, it becomes clear that 
the United States does not cooperate much with China and that the negative anticipation it had 
regarding that country’s development cooperation keeps it from engaging fully in trilateral pro-
jects. The United State seemed to be more willing to engage with like-minded emerging donors 
that share democratic principles. But even here, cooperation remains rather limited if compared 
to the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, in recent years, the United States seemed to have picked 
up the general trend of collaborating more with all emerging donors – the initial ideas have 
therefore been adapted through exchanges and dialogues.  
Finally, in the Norwegian case, the idea that there is a need to further integrate emerging donors 
into existing multilateral structures has only led to minor incentives within the narratives and 
even lower incentives in the layers of rules and practices regarding trilateral cooperation. The 
narrative and practice illustrate that, while Norway stresses that it finds the idea of trilateral 
cooperation engaging, its narrative focuses on projects either with countries that are too im-
portant to ignore (China), or that have a similar political vision to its own (Brazil). The rules also 
illustrated that no general policy is formulated within Norwegian aid as to how to engage in 
trilateral cooperation. The practice confirmed the tentative approach of Norway regarding tri-
lateral cooperation. Isolated projects receive funding, especially with Brazil, while China and 
South Africa only receive very limited amounts for trilateral projects. Generally, the engagement 
of Norway in trilateral cooperation has remained very low. This hesitance can only be explained 
by the fact that Norway laid the responsibility for integrating emerging donors into existing 
structures upon multilateral structures rather than upon itself – in contrast to the United States 
(with the idea of socialising emerging donors) and the United Kingdom (with the idea to help 
them integrate).  
In general, all donors engage increasingly in trilateral projects – an institutional change has there-
fore certainly taken place within the development policies of the traditional donors examined 
here. Speaking in terms of the change mechanisms introduced by James Mahoney and Kathleen 
Thelen (2010a), a process of displacement has occurred: the aid relationship between the tradi-
tional donors and emerging donors has ended (existing rules have been displaced), and a new 
form of cooperation has begun in the form of trilateral projects (new rules have been put in 
place). The mechanism of displacement therefore nicely illustrates the change process that has 
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taken place while ideas explain most of the empirical findings. The following table summarises 
the empirical findings on trilateral cooperation.  
Table 8-2: Summarizing the findings on trilateral cooperation 








donors to American 
values 
Incentive to increase 
cooperation with all 
emerging donors 
Need for better inte-
gration in multilateral 
aid structures 
Strong need to increase co-
operation with emerging 
donors 











and diplomatic; strong 
selectivity) 
Value-driven policy 
Motives (commercial and 





Increase in narrative Smaller increase in 
narrative 
Strong increase in narrative 
Empirical re-
sults (rules & 
practices) 
Increasing trend in tri-
lateral cooperation 
(biggest with India 
(USD 10.9 million) and 
Brazil (USD 9.3 mil-
lion)) 
Weak response in 
rules and practices 
(strongest focus on 
Brazil (with USD 9 mil-
lion) and South Africa 
(USD 4.7 million) 
Strong increase in rules and 
practices (strongest focus 
on projects with China (with 
USD 44.6 million) and Brazil 
(USD 35.2 million) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Source: Own compilation 
Generally, then, this thesis has shown that all three traditional donors adapt their aid policies in 
both domains that were studied here, but more so in the newly established field of trilateral 
cooperation. Ultimately, we are dealing here with new players in a partly different game – where 
especially the narratives and rules for conditionality increased whereas trilateral cooperation has 
largely replaced the aid relationship between emerging and traditional donors. What about the 
theoretical implications of these empirical findings? The next section develops on these.  
8.1.2 Theoretical findings: the results of mixing institutionalism with constructivism 
The main theoretical questions were twofold: first, can ideas serve as an explanatory variable 
for institutional change? With respect to the material presented here, this question asks whether 
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the ideas that traditional donors had about emerging donors can explain the changes within 
their aid policies. The answer to that question is slightly unsatisfying: yes, they can, but only 
partly. First of all, a distinction is necessary between the two policy fields. Within the older 
policy field (conditionality) ideas were particularly helpful to explaining a change within the nar-
ratives and rules of the donor institutions, but were much less influential to explaining the 
change (or rather non-change) for practices. Different – and more interest-based explanations 
– could be helpful in explaining the inertia in the practices of conditionality. Within the newer 
policy field, however, ideas could explain most of the change (or lack thereof in the case of 
Norway) and proved to be a useful explanatory variable. Therefore, future studies should con-
tinue to take the explanatory power seriously.  
The second aspect that was investigated here was the kind of change that took place within the 
thematic fields of conditionality (explained in chapter 6) and trilateral cooperation (studied in 
chapter 7). The theoretical hypotheses claimed that change is more likely to occur in less well-
established thematic fields (such as trilateral cooperation) whereas it is less likely to occur in 
well-established, traditional fields (such as conditionality) as veto players are more active in a 
field with a long tradition than in one with less history to look back upon. Moreover, the claim 
was that change begins within the layer of narratives, continues within the layer of rules, but is 
least likely to occur in the layer of practices. Have these theoretical assumptions been confirmed 
by this study? These hypotheses were verified through the empirical study and give credit to 
theories focusing on path-dependent tendencies of long established fields. Moreover, the divi-
sion of the institution of development cooperation into the layers of narratives, rules and prac-
tices has proven to be incredibly useful to understanding the underlying change processes that 
are otherwise difficult to decipher.  
The above summary on the empirical findings has already developed on the usefulness of the 
mechanisms to illustrate what kind of change takes place: the mechanisms of layering and dis-
placement could clearly be identified and combined with the helpful distinction into three insti-
tutional layers – these two theoretical inputs have greatly enriched the understanding of the 
empirical material and can be recommended for further studies.   
8.2 Lessons and contributions of this thesis for future studies 
What lessons can be drawn for future studies on similar theoretical or empirical topics? A first 
question that needs to be addressed is the choice of cases. Did this study undertake too big a 
task from the beginning – and would it potentially have benefited from focusing on one singular 
thematic field (conditionality OR trilateral cooperation) or excluding one of the three donors 
from the empirical observations? Both choices were made deliberately: focusing only on one 
thematic field would have limited the reach of this study considerably, as both aspects (condi-
tionality and trilateral cooperation) are areas of strong adaptation. Focusing solely on the adap-
tation of conditionality could have painted too grim a picture for the relationship between the 
two donor groups – similarly, focusing solely on trilateral cooperation would have indicated a 
too optimistic outlook on the relationship. Moreover, excluding one of the three donors would 
have reduced the explanatory power of this thesis: had one simply concentrated on the United 
States and the United Kingdom, one would have had a nice, dense story of the Anglo-Saxon 
reaction towards emerging donors – but without the balance of another model of cooperation. 
Similarly, excluding either the United States or the United Kingdom would have either taken 
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away any European donor (in the case of the UK) or the largest nominal contributor in devel-
opment aid, which is to focus on small changes and to ignore the bigger picture. Therefore, the 
study was conceived the way it is – with the limitations that were mentioned. Future studies 
might profit from the outline of this work and build possibly on a broader sample: as such, it 
could be imaginable to include further donor countries to the theoretical framework established 
here or to add another thematic field (for instance the work of infrastructure development). 
One should, however, keep in mind that when adding several other cases, one might lose inter-
esting insights into the empirical reality of donor policies. As this study has demonstrated the 
reaction is individual to the ideas that reign within the particular donor country about emerging 
donors, but also about the general concept of development cooperation or cooperation more 
broadly. Moreover, the differences in the reactions of the group of three traditional donors can 
only be understood when taking national histories, interests and individual political settings into 
account. Including further countries into the study might have allowed for more generalisations 
to be made but to the detriment of empirical, detailed knowledge of what traditional donors 
actually do in reaction to emerging donors – the main purpose of this study.  
The third and last aim of this study was to contribute to the academic debate about the (future) 
relationship between two distinct groups: established and rising powers. This thesis gives an 
indication of the sheer complexity of the relationship between these two groups in only one 
particular policy field: development cooperation. While trilateral cooperation could be indicative 
of a closer cooperation (or at least closer contact) between the two groups, the investigation of 
conditionality has highlighted remaining differences and strong rivalries. Similarly complex stud-
ies should be undertaken to enhance our understanding of the relationship between the South 
and the North. This case study on the field of development cooperation could be equally con-
ducted in the area of financial cooperation (or competition), climate change policies, security 
policies, policies towards international institutions, trade relationships – in short in any field of 
international relations. The potential power shift is indeed a topic that is here to stay in the 
discipline of international relations. The lessons that can be drawn for future research from this 
study are manifold: 
First, the study has emphasised that, especially when studying the relationship between two 
distinctive and potentially competing groups in international relations, ideas and perceptions do 
play a role in explaining policy change. Therefore, even though other factors are also very im-
portant and should not be neglected, neither should the factor of ideas.  
Second, the study also indicated that it is important to understand a relationship as a two-way 
street. It would be beneficial for future studies to also take the reaction of emerging countries 
into consideration, even though this might require a more complex theoretical framework. What 
could be truly interesting is a study that looks at both reactions simultaneously in order to un-
derstand the mutual impact that countries have on each other. Possibly, a little more time could 
be beneficial in order to truly establish what is a reaction towards traditional donors and what 
is simply the consolidation of emerging donors’ aid policies – that might indeed be a worthy 
field for future researchers.  
Third, the theoretical framework has allowed us to look at development cooperation through 
the prism of three distinctive layers. This enterprise was truly beneficial as it uncovered – espe-
cially for the field of conditionality – the great inconsistencies that often exist between what is 
said officially (narratives) and what is actually done (practices). This dichotomy should be kept 
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in mind when designing future studies so that none of the layers are neglected, as they all offer 
interesting insights into complex policy processes and their change mechanisms.  
Finally, the thesis has shown that the story of the relationship between these two groups of 
countries will never be easy to tell. Any relationship cannot be summarised under headings such 
as “good” or “bad”. Most of the time, relations between two countries can probably be charac-
terised as “OK”. What exactly defines this “OK” relationship and whether it has more elements 
of “good” or of “bad” is the work that political science has set out to do. This study therefore 
is a contribution towards defining more specifically the character of this “OK” relationship 
between emerging and traditional forces within the field of development cooperation: whereas 
the field of conditionality hinted at potential rivalries over influence in recipient countries and 
specific sectors, the field of trilateral cooperation could indicate a promising exchange of 
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Yamamoto Donald Y. U.S. (Principal Deputy) Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of 
African Affairs 
Since 2012 







9.2 List of documents consulted  
9.2.1 Document for the United States of America 
Institution (ab-
breviation) 
Institution Amount of documents 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 48 
USCESR United States China-Economic and Security Review 
Commission  
23 
U.S. Congress United States Congress 35 
USDS United States Department of State 261 
USDS & USAID United States Department of State & United States 
Agency for International Development (joint state-
ments) 
28 
US GOV United States Government / White House 45 
USMCC United States Millennium Challenge Corporation  64 
US AGH&HR United States Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health 
and Human Rights 
5 
US FAC United States Foreign Affairs Committee 
 
2 
  In total 546 
United States Agency for International Development  
Blumel, Christina, and QueTran Nguyen. 2008. Research guide: Trilateral cooperation and emerging donors. 
Washington D.C. USAID Knowledge Center. Accessed Mai 2016. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADM006.pdf. 
Fore, Henrietta H. 2015. “Closing remarks for donor coordination forum.” United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development, Washington D.C., April 21. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/news-infor-
mation/speeches/closing-remarks-donor-coordination-forum. 
Johnson, Doug, Gene Goldstein-Plesser, and Tristan Zajong. 2014. Can foreign aid create an incentive for good 
governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Cooperation. Washington D.C. USAID. 
Lopes, Mark. 2011. “Staff exchange deepens between Brazil and the U.S.” USAID Blog, February 11. Accessed 
August 2015. https://blog.usaid.gov/2011/02/staff-exchange-program-deepens-relationship-between-bra-
zil-and-u-s/. 
———. 2011. “Doing business in Latin America: Sharing reform experiences.” United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development, Washington D.C., December 14. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/news-
information/speeches/remarks-mark-lopes-deputy-assistant-administrator-latin-america-and. 




Rollins, Denise. 2014. “Budget oversight: Examining the President's 2015 budget request for South Asia.” 
United States Agency for International Development, Washington D.C., April 30. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/congressional-testimony/apr-30-2014-denise-rollins-budget-
oversight-2015-south-asia. 
Shah, Rajiv. 2010. “On U.S. strategy to achieve MDGs.” United States Agency for International Development, 
Washington D.C., July 30. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-re-
leases/statement-usaid-administrator-dr-rajiv-shah-us-strategy-achieve. 
———. 2011. “Remarks at DRG 2.0 Promoting democracy, human rights, and governance in 2011 Conference: 
An expansion of human welfare.” United States Agency for International Development, Washington D.C., 
June 20. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/remarks-usaid-adminis-
trator-dr-raj-shah-drg-20-promoting-democracy-human. 
———. 2013. “USAID forward event.” United States Agency for International Development, Washington D.C., 
March 20. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/remarks-administra-
tor-rajiv-shah-usaid-forward-progress-event. 
Tindell, Erin. 2013. “Helping Haiti recover three years later.” USAID Blog, March 6. Accessed August 2015. 
https://blog.usaid.gov/2013/03/helping-haiti-recover-three-years-later/. 
USAID. 2002. Foreign aid in the national interest: Promoting freedoms, security and opportunity. Washington 
D.C. United States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usaid/foreign_aid_in_the_national_interest-full.pdf. 
———. 2004. Foreign food aid donation program. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International De-
velopment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circu-
lars/a133_compliance/04/usaid.pdf. 
———. 2004. U.S. foreign aid: Meeting the challenges of the 21st century. White   paper. Washington D.C. United 
States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~gur-
ney/ForAidWhtPap.pdf. 
———. 2005. Audit of USAID/ South Africa’s global alliance development programme. Washington D.C. United 
States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/audit-reports/4-674-05-004-p.pdf. 
———. 2006. China's impact on the developing world and implications for US development assistance policy. 
Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADX884.pdf. 
———. 2006. Foreign assistance framework: Plan. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International De-
velopment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/frame-
work_102506.pdf. 
———. 2007. Foreign direct investment and implications for the U.S. Review made for USAID. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK049.pdf. 
———. 2008. USAID Implementing mechanisms, an additional help for ADS Chapters 200-203. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/200sbo.pdf. 
———. 2010. Cooperation with China on international development. Washington D.C. United States Agency for 
International Development. Accessed August 2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACS419.pdf. 
———. 2010. Country development cooperation strategy: Southern Africa: Regional development strategy 2011-
2016. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/SouthernAfricaRDCS.pdf. 
———. 2010. Five decades of US-India cooperation. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International 







———. 2010. The changing face of Indian philanthropy. Washington D.C. United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development. Accessed August 2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADM067.pdf. 
———. 2011. Annual letter. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1872/USAID-Annual-Letter-2011.pdf. 
———. 2011. Memorandum of understanding between ABC and USAID for staff exchange. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX236.pdf. 
———. 2011. Protocol of intensions of the United States and Brazil for the expansion of cooperation in third 






———. 2011. “U.S. foreign assistance performance publication: South Africa fiscal year 2009.” News release. 
2011. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/159155.pdf. 
———. 2011. “U.S. foreign assistance performance publication: India fiscal year 2009.” News release. 2011. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/159243.pdf. 
———. 2011. “U.S. foreign assistance performance publication: Brazil fiscal year 2009.” News release. 2011. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/159247.pdf. 
———. 2011. “U.S. foreign assistance performance publication: China fiscal year 2009.” News release. 2011. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/159177.pdf. 
———. 2012. Annual letter. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/2012annualletter.pdf. 
———. 2012. Country development cooperation strategy: India: 2012-2016. Washington D.C. United States 
Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/1861/India_CDCS.pdf. 
———. 2012. Protocol of intensions of the United States, Brazil and Honduras for technical cooperation in Hon-
duras. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAC207.pdf. 
———. 2013. Annual letter. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacw323.pdf. 
———. 2013. Country development cooperation strategy: South Africa: 2013-2017. Washington D.C. United 
States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/1860/USAID-Southern%20Africa%20Final%20CDCS%20-%20Public%20Version.pdf. 
———. 2013. Trilateral assistance program. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Develop-
ment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Trilateral%20Assis-
tance%20Program%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
———. 2014. Annual letter. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/9276/USAIDAnnualLetter2014.pdf. 
———. 2014. Can foreign aid be an incentive for good governance? Interview with Mr Kelly. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/audit-reports/m-000-14-005-s.pdf. 
———. 2015. “Foreign aid dashboard.” https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-dashboard.html. 




———. 2015. Memorandum of understanding between China and USAID for future cooperation. Washington 
D.C. United States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/9-24-15-Final%20MoU%20on%20Develop-
ment%20Cooperation%20-%20USAID-MoFCOM-%20Clean.pdf. 
———. 2015. Our work: South Africa. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Development. 
Accessed December 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/south-africa/our-work. 
———. 2015. Trilateral cooperation with Brazil. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Devel-
opment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/brazil/our-work/trilateral-cooperation. 
———. 2015. Trilateral cooperation with South Africa. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International 
Development. Accessed December 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/trilateral-assistance. 
———. 2016. Agricultural Innovation Partnership Program. Washington D.C. United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development. Accessed August 2016. http://www.aginnovation.org/. 
———. 2016. Developing agricultural communities: Project in Timor Leste with China. Washington D.C. United 
States Agency for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/timor-
leste/project-descriptions/developing-agricultural-communities. 
———. 2016. U.S. - India triangular cooperation. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International De-
velopment. Accessed August 2016. https://www.usaid.gov/india/us-india-triangular-cooperation. 
———. 2016. “United States and Brazil expand partnership to promote food security in Mozambique.” News 
release. July 1. Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jul-1-2015-
united-states-and-brazil-expand-partnership-promote-food-security. 
United States China Economic and Security Review Commission  
Bartholomew, Carolyn. 2006. “Opening statement.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? Washington D.C., August 3. 
Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTras-
cript.pdf. 
Blumenthal, Daniel. 2006. “Opening statement.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? Washington D.C., August 3. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Brill Olcott, Martha. 2006. “Testimony: China and the Petroleum supply.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? 
Washington D.C., August 4. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/tran-
scripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Calabrese, John. 2006. “Testimony: The impact of China's diplomatic strategies on U.S. interests.” Hearing be-
fore the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a respon-
sible stakeholder? Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Christensen, Thomas. 2006. “Testimony: Administration perspectives.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? Washington 
D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/8.3-
4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Cohen, Ariel. 2006. “Testimony: China's involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” Hearing be-
fore the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a respon-
sible stakeholder? Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Downs, Erica S. 2006. “Testimony: China's energy requirements and policies.” Hearing before the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? 




Fredriksen, Katharine A. 2006. “Testimony: Administrative perspectives.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? 
Washington D.C., August 4. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/tran-
scripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Gates, David. 2006. “Testimony: China and the global petroleum supply.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? 
Washington D.C., August 4. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/tran-
scripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Genser, Jared M. 2006. “Testimony: China's relationship with countries of concern.” Hearing before the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stake-
holder? Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Gladney, Dru. 2006. “Testimony: China's involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” Hearing be-
fore the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a respon-
sible stakeholder? Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Inhofe, James M. 2006. “Testimony: Congressional perspectives.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? Washington D.C., 
August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06Hear-
ingTrascript.pdf. 
Jackson, Karl D. 2006. “Testimony: China's activities and diplomacy in Asia.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? 
Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/tran-
scripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Jaffe, Amy. 2006. “Testimony: China and the petroleum supply.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? Washington D.C., 
August 4. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06Hear-
ingTrascript.pdf. 
McDevitt, Michael. 2006. “Testimony: China's activities and diplomacy in Asia.” Hearing before the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? 
Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/tran-
scripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Ratliff, William. 2006. “Testimony: China's relationship with countries of concern.” Hearing before the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stake-
holder? Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Reeves, Eric. 2006. “Testimony: China's relationship with countries of concern.” Hearing before the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? 
Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/tran-
scripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Sutter, Robert. 2006. “Testimony: China's activities and diplomacy in Asia.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? 
Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/tran-
scripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Watson, Cynthia. 2006. “Testimony: The impact of China's diplomatic strategies on U.S. interests.” Hearing be-
fore the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a respon-
sible stakeholder? Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Weston, Jonathan, Caitlin Campbell, and Katherine Koleski. 2011. “China's foreign assistance in review: Implica-
tions for the United States.” Staff research backgrounder the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 




Wilson, Ernest J. 2006. “Testimony: The impact of China's diplomatic strategies on U.S. interests.” Hearing be-
fore the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a respon-
sible stakeholder? Washington D.C., August 3. Accessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Wortzel, Larry M. 2006. “Opening statement.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? Washington D.C., August 4. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. 
Wessel, Michael. 2006. “Opening statement.” Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission: China's role in the world: Is China a responsible stakeholder? Washington D.C., August 4. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf 
United States Congress 
Armitage, Richard L. 2004. “U.S. assistance programs in Iraq.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., 
September 24. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/37281.htm. 
Black, Cofer. 2004. “Foreign assistance and international terrorism.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington 
D.C., April 21. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2004/31672.htm. 
Burns, R. N. 2005. “The US and India: An emerging entente.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., 
September 8. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/52753.htm. 
Campbell, Kurt M. 2011. “Asia overview: Protecting American interests in China and Asia.” U.S. Congressional 
Testimony, Washington D.C., March 31. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/03/159450.htm. 
Carson, Johnnie. 2012. “Examining the U.S policy responses to entrenched African leadership.” U.S. Congres-
sional Testimony, Washington D.C., April 18. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2012/188121.htm. 
Christensen, Thomas. 2007. “The state of US China diplomacy.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., 
February 2. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/79866.htm. 
———. 2007. “US-China relations.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., March 27. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/82276.htm. 
———. 2008. “Shaping China's global choices through diplomacy.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington 
D.C., March 18. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/03/102327.htm. 
———. 2008. “China in Africa: Implications for U.S. policy.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., 
June 5. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/06/105556.htm. 
Desai Biswal, Nisha. 2011. “Bilateral assistance programs in China.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington 
D.C., November 15. Accessed August 2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACT150.pdf. 
———. 2014. “Reenergizing U.S.-India ties.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., July 16. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2014/229361.htm. 
———. 2014. “U.S. - India relations under the Modi government.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington 
D.C., July 24. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2014/229739.htm. 
Dobriansky, Paula J. 2005. “Promoting democracy through diplomacy.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Wash-
ington, D.C, May 5. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2005/46358.htm. 
Fore, Henrietta H. 2007. “US assistance reform.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., June 12. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2007/87626.htm. 
———. 2008. “Fiscal year 2009 budget hearing for foreign assistance.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washing-
ton D.C., February 27. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/f/releases/101453.htm. 
Fortenberry, Jeff. 2012. “Testimony.” U.S. Congressional Testimony: Assessing China's influence and role in Af-




Frazer, Jendayi. 2007. “Exploring the U.S. Africa command and a new strategic relationship with Africa.” U.S. 
Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., August 1. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/89905.htm. 
Hill, Christopher R. 2005. “Emergence of China in the Asia-Pacific: Economic and security consequences for the 
US.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., June 7. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/47334.htm. 
Jackson Lee, Sheila. 2012. “Testimony.” U.S. Congressional Testimony: Assessing China's influence and role in 
Africa, Washington D.C., March 29. Accessed August 2015. http://archives.republicans.foreignaf-
fairs.house.gov/112/73538.pdf. 
Jones, A. E. 2004. “U.S. foreign assistance programs.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., March 2. 
Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/30059.htm. 
Kritenbrink, Daniel J. 2011. “U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.).” U.S. Congressional Tes-
timony, Washington D.C., April 13. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/04/160652.htm. 
Kunder, James. 2006. “USAID assistance to Afghanistan.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., 
March 9. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/62971.htm. 
Natsios, Andrew S. 2007. “Darfur: A plan B to stop genocide.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., 
April 11. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/82941.htm. 
Negroponte, John D. 2007. “The future of political, economic and security relations with China.” U.S. Congres-
sional Testimony, Washington D.C., May 1. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/d/2007/84118.htm. 
———. 2008. “U.S. - China relations in the era of globalization.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington, 
D.C, May 15. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/2008/104932.htm. 
Russel, Daniel R. 2014. “The future of U.S.-China relations.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., 
June 25. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm. 
Shannon, Thomas A. 2007. “Vision and foreign assistance priorities for the Western hemisphere.” U.S. Congres-
sional Testimony, Washington D.C., March 1. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/07/q1/81226.htm. 
Shear, David B. 2009. “U.S.-China Relations: Maximizing the effectiveness of the strategic and economic dia-
logue.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington D.C., September 10. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/09/129103.htm. 
———. 2010. “China: Recent security developments.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington, D.C, January 
13. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/134167.htm. 
Simons, Paul. 2004. “Role of West Africa in our energy security.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington 
D.C., July 15. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/35771.htm. 
Smith, Christopher H. 2012. “Testimony.” U.S. Congressional Testimony: Assessing China's influence and role in 
Africa, Washington D.C., March 29. Accessed August 2015. http://archives.republicans.foreignaf-
fairs.house.gov/112/73538.pdf. 
Sullivan, Daniel S. 2008. “Energy issues in the Western hemisphere.” U.S. Congressional Testimony, Washington 
D.C., July 31. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/2008/107598.htm. 
Valenzuela, Arturo. 2011. “Priorities for U.S. assistance in the Western Hemisphere.” U.S. Congressional Testi-
mony, Washington D.C., April 13. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2011/160643.htm. 
Wayne, E. A. 2005. “Energy trends in China and India and their implications for the US.” U.S. Congressional Tes-
timony, Washington D.C., July 26. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/2005/66574.htm. 
Yun, Jospeh. 2013. “Democracy and human rights in the context of Asia rebalance.” U.S. Congressional Testi-




United States Department of State 
Blake, Jr. Robert O. 2013. “The new silk road and regional economic integration.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., March 13. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2013/206167.htm. 
Clinton, Hillary R. 14.012011. “Inaugural Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture on a broad vision of U.S.-China relations 
in the 21st century.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., 14.012011. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/01/154653.htm. 
———. 2009. “Closing remarks for U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., July 28. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clin-
ton/rm/2009a/july/126599.htm. 
———. 2010. “Leading Through Civilian Power.” Foreign Affairs Web (November/ December Issue). Accessed 
March 07, 2014. 
———. 2010. “Remarks on development in the 21st century.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., January 6. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clin-
ton/rm/2010/01/134838.htm. 
———. 2010. “World water day.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., March 22. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/03/138737.htm. 
———. 2010. “State Department foreign affairs day celebration.” United States Department of State, Washing-
ton D.C., May 7. Accessed August 2015. http://m.state.gov/md141611.htm. 
———. 2010. “Partnership of democracy: India.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., June 4. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/06/142702.htm. 
———. 2011. “Global chief of mission conference.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., Feb-
ruary 2. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/02/155870.htm. 
———. 2011. “State Department and USAID budget request.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., March 2. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clin-
ton/rm/2011/03/157577.htm. 
———. 2011. “Fiscal year 2012 budget request.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., March 
10. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/03/158004.htm. 
———. 2011. “Remarks at the opening session on the U.S.-India strategic dialogue.” United States Department 
of State, Washington D.C., July 19. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clin-
ton/rm/2011/07/168736.htm. 
———. 2011. “U.S.-India strategic dialogue joint statement.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., July 19. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168745.htm. 
———. 2011. “Briefing on Clinton's participation in global summit on aid.” United States Department of State, 
Washington D.C., November 28. Accessed August 2015. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/text-
trans/2011/11/20111128175701su0.8984143.html#axzz3rrdIwccQ. 
———. 2011. “Keynote at the opening session of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness.” United 
States Department of State, Busan, November 30. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/177892.htm. 
———. 2012. “Remarks on town hall meeting about quadrennial diplomacy and development review imple-
mentation.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., January 26. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/182613.htm. 
———. 2012. “National security and foreign policy priorities in the fiscal year 2013 International Affairs 
budget.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., February 28. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/02/184847.htm. 
———. 2012. “State Department and USAID budget request.” United States Department of State, Washington 




———. 2012. “Budget hearing for the State Department.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., 
February 29. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clin-
ton/rm/2012/02/184885.htm. 
———. 2012. “Clinton at second friends of the Lower Mekong meeting.” United States Department of State, 
Washington D.C., July 13. Accessed August 2015. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/text-
trans/2012/07/201207139032.html#axzz3qXECsyEk. 
———. 2012. “Delivering on the promise of economic statecraft.” United States Department of State, Washing-
ton D.C., November 17. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clin-
ton/rm/2012/11/200664.htm. 
———. 2012. “Remarks at the Foreign Policy Group's "Transformational Trends 2013" forum.” United States 
Department of State, Washington D.C., November 29. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/11/201235.htm. 
Clinton, Hillary R., Robert Gates, and Geithner, Timothy, Shah, Raj, Yohannes, Daniel. 2010. “Remarks in a 
roundtable discussion on the administration's annual U.S. global leadership coalition conference.” United 
States Department of State, Washington D.C., September 28. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/09/148304.htm. 
Clinton, Hillary R., Anne-Marie Slaugther, Patrick F. Kennedy, Rajiv Shah, and Dean Acheson. 2010. “Remarks at 
town hall meeting on the release of the first quadrennial diplomacy and development review.” United States 
Department of State, Washington D.C., December 15. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/12/152934.htm. 
Crebo-Rediker, Heidi. 2012. “U.S. engagement with international organizations.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., September 4. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/e/oce/rls/2012/200250.htm. 
Gordon, Philip H. 2012. “U.S. relations with Central Europe.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., September 20. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/197986.htm. 
Higginbottom, Heather. 2014. “Remarks on the State Department and USAID budget fiscal year 2015.” United 
States Department of State, Washington D.C., March 4. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/remarks/2014/222911.htm. 
Kerry, John. 2013. “Remarks to the headquarters of USAID.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., February 15. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/02/204829.htm. 
———. 2013. “Fiscal year 2014 budget request for Foreign Operations.” United States Department of State, 
Washington D.C., April 18. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2013/04/207698.htm. 
———. 2013. “Fiscal year 2014 International Affairs budget: Opening remarks.” Washington D.C., April 18. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/04/207698.htm. 
———. 2014. “Background briefing on the President's FY15 budget proposal for the U.S. Department of State 
and USAID.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., March 4. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222928.htm. 
———. 2014. “Fiscal year 2015 State Department budget request.” United States Department of State, Wash-
ington D.C., March 13. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2014/03/223423.htm. 
———. 2014. “National security and foreign policy priorities in the fiscal year 2015 International Affairs 
budget.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., April 8. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/04/224523.htm. 
———. 2014. “Remarks on the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review launch.” United States De-
partment of State, Washington D.C., April 22. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2014/04/225050.htm. 
———. 2014. “Remarks at the 2014 frontiers in development forum.” United States Department of State, 




———. 2014. “Remarks on U.S.-China relations.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., Novem-
ber 4. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/11/233705.htm. 
———. 2015. “Joint statement on the First U.S.-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue.” Washington D.C., 
September 22. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/247192.htm. 
Nides, Thomas. 2011. “Briefing on the 2012 state department budget.” United States Department of State, 
Washington D.C., February 14. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/former/nides/re-
marks/2011/156570.htm. 
Otero, Maria. 2010. “U.S.-Brazil cooperation on global issues.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., March 26. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/140255.htm. 
———. 2011. “Remarks on congressional-executive commission on China 2011 annual report.” United States 
Department of State, Washington D.C., November 3. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/j/176611.htm. 
Rice, Condoleezza. 2005. “President's fiscal year 2006 International Affairs budget request.” United States De-
partment of State, Washington D.C., February 16. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2005/42396.htm. 
———. 2005. “President's fiscal year 2006 International Affairs budget request.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., February 17. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2005/42422.htm. 
———. 2005. “President's fiscal year budget request.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., 
March 9. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43184.htm. 
———. 2005. “Remarks with Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh.” United States Department of State, Wash-
ington D.C., March 16. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43490.htm. 
———. 2005. “Remarks with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., March 20. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43662.htm. 
———. 2005. “Remarks with Chinese President Hu Jintao.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., March 20. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43663.htm. 
———. 2005. “Remarks to the press in China.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., March 21. 
Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43678.htm. 
———. 2005. “Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhao Xing.” United States Department of State, Wash-
ington D.C., March 21. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43672.htm. 
———. 2005. “Shooting of USAID Officer in Darfur.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., 
March 23. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43728.htm. 
———. 2005. “Remarks with Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh following meeting.” United States Depart-
ment of State, Washington D.C., April 14. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2005/44662.htm. 
———. 2005. “Remarks with Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim.” United States Department of State, 
Washington D.C., April 26. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2005/45180.htm. 
———. 2005. “The President's fiscal year 2006 International Affairs budget.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., May 12. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2005/46137.htm. 
———. 2005. “Remarks at Board Meetingof the Millennium Challenge Corporation.” United States Department 
of State, Washington D.C., May 20. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2005/46565.htm. 
———. 2005. “Remarks in Beijing.” United States Department of State, Beijing, July 10. Accessed August 2015. 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/49113.htm. 
———. 2005. “Remarks with the UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.” United States Department of State, Wash-
ington D.C., October 21. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55423.htm. 
Appendixes│235 
 
———. 2005. “Press briefing on the President's visit to China.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., November 20. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57412.htm. 
———. 2005. “An overview of international support for Iraqi democracy on the eve of the December 15, 2005 
elections.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., December 13. Accessed August 2015. 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/58039.htm. 
———. 2006. “Transformational diplomacy: Questions and answers.” United States Department of State, Wash-
ington D.C., January 18. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59375.htm. 
———. 2006. “Transformational diplomacy.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., January 18. 
Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm. 
———. 2006. “Opening remarks at the U.S. Agency for International Development on foreign assistance.” 
United States Department of State, Washington D.C., January 19. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59448.htm. 
———. 2006. “Remarks at the U.S. Agency for International Development on foreign assistance: Questions and 
answers.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., January 19. Accessed August 2015. 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59449.htm. 
———. 2006. “Remarks on foreign assistance.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., January 
19. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59408.htm. 
———. 2006. “Excerpts from remarks for delivery before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” United 
States Department of State, Washington D.C., February 15. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/61282.htm. 
———. 2006. “President's fiscal year 2007 International Affairs budget request.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., February 15. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2006/61262.htm. 
———. 2006. “International Affairs budget request for fiscal year 2007.” United States Department of State, 
Washington D.C., February 16. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2006/61384.htm. 
———. 2006. “Briefing on the State Department's 2005 country reports on human rights practices.” United 
States Department of State, Washington D.C., March 8. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/62738.htm. 
———. 2006. “Briefing en route Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., 
March 12. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/63024.htm. 
———. 2006. “Our opportunity with India.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., March 13. 
Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/63008.htm. 
———. 2006. “Fiscal year budget request for the Department of State and Foreign Operations.” United States 
Department of State, Washington D.C., March 28. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2006/63782.htm. 
———. 2006. “Fiscal year 2007 State Department budget request.” United States Department of State, Wash-
ington D.C., April 4. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64120.htm. 
———. 2006. “Remarks at the United Nations Security Council meeting on Sudan.” United States Department 
of State, New York, May 9. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2006/66025.htm. 
———. 2006. “Sharing a vision of peace, justice, and democracy for the world.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., July 10. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2006/68803.htm. 
———. 2006. “Signing ceremony for Millennium Challenge Corporation's compact with the Republic of 




———. 2006. “Address to the Africa Society of the National Summit on Africa.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., September 27. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2006/73259.htm. 
———. 2006. “Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Li after their meeting.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., October 20. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2006/74819.htm. 
———. 2007. “International Affairs fiscal year 2008 budget.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., March 21. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/mar/82015.htm. 
———. 2007. “Remarks at the signing ceremonies between the U.S., brazil and Guinea-Bissau.” United States 
Department of State, Washington D.C., March 30. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2007/mar/82507.htm. 
———. 2007. “Remarks at the U.S.-India Business Council 32nd anniversary "Global India" summit.” United 
States Department of State, Washington D.C., June 26. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/06/87487.htm. 
———. 2007. “Remarks at the Organization of American States/African Union Democracy Bridge Forum.” 
United States Department of State, Washington D.C., July 11. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/88123.htm. 
———. 2007. “United States and India complete civil nuclear negotiations.” United States Department of State, 
Washington D.C., July 27. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/89522.htm. 
———. 2007. “Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi before meeting.” United States Department 
of State, Washington D.C., September 23. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2007/09/92605.htm. 
———. 2008. “Remarks on transformational diplomacy.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., 
February 12. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100703.htm. 
———. 2008. “President's fiscal year 2009 International Affairs budget request.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., February 13. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2008/02/100726.htm. 
———. 2008. “Excerpt from Secretary Rice's meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.” United States Depart-
ment of State, Washington D.C., February 26. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2008/02/101335.htm. 
———. 2008. “Joint press availability with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.” United States Department of 
State, Washington D.C., February 26. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2008/02/101308.htm. 
———. 2008. “Roundtable with traveling press.” United States Department of State, Beijing, February 26. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/101357.htm. 
———. 2008. “President's 2009 International Affairs budget.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., March 12. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/03/102130.htm. 
———. 2008. “Remarks with Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim.” United States Department of State, 
Washington D.C., March 13. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2008/03/102228.htm. 
———. 2008. “Remarks before meeting with Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim.” United States Depart-
ment of State, Washington D.C., March 21. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2008/03/102479.htm. 
———. 2008. “President's fiscal year International Affairs budget request.” United States Department of State, 
Washington D.C., March 24. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2008/04/103380.htm. 
———. 2008. “Remarks with Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Kumar Mukherjee.” United States Department of 




———. 2008. “Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang.” United States Department of State, Washington 
D.C., June 29. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/04/103380.htm. 
———. 2008. “Remarks with the press in Beijing.” United States Department of State, Beijing, June 30. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/04/103380.htm. 
———. 2008. “Remarks at the Millennium Challenge Corporation compact signing ceremony with Burkina 
Faso.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., July 14. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/07/106974.htm. 
———. 2008. “Remarks at the United States Agency for International Development.” United States Department 
of State, Washington D.C., July 14. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2008/07/106995.htm. 
———. 2008. “Congressional approval of the U.S.-India agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy (123 Agreement).” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., October 2. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/10/110554.htm. 
———. 2008. “Remarks en route to New Delhi, India.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., 
October 3. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/10/110618.htm. 
———. 2008. “Remarks with Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee.” United States Department of State, 
New Dehli, October 4. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2008/10/110622.htm. 
———. 2008. “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee at the sign-
ing of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement.” United States Department of State, New Delhi, 
October 10. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/10/110916.htm. 
———. 2008. “Remarks from White House summit on international development: Sustaining a new era.” 
United States Department of State, Washington D.C., October 21. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/10/111103.htm. 
———. 2008. “Press conference in New Delhi, India.” United States Department of State, New Delhi, December 
3. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/12/112606.htm. 
———. 2009. “Ceremony to commemorate foreign policy achievements (2001-2009).” United States Depart-
ment of State, Washington D.C., January 15. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2009/01/114092.htm. 
Rice, Condoleezza, and Andrew S. Natsios. 2005. “Remarks with USAID Administrator Andrew S. Natsios.” 
United States Department of State, Washington D.C., December 2. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57557.htm. 
Richard, Anne C. 2012. “The Syrian humanitarian crisis.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., 
October 10. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/remarks/2012/198970.htm. 
———. 2013. “The Syrian humanitarian crisis.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., March 19. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/remarks/2013/206407.htm. 
———. 2014. “The Syrian refugee crisis.” United States Department of State, Washington D.C., January 7. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/remarks/2014/219388.htm. 
Slaugther, Anne-Marie, Philip J. Crowley, and Donald Steinberg. “Conversations with America: Leading through 
civilian power: The first QDDR: Fact sheet.” Washington D.C. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/154135.htm. 
USDS. 2003. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Fiscal year 2004. Washington D.C. United 
States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/2004/index.htm. 
———. 2004. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations. Washington D.C. United States Depart-
ment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/2005/index.htm. 
———. 2004. Human rights: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41586.htm. 
238│Appendixes 
 
———. 2004. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41783.htm. 
———. 2004. Performance and accountability report: Fiscal year 2004. Washington D.C. United States Depart-
ment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/39869.pdf. 
———. 2005. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Fiscal year 2006. Washington D.C. United 
States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/42258.pdf. 
———. 2005. Foreign Operations, export financing, and related programs: Budget request for fiscal year 2006. 
Washington D.C. United States Bureau of Resource Department. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/2007/html/60200.htm. 
———. 2005. Human rights: A cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States De-
partment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/57932.pdf. 
———. 2005. Human rights: Annual report. Washington, D.C: United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61550.htm. 
———. 2005. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61750.htm. 
———. 2005. Key U.S. government assistance programs for Africa: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States 
Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/48103.pdf. 
———. 2005. Performance and accountability report: Fiscal year 2005. Washington D.C. United States Depart-
ment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58408.pdf. 
———. 2005. United States and international development: Fostering hope through growth: Fact sheet. Washing-
ton D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/47055.pdf. 
———. 2006. America: Helping the people of Sudan: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of 
State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/71633.pdf. 
———. 2006. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Fiscal year 2007. Washington D.C. United 
States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/60641.pdf. 
———. 2006. Foreign Operations, export financing, and related programs: Budget request for fiscal year 2007. 
Washington D.C. United States Bureau of Resource Department. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/2007/html/60200.htm. 
———. 2006. Human rights: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78717.htm. 
———. 2006. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78914.htm. 
———. 2006. New direction for U.S. foreign assistance: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department 
of State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59398.htm. 
———. 2006. Performance and accountability report: Transforming the world through development and cooper-
ation: Fiscal year 2006. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75840.pdf. 
———. 2006. The UN democracy fund: Promoting human rights and freedom worldwide: Fact sheet. Washington 




———. 2006. The United States and developing countries: A partnership for growth: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. 
United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organi-
zation/72352.pdf. 
———. 2006. The United States and India: A growing partnership: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States 
Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2006/62209.htm. 
———. 2006. The United States' response to the Darfur Crisis: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States De-
partment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/92592.pdf. 
———. 2006. Transformational diplomacy: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm. 
———. 2006. US-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Depart-
ment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/78048.pdf. 
———. 2007. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Fiscal year 2008. Washington D.C. United 
States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/84462.pdf. 
———. 2007. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Supplement: Fiscal year 2008. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/94433.pdf. 
———. 2007. Congressional budget justification: Executive budget summary and highlights: Function 150 & 
other international programs: Fiscal year 2008. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/80151.pdf. 
———. 2007. Department of State financial report fiscal year 2007: Transforming the world through diplomacy. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2007/pdf/. 
———. 2007. Human rights: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100464.htm. 
———. 2007. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/c25289.htm. 
———. 2008. Agency financial report: Fiscal year 2008. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/112566.pdf. 
———. 2008. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Supporting information: Fiscal year 2009. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/102658.pdf. 
———. 2008. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary tables by account: Fiscal year 
2009. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/101408.pdf. 
———. 2008. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary and highlights: Fiscal year 2009. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/100014.pdf. 
———. 2008. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations. Washington D.C. United States Depart-
ment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100326.pdf. 
———. 2008. Diplomacy in action. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/46839.pdf. 
———. 2008. Financing for development: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/109992.pdf. 
———. 2008. Human rights: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/frontmatter/118984.htm. 
240│Appendixes 
 
———. 2008. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/appendices/119182.htm. 
———. 2008. The U.S. commitment to human rights: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of 
State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/109999.pdf. 
———. 2008. U.S. commitment to multilateralism: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of 
State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/109995.pdf. 
———. 2008. U.S. commitment to the Millennium Development Goals: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United 
States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/109987.pdf. 
———. 2008. U.S.-Brazil joint action plan to promote racial and ethnic equality: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. 
United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organi-
zation/111549.pdf. 
———. 2009. Agency financial report: Fiscal year 2009. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/132214.pdf. 
———. 2009. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Supporting information: Fiscal year 2010. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/124296.pdf. 
———. 2009. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary tables by account: Fiscal year 
2010. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/124295.pdf. 
———. 2009. Congressional budget justification: Foreign Operations: Volume I. Washington D.C. United States 
Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pcaab893.pdf. 
———. 2009. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary and highlights: Fiscal year 2010. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/122513.pdf. 
———. 2009. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Volume II: Fiscal year 2010. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/124072.pdf. 
———. 2009. Human rights: Annual report. Washington, D.C: United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/frontmatter/135936.htm. 
———. 2009. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/136346.pdf. 
———. 2009. International affairs budget: Fiscal year 2010: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Depart-
ment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123160.htm. 
———. 2010. Agency financial report: Fiscal year 2010. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/150505.pdf. 
———. 2010. Congressional budget justification: Volume I: Department of state operations: Fiscal year 2011. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/136355.pdf. 
———. 2010. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary tables by account: Fiscal year 
2011. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138174.pdf. 
———. 2010. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Annex: Regional perspectives: Fiscal year 




———. 2010. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Haiti supplemental budget justification: Fis-
cal year 2010. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141243.pdf. 
———. 2010. Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign operations: Summary tables: Fiscal year 2011. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/138174.pdf. 
———. 2010. Department of State and other international programs budget request: Fiscal year 2011: Fact sheet. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet_department_state/. 
———. 2010. Department of State and USAID executive budget summary: Fiscal year 2011: Fact sheet. Washing-
ton D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/136560.pdf. 
———. 2010. Human rights: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160515.pdf. 
———. 2010. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/154741.pdf. 
———. 2010. Priorities and results in U.S. foreign affairs: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department 
of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145822.pdf. 
———. 2010. Report to Congress on assistance by the People's Republic of China to governments and entities in 
Latin America and Africa. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACW760.pdf. 
———. 2010. The first quadrennial diplomacy and development review: Leading through civilian power. Wash-
ington, D.C: United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/153108.pdf. 
———. 2011. Agency financial report: Fiscal year 2011. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/177397.pdf. 
———. 2011. Background briefing: Senior State Department officials on the fiscal year 2013 budget. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/183848.htm. 
———. 2011. Background briefing: Senior State Department officials on the fiscal year 2012 budget. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/rm/2011/156629.htm. 
———. 2011. Congressional budget justification: Volume II: Foreign operations: Fiscal year 2011. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/137936.pdf. 
———. 2011. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Executive budget summary: Fiscal year 
2012. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156214.pdf. 
———. 2011. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary tables: Fiscal year 2012. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/158269.pdf. 
———. 2011. Congressional budget justification: Volume II: Foreign operations: Fiscal year 2012. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/158267.pdf. 
———. 2011. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Annex: Regional perspectives: Fiscal year 




———. 2011. Congressional budget justification: Volume I: Department of State operations: Fiscal year 2012. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/156215.pdf. 
———. 2011. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary tables by account: Fiscal year 
2012. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/158269.pdf. 
———. 2011. Fiscal year 2012 State and USAID: Core budget: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Depart-
ment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156763.pdf. 
———. 2011. Human rights: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186369.pdf. 
———. 2011. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/186771.pdf. 
———. 2011. Ten things you should know about the state department: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United 
States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/176794.pdf. 
———. 2011. The department of state evaluation policy: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department 
of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/fs/2011/163299.htm. 
———. 2011. US department of state and USAID budget 2012: Overseas contingency operations: Fact sheet. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/156765.pdf. 
———. 2012. 2011-2016 Strategic plan addendum for the US department of state and the USAID: Fact sheet. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/185825.pdf. 
———. 2012. Agency financial report: Financial year 2012. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/200506.pdf. 
———. 2012. Briefing on the 2013 State Department budget. Washington D.C. United States Department of 
State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/former/nides/remarks/2012/183842.htm. 
———. 2012. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Executive budget summary: Fiscal year 
2011. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135888.pdf. 
———. 2012. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary tables: Fiscal year 2013. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/185016.pdf. 
———. 2012. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Annex: Regional perspectives: Fiscal year 
2013. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185015.pdf. 
———. 2012. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations. Summary tables by account. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/185016.pdf. 
———. 2012. Congressional budget justification: Volume I: Department of State operations: Fiscal year 2013. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/181061.pdf. 
———. 2012. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Executive budget summary: Fiscal year 
2013. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/183755.pdf. 
———. 2012. Congressional budget justification: Volume II Foreign Operations. Washington, D.C: United States 
Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185014.pdf. 
Appendixes│243 
 
———. 2012. Domestic finance for development: Helping developing countries fund their own development: Fact 
sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/183329.pdf. 
———. 2012. Human rights: Annual report. Washington, D.C: United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204294.pdf. 
———. 2012. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/204707.pdf. 
———. 2012. Multilateral organisation performance assessment network: World Bank. Washington D.C. United 
States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/f/evaluations/all/233703.htm. 
———. 2012. Multilateral organisation performance assessment network: UNDP. Washington D.C. United States 
Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/f/evaluations/all/234254.htm. 
———. 2012. The department of state evaluation policy: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department 
of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/evaluation/2012/184556.htm. 
———. 2012. United States and Brazil: Trilateral cooperation: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Depart-
ment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2012/187613.htm. 
———. 2013. Agency financial report: Fiscal year 2013. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/217939.pdf. 
———. 2013. Background briefing: Senior State Department officials on the fiscal year 2016 budget. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/04/207326.htm. 
———. 2013. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary tables by account: Fiscal year 
2014. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208292.pdf. 
———. 2013. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Annex: Regional perspectives: Fiscal year 
2014. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208291.pdf. 
———. 2013. Congressional budget justification: Volume II: Foreign operations: Fiscal year 2014. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/208290.pdf. 
———. 2013. Congressional budget justification: Volume I: Department of State operations: Fiscal year 2014. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/207266.pdf. 
———. 2013. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Executive budget summary: Fiscal year 
2014. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/207305.pdf. 
———. 2013. Federal program inventory list: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210335.pdf. 
———. 2013. Highlights of the department of state USAID budget: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States 
Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/04/207281.htm. 
———. 2013. Human rights: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220287.pdf. 
———. 2013. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/220698.pdf. 
———. 2013. U.S. relations with Brazil: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35640.htm. 
244│Appendixes 
 
———. 2013. U.S. relations with China: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://go.usa.gov/P29T. 
———. 2014. Agency finacial report: Fiscal year 2014. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234331.pdf. 
———. 2014. Budget amendment summary ISIS: Fiscal year 2015. Washington D.C. United States Department 
of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234238.pdf. 
———. 2014. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary tables by account: Fiscal year 
2015. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/224071.pdf. 
———. 2014. Congressional budget justification: Budget amendment summary: Fiscal year 2015. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/228924.pdf. 
———. 2014. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Supplement justification: Fiscal year 2014. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/229535.pdf. 
———. 2014. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Annex: Regional perspectives: Fiscal year 
2015. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/224070.pdf. 
———. 2014. Congressional budget justification: Volume II: Foreign operations: Fiscal year 2015. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/224069.pdf. 
———. 2014. Congressional budget justification: Volume I: Department of State operations: Fiscal year 2015. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/223495.pdf. 
———. 2014. Congressional budget justification: Department of state, foreign operations, related programmes. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/222898.pdf. 
———. 2014. Emergence request justification: Ebola: Fiscal year 2015. Washington D.C. United States Depart-
ment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234249.pdf. 
———. 2014. Engaging China on global development: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of 
State. Accessed August 2015. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/in-
brief/2014/05/20140527299685.html#axzz3rrdIwccQ. 
———. 2014. Highlights of the department of state USAID budget: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States 
Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222870.htm. 
———. 2014. Highlights of the department of state USAID budget: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States 
Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222870.htm. 
———. 2014. Human rights: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236534.pdf. 
———. 2014. Human rights report: Congressional budget justification for foreign assistance by account. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/236944.pdf. 
———. 2014. List of U.S.-China cooperative projects: Media note. Washington D.C. United States Department of 
State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/220530.htm. 
———. 2014. U.S. Funding for Safe From the Start Announced at the Call to action on protection from gender-
based violence in emergencies: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/231948.htm. 
———. 2014. U.S. relations with India: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://go.usa.gov/mXz4. 
Appendixes│245 
 
———. 2014. U.S. relations with South Africa: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. http://go.usa.gov/PZmd. 
———. 2014. U.S.-India development cooperation: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of 
State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/232331.htm. 
———. 2014. U.S.-India trade and economic cooperation: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Depart-
ment of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/232339.htm. 
———. 2015. Agency financial report: Fiscal year 2015. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/249770.pdf. 
———. 2015. Background briefing: Senior State Department officials on the fiscal year 2016 budget. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237100.htm. 
———. 2015. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Annex: Regional perspectives: Fiscal year 
2016. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238222.pdf. 
———. 2015. Congressional budget justification: Volume II: Foreign operations: Fiscal year 2016. Washington 
D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/238221.pdf. 
———. 2015. Congressional budget justification: Volume I: Department of State operations: Fiscal year 2016. 
Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/236395.pdf. 
———. 2015. Quadrennial diplomacy and development review: Enduring leadership in a dynamic world. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/241429.pdf. 
———. 2015. Ten things you should know about foreign assistance: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States 
Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/243785.pdf. 
———. 2015. Ten things you should know about the State Department: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United 
States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/203058.pdf. 
———. 2015. The department of state evaluation policy: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department 
of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/evaluation/2015/236970.htm. 
———. 2015. The state department and USAID budget: Fiscal year. Washington D.C. United States Department 
of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238144.pdf. 
———. 2015. The state department and USAID budget: Fiscal year 2016: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United 
States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/236859.htm. 
———. 2015. U.S. relations with Brazil: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35640.htm. 
———. 2015. U.S. relations with China: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm. 
———. 2015. U.S. relations with India: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed December 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm. 
———. 2015. U.S. relations with South Africa: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Department of State. 
Accessed December 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2898.htm. 
———. 2016. Congressional budget justification: Foreign operations: Summary tables: Fiscal year 2016. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/238223.pdf. 
Verver, Meanne. 2012. “Gender equity and sustainable development prioritizing actions to achieve results.” 




United States Department of State and United States Agency for International Development (common 
statements)  
USDS, and USAID. 2003. Strategic plan: Fiscal years 2004-2009: Security, democracy, prosperity. Washington 
D.C. United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24299.pdf. 
———. 2004. Annual performance report: Fiscal year 2004. Washington D.C. United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA700.pdf. 
———. 2005. Annual performance report: Fiscal year 2005. Washington D.C. United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACF600.pdf. 
———. 2006. Annual performance report: fiscal year 2006. Washington D.C. United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACI500.pdf. 
———. 2007. Foreign assistance performance report and fiscal year 2009 performance plan. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 
2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACL907.pdf. 
———. 2007. Strategic plan: Fiscal years 2007-2012: . Washington D.C. United States Agency for International 
Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/86291.pdf. 
———. 2008. Annual performance report: Fiscal year 2008. Washington D.C. United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACM303.pdf. 
———. 2008. Joint highlights of performance, budget, and financial operations: Fiscal year 2007. Washington 
D.C. United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100020.pdf. 
———. 2009. Foreign assistance performance report: China: Fiscal year 2009. Washington D.C. United States 
Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACR026.pdf. 
———. 2009. Foreign assistance performance report and fiscal year 2011 performance plan. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 
2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP747.pdf. 
———. 2009. Joint summary of the performance and financial situation: Fiscal year 2009. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138975.pdf. 
———. 2009. U.S. foreign assistance performance publication: Fiscal year 2009 foreign assistance goals. Wash-
ington D.C. United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/159279.pdf. 
———. 2010. A citizen's report to foreign affairs: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/141872.pdf. 
———. 2010. Joint summary of the performance and financial situation: Fiscal year 2010. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/157293.pdf. 
———. 2011. Foreign Assistance Performance Report & Fiscal Year 2013 Performance Plan: Fiscal year 2011. 
Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/APR2011-2013.pdf. 
Appendixes│247 
 
———. 2011. Joint summary of the performance and financial situation: Fiscal year 2011. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development; United States Bureau of Resource Department. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/180916.pdf. 
———. 2012. Foreign assistance performance report and fiscal year 2014 performance plan: Fiscal year 2012. 
Washington D.C. United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/1870/FY%202012%20APR%20FY%202014%20APP_FINAL_4-2-2013.pdfA. 
———. 2012. Joint summary of the performance and financial situation: Fiscal year 2012. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/203937.pdf. 
———. 2013. Foreign assistance performance report: Fiscal year 2013. Washington D.C. United States Agency 
for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/USAID_FY2013_APR.pdf. 
———. 2013. Foreign assistance programs federal program inventory: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States 
Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210334.pdf. 
———. 2013. Foreign assistance standardized program structure and definitions. Washington D.C. United States 
Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/246744.pdf. 
———. 2013. Highlights of the Department of State and USAID budget: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United 
States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/04/207281.htm. 
———. 2013. Joint summary of the performance and financial situation: Fiscal year 2013. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223825.pdf. 
———. 2013. The State Department and USAID budget: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Agency for 
International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/207424.pdf. 
———. 2014. Joint summary of the performance and financial situation: Fiscal year 2014. Washington D.C. 
United States Agency for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/237637.pdf. 
———. 2014. Strategic plan: Fiscal year 2014-2017. Washington D.C. United States Agency for International 
Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/223997.pdf. 
———. 2014. The State Department and USAID budget: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Agency for 
International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2014. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223056.pdf. 
———. 2015. The Department of State and USAID budget: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. United States Agency 
for International Development; United States Department of State. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238144.pdf. 
United States Government  
Bush, George W. 2004. “Remarks by the President at ceremony celebrating countries selected for the Millen-
nium Challenge Account.” U.S. Government, Washington D.C., May 10. Accessed August 2015. 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040510.html. 
———. 2007. “President Bush discusses United States international development agenda.” U.S. Government, 




———. 2008. “Speech at White House summit on international development.” U.S. Government, Washington 
D.C., October 8. Accessed August 2015. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/internatio-
naldevelopment/trans-ids-6.html. 
Obama, Barack. 2010. “Remarks by the President at the Millennium Development Goals summit in New York.” 
U.S. Government, New York, October 22. Accessed August 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2010/09/22/remarks-president-millennium-development-goals-summit-new-york-new-york. 
Office of the spokesperson. 2009. “Joint press release on the first round of the U.S.-China strategic and eco-
nomic dialogue.” News release. July 28. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126596.htm. 
———. 2010. “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue outcomes of the strategic track.” News release. 
May 25. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/142180.htm. 
———. 2011. “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue outcomes of the strategic track.” News release. 
May 10. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/162967.htm. 
———. 2012. “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue outcomes of the strategic track.” News release. 
May 4. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189287.htm. 
———. 2013. “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue outcomes of the strategic track.” News release. July 
12. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211861.htm. 
———. 2014. “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue outcomes of the strategic track.” News release. July 
14. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229239.htm. 
———. 2015. “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue outcomes of the strategic track.” News release. 
June 24. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244205.htm. 
The White House. 2010. “Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy.” News release. September 22. Accessed 
March 07, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-develop-
ment-policy. 
U.S. Government. 1961; amended 2002. Foreign assistance act. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/faa.pdf. 
———. 2000. African growth and opportunity act. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. 
http://trade.gov/agoa/legislation/agoa_main_002118.pdf. 
———. 2004. Millennium Challenge Account creation. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.congress.gov/108/bills/hr4558/BILLS-108hr4558ih.pdf. 
———. 2005. Foreign Operations, export financing, and related programs appropriation act. Washington D.C. 
U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ102/PLAW-
109publ102.pdf. 
———. 2005. International cooperation to meet the MDG Act of 2005. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.congress.gov/109/bills/s1315/BILLS-109s1315es.pdf. 
———. 2006. Africa investment incentives. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. 
http://trade.gov/agoa/legislation/agoa_main_002132.pdf. 
———. 2006. Democratic Republic of Congo relief, security and democracy promotion act. Washington D.C. U.S. 
Government. Accessed August 2015. https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ456/PLAW-109publ456.pdf. 
———. 2006. National security strategy. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. 
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2006.pdf. 
———. 2007. Commitment to international development: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070531-
14.html. 




———. 2007. Memorandum of Understanding between the governments of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil to advance cooperation on biofuels. Washington D.C. U.S. 
Government. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/158654.htm. 
———. 2007. Memorandum of Understanding between United States, Brazil and Guinea Bissau. Washington 
D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. http://www.brazilcouncil.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/11/MOUforCooperationonLegislativeStrengtheninginGuinea-Bissau-Mar302007.pdf. 
———. 2008. Feed the Future Initiative: Progress report. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 
2015. http://feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/ftf_progress_report_2012.pdf. 
———. 2008. Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States global leadership against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria reauthorization act. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. https://www.con-
gress.gov/110/plaws/publ293/PLAW-110publ293.pdf. 
———. 2008. White House summit on international development: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. 
Accessed August 2015. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081020-
1.html. 
———. 2010. Memorandum of understanding between the governments of the United States and the Govern-
ment of the Federative Republic of Brazil for the implementation of technical cooperation activities in third 
countries. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/158856.pdf. 
———. 2010. National security strategy. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
———. 2010. President Obama's development policy and global food security: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. U.S. 
Government. Accessed August 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Food_Secu-
rity_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
———. 2010. President Obama's development policy and the global climate change initiative: Fact sheet. Wash-
ington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Cli-
mate_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
———. 2010. President Obama's development policy and the global health initiative: Fact sheet. Washington 
D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/Global_Health_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
———. 2010. Transforming international development: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed 
August 2015. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081021-4.html. 
———. 2010. U.S. global development policy: Presidential policy initiative. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. 
Accessed August 2015. http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-6.pdf. 
———. 2010. U.S. global development policy: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy. 
———. 2011. International initiatives to promote human rights of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transsexual people: 
Presidential memoranda. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/06/presidential-memorandum-international-initia-
tives-advance-human-rights-l. 
———. 2011. Memorandum of Understanding between United States and Brazil on implementation of technical 
cooperation in third countries in the field of decent work. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/158860.pdf. 
———. 2011. Protocol of intentions between the governments of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Federative Republic of Brazil for the expansion of technical cooperation activities in third coun-
tries. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/158858.pdf. 
———. 2011. U.S. national action plan on women, peace, and security. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Ac-




———. 2012. Guidance on collection of U.S. foreign assistance data: Number 12-01. Washington D.C. U.S. Gov-
ernment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/bulletins/fy2012/b12-
01.pdf. 
———. 2012. Memorandum of Understanding between the governments of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil to support state and local cooperation. Washington D.C. U.S. 
Government. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188501.pdf. 
———. 2012. U.S. strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa: Presidential policy initiative. Washington D.C. U.S. Gov-
ernment. Accessed August 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/209377.pdf. 
———. 2013. The U.S. global development policy and Agenda 2030: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. U.S. Govern-
ment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/27/fact-sheet-us-
global-development-policy-and-agenda-2030. 
———. 2013. White House facts on U.S.-India as strategic, global partner: Fact sheet. Washington D.C. U.S. Gov-
ernment. Accessed August 2015. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/text-
trans/2013/09/20130927283747.html#axzz3rrdIwccQ. 
———. 2015. National security strategy. Washington D.C. U.S. Government. Accessed August 2015. 
http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf. 
United States Millennium Challenge Corporation 
Fine, Patrick C. 2012. “MCC official at aid and development forum.” United States Millennium Challenge Corpo-
ration, June 6. Accessed August 2015. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/text-
trans/2012/06/201206127246.html#axzz3rrdIwccQ. 
USMCC. 2004. Agency Financial Report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-fy2004-par.pdf. 
———. 2004. Annual report. Washington, D.C: United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/mcc_annual_report_2004.pdf. 
———. 2005. Agency financial report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-fy2005-par.pdf. 
———. 2005. Annual report. Washington, D.C: United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/mcc_annual_report_2005.pdf. 
———. 2006. Agency Financial Report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-fy2006a-par.pdf. 
———. 2006. Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/mcc-annualreport-2006.pdf. 
———. 2006. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/report-summary-of-the-nov.-8-
2006-board-of-directors-meeting. 
———. 2006. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/summary-board-of-directors-
meeting-september-2006. 
———. 2006. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/summary-board-of-directors-
meeting-june-2006. 
———. 2007. Agency financial report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-fy2007-par.pdf. 
———. 2007. Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/documents/mcc-2007-annualreport.pdf. 
Appendixes│251 
 
———. 2007. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-121207-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2007. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-091207-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2007. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-062707-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2007. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/report-summary-of-the-february-
14-2007-board-of-directors-meeting. 
———. 2008. Agency financial report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/mcc-2008-par.pdf. 
———. 2008. Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/mcc-2008-annualreport.pdf. 
———. 2008. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-061708-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2008. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-031108-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2008. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-091908-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2008. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-121108-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2009. Agency financial report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-fy2009-afr.pdf. 
———. 2009. Annual report. Washington D.C. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-
2010001002007-annual-web.pdf. 
———. 2009. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-031109-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2009. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-061009-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2009. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-090909-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2009. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-120909-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2010. Agency financial report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-fy2010-afr.pdf. 
———. 2010. Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-2011001049801-2010annual.pdf. 
———. 2010. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-120909-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2010. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-061610-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2010. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-032410-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2011. Agency financial report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-fy2011-afr.pdf. 
———. 2011. Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/2012-001-0966-02-MCC_2011_annual_report.pdf. 
252│Appendixes 
 
———. 2011. Country ownership: Principles into practice. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/paper-2011001093802-principles-coun-
try-ownership.pdf. 
———. 2011. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-062211-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2011. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-032311-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2011. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-010511-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2011. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-092811-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2011. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-121511-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2011. “MCC board of directors selects Tunisia as eligible for threshold program, provides conditional 
approval of Indonesia compact, strengthens MCC selective criteria.” News release. September 29. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/release/release-092811-boardmtg. 
———. 2012. Agency financial report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-fy2012-afr.pdf. 
———. 2012. Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-2012-001-1242-01-annual-report-2012_1.pdf. 
———. 2012. Criteria and methodology for determining the eligibility of candidate countries for MCC. Washing-
ton, D.C: United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://as-
sets.mcc.gov/reports/report-2012001114201-fy13-selection-criteria.pdf. 
———. 2012. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-032212-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2012. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-062112-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2012. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-091312-meeting.pdf. 
———. .2012. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-121912-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2013. Agency financial report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-fy13-afr_1.pdf. 
———. 2013. Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/pub/annual-report-2013. 
———. 2013. Compact development guidance: Overview. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/compact-development-guidance-
overview. 
———. 2013. Guidelines for economic and beneficiary analysis. Washington D.C. United States Millennium 
Challenge Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/guidelines-for-eco-
nomic-and-beneficiary-analysis. 
———. 2013. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/agreements/summary-061913-board-meet-
ing.pdf. 
———. 2013. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 




———. 2013. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/summary-board-031413-meeting.pdf. 
———. 2013. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/documents/summary-121013-board-meet-
ing.pdf. 
———. 2014. Agency financial report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/report-fy2014-afr.pdf. 
———. 2014. Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/pub/annual-report-2014. 
———. 2014. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/report-summary-of-the-march-
26-2014-board-of-directors-meeting. 
———. 2014. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/report-summary-of-the-septem-
ber-17-2014-board-of-directors-meeting. 
———. 2014. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/report-december-2014-board-
summary. 
———. 2014. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/report-summary-of-the-june-18-
2014-board-of-directors-meeting. 
———. 2015. Agency financial report: Annual report. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration. Accessed August 2015. https://assets.mcc.gov/documents/FY15_MCC_AFR_508-07.pdf. 
———. 2015. Guide to the indicators: FY 2016. Washington, D.C: United States Millennium Challenge Corpora-
tion. Accessed December 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/guide-to-the-indicators-fy-2016. 
———. 2015. Summary of board of directors meeting. Washington D.C. United States Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Accessed August 2015. https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/report-march-2015-board-sum-
mary 
United States Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights 
Bartholomew, Carolyn. 2012. “Testimony.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and hu-
man rights: Assessing China's influence and role in Africa, Washington D.C., March 29. Accessed August 
2015. http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/73538.pdf. 
Hayes, Stephen. 2012. “Testimony.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and human 
rights: Assessing China's influence and role in Africa, Washington D.C., March 29. Accessed August 2015. 
http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/73538.pdf. 
Pham, J. P. 2012. “Testimony.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and human rights: 
Assessing China's influence and role in Africa, Washington D.C., March 29. Accessed August 2015. http://ar-
chives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/73538.pdf. 
Shinn, David H. 2012. “Testimony.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and human 
rights: Assessing China's influence and role in Africa, March 29. Accessed August 2015. http://archives.re-
publicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/73538.pdf. 
Yamamoto, Donald Y. 2012. “Testimony.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and hu-




United States Foreign Affairs Committee 
Blake, Jr., Robert O. 2011. “Statement.” Hearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee: Subcommittee on Africa, 
Global Health and Human Rights, Washington D.C., October 27. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2011/176346.htm. 
CdeBaca, Luis. 2014. “Testimony.” Hearing before before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global 
Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, Washington D.C., January 27. Accessed Au-




9.2.2 Documents for Norway 
Institution (ab-
breviation) 
Institution Amount of documents 
NMFA Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 123 
NMFA & Norad Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad 
(common publications) 
2 
Norad Norwegian Implementing Agency for Develop-
ment Cooperation 
44 
  In total 169 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Barth Eide, Espen. 2012. “Transatlantic ties in times of financial austerity.” Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Oslo, 
February 8. Accessed August 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/transatlantic-ties-in-times-of-
financial/id671826/. 
———. 2012. “Be a part of the African growth story: Norwegian-African Business Summit.” Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, October 12. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stolten-
bergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2012/growth_af-
rica.html?regj_oss=2&id=704633#. 
———. 2013. “Changing norms in the emerging world order and the ethics of trade.” Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Trondheim, February 7. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stol-
tenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2013/norms_chang-
ing.html?regj_oss=1&id=714284#. 
———. 2013. “Foreign policy address to the Storting.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, February 
12. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-
of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2013/address_february.html?regj_oss=1&id=714380 
Brattskar, Hans. 2014. “Opening speech at the presentation of Asian Development Outlook.” Norwegian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, April 8. Accessed August 2015. 
———. 2014. “Norway and South Africa: Celebrating democracy and joint efforts for a safer world.” Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 12. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/whats-
new/Speeches-and-articles/Speeches-and-articles-by-political-staff/hb_speeches/2014/southafrica_celebra-
tion.html?regj_oss=1&id=760029#. 
Brende, Børge. 2014. “The rise of East Asia and transatlantic relations.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Oslo, February 3. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/whats-new/Speeches-and-
articles/speeches_articles/2014/realations_eastasia.html?regj_oss=2&id=750341#. 
———. 2014. “Foreign policy address to the Storting.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, March 25. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/whats-new/Speeches-and-arti-
cles/speeches_articles/2014/address_storting.html?regj_oss=1&id=753809#. 
———. 2014. “The geopolitics of energy: A Norwegian perspective.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Oslo, April 9. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/whats-new/Speeches-and-arti-
cles/speeches_articles/2014/csis_energy.html?regj_oss=1&id=757924#. 
———. 2014. “Nordic statement on human rights and good governance.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Af-




———. 2014. “Human rights in the new development goals.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, Oc-
tober 24. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/whats-new/Speeches-and-arti-
cles/speeches_articles/2014/unday.html?regj_oss=1&id=772825#. 
Fagertun Stenhammer, Anne M. 2007. “2007 annual meetings of the African Development Bank.” Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shanghai, May 16. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/ar-
chive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2007/meet-
ing_adb.html?regj_oss=17&id=471974#. 
———. 2007. “The NUFU-programme and its impact on policy communities and institutions.” Norwegian Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, June 4. Accessed August 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/nufu_pro-
gramme/id473062/. 
Gahr Støre, Jonas. 2006. “Foreign policy address to the Storting.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Febru-
ary 8. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Minis-
try-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2006/foreign-policy-address-to-the-stor-
ting.html?regj_oss=20&id=420775. 
———. 2007. “Statement to the Storting on foreign policy.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 13. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-
Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2007/Foreign-Policy-Address.html?regj_oss=18&id=450698#. 
———. 2008. “Common cause, different approaches: The Petroleum sector and economic development in Ni-
geria.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, January 30. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2008/af-
rica_china.html?regj_oss=15&id=498587#. 
———. 2008. “Norwegian-Chinese relations: Much more than the Olympics.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, April 14. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Govern-
ment/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2008/china_olympics.html?regj_oss=14&id=507301#. 
———. 2008. “Foreign policy address to the Storting.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 20. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-
Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2008/foreignpolicy_address.html?regj_oss=14&id=511988#. 
———. 2008. “A new world order.” Aftenposten, July 30. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-arti-
kler/2008/new_order.html?regj_oss=13&id=522326#. 
———. 2008. “Towards a new world order? The UN's role and Norwegian interests.” Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, September 3. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-
2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2008/nor-
way_un.html?regj_oss=13&id=525613. 
———. 2008. “The 60th anniversary of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights: What are the dilemmas 
for foreign policy?” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 11. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-
artikler/2008/norwegian-human-rights-policy.html?regj_oss=13&id=535598#. 
———. 2009. “Foreign policy address to the Storting.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 10. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-For-
eign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2009/address_storting0902.html?regj_oss=12&id=545344#. 
———. 2009. “The impact of Africa: Political partner and global actor.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
May 7. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Minis-
try-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2009/impact_africa.html?regj_oss=11&id=560867#. 
———. 2010. “China forum.” January 25. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stol-
tenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2010/china_fo-
rum.html?regj_oss=9&id=592746#. 
———. 2010. “Foreign policy address to the Storting.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 23. Ac-




———. 2011. “Foreign policy address to the Storting.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 10. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-For-
eign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2011/address_110211.html?regj_oss=6&id=633292#. 




———. 2011. “Presentation of Norway's Brazil strategy in Rio de Janeiro.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, March 31. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Govern-
ment/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2011/presentation_brazil_strat-
egy_rio.html?regj_oss=6&id=640300#. 
———. 2011. “Norway and China.” Dagens Næringsliv, October 11. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2011/nor-
way_china.html?regj_oss=5&id=660339#. 
———. 2012. “Foreign policy address to the Storting.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 14. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-For-
eign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2012/policy_address1202.html?regj_oss=3&id=672235#. 
Glad Pedersen, Bård. 2014. “Norway's position on the post-2015 agenda: Priorities and responsibilities. Will the 
world get the development goals it needs?” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 24. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/position-post-2015/id757689/. 
Gulbrandsen, Håkon A. 2009. “Statement at the conference on the world financial and economic crisis and its 
impact on development.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 25. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-
artikler/2009/crisis_impact.html?regj_oss=1&id=570242#. 
Høglund, Morten. 2014. “Norwegian policy towards Asia: Our place in a transnational economy.” Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 22. Accessed August 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/nor-
way_asia/id760717/. 
Holmås, Heikki. 2012. “Ensuring resilient livelihoods.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 25. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-For-
eign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2012/ensuring-resilient-livelihoods.html?regj_oss=1&id=700141#. 
———. 2013. “High-level dialogue on international development and migration.” Norwegian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, October 3. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-
Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2013/migration.html?id=737469. 
Johnson, Hilde F. 2004. “Opening statement at the IGAD Partners Forum.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, September 27. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Govern-
ment/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2004/opening_state-
ment_at_the_igad_partners.html?regj_oss=23&id=268024#. 
———. 2005. “Statement at the 2005 joint annual meeting of the World Bank on behalf of the Nordic coun-
tries.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 24. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/en/archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-indi-
viduelt/2005/statement_at_the_annual_meeting.html?regj_oss=1&id=270128#. 
NMFA. 2004. Annual report on Norway's effort to promote human rights 2004/04. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/up-
load/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0007/ddd/pdfv/273166-humanrightsannualreport04-05.pdf. 
———. 2004. Debt relief for development: A plan for action. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2004/0225/ddd/pdfv/217380-debt-
plan.pdf. 
———. 2004. Fighting poverty through agriculture: Action plan. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 




———. 2004. Fighting poverty together: A comprehensive development policy: Report No. 34 (2003-2004) to the 
Storting. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. https://www.regjer-
ingen.no/contentassets/7401c9d6b1c741d39f3d50dc282c6ba8/en-
gb/pdfs/stm200320040035000en_pdfs.pdf. 
———. 2004. Guidelines for Norway’s effort to strengthen support for indigenous peoples in development coop-




———. 2005. Norway's development strategy for children and young people in the South: Three billion rea-
sons: Action plan. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2005/0232/ddd/pdfv/247957-young.pdf. 
———. 2005. Strategy for Norway’s culture and sports cooperation with countries in the South: Action plan. Oslo: 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/up-
load/kilde/ud/rap/2005/0022/ddd/pdfv/265661-culture.pdf. 
———. 2006. New roles for non-governmental organisations in development cooperation. Oslo: Norwegian Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/up-
load/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0127/ddd/pdfv/289230-rattso-rapport-eng.pdf. 
———. 2006. Norwegian Action Plan for environment in development cooperation. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/Act-
PlanEnv.pdf. 
———. 2006. Norwegian Assistance to South Africa. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/Reports-programmes-of-action-and-
plans/Reports/2006/Norwegian-assistance-to-South-Africa.html?id=420430#. 
———. 2006. Oslo conditionality on conference: Chairman's summary. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. Accessed August 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/Oslo-Conditionality-Confer-
ence/id437791/?q=oslo%20conference%20on%20conditionality&_t_dtq=true. 
———. 2006. Oslo conference on conditionality: Conference programme. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/up-
load/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0164/ddd/pdfv/300467-1_-conferenceprogramme.pdf. 
———. 2006. Oslo conference on conditionality: Presentation. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/Oslo-Conditionality-Confer-
ence/id437791/?q=oslo%20conference%20on%20conditionality&_t_dtq=true. 
———. 2006. Oslo conference on conditionality: Report on conditionality. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/up-
load/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0164/ddd/pdfv/300495-7final_conditionality_report.pdf. 
———. 2006. Oslo conference on conditionality: Report on conference. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/Reports-programmes-of-
action-and-plans/Reports/2006/Oslo-Conditionality-Conference.html?id=437791#. 
———. 2006. Oslo conference on conditionality: Speaking notes. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0164/ddd/pdfv/300468-2_-
speaking_notes_imf.pdf. 
———. 2007. Aid for trade: Norway’s action plan. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/aidfortrade_e.pdf. 
———. 2007. Norwegian development assistance in 2008: Priority areas: Website. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/develop-
ment_cooperation/norwegian-development-assistance-in-2008.html?regj_oss=3&id=493308#. 
———. 2007. Norwegian policy on the prevention of humanitarian crises: Report No. 9 (2007-2008) to the Stor-




———. 2007. The Government’s China strategy: Action plan. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Kinastrategi_opplag_to.pdf. 
———. 2007. “Norwegian government launches new China strategy.” News release. August 14. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Af-
fairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2007/chinastrategy.html?regj_oss=16&id=477615#. 
———. 2007. “Norway to open new mission in China.” News release. August 15. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/Nyheter-
og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2007/newmission.html?regj_oss=16&id=477640#. 
———. 2007. “Changes to Norway’s diplomatic presence abroad.” News release. October 5. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/Ny-
heter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2008/climate_china.html?regj_oss=15&id=498281#. 
———. 2008. Memorandum of understanding between India and Norway on cooperation in the field of educa-
tion. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/up-
load/KD/Vedlegg/Internasjonalt/memorandumunderstanding.pdf. 
———. 2008. Norway’s humanitarian policy. Olso: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/humpolicy_eng.pdf. 
———. 2008. On equal terms: Women’s rights and gender equality in international development policy: Report 
No. 11 (2007-2008) to the Storting. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2156814/PDFS/STM200720080011000EN_PDFS.pdf. 
———. 2008. Platform for an integrated Africa policy: Action plan. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/africa_platform_web_opti-
mized.pdf. 
———. 2008. Recent experiences in linking diplomatic peace-making with development efforts. Oslo: Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/Mul-
tidimensional%20and%20Integrated/Linking%20Diplomacy%20and%20Develop-
ment%20Draft%20Jan%2024%20_4_.pdf. 
———. 2008. “China and Norway boost cooperation on climate change.” News release. January 28. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-
Affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2008/climate_china.html?regj_oss=15&id=498281#. 
———. 2009. Climate, conflict and capital: Norwegian development policy adapting to change: Report No. 13 
(2008-2009) to the Storting. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2171591/PDFS/STM200820090013000EN_PDFS.pdf. 
———. 2009. Coherent for development? Mandate and work of Policy Coherence Commission. Oslo: Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/Re-
ports-programmes-of-action-and-plans/Reports/2008/nou_coherent.html?id=528066#. 
———. 2009. Corporate social responsibility in a global economy: Report No. 10 (2008-2009) to the Storting. 
Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/pages/2171591/PDFS/STM200820090013000EN_PDFS.pdf. 
———. 2009. Interests, responsibilities and opportunities: The main features of Norwegian foreign policy: Report 
No. 15 (2008-2009) to the Storting. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/14607054/PDFS/STM200820090015000EN_PDFS.pdf. 
———. 2009. Norway’s humanitarian policy: Report No. 40 (2008-2009) to the Storting. Oslo: Norwegian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/pages/2243145/PDFS/STM200820090040000EN_PDFS.pdf. 
———. 2009. The Norwegian Government's strategy for cooperation between Norway and India: Opportunities 
in diversity. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/Indiastrategi_Norsk_engelsk_endelig.pdf. 
———. 2009. The role of human rights in Norwegian foreign and development policy. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry 




———. 2009. “Norway and China have signed an agreement on enhanced cooperation in the petroleum sec-
tor.” News release. January 16. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-
2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/nyheter/2009/norway-
and-china-have-signed-an-agreemen.html?regj_oss=12&id=542762#. 
———. 2009. “A more ambitious Norwegian development policy.” News release. February 13. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/Ny-
heter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2009/policy_ambitious.html?regj_oss=12&id=546192#. 
———. 2009. “Government launches strategy for cooperation with India.” News release. August 28. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-
Affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/nyheter/2009/strategy_india.html?regj_oss=10&id=574688#. 
———. 2010. Action plan for women's rights and gender equality in development cooperation. Oslo: Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvi-
kling/Kvinner%20og%20likestilling/Handlingsplan_kvinner_Eng0510.pdf. 
———. 2010. Norway’s human rights dialogues. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Af-
fairs/tema-og-redaksjonelt-innhold/redaksjonelle-artikler/2010/dialogues.html?regj_oss=7&id=447059#. 
———. 2010. “Closer cooperation between China and Norway regarding social responsibility.” News release. 
January 19. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Govern-
ment/Ministry-of-Trade-and-Industry/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2010/Closer-coopera-
tion-between-China-and-Norway-regarding-social-responsibility-.html?regj_oss=10&id=590351#. 
———. 2010. “Strengthened relationship with China a top priority for Giske’s 11 days’ tour.” News release. May 
21. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-
of-Trade-and-Industry/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2010/Strengthened-relationship-
with-China-a-top-priority-for-Giskes-11-days-tour-.html?regj_oss=8&id=605507#. 
———. 2010. “One of China’s most important politicians on a visit to Norway.” News release. June 16. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-
Trade-and-Industry/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2010/One-of-of-Chinas-most-powerful-
politicians-on-a-visit-to-Norway-.html?regj_oss=8&id=608236#. 
———. 2010. “Changes to Norway’s diplomatic presence abroad.” News release. October 5. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/Ny-
heter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2010/diplomatic_presence.html?regj_oss=7&id=620269#. 
———. 2011. Review of multilateral organizations: UNDP assessment. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/profi-
lark2011/E886_E_UNDP.pdf#search=China&regj_oss=5. 
———. 2011. The Norwegian’s Government’s strategy for cooperation between Brazil and Norway: New perspec-
tives on a long-standing relationship. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Naeringsliv/280311brasilstrategi_webE.pdf. 
———. 2011. Towards greener development: On a coherent environmental and development policy: Report No. 
14 (2010-2011) to the Storting. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/35110414/PDFS/STM201020110014000EN_PDFS.pdf. 
———. 2011. UN 2015: How can Norway contribute to reforms and to strengthening the UN? Oslo: Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Ved-
legg/FN/FN2015rapport_ENG_for_nett.pdf. 
———. 2011. “Norway’s priorities for the UN 66th General Assembly.” News release. September 16. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-
Affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/nyheter/2011/un_priorities.html?regj_oss=5&id=654805#. 






———. 2012. Business creates development: What the Norwegian authorities are doing to promote private in-
vestments in developing countries. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/Business_development_E899E.pdf. 
———. 2012. Global health in foreign and development policy: Report No. 11 (2011-2012) to the Storting. Oslo: 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/pages/36968001/PDFS/STM201120120011000EN_PDFS.pdf. 
———. 2012. Import from developing countries: Review of Norway’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for 
import of goods from developing countries. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Handelspolitikk/121029_Import_from_develop-
ing_countries_WEB_v2.pdf. 
———. 2012. Norway and the United Nations: Common future, common solutions: Report No. 33 (2011-2012) to 
the Storting. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/pages/38267499/PDFS/STM201120120033000EN_PDFS.pdf. 
———. 2012. Norway’s humanitarian policy: Annual report 2011. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/Norwegian_hum_pol-
icy2011_eng_final.pdf. 
———. 2012. Report on Policy Coherence for Development 2011: Report to the Storting as part of budget pro-
posal. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/up-
load/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/0412_report_policy_coherence_for_development.pdf. 
———. 2012. Report on Policy Coherence for Development 2012: Energy and development: Report to the Storting 
as part of budget proposal. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/Norwegian2012_PCD_Report.pdf. 
———. 2012. “Priorities for Norway at UN General Assembly 2012.” News release. September 24. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/un/priorities_assem-
bly67.html?regj_oss=9&id=699661#. 
———. 2012. “Erik Solheim new chair of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee.” News release. Novem-
ber 2. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Minis-
try-of-Foreign-Affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2012/sol-
heim_dac.html?regj_oss=2&id=706789#. 




———. 2013. Equal rights – equal opportunities: Action plan for women’s rights and gender equality in foreign 
and development policy 2013-15. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/Kvinner%20og%20likestilling/Action-plan-Equal-
rights-equal-opportunities11-2013.pdf. 
———. 2013. Long term perspective: Knowledge provides opportunity: Report No. 18 (2012-2013) to the Storting. 
Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/conten-
tassets/9f8d4da472c04edf8cabee3fed441b3d/en-gb/pdfs/stm201220130018000engpdfs.pdf. 
———. 2013. Norway’s policy of engagement: Website. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/nor-
way_engagement.html?regj_oss=11&id=587985#. 
———. 2013. Sharing for prosperity, fair distribution and growth in development policy: Report No. 25 (2012-
2013) to the Storting. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/pages/38299114/PDFS/STM201220130025000EN_PDFS.pdf. 
———. 2013. Women, peace and security: Progress Report. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ac-




———. 2013. “New white paper: Fair distribution is key to development.” News release. April 5. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Af-
fairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2013/paper_fairdistribution.html?id=721579. 
———. 2013. “Priorities for Norway at UN General Assembly 2013.” News release. September 16. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/un/priori-
ties_ga68.html?regj_oss=7&id=735364#. 
———. 2013. “Closer cooperation with South Africa.” News release. November 29. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/whats-new/news/2013/closer_contact.html?regj_oss=5&id=746971#. 
———. 2014. Annual report on Norway’s efforts to promote human rights: Human rights 2003. Oslo: Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/up-
load/kilde/ud/rap/2004/0234/ddd/pdfv/231960-human03.pdf. 
———. 2014. Education for development: Report No. 25 (2013-14). Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjer-
ingen.no/pages/38838662/PDFS/STM201320140025000EN_PDFS.pdf. 
———. 2014. Opportunities for all: Human rights in Norway's foreign policy and development cooperation: Re-
port No. 10 (2014-2015) to the Storting. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/261f255d028b42cab91ad099ee3f99fc/en-
gb/pdfs/stm201420150010000engpdfs.pdf. 
———. 2014. Programme area 03: International aid 2013: Expenses by programme category: Website. Oslo: 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/se-
lected-topics/development_cooperation/area_03.html?id=714710#. 
———. 2014. Programme area 03 International aid: The Government’s key priority areas for 2014: Website. Oslo: 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/se-
lected-topics/development_cooperation/programme-area-03-international-aid.html?id=750504#. 
———. 2014. “New agreement on Norway’s support to UN human rights efforts.” News release. April 28. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/news/2014/pm_sup-
port.html?regj_oss=3&id=757909#. 
———. 2014. “Priorities for Norway at UN General Assembly 2014.” News release. September 8. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-top-
ics/un/unga_2014.html?regj_oss=1&id=766854#. 
———. 2014. “Promoting New Actors and Innovative Approaches in the Field of Peacebuilding: The Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Carnegie Corporation of New York.” News release. October 1. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/about_mfa/grants/calls_proposals/approaches-peace-
building.html?regj_oss=1&id=768191#. 
———. 2014. “Development budget with clear priorities.” News release. October 8. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/news/2014/clear_priorities.html?regj_oss=1&id=770728#. 
———. 2014. “Reforming development assistance to improve results.” News release. October 8. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/news/2014/development_re-
form.html?regj_oss=1&id=770735#. 
Petersen, Jan. 2005. “Statement to the Storting on foreign policy.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Feb-
ruary 15. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/minis-
try-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2005/statement_to_the_storting_on_for-
eign.html?regj_oss=22&id=269783#. 
Schjerva, Roger. 2008. “Structural conditionality in IMF programmes.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
January 10. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Govern-
ment/Ministry-of-Finance/taler-og-artikler/2008/Structural-conditionality-in-IMF-pro-
gram.html?regj_oss=1&id=496178#. 
Selbervik, Hilde. 1999. Aid and conditionality: The role of the bilateral donor: A case study of Norwegian-Tanza-
nian aid relationship: A report submitted to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. Accessed August 2015. http://www.oecd.org/countries/tanzania/35178610.pdf. 
Appendixes│263 
 
Solheim, Erik. 2006. “The role of the business sector in international development policy.” Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, February 14. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-
2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2006/the-role-of-the-business-sector-in-in-
ter.html?regj_oss=20&id=438654#. 
———. 2006. “Statement to the Storting on foreign policy.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 16. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-For-
eign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2006/international-development-minister-erik-
.html?regj_oss=20&id=420850#. 
———. 2006. “Opening address: Oslo conference on conditionality.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Olso, November 28. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/stoltenberg-
ii/ud/taler-og-artikler/2006/welcome-speech-at-the-oslo-conference-on.html?id=436990. 
Sorensen, Heide. 2010. “Environmental cooperation between China and Norway.” Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment, June 1. Accessed August 2015. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/MD/Vedlegg/taler_arti-
kler/The_environmental_cooperation_between_China_and_Norway_Sorensen_EXPO2010_100601.pdf. 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad 
Brandtzæg, Bjørn, and Econ Pöyry. 2008. Common cause, different approaches: China and Norway in Nigeria: 
Research report. 15. Oslo: commissioned by Norwegian Foreign Ministry and Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/Common%20cause%20different%20approaches_0.pdf. 
Tjønneland, Elling N., Bjørn Brandtzæg, Åshild Kolås, and Garth Le Pere. 2006. China in Africa: Implications for 
Norwegian foreign and development policies. 15. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute; commissioned by Norwe-
gian Foreign Ministry and Norad. Accessed November 2015. http://www.cmi.no/publications/publica-
tion/?2438=china-in-africa-implications-for-norwegian. 
Norad 
Dahle Huse, Martine, and Stephen L. Muyakwa. 2008. China in Africa: Lending, Policy Space and Governance. 
Oslo: Norwegian Campaign for Debt Cancellation, commissioned by Norad. Accessed February 17, 2015. 
http://www.afrika.no/noop/file.php%3Fid%3D15890+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=de. 
Norad. 2005. Direct budget support disbursement mechanisms and predictability. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=109514. 
———. 2005. Norad in brief 2005: Website. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-
and-publications/publications/publication?key=109539. 
———. 2006. Annual report on bilateral development cooperation 2005. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0131/ddd/pdfv/292844-norad_eng_web.pdf. 
———. 2006. Norad’s strategy towards 2010. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=109554. 
———. 2006. Oil for development: Factsheet: Website. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=109578. 
———. 2007. Annual report on bilateral development cooperation 2006. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/bilrapportl_engelsk.pdf. 
———. 2007. Evaluation of Norwegian development cooperation: Annual report 2006. Oslo: Norad. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/evaluations/publica-
tion?key=109690. 
———. 2007. Norad in brief 2006: Website. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-
and-publications/publications/publication?key=109594. 






———. 2007. Oil for development: Annual report 2007. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=109769. 
———. 2008. Annual report on bilateral development cooperation 2007. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=117521. 
———. 2008. Evaluation of Norwegian development cooperation: Annual report 2007. Oslo: Norad. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/evaluations/publica-
tion?key=109809. 
———. 2008. Norad factsheet 2008: Website. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=164689. 
———. 2008. Results report 2007: Norwegian aid works – but not well enough. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 
2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=109752. 
———. 2009. Annual report on bilateral development cooperation 2008. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=235867. 
———. 2009. Evaluation programme 2009-2011. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/evaluations/publication?key=149864. 
———. 2009. Oil for development: Annual report 2008. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=132945. 
———. 2009. Results report 2008: Development assistance - no shortcuts to good results. Oslo: Norad. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=124816. 
———. 2010. Annual report on bilateral development cooperation 2009. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=244661. 
———. 2010. Evaluation of Norwegian development cooperation 2009. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/evaluations/publication?key=171040. 
———. 2010. Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002-2009. Oslo: Norad. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/evaluations/publica-
tion?key=158291. 
———. 2010. Good governance in Nigeria: A study in political economy and donor support. Oslo: Norad. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/norad-reports/publica-
tion?key=203616. 
———. 2010. Oil for development: Annual report 2009. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=178576. 
———. 2010. Results report 2009: Aid and economic development: Ripples in the water or a drop in the ocean? 
Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publica-
tion?key=159028. 
———. 2011. Democracy support through the United Nations. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/evaluations/publication?key=284256. 
———. 2011. Energy for sustainable development: Annual report 2010. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=380678. 
———. 2011. Evaluation of Norwegian development cooperation: Annual report 2010. Oslo: Norad. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/evaluations/publica-
tion?key=372069. 
———. 2011. Evaluation of Norwegian development cooperation to promote human rights. Oslo: Norad. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/evaluations/publica-
tion?key=385467. 




———. 2011. Oil for development: Annual report 2010. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=380673. 
———. 2011. Oil for development: Annual report 2011. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=392371. 
———. 2011. Real-time evaluation of Norway's international climate and forest initiative: Contributions to a 
global REDD and regime 2007-2010. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. https://www.norad.no/globalas-
sets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/real-time-evaluation-
of-norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative1.pdf. 
———. 2011. Results report 2010: Capacity development: Building societies capable of sustaining themselves. 
Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publica-
tion?key=380956. 
———. 2011. Review and recommendations for Norwegian support to good governance in Pakistan. Oslo: 
Norad. Accessed August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/norad-re-
ports/publication?key=372089. 
———. 2012. Energy for sustainable development: Annual report 2009. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=393797. 
———. 2012. Energy for sustainable development: Annual report 2011. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=393797. 
———. 2012. Evaluation Norwegian development cooperation: Lessons learnt in 2011. Oslo: Norad. Accessed 
August 2015. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=393706. 
———. 2012. Results report 2011: Aid and conflict. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=392469. 
———. 2013. Energy for sustainable development: Annual report 2012. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=404572. 
———. 2013. Oil for development: Annual report 2012. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=404573. 
———. 2014. Energy for sustainable development: Annual report 2013. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=413563. 
———. 2014. Oil for development: Annual report 2013. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=412149. 
———. 2014. Results report 2013: Health and education. Oslo: Norad. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=414342. 
9.2.3 Documents for the United Kingdom  
Institution (ab-
breviation) 
Institution Amount of documents 
BHC British High Commission  1 
DevTracker Development Tracker 31 
DFID Department for International Development 128 
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office  25 
HC House of Commons  9 
266│Appendixes 
 
ICAI Independent Commission for Aid Impact  5 
UK Gov UK Government  11 
  In total 210 
 
British High Commission  
British High Commission. 2013. “Celebrating UK-India partnership on research and innovation.” News release. 
November 13. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/celebrating-
uk-india-partnership-on-research-innovation. 
Department for International Development 
DFID. 1997. Eliminating world poverty: A challenge for the 21st century: White paper on international develop-
ment. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/20050404190659/http:/www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/whitepaper1997.pdf. 
———. 2002. Departmental report 2002. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67953/dr2002.pdf. 
———. 2003. Departmental report 2003. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67947/full_re-
port.pdf. 
———. 2005. Autumn performance report 2005. London: Department for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/272216/6706.pdf. 
———. 2005. DFID: Partnerships for poverty reduction: Rethinking conditionality: Guidance note. London: De-
partment for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/up-
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/211182/partnerships-poverty-reduction.pdf. 
———. 2005. Resource accounts 2004-2005. London: Department for International Development. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/235121/0550.pdf. 
———. 2006. Annual report. London: Department for International Development. 
———. 2006. Autumn performance report 2006. London: Department for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/272380/6978.pdf. 
———. 2006. Eliminating world poverty: Making governance work for the poor: White paper. London: Depart-
ment for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys-
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/272330/6876.pdf. 
———. 2006. How to note: Implementing the UK's conditionality policy. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/20140627025557/http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC20671.pdf. 
———. 2006. Resource accounts 2005-06. London: Department for International Development. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/231585/1450.pdf. 
———. 2006. Statistics on international development 2001/02-2005/06. London: Department for International 




———. 2007. Annual report 2007. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/231305/0514.pdf. 
———. 2007. Autumn performance report 2007. London: Department for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/243136/7274.pdf. 
———. 2007. Governance, development and democratic politics: DFID's work in building more effective states. 
London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/governance.pdf. 
———. 2007. Resource accounts 2006.07. London: Department for International Development. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/231235/0896.pdf. 
———. 2007. Statistics on international development 2002/03-2006/07. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67740/FINAL-printed-SID-2008.pdf. 
———. 2008. Annual report 2008: Development in the making. London: Department for International Develop-
ment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/250281/0567.pdf. 
———. 2008. Autumn performance report 2008. London: Department for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/238676/7515.pdf. 
———. 2008. DFID asset management strategy. London: Department for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67765/asset-
management-strategy-dec07.pdf. 
———. 2008. DFID research strategy 2008-2013. London: Department for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67757/re-
search-strategy-08.pdf. 
———. 2008. DFID stakeholder survey 2008: Final report. London: Department for International Development. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67760/stakeholder-survey-2008-report.pdf. 
———. 2008. How to note: Country governance analysis. London: Department for International Development. 
Accessed August 2015. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/how-
to-cga.pdf. 
———. 2008. Independent evaluation in DFID: Annual report 2007-08. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67741/ev695.pdf. 
———. 2008. Resource accounts 2007-08. London: Department for International Development. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67741/ev695.pdf. 
———. 2008. Statistics on international development 2003/04-2007/08. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67816/sid06-full.pdf. 
———. 2008. The UK and the World Bank 2007-2009. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/world-
bank-2009.pdf. 
———. 2009. Annual report and resource accounts 2008-09. London: Department for International Develop-
ment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-report-and-resource-
accounts-2008-09-volume-1. 





———. 2009. Building the evidence to reduce poverty: The UK's policy on evaluation for international develop-
ment. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67729/evaluation-policy.pdf. 
———. 2009. DFID Evaluation department: Forward work programme 2009/10. London: Department for Inter-
national Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up-
loads/attachment_data/file/67728/forward-work-plan0910.pdf. 
———. 2009. Eliminating world poverty: Building our common future: White paper. London: Department for In-
ternational Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up-
loads/attachment_data/file/229029/7656.pdf. 
———. 2009. How to note: Implementing the UK's conditionality policy. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/20100512165313/https://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/implementing-condi-
tionality-policy.pdf. 
———. 2009. Independent evaluation: Annual report 2009. London: Department for International Development. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67714/ev-annual-report-09.pdf. 
———. 2009. Resource accounts 2008-09. London: Department for International Development. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67726/vol2-re-
source-acc.pdf. 
———. 2009. Statistics on international development 2004/05-2008/09. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67720/final-printed-sid-2009.pdf. 
———. 2010. DFID business plan 2011 to 2015. London: Department for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67658/DFID-
business-plan.pdf. 
———. 2010. DFID core competency framework. London: Department for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214008/com-
petency-framework.pdf. 
———. 2010. DFID in 2009-10: Response to the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 
2006. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67675/dfid-in-2009-10-revised-6-sept-2010.pdf. 
———. 2010. DFID structural reform plan. London: Department for International Development. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67673/DFID_SRP.pdf. 
———. 2010. DFID's expenditure on humanitarian assistance 2008/09. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67680/humanitarian-spend-report0809.pdf. 
———. 2010. DFID's expenditure on humanitarian assistance 2009/10. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67644/humanitarian-spend-report0910.pdf. 
———. 2010. Evaluation of DFID's China programme 2004-2009. London: Department for International Devel-
opment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.oecd.org/derec/unitedkingdom/46973339.pdf. 
———. 2010. Evaluation of DFID's country programme: China 2004-2009: Summary. London: Department for 
International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up-
loads/attachment_data/file/67686/evsum-cnty-prog-eval-cn-2004-09.pdf. 
———. 2010. Health portfolio review report 2009. London: Department for International Development. Ac-




———. 2010. Public attitudes towards development. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67684/public-attitudes-april10.pdf. 
———. 2010. Resource accounts 2009-10. London: Department for International Development. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67674/rsce-ac-
cts-09-10.pdf. 
———. 2010. Statistical release: Statistics on international development. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67663/SID-2010-Statistical-Release.pdf. 
———. 2010. Statistics on international development 2005/06-2009/10. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67662/SID-2010.pdf. 
———. 2010. “The outcomes of the UN MDG Summit: Newsletter special edition.” News release. 2010. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67665/newsletter-sp-ed-outcomes-un-mdg-summit.pdf. 
———. 2010. Congo: 50 years and beyond: Country report. London: Department for International Development. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67677/congo-50-and-beyond.pdf. 
———. 2011. Annual report and accounts 2010-11. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-report-and-accounts-2011-vol-
ume-i. 
———. 2011. China: International development support project: Business case. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. Accessed August 2015. iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/3717523.odt. 
———. 2011. Conflict pool: Annual report 2009-10. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67639/conflict-pool-annual-report.pdf. 
———. 2011. DFID management response to Independent Commission for Aid Impact recommendations on: 
DFID's approach to anti-corruption. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/187578/ICAI-anti-
corruption-progress-sept12.pdf. 
———. 2011. How to note: A practical guide to assessing and monitoring human rights in country programmes. 
London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/20130603163248/http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/attachments/arti-
cle/523/DFID_how_to_note_-_human_rights_in_country_programmes_-_edited.pdf. 
———. 2011. Multilateral aid review 2011: Evaluation. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67583/multilateral_aid_review.pdf. 
———. 2011. Operational plan Global Partnership Department 2011-2015. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/67567/glob-parts-dept-1.pdf. 
———. 2011. Statistics on international development 2006/07-2010/11. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/197477/SID-2011.pdf. 
———. 2011. Taking forward the findings of the UK multilateral aid review. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/224993/MAR-taking-forward.pdf. 
———. 2011. UK aid: Changing lives, delivering results. London: Department for International Development. 




———. 2011. “Emerging economies key to international development.” News release. February 15. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/emerging-economies-key-to-international-develop-
ment. 
———. 2011. Technical note: Implementing DFID's strengthened approach to budget support. London: Depart-
ment for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys-
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/214161/Strengthened-approach-budget-support-Tecnical-Note.pdf. 
———. 2011. “UK hails new aid partnership with emerging powers.” News release. December 1. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-hails-new-aid-partnership-with-emerging-powers. 
———. 2012. Annual report and accounts 2011-12. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/48979/Annual-report-accounts-2011-12.pdf. 
———. 2012. DFID business plan 2012 to 2015. London: Department for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31197/DFID-
business-plan2012.pdf. 
———. 2012. DFID business plan 2012 to 2015. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/up-
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31197/DFIDbusiness-plan2012.pdf. 
———. 2012. DFID Rwanda: Business case. London: Department for International Development. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67320/DFID-
Rwanda-business-case.pdf. 
———. 2012. Joint factsheet on US-UK partnership for global development. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/67435/US-UK_20Global_20Development_20Partnership_20-_202012_20factsheet.pdf. 
———. 2012. Operational plan Global Partnership Department 2011-2015. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/67419/glob-parts-dept-2011.pdf. 
———. 2012. Promoting human rights internationally. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/promoting-human-rights-internationally. 
———. 2012. Statistics on international development 2007/08-2011/12. London: Department for International 
Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/67317/SID-2012.pdf. 
———. 2012. “Aid effectiveness: Mitchell co-chairs 'post-Busan' panel.” News release. June 29. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/aid-effectiveness-mitchell-co-chairs-post-busan-panel. 
———. 2012. “DFID research: Research call: The Brazilian development model for Africa: Evidence and lessons.” 
News release. August 24. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dfid-research-re-
search-call-the-brazilian-development-model-for-africa-evidence-and-lessons. 
———. 2012. “Greening announces new development relationship with India.” News release. November 9. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/20130128103201/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/press-re-
leases/Greening-announces-new-development-relationship-with-India.pdf. 
———. 2013. Annual evaluation report: July 2013. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/237332/annual-evaluation-report-july-2013a.pdf. 
———. 2013. Annual report and accounts 2012-13. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/208445/annual-report-accounts2013-13.pdf. 
———. 2013. China: International development support project: Annual review. London: Department for Inter-
national Development. Accessed August 2015. iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/3849963.odt. 
Appendixes│271 
 
———. 2013. Development partnership arrangement UK and Vietnam 2006-2015. London: Department for In-
ternational Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up-
loads/attachment_data/file/205947/Dev-Part-Arrangement-vietnam-2006-2015.pdf. 
———. 2013. Development partnership arrangement UK and Vietnam 2006-2015: Amendment. London: De-
partment for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/up-
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/205948/Dev-part-arrangement-vietnam-amendment.pdf. 
———. 2013. DFID in Bangladesh: Autumn update 2013. London: Department for International Development. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/249004/autumn-update-Bangladesh-2013.pdf. 
———. 2013. DFID in Nepal: Portfolio review 2012/13. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/237274/Nepal-portfolio-review-2012-13.pdf. 
———. 2013. DFID in Nigeria: Autumn update 2013. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/249002/autumn-update-nigeria-2013.pdf. 
———. 2013. DFID in Pakistan: Autumn update 2013. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/249003/autumn-update-Pakistan-2013.pdf. 
———. 2013. DFID in Somalia: Autumn update 2013. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/249741/autumn-update-Somalia-2013-2.pdf. 
———. 2013. DFID International development evaluation policy. London: Department for International Devel-
opment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/204119/DFID-Evaluation-Policy-2013.pdf. 
———. 2013. DFID management response to Independent Commission on Aid Impact recommendations on: The 
management of UK budget support. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67357/man-re-
sponseICAI-UK-Budget-Support.pdf. 
———. 2013. DFID Nepal portfolio review 2011/12. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/213941/dfid-nepal-portfolio-review-2011-12.pdf. 
———. 2013. DFID Sudan: Operational plan 2011-2015. London. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209587/Sudan2.pdf. 
———. 2013. Framework paper: UK-India development partnership after 2015. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/191059/framework-paper-UK-India-future-dev-partnership.pdf. 
———. 2013. Glossary of terms used by DFID: Website. London: Department for International Development. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/glossary-of-terms-used-by-the-de-
partment-for-international-development/glossary-of-terms-used-by-the-department-for-international-de-
velopment. 
———. 2013. India-UK relations. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/india-uk-relations. 
———. 2013. Malawi: Common approach to budget support (CABS). London: Department for International De-
velopment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/205936/malawi-perf-assess-frame-comm-app-bud-support-2013-14.pdf. 
———. 2013. Mid-year report to Parliament: April to September 2013. London: Department for International 




———. 2013. Operational plan Global Partnership Department 2011-2015. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/211229/Global-partnerships.pdf. 
———. 2013. Prosperity fund evaluation: Implementing energy efficiency in Brazil 2012. London: Department 
for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/pros-
perity-fund-project-evaluation-implementing-energy-efficiency-in-brazil-2012. 
———. 2013. Prosperity fund evaluation: Supporting the implementation of the Brazilian national policy on 
waste management. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prosperity-fund-project-evaluation-supporting-the-imple-
mentation-of-the-brazilian-national-policy-on-waste-management-2012. 
———. 2013. Statistics on international development 2013. London: Department for International Develop-
ment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/254277/Statistics_on_International_Development_2013a.pdf. 
———. 2013. “UK and China build resilience to disasters in Asia: Launch of China-UK project to build resilience 
to disasters in Asia.” News release. January 14. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/news/uk-and-china-build-resilience-to-disasters-in-asia. 
———. 2013. “Global health support programme supports shared international development objectives.” 
News release. January 16. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/global-health-sup-
port-programme-supports-shared-international-development-objectives. 
———. 2013. “Helping developing countries to be better-run and more accountable.” News release. March 22. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/helping-developing-countries-to-be-bet-
ter-run-and-more-accountable. 
———. 2013. “Working with China to reduce poverty.” News release. March 22. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/priority/working-with-china-to-reduce-poverty. 
———. 2013. “UK to end direct financial support to South Africa.” News release. April 30. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-end-direct-financial-support-to-south-africa. 
———. 2013. “Global index set to boost energy investment in developing world.” News release. November 22. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/global-index-set-to-boost-energy-invest-
ment-in-developing-world. 
———. 2014. AgriTT research challenge fund projects: Website. London: Department for International Develop-
ment. Accessed August 2015. http://www.agritt.org/#!rcf-projects/c1nzo. 
———. 2014. Annual report and accounts 2013-14. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/342888/hires-DFID-Annual-Report-2014.pdf. 
———. 2014. DFID departmental improvement plan. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/346064/DFID-DIP-2014-refresh.pdf. 
———. 2014. DFID in Malawi: Spring update. London: Department for International Development. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/297658/Ma-
lawi.pdf. 
———. 2014. DFID in Pakistan: Spring update 2014. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-in-pakistan-spring-update-2014. 
———. 2014. DFID Nepal: Portfolio review 2013/14. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/325400/DFID_Nepal_Portfolio_Review_FY_2013-14.pdf. 





———. 2014. Economic development for shared prosperity and poverty reduction: A strategic framework. Lon-
don: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/276859/Econ-development-strategic-framework_.pdf, 
no ISBN. 
———. 2014. India / South Africa: Using science to advance green fuel production. London: Department for In-
ternational Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/south-afri-
caindia-using-science-to-advance-green-fuel-production-september-2014/south-africaindia-using-science-
to-advance-green-fuel-production-september-2014. 
———. 2014. India-UK research and innovation partnership: Website. London: Department for International De-
velopment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/300341/RESEARCH_Booklet_Updated_WebVersion2.pdf. 
———. 2014. Nigeria: Spring update 2014. London: Department for International Development. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/297659/Nige-
ria.pdf. 
———. 2014. Operational plan Global Partnership Department 2011-2016. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/388892/Global-Partnerships-Department.pdf. 
———. 2014. Review of embedding evaluation in the UK Department for International Development. London: 
Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/up-
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/292208/Embedding-Evaluation-Review.pdf. 
———. 2014. Smart rules: Better programme delivery: Guidance note. London: Department for International De-
velopment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/557366/Smart_Rules-Oct2016.pdf. 
———. 2014. Statistics on international development 2014. London: Department for International Develop-
ment. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/368798/SID-2014a.pdf. 
———. 2014. The AgriTT Programme: Improved agricultural productivity can play a major role in poverty allevi-
ation: Website. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. 
https://agritt.landellmillsprojects.com/about. 
———. 2014. The partnership principles: Guidance note. London: Department for International Development. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/358341/how-to-partnership-principles-march2014a.pdf. 
———. 2014. UKIERI: UK-India education and research initiative: Programme background: Website. London: De-
partment for International Development. Accessed August 2015. http://www.ukieri.org/program-back-
ground.html. 




———. 2015. Annual report and accounts 2014-15. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/445698/Annual-Report-2014-2015.pdf. 
Lowcock, Mark. 2012. “The future of international development.” Department for International Development, 
October 16. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/mark-lowcock-the-future-
of-international-development. 
Mitchell, Andrew. 2011. “Emerging Powers.” Department for International Development, February 15. Accessed 
March 07, 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/emerging-powers. 
———. 2011. “The outcome of the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness: Written statement to Parliament.” 





———. 2012. “Our aid programme to India.” Department for International Development, May 14. Accessed 
August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/andrew-mitchell-our-aid-programme-in-india. 
———. 2012. “Results for change.” Department for International Development, June 9. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/andrew-mitchell-results-for-change. 
Development Tracker 
Development Tracker. 2011. DFID-TERI partnership for clean energy access and improved policies for sustainable 
development: Intervention summary. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 
2015. iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/4948789.odt. 
———. 2012. Building Brazil's development impact in low income countries: Business case. London: Department 
for International Development. [GB-1-204124]. Accessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/pro-
jects/GB-1-204124. 
———. 2012. ClimAA: Africa-Brazil partnership on climate-smart agriculture and food security: New tools and 
new approaches: Business case. London: Department for International Development. [GB-1-203707]. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203707/documents. 
———. 2012. Market shaping for access to safe, effective and affordable health commodities: Business case. Lon-
don: Department for International Development. [GB-1-202575]. Accessed August 2015. https://dev-
tracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202575/documents. 
———. 2012. Promoting and facilitating China's conflict sensitive engagement in South Sudan: Saferworld grant 
proposal. London: Department for International Development. [GB-CHC-1043843-OpenSociety-NON]. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-CHC-1043843-OpenSociety-NON. 
———. 2012. South African Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: Business case. London: Depart-
ment for International Development. [GB-1-203622]. Accessed August 2015. https://dev-
tracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203622/documents. 
———. 2012. South African partnership for global economic governance: Business case. London: Department for 
International Development. [GB-1-202528]. Accessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/pro-
jects/GB-1-202528/documents. 
———. 2012. Working with China to accelerate agricultural technology transfer to low income countries (AgriTT 
Programme): Business case. London: Department for International Development. [GB-1-202787]. Accessed 
August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202787/documents. 
———. 2012. Working with UNDP on "China in the world": Business case. London: Department for International 
Development. [GB-1-203622]. Accessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
203038/documents. 
———. 2013. Knowledge partnership programme (KPP): Annual review. London: Department for International 
Development. [GB-1-202765]. Accessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
202765/documents. 
———. 2013. Market shaping for access to safe, effective and affordable health commodities: Annual review. 
London: Department for International Development. [GB-1-202575]. Accessed August 2015. https://dev-
tracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202575/documents. 
———. 2013. Research into use: Completion review. London: Department for International Development. Ac-
cessed August 2015. iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/3910885.odt. 
———. 2013. South African partnership for effective development cooperation: Annual review. London: Depart-




———. 2013. Working in partnership to accelerate agricultural technology transfer (AgriTT): Annual review. Lon-
don: Department for International Development. [GB-1-202787]. Accessed August 2015. https://dev-
tracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202787/documents. 
———. 2014. Building Brazil's development impact in low income countries: Annual review. London: Depart-
ment for International Development. [GB-1-204124]. Accessed August 2015. https://dev-
tracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204124. 
———. 2014. ClimAA: Africa-Brazil partnership on climate-smart agriculture and food security: New ap-
proaches: Annual review. London: Department for International Development. [GB-1-203707]. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203707/documents. 
———. 2014. Global research partnership programme (GRP): Business case. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. [GB-1-202766]. Accessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
202766/documents. 
———. 2014. Innovative ventures and technologies for development (INVENT): Annual review. London: Depart-
ment for International Development. [GB-1-202927]. Accessed August 2015. https://dev-
tracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202927/documents. 
———. 2014. Knowledge partnership programme (KPP): Business case. London: Department for International 
Development. [GB-1-202766]. Accessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
202766/documents. 
———. 2014. Sharing and learning on community based disaster management in Asia: Annual review. London: 
Department for International Development. [GB-1-202949]. Accessed August 2015. https://dev-
tracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202949/documents. 
———. 2015. China-UK global health support programme: Annual review. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. [GB-1-202708]. Accessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
202708/documents. 
———. 2015. China-UK Global health support programme: Business case. London: Department for International 
Development. [GB-1-202708]. Accessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
202708/documents. 
———. 2015. Development lessons from successful emerging economies for low income countries: Annual re-
view. London: Department for International Development. Accessed August 2015. iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_docu-
ments/4958587.odt. 
———. 2015. Global research partnership programme (GRP): Annual review. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development. [GB-1-202766]. Accessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
202766/documents. 
———. 2015. Grow campaign: South Asia. London: Department for International Development. [GB-CHC-
202918-AASA46]. Accessed August 2015. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-CHC-202918-AASA46. 
———. 2015. India partnership framework: Annual review. London: Department for International Development. 
Accessed August 2015. iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/4945237.odt. 
———. 2015. International development support: China. London: Department for International Development. 
Accessed August 2015. iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/5132936.odt. 
———. 2015. Partnership with the Development Research Centre on knowledge for development programme: 
Business case. London: Department for International Development. [GB-1-204737]. Accessed August 2015. 
https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204737/documents. 
———. 2015. Sharing and learning on community based disaster management in Asia: Business case. London: 
Department for International Development. [GB-1-202949]. Accessed August 2015. https://dev-
tracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202949/documents. 
———. 2015. South African Partnership for global economic governance: Completion report. London: Depart-




———. 2015. Supporting Indian trade and investment for Africa (SITA Africa): Annual review. London: Depart-
ment for International Development. [GB-1-202762]. Accessed August 2015. https://dev-
tracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202762/documents. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Browne, Jeremy. 2012. “British competitiveness: Responding to the rise of emerging powers.” Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, April 24. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/british-
competitiveness-responding-to-the-rise-of-the-emerging-powers 
FCO. 2005. Annual report on human rights. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32913/human-rights-re-
port-2005.pdf. 
———. 2006. Annual report on human rights. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32912/human-rights-
06.pdf. 
———. 2006. Global opportunities fund: 2005-2006. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/272377/6955.pdf. 
———. 2007. Annual report on human rights. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32911/human-rights-
report-2007.pdf. 
———. 2008. Annual report on human rights. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238659/7557.pdf. 
———. 2008. Global opportunities fund: 2006-2007. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/238777/7314.pdf. 
———. 2009. Annual report on human rights. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32908/human-rights-
report-2009.pdf. 
———. 2010. Human rights and democracy: The 2010 Foreign and Commonwealth Report. London: Department 
for International Development. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys-
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/32907/accessible-hrd-report-2010.pdf. 
———. 2011. Human rights and democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Report. London: Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up-
loads/attachment_data/file/32906/Cm-8339.pdf. 
———. 2011. “UK-Brazil joint communiqué.” News release. June 22. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-brazil-joint-communique. 
———. 2012. Human rights and democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Report. London: Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up-
loads/attachment_data/file/186688/Cm_8593_Accessible_complete.pdf. 
———. 2012. “Announcement: UK and Brazil commit to developing enhanced foreign policy relationship.” 
News release. January 18. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-brazil-
commit-to-developing-enhanced-foreign-policy-relationship. 
———. 2012. “The India and UK partnership.” News release. November 8. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-india-and-uk-partnership. 
———. 2013. Human rights and democracy: The 2013 Foreign and Commonwealth Report. London: Foreign and 




———. 2014. Brazil: BRICS summit: Research and analysis. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/brazil-brics-summit-july-2014/brazil-
brics-summit-july-2014. 
———. 2014. Human rights and democracy: The 2014 Foreign and Commonwealth Report. London: Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up-
loads/attachment_data/file/415910/AHRR_2014_Final_to_TSO.pdf. 
Greening, Justine. 2012. “Update on aid to India.” Department for International Development, November 9. 
Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/justine-greening-update-on-aid-to-in-
dia. 
———. 2014. “Smart aid: Why it's all about jobs.” Department for International Development, January 27. Ac-
cessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/smart-aid-why-its-all-about-jobs. 
———. 2014. “An end to poverty.” Department for International Development, April 2. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/an-end-to-poverty-justine-greenings-speech-to-the-china-in-
ternational-development-research-network. 
———. 2014. “Beyond aid: Development priorities from 2015.” Department for International Development, July 
7. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/justine-greening-beyond-aid-devel-
opment-priorities-from-2015. 
———. 2014. “Oral evidence.” House of Commons: Beyond aid hearing: 3rd oral evidence session, London, De-
cember 11. Accessed August 2015. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evi-
dencedocument/international-development-committee/the-future-of-uk-development-cooperation-phase-
2-beyond-aid/oral/16791.pdf. 
Hague, William. 2012. “Britain and South Africa: A 21st century partnership.” Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice, February 14. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-and-south-af-
rica-a-21st-century-partnership. 
———. 2014. “UK and Brazil in partnership with Africa for prosperity.” Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Feb-
ruary 19. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-and-brazil-in-partnership-
with-africa-for-prosperity. 
Lyall Grant, Mark. 2014. “Human rights and the rule of law are integral to the post-2015 development agenda.” 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office/United Nations, June 11. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/human-rights-and-the-rule-of-law-are-integral-to-the-post-
2015-development-agenda. 
House of Commons 
Ditchburn, Liz. 2014. “Oral evidence.” House of Commons: Beyond aid hearing: 3rd oral evidence session, Lon-
don, December 11. Accessed August 2015. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevi-
dence.svc/evidencedocument/international-development-committee/the-future-of-uk-development-coop-
eration-phase-2-beyond-aid/oral/16791.pdf. 
House of Commons. 2004. DFID Departmental report 2004. London: House of Commons. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmintdev/749/749.pdf. 
Jackson, Ben. 2014. “Oral evidence.” House of Commons: The future of UK development cooperation: Beyond 
aid: 1st oral evidence session, London, October 14. Accessed August 2015. http://data.parliament.uk/writ-
tenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/international-development-committee/the-future-
of-uk-development-cooperation-phase-2-beyond-aid/oral/14716.pdf. 
Labour campaign for international development. 2014. “Written evidence.” House of Commons: Beyond aid 





Leach, Melissa. 2014. “Oral evidence.” House of Commons: The future of UK development cooperation: Beyond 
aid: 1st oral evidence session, London, October 14. Accessed August 2015. http://data.parliament.uk/writ-
tenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/international-development-committee/the-future-
of-uk-development-cooperation-phase-2-beyond-aid/oral/14716.pdf 
Lunn, Jon. 2011. India. Recent developments. London: House of Commons Library. 
Thomas, Louise. 2014. “Oral evidence.” House of Commons: Beyond aid hearing: 3rd oral evidence session, 
London, December 11. Accessed August 2015. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevi-
dence.svc/evidencedocument/international-development-committee/the-future-of-uk-development-coop-
eration-phase-2-beyond-aid/oral/16791.pdf. 
Tyson, Kathryn. 2014. “Oral evidence.” House of Commons: Beyond aid hearing: 3rd oral evidence session, Lon-
don, December 11. Accessed August 2015. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevi-
dence.svc/evidencedocument/international-development-committee/the-future-of-uk-development-coop-
eration-phase-2-beyond-aid/oral/16791.pdf. 
Woods, Ngaire. 2014. “Oral evidence.” House of Commons: The future of UK development cooperation: Be-
yond aid: 1st oral evidence session, London, October 14. Accessed August 2015. http://data.parlia-
ment.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/international-development-commit-
tee/the-future-of-uk-development-cooperation-phase-2-beyond-aid/oral/14716.pdf. 
Independent Commission on Aid Impact 
ICAI. 2012. ICAI annual report 2011-12. London: Independent Commission on Aid Impact. Accessed August 
2015. http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ICAI-Annual-Report-2011-12-FINAL.pdf. 
———. 2012. The management of UK budget support operations. London: Independent Commission on Aid Im-
pact. Accessed August 2015. https://www.oecd.org/derec/50359937.pdf. 
———. 2013. ICAI annual report 2012-13. London: Independent Commission on Aid Impact. Accessed August 
2015. http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ICAI-Annual-Report-2012-13.pdf. 
———. 2014. ICAI annual report 2013-14. London: Independent Commission on Aid Impact. Accessed August 
2015. http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ICAI-Annual-Report-13-14-FINAL.pdf. 




UK Government / Prime Minister 
Clegg, Nick. 2014. “On international development.” Prime Minister's Office, May 28. Accessed August 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nick-clegg-speech-on-international-development. 
National Audit Office. 2008. DFID providing budget support to developing countries. London: National Audit Of-
fice. Accessed August 2015. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/07086.pdf. 
UK Government. 2002. International Development Act. London: UK Government. Accessed August 2015. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/1/contents. 
———. 2003. Industrial Development (Financial Assistance) Act 2003. London: UK Government. Accessed Au-
gust 2015. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/11/data.pdf. 
———. 2006. International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006. London: UK Government. Ac-
cessed August 2015. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/31/contents. 
———. 2010. Draft International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Bill. London: UK Gov-




———. 2010. Government response to the International Development Committee Report on the Draft Interna-
tional Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Bill. London: UK Government. Accessed August 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238434/7866.pdf. 
———. 2012. Letter of intentions between the UK and Brazil on Africa-Brazil partnership on climate-smart agri-
culture and food security. London: UK Government. Accessed August 2015. https://dev-
tracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203707/documents. 
———. 2012. Policy Strengthening UK relationships in Asia Latin America and Africa to support UK prosperity 
and security. London: UK Government. Accessed August 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/poli-
cies/strengthening-uk-relationships-in-asia-latin-america-and-africa-to-support-uk-prosperity-and-secu-
rity#case-studies. 
———. 2013. Memorandum of understanding for a partnership to enhance development cooperation and 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals between Ministry of Commerce of the PRC and DFID of 










9.3 Coding scheme/ results of coding for three countries 
9.3.1 Coding scheme 
Chapter Code Explanation 
Codes for chapter 5: 
Ideas about emerg-
ing donors 
Ideas  relevant for representing the ideas of traditional 
donors about emerging donors 
 
Codes for chapter 6: 
Conditionality 
 
C narr.: Conditionality narra-
tive 
General narrative regarding conditionality/ posi-
tive or negative attitude towards conditionality 
C narr. political: Conditional-
ity narrative political  
General narrative regarding political conditional-
ity 
C eco: Conditionality narra-
tive economic 
General narrative regarding economic condition-
ality 
C HR: Conditionality human 
rights 
Position regarding conditionality in human rights 
policies 
C GG: Conditionality good 
governance 
Position regarding conditionality in good govern-
ance policies 
C BS: Conditionality budget 
support 
Position regarding conditionality in budget sup-
port policies 
C IMF: Conditionality within 
IMF and World Bank 
Position regarding conditionality within the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
C Debt: Conditionality within 
debt relief  
Position regarding conditionality regarding debt 
relief (note that this category was abandoned)  
C pract.: Conditionality prac-
tices 
Evidence for behaviour within the practices of 
conditionality (note that most evidence for this 
category was found in the statistics) 
Codes for chapter 7: 
Trilateral coopera-
tion 
TC narr.: Trilateral coopera-
tion narrative 
Position regarding trilateral cooperation in gen-
eral and with particular countries  
TC pract.: Trilateral coopera-
tion practices 
Evidence for trilateral projects in practice (note 





9.3.2 Search results and resulting coding for the individual donor countries 
Search word USA Norway UK 
 Hits Coded Hits Coded Hits  Coded  
Emerging donors 37 Ideas 7 
TC (narr.) 14 
1 None 2 Ideas 2 
TC (narr.) 2 
Emerging country/coun-
tries 
9 Ideas 1 
TC (narr.) 1  
0 None 0 None 
Emerging power/ pow-
ers 
10 Ideas 4  34 Ideas 21 
TC (narr.) 11 
54 Ideas 52 
TC (narr.) 27 
TC (pract.) 2 
C (narr.) 3 
Emerging economy/ 
economies 
136 Ideas 29  
TC (narr.) 1 
C (IMF) 4 
58 Ideas 12 
TC (narr.) 4 
C (narr.) 2 
37 Ideas 16 
TC (narr.) 10 
TC (pract.) 4 
C (narr.) 2  
BRIC/BRICS 17 Ideas 7  17 Ideas (4) 
TC (narr.) 2 
40 Ideas 3 
TC (narr.) 2 
South-South 40 Ideas 2  
TC (narr.) 4  
70 Ideas (139 
TC (narr.) 6 
9 Ideas 2 
TC (narr.) 5 
Power shift/ shifts 1 None 2 None 1 None 
Brazil/ Brazilian/ Brazil’S 1481 Ideas 43 
TC (narr.) 5 
C (IMF) 1 
639 Ideas 32 
TC (narr.) 22  
C (pract). 2 
320 Ideas 24 
TC (narr.) 51 
C (narr.) 6 
C (pract.) 1 
China/ Chinese/ China’s/ 
China-Africa 
7608 Ideas 153 
C (narr.) 2 
C (IMF) 3 
C (HR) 20 
C (GG) 6 
C (BS) 1 
TC (narr.) 6 
TC (prat.) 1 
2629 Ideas 29 
C (narr.) 4 
C (HR) 2 
C (GG) 1 
TC (narr.) 21  
TC (pract). 1 
1722 Ideas 11 
C (narr.) 13 
TC (narr.) 49 
TC (pract.) 1 
India/ Indian/ India’s/ 
India-Africa 
3895 Ideas 36 
TC (narr.) 9 
C (HR) 1 
C (Eco) 1 
846 Ideas 10 
TC (narr.) 8  
C (HR) 2 
1550 Ideas 11 
TC (narr.) 17 
C (narr.) 10 
South Africa/ South Afri-
can/ South Africa’s 
2099 Ideas 16 
TC (narr.) 9 
C (narr.) 1 
611 Ideas 7 
TC (narr.) 3 
C (narr.) 1 
520 Ideas 9 
TC (narr.) 8 





Search word (cont’d.) USA Norway UK 
 Hits Coded Hits Coded Hits  Coded  
Trilateral/ tripartite/ tri-
angular 
200 TC (narr.) 64 
TC (pract.) 6 
Ideas 4 
50 TC (narr.) 1 
TC (pract). 4 
Ideas 3 
22 TC (narr.) 3 
Conditionality 84 C (narr.) 9 
C (IMF) 26 
C (pract.) 1 
517 C (narr.) 67 
C (GG) 12 
C (HR) 11 
139 C (narr.) 98 
Conditions/ condition/ 
conditional 
3106 Ideas 4  
C (narr.) 37 
C (narr.pol.) 16 
C (HR) 7 
C (GG) 1 
1524 C (narr.) 24 
C (HR) 8 
C (GG) 17 
 
1105 C (narr.) 30 
C (pract.) 19 
Conditionally/ uncondi-
tional/ unconditionally  
46 None  20 None 23 None 
Emerging market/ mar-
kets 
109 C (narr.) 1 0 None 6 None 
Debt (un)sustainability/ 
macroeconomic stability  
125 C (eco) 1 
C (debt) 1 
25 C (debt) 5 88 C (narr.) 23 
Irresponsible 35 C (eco) 1 11 C (debt) 1 20 None 
Budget support 94 C (BS) 27 547 C (BS) 24 1835 C (debt) 9 
C (BS) 205 
IMF, WB, World Bank, 
International Monetary 
Fund 
5624 Ideas 10 
C (narr.pol.) 1 
C (GG) 3 
C (IMF) 53 
C (pract.) 18 
2308 C (eco) 5 
C (IMF) 67 
C (debt) 4 
C (GG) 3 
1830 C (BS) 1 
C (IMF) 55 
C (Debt) 10 
C (GG) 1 
C (pract.) 1 
Human rights 10043 C (narr.pol.) 12 
C (HR) 19 
C (GG) 1 
5116 C (narr.pol) 34 
C (HR) 43 
C (GG) 5 
10849 C (BS) 10 
C (HR) 60 
Good governance 3224 C (narr.) 3 
C (narr.pol.) 29 
C (GG) 233 
C (HR) 11 
C (eco) 3 
C (IMF) 1 
C (pract.) 177 
734 C (narr.) 5 
C (narr.pol.) 4  
C (GG) 19 
C (HR) 7 
C (pract.) 2 
 
2806 C (BS) 5 
C (GG) 230 
Ownership 974 C (narr.) 47 
C (HR) 5 
C (IMF) 6 
C (pract.) 2 
655 C (narr.) 
C (HR) 
TC (narr.) 
291 C (narr.) 17 
C (HR) 1 
TC (narr.) 1 
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9.4 Interview guidelines 
Questions regarding the influence of the person  
- Can you give us an insight into your position at XY? 
- Since when do you work for XY? 
- What is the main focus of your work?  
- What kind of meetings do you attend? How many? How often?  
Standing on conditionality/ efficiency debate? 
- What is your opinion on the conditionality of aid? 
- Has that opinion changed over the years? 
- Since 2005, what progress/ regression have been made in your opinion? 
- Should XY advocate for a stronger conditionality?  
- What results has conditionality shown?  
Standing on triangular cooperation? 
- Triangular cooperation seems to be fashionable right now. What is your personal view on 
the issue? 
- Advantages/ disadvantages?  
- What do you think is the main goal of triangular cooperation?  
- Do you think that triangular cooperation is a success so far? 
- What influence do traditional donors maintain?  
Perception of new donors 
- Can you remember when the issue of the so called emerging donors was first addressed?  
- Generally, what is your overall judgement of emerging donors?  
- What do you think is the major advantage of emerging donors?  
- What are the major risks involved when it comes to emerging donors?  
- Do you think their development aid is equal to that of [country of origin]? 
- In quality? 
- In who it addresses?  
- What is your reaction to these issues?  
- Do they influence the policies of traditional donors? Do you have concrete examples of 
how emerging donors’ development policies influence the policies of your country/ your 
institution?   
284│Appendixes 
 
9.5 Interviews transcriptions  
9.5.1 Interview III  
Interview conducted on 9 October 2013; ME: Interviewer; I: Interviewed; Text in brackets: anonymised  
[Introduction and explanation of procedure with the interview material] #00:05:18-9#  
ME: I think we are ready to start then. First of all, you just said that you worked for [institution] 
for two years in the field of emerging powers. Maybe you could elaborate on that, what exactly 
do you do at the [institution] at the moment. You are working for the [specific programme]. 
#00:05:40-0#  
I: Yes. So the [programme] from [institution] covers areas including the G20, the G8, our rela-
tionship with OECD donors. The OECD DAC and also with philanthropic foundations. We, 
about, just over two years ago, that [politician] said that he wanted [institution] to improve its 
collaboration with what we call emerging powers. And as a result a new team was created within 
that department to work with emerging powers specifically. So the role of our team is really to 
coordinate the network of people who are doing the work across the organisation. So, I work 
very closely with people based in our embassies in Beijing and Brasilia and also teams in Delhi 
and Pretoria. So I have a coordination role. We also obviously coordinate with other partners 
as well. Our role is really to make sure we have a coherent policy and towards working with this 
group of countries because it is quite a new area of work and also to be able to facilitate the 
sharing of lessons between all of them. Because it is quite a new experiment and it is quite useful 
for them to be able to learn from each other. #00:07:49-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:07:50-2#  
I: And then we have a role to reporting that to our ministers and aggregating information what 
is happening in this area. So that is the role of our team. #00:07:58-4#  
ME: And you said that this team works since 2011. That it started working then. #00:08:05-8#  
I: Yes. If you wanted a sort of reference to what kick-started it, it is the speech of [politician] at 
[institution] in 2011. And I think it is called something like [title]. That is what initiated the 
department. #00:08:34-7#  
ME: Interesting. So you said also that you have some kind of a coordinating role. Do you also 
attend meetings with so-called emerging donors? #00:08:46-0#  
I: Yes. To some extent. The main face to face contact happens in capitals. But I quite frequently 
seem to opt that back to my colleagues. When I visited them overseas, I would attend meetings 
with [institution]. And in addition when there are visitors from South Africa, we go, I can rep-
resent the institution here. In addition, there are some countries where we haven’t got a [insti-
tution] person and in those countries our team represents [institution] to a large extent. An 
example for that would be Mexico. #00:09:54-7#  
ME: Okay. Very interesting. If you work there since 2011, but maybe still from your personal 
background, can you remember when the issue of so-called emerging donors was first ad-
dressed? When was the very first time that you have heard that term or have heard of their aid 
effort, increasing aid effort, because it is not new, obviously. #00:10:18-1#  
I: The increasing aid of emerging donors. #00:10:22-0#  
ME: Yes, exactly, or the term itself "emerging donors." #00:10:21-6#  
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I: Ahm. I can’t remember the term "emerging donors" used before 2011 but that might have to 
do with my own reading or my own focus. #00:10:48-4#  
ME: Yes, of course. #00:10:47-1#  
I: Ahm. But I do know that as an organisation we were very aware of the impact of the larger 
emerging countries like China quite before that. But we haven’t used the term to my knowledge. 
And I think the awareness of their impact has been more about private sector investment or 
parastatal investment. #00:11:16-9#  
ME: Okay. #00:11:19-0#  
I: Rather than aid. #00:11:26-1#  
ME: Ahm. Generally, as you are in contact with the so-called emerging donors, say China, India, 
South Africa, Brazil. What do you think are the major advantages of these donors in comparison 
to traditional donors? #00:11:48-1#  
I: Ahm. The main... I mean you have to think of advantage for whom. #00:12:02-7#  
ME: Exactly. #00:12:00-8#  
I: One of the main advantages for us to work with them, from our point of view, is that they 
have a lot of interesting experiences from their own domestic developments which perhaps we 
think could be relevant in other contexts. And working with them to share, to identify what 
those lessons might be and to help transfer them, is, you know, a good thing. There are a lot of 
hypothetical benefits; I guess that we need to test. Part of the reason why I say it is at an exper-
imental stage is that we need to actually test a bit how valid the assumptions are. #00:13:07-3#  
ME: Our assumptions? Our assumptions about their aid effort or? #00:13:12-7#  
I: No. Our assumptions about for instance, whether for instance working with the South African 
revenue service, is a more effective way of helping to improve customs’ reform in other coun-
tries in Africa than working with consultancies for instance. #00:13:41-1#  
ME: Okay. #00:13:42-6#  
I: A direct collaboration between [institution] and revenue custom authorities and African coun-
tries. So there are some assumptions about perhaps the experience being more comparable, that 
they are more sensitive to the stage of development and the context, some of the challenges of 
the context, which lead us to work with them, but I suppose we haven’t tested all the assump-
tions. Not yet. #00:14:18-4#  
ME: Obviously, the idea of risks or what potential risks could emerge from so-called new donors 
was mentioned in what you said a little bit. That obviously there are not only advantages, could 
you elaborate a little bit on the potential risks that you see while working with them? #00:14:48-
8#  
I: Ahm. So at the level that I have mentioned about their experience, I think the risk is that we 
assume that what is appropriate in one country or a reform that has happened in one country is 
immediately transferable to another. Because there are multilayered stages of development. And 
I think we should not simplify like that. I think that is one thing that we need to test through 
our experience. That is the risk of delivering during programmes using the experiences of emerg-
ing donors. Let me think about other risks. I mean, it would helpful to know if you are looking 
for risks in particular areas. #00:16:08-2#  
ME: No, just generally your idea of what risks could be involved. Maybe if you look at the 
recipient side of the coin. What potential... Do you see any advantages or risks for their side 
when it comes to the cooperation between the two groups. #00:16:30-7#  
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I: I think the... It’s almost become a cliché to say that triangular cooperation is more transaction. 
And so I think that is a risk in the effectiveness of delivery and burden on countries. Which 
partners bury the biggest part of that, I don’t know in the triangle. But certainly, it’s a complaint 
that you hear from some donors. It’s not something that we’ve been particularly concerned 
about so far. But I think slightly linked to that is the... I think there are multiple objectives in 
triangular cooperation. The objective of delivering development results which is the primary 
reason people come together. There are then a series of motivations around understanding how 
different partners work and getting to know them better. And I think we need to get the balance 
right between making sure the work is a way of understanding how better to deliver aid pro-
grammes and to share experience on that but not, to make sure that deepening the partnership 
in understanding doesn’t outweigh the development projective you are trying to achieve. So you 
need to achieve a balance between those things. #00:18:50-3#  
ME: And do you think, in the long, triangular cooperation will maybe replace bilateral cooper-
ation? #00:18:58-2#  
I: I find that hard to see at the moment. #00:19:09-1#  
ME: Maybe you could mention some projects of the [institution] aiming at triangular coopera-
tion? Who are you working with and what kind of projects do you do when you do triangular 
cooperation? #00:19:22-5#  
I: Okay. It varies quite a lot between different countries. Before I go on, can I just check whether 
you have seen a recent report by ECDPM? #00:19:49-9#  
ME: No, I don’t think so. #00:19:56-0#  
I: I think it is about two weeks ago and they published a report from the approach of traditional 
donors to working with emerging donors. #00:20:01-6#  
ME: Okay. That is very crucial for my research. #00:20:12-6#  
I: Yeah. It would be worth looking at that. We provided some information to them. So that 
would be a good place for you to look at. And after this interview I can also send you some 
other press releases about our work in China and that would give you some tangible examples. 
#00:20:27-5#  
ME: Yes, that would be great. #00:20:32-6#  
I: We have a few examples of triangular cooperation. One I mentioned was with South Africa. 
Working with the South African Revenue Service for a customs reform in the region and we 
are doing that in collaboration with the World Customs Organisation. And that is so far working 
in four countries in East and Southern African regions but there are plans possibly to expand 
that later. Some other examples, I think the most tangible examples come from China and Bra-
zil. Earlier this year we launched a programme of [sector] cooperation, so joints between China 
and [traditional donor] and [recipient country] and [recipient country] and that would be looking 
at the context of agriculture in the case of [the recipient countries]. It would be looking at small 
pilot projects in those sectors and identifying any relevant experience from China that might be 
helpful there, but also in the context of a wider development project. And also with China and 
the UNDP we’re working with [recipient country] and [recipient country] in a community based 
disaster management. Again it is very much a pilot of work but looking at whether Chinese 
expertise could help develop the community based systems in [recipient countries] particularly 
after flooding, I think. #00:22:50-5#  
ME: //mhm// #00:22:52-7#  
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I: So those are some of the most tangible ones so far, but both sectors are quite in an early stage. 
Something a bit bigger is going on with Brazil. We have provided for some time, including 
before 2011 but at a much lower level, some support for their agricultural and technology insti-
tution called EMBRAPA. And since 2011 that project has been scaled up. So it is working with 
EMBRAPA. You know that agency? #00:23:35-2#  
ME: Yes, I do. #00:23:35-2#  
I: Also with the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organisation at the UN 
in a few areas. First of all, climate risk crops, climate resilience, agricultural productivity and 
access of smallholding farmers to local markets and then nutrition programmes. So the pro-
gramme has tried to look at the Brazilian experience in those areas, but then look at the current 
situation of smallholding farmers and nutrition programmes in a range of African countries. A 
lot of countries are included in this. It has basically helped improve agricultural resilience, access 
of local farmers, agricultural reform programmes and nutrition programmes. And it worked 
with such a range of countries that I can’t list them here. #00:24:51-8#  
ME: No, of course not. #00:24:55-3#  
I: And in each country, the focus is adapted to the local requirements. #00:25:05-5#  
ME: Would you say that there is a division of labour in triangular cooperation between emerging 
and traditional donors? Or would you say it is really a shared experience working for develop-
ment. #00:25:24-6#  
I: I think at this stage, it is very difficult to generalize about triangular cooperation. I think, 
looking at the way [traditional donor] approaches it compared to other traditional donors, there 
are differences and even within what [traditional donor] is doing we work very differently with 
different countries depending on, you know, the nature of the partnership, the style of the 
emerging donor and the requirements on the recipient side as well. #00:26:04-#  
ME: Could you maybe elaborate on the different styles of emerging donors? What kind of style 
would you characterise China with or India? #00:26:21-2#  
I: Ahm. I think the main characteristic we observed in working with China is the fact that they 
very much want to start at the pilot phase. And I understand that coming from the way they 
work domestically as well. To manage their own risks, to start something full-scale and test it 
out before expanding it. So it’s being quite small pilot projects so far and with the involvement 
of Chinese experts and some of our experts, the involvement of the [institution] office in recip-
ient countries as well as people from our office in Beijing coming together for quite technical 
studies worth and exchanging of information. On the other hand, with Brazil, because EM-
BRAPA is such an established organisation, it’s gone to scale quite quickly. And our participa-
tion had been mainly, or my understanding is, that it has been mainly from the Brazilian end, 
with the occasional participation on the African side, but mainly we were working through in-
termediary bodies, whether through EMBRAPA or UN agencies. #00:28:27-5#  
ME: Very interesting. I think those were my questions on triangular cooperation. I have one 
more small block of questions, concerning generally the efficiency debate and conditionality in 
particular because it is often claimed that so-called emerging donors do not focus on conditions 
whereas traditional donors still use conditionality. First of all, what is your opinion on that char-
acterisation? #00:29:06-0#  
I: Ahm. I think. Conditionality, again, there is a wide spectrum about conditionality. And it’s in 
most... Yeah... Whether it is budget support happening, there are some clearer requirements of 
what’s expected from the recipient. Usually in terms of public financial management. And on 
288│Appendixes 
 
top of that there is the political activity about human rights which - I am not really qualified to 
speak about the current phases of our policies on conditionality around budget support. So 
while there are some requirements associated with certain aid modalities of traditional donors, 
on the other hand it is not the case that... In all cases we should be working to support the 
government to do what they want to do. Ahm. So it is not about going against the grain of what 
a country’s government wants to achieve. So, the idea is that South-South Cooperation support 
is somehow more determined by the priorities of the recipient country government than tradi-
tional donors. And I think that’s overstated. I think both are supporting governments to achieve 
what they want to achieve for the people. #00:31:42-2#  
ME: And the conditions imposed from outside could actually help the government to push 
through something that they probably want themselves maybe? #00:31:48-9#  
I: Yes, perhaps. Or it is basically a statement of what, this is what we agreed the money would 
be used for in line with your objective. So, it'’ not as if they are imposed, they are just restating 
the agreement that was reached before the provision of money according to the government's 
priorities. So, I don’t think there is a large distinction between whether South-South Coopera-
tion or traditional donor assistances are more country-led. #00:32:4#  
ME: Interesting. #00:32:44-0#  
I: I think it is an observation to say traditional donor approaches have become over time, over 
the last twenty or so years more concerned with the policy environment in which aid is provided 
because basically through experience of realising that small projects won’t have a large effect if 
they are not supported by the right policy environment. #00:33:14-6#  
ME: //mhm// And that would in the end obviously increase efficiency in the end. #00:33:19-
9#  
I: Yes. #00:33:22-4#  
ME: Okay. I think you also mentioned that you work with the OECD DAC and there is the 
China-DAC study group and generally do you attend meetings at the DAC as well? Or did you? 
#00:33:43-5#  
I: I haven’t attended meetings of the DAC-China study group. My colleague in China tends to 
go to those. I have been to meetings held by the DAC on triangular cooperation. And they had 
two the last twelve months. I also think the DAC’s report on triangular cooperation as they did 
last year. Have you seen that? I would say that’s probably the best analysis of the state of trian-
gular cooperation. #00:34:26-5#  
ME: Yes, I thought it was quite well done as well. Okay. And what about the UN Development 
Cooperation Forum? Is there any cooperation within that forum as it sometimes called to be a 
larger forum for cooperation exchanges basically. #00:34:49-9#  
I: Yes, we participate in those. But so far it’s not. It’s been more about policy and not so much 
a forum for agreeing to practical collaboration. That is my impression again, I don’t represent 
my institution on that. #00:35:18-1#  
ME: Do you have anything that you thought would come up as questions? And that I have not 
asked you? Or a topic generally that you think should have been mentioned? #00:35:32-3#  
I: I suppose... Just to say, we’ve been talking quite a lot about aid and triangular cooperation. 
And for us, we see that only as one part of the impact that emerging powers will have on devel-
opment. So the other impacts will be the role of their private sectors organisations, including 
finance from Southern banks. Also the role that countries play in the multilateral system whether 
at the agency level, say a UN agency on the board of that, or at the system level for instance in 
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discussing what the successors of the MDGs will be. And then there is a wider issue which is 
beyond, which is about policy coherence of development, around trade policy negotiations and 
of all the complex international prerogatives. It’s not to say that we have identified in all of these 
cases what the exact role of a traditional donor should be. We want to make sure we don't loose 
sight of the bigger picture. And just a final thing to say, you’ve mentioned the OECD and the 
DCF. For us, we are very keen to support the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation which came out of the Busan agreement. For us, the participation over time, the 
global participation of emerging donors in that forum is very important. But it obviously has to 
demonstrate whether it can deliver useful outputs and show that it is a worthwhile enterprise. 
But for us, that is a very important objective as well. #00:38:32-8#  
ME: As is working through multilateral organisation in general. #00:38:34-1#  
I: I think partly because we realise that our bilateral and trilateral programmes can only ever do 
a limited amount so we need to look at working the multilateral system and on global issues. 
#00:38:50-3#  
ME: Do you think that emerging donors will be willing to go that path as well? Or do you feel 
that there is some resistance from their part? #00:38:58-9#  
I: Is your question about working within the multilateral system? #00:39:05-5#  
ME: Yes. #00:39:04-6#  
I: Ahm. I think my impression is that working multilaterally can be more challenging than bilat-
erally but there is still opportunity. Within the UN system there are very traditional groupings, 
like the G77 which countries find it hard to break away from certain issues. Ahm. But both at 
the technocratic level around aid performances at certain agencies and on particular issues for 
instance the World Bank has a Trust Fund on South-South knowledge exchange which a num-
ber of emerging donors contribute to. So there are opportunities like this to have a dialogue 
around the multilateral work. #00:40:11-5#  
[End of conversation]  
9.5.2 Interview VIII 
Interview conducted on 26 August 2014; ME: Interviewer; I: Interviewed; Text in brackets: anonymised  
[Introduction and explanation of procedure with the interview material] #00:01:46-4#  
ME: Okay, maybe as a first question because I am not that familiar unfortunately with the 
[anonymised] development setting or with your [institution]. So if you could just give us an 
insight into what kind of work you are doing or your institution is doing.  #00:02:05-4#  
I: Okay. The [institution] is a non-governmental organisation and it is membership-based, so 
//ahm// all our income and all the things we do are based on //ahm// income from our 
members. It’s a business and employer’s organisation.  #00:02:27-3#  
ME://mhm// #00:02:28-2#  
I: We have around 23000 member companies, most of them are small and medium-sized enter-
prises but we also have the big ones, like the oil companies and telecommunication and that 
kind of companies.  #00:02:44-4#  
ME: So very diverging kind of membership. //mhm// #00:02:50-6#  
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I: And we do lobbying on behalf of our companies towards the government to ensure that there 
is a //ahm// stable and good business environment.  #00:02:59-7#  
ME://mhm// #00:03:01-9#  
I: We are also part in the tripartite cooperation, meaning the government, the unions, trade 
unions and the employers. We have this tripartite model //ahm// in the working life in [anon-
ymised] and we are also involved in the ILO, the labour organisation in Geneva, so we are 
representing the employers.  #00:03:26-1#  
ME://mhm// #00:03:26-1#  
I: Then we do, of course, a lot of services to our members, like legal services or training, CSR, 
occupational safety and health, all these issues that are important for the employers.  #00:03:43-
4#  
ME: Yes.  #00:03:43-4#  
I: And then in 2002, we entered into an agreement with the agency of development cooperation 
[anonymised] and //ahm// then we //ahm// made an agreement where our company was 
going to support sister organisations in different development countries.  #00:04:04-3#  
ME: Okay, sister organisations of your company or of the development cooperation agency? 
#00:04:08-0#  
I: No, of our company. So it’s employers’ and business’ organisations in developing countries.  
#00:04:16-0#  
ME: Okay, that is very interesting.  #00:04:19-3#  
I: So, we cooperate with some countries in Asia, like China, Vietnam, Indonesia and Myanmar 
and then we cooperate mainly with the employer’s organisation in Africa and with focus on 
Eastern Africa, like Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Angola. We also had a project in 
Nigeria before.  #00:04:44-9#  
ME: Okay.  #00:04:45-9#  
I: So, what we do in this cooperation, we transfer knowledge about [our] experiences in labour 
relations. Very many countries are interested in the tripartite set-up.  #00:05:04-1#  
ME: Yeah, like the model.  #00:05:06-8#  
I: Right. With the trade unions and the government and how to avoid strikes, how you do 
negotiate with the trade unions, how you have stable labour relations but they are also interested 
in, you know, how employers’ organisation can assist its member companies in occupational 
safety and health, CSR, how you can support your members with legal services //ahm// etcet-
era, etcetera. Yeah, how you lobby towards the government, to have good labour laws and stable 
labour relations and business environment.  #00:05:49-9#  
ME: //mhm// #00:05:53-0#  
I: The development cooperation supports us with financing.  #00:05:55-2#  
ME: Okay. //mhm// #00:05:56-3#  
I: We use our. We have some money that we put into this //ahm// cooperation ourselves.  
#00:06:05-8#  
ME: Okay. From your members then.  #00:06:06-7#  
I: Yes, from our members. So, we use experts from our member companies or from the organ-
isation and they will give capacity training or //ahm// participate in training or conferences in 
different countries where we cooperate.  #00:06:25-5#  
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ME: //mhm// #00:06:29-5#  
I: So, in this cooperation, we - then - we notice that in Africa some seven, eight years ago, the 
increased presence of the Chinese in these countries.  #00:06:40-2#  
ME: //mhm// So, seven years ago, you would say, so 2007? #00:06:43-6#  
I: Yes, 2006 we started, we signed the agreement in 2007.  #00:06:51-5#  
ME: Okay, yeah.  #00:06:54-0#  
I: So, then we signed the agreement, first of all with our sister organisation in China and then 
with different African employers’ organisations.  #00:07:05-0#  
ME: //mhm// #00:07:05-9#  
I: So, on equal terms with the Chinese, we assist the local African employers’ organisation to 
get into contact with the Chinese business community. For example, in Uganda.  #00:07:20-8#  
ME: Yes, okay. That’s very interesting.  #00:07:25-3#  
I: So, both the Chinese and the CEC and the Chinese business organisations and the different 
//ahm// companies, Chinese enterprises.  #00:07:34-6#  
ME: And what is your general perception of their engagement, because you said when you sent 
me the first email as well, that you were in direct contact with the Chinese counterparts in Africa. 
What's your take on the so-called emerging donors even though they have been spending money 
on development aid for decades as well?  #00:07:56-8#  
I: Yeah. So the contact is also of a private, it’s not the government, it’s more the private because 
our sister organisation in China is more or less a private organisation.  #00:08:13-8#  
ME: I was about to say, how private is it in the context of the Chinese system.  #00:08:16-1#  
I: I think, it’s/ they describe it as a non-governmental organisation but they get one third from 
their member companies, maybe one third from the government and one third through other 
sources.  #00:08:34-5#  
ME: Okay.  #00:08:36-1#  
I: So, but of course, nothing is completely non-governmental in China, so. But they are also 
membership-based organisations.  #00:08:42-2#  
ME: //mhm// #00:08:43-6#  
I: But many of their members are state-owned companies.  #00:08:47-9#  
ME: Yes. And when you talk to them in Africa, do you also engage in cooperation with them? 
Or? #00:08:56-8#  #00:08:58-0#  
I: Yes, we have one special project together with the //ahm// CEC China Enterprise Cooper-
ation which is our sister’s organisation in China, they represent the employers in China and they 
also represent the Chinese employers in the ILO conference.  #00:09:14-6#  
ME: //mhm// Okay.  #00:09:17-2#  
I: That’s. You know, all the countries have representatives from the government, the trade un-
ions and employers meeting in ILO //ahm// every year in a big conference where they decide 
on different conventions and //ahm// concerning labour laws. So CEC would represent the 
Chinese employers. So, we decided to help the African employers’ organisations and in getting 
into contact with Chinese companies.  #00:09:47-3#  
ME: Ah, okay.  #00:09:48-2#  
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I: So, we started. And of course we needed to get in contact with the Chinese embassies, so 
CEC was like a door opener to get into contact with Chinese embassies.  #00:10:01-0#  
ME://mhm// #00:10:01-8#  
I: So, they physically they opened the door. Then also the Chinese embassies were very inter-
ested because they realised that a lot of companies are helpless when it comes to labour relations.  
#00:10:17-5#  
ME: Yes.  #00:10:18-6#  
I: This is a big struggle. So, on the one hand, we got into contact with the Chinese embassy and 
in the Chinese embassy there is an economic and commercial faction of the embassy. They are 
quite independent but they are sort of under the Chinese embassies.  #00:10:35-7#  
ME: //mhm// #00:10:36-5#  
I: So, we cooperate with them. And then we cooperate with. So the Chinese enterprises in the 
different countries they are organised in either //ahm// the state-owned companies, the big 
companies. They are organised in business councils, and then you have the smaller and medium-
sized and very private Chinese enterprises. They are often organised in different kind of organ-
isations, business organisations.  #00:11:09-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:11:09-9#  
I: It is a little bit complex because it’s, it’s different from country to country.  #00:11:13-6#  
ME: Yes, it always is. And with regard to China, I have the feeling that transparency isn’t that 
great yet. Or it’s difficult to say who is state-owned, who’s not state-owned and what level of 
independence do they really have. It’s difficult to assess from outside.  #00:11:33-5#  
I: Yeah, it’s difficult. But you know, the state-owned companies, they are big and they are 
//ahm// responding to the embassies or the commercial section of the embassy. They have a 
very close contact. But all the smaller, medium-sized companies, they prefer to be very private 
and not to interfere too much with the embassy.  #00:11:56-9#  
ME: That’s interesting.  #00:11:56-9#  
I: The problem is that the Chinese embassy doesn’t have any control over them.  #00:11:59-8#  
ME: Okay.  #00:12:00-9#  
I: Yeah.  #00:12:03-3#  
ME: So they are completely independent actors? #00:12:06-4#  
I: Yeah. And, you know sometimes, they organise, like in Uganda, they have a lot of different 
organisations. They can organise depending on which province they come from in China. Or in 
Kenya, they are very, they are better organised, so it’s only two business organisations, one for 
the smaller, medium-sized and one for the state-owned.  #00:12:28-7#  
ME: Okay.  #00:12:28-7#  
I: But in Uganda, you have many different. So, it depends a little bit from country to country.  
#00:12:34-3#  
ME: //mhm// #00:12:36-9#  
I: So, in Ethiopia, they establish the business organisation just a year ago. So they are not so 
organised yet.  #00:12:42-5#   
ME: //mhm// Okay.  #00:12:43-7#  
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I: And it’s very different in Ethiopia. It’s. It’s very difficult to get to know who they are and 
//ahm// they are very suspicious in a way. But in Uganda they are very open and, you know, 
very friendly. It seems like also the Chinese companies get in a way influenced by the country 
mentality, the African country.  #00:13:11-1#  
ME: Okay.  #00:13:11-1#  
I: It’s interesting.  #00:13:15-6#  
ME: So, would you say that generally Ethiopia is more suspicious of your organisation and 
Uganda less so, or more friendly. And that is why the Chinese also act that way. Or? #00:13:28-
3#  
I: //ahm////ahm// I would say, like in Uganda we have cooperated with the - our sister or-
ganisation for twenty years.  #00:13:36-6#  
ME: //mhm// #00:13:37-6#  
I: And we are very close friends. But with Ethiopia we just started.  #00:13:40-7#  
ME: Of course, then there is big difference in confidence.  #00:13:43-3#  
I: And trust and confidence it’s key, are key words for this cooperation. You have to build the 
confidence and build the trust. And the Chinese companies are very suspicious about who are 
the local //ahm// employers’ organisations, are they really willing to help you. Are they on your 
side? So they question all these things in the beginning. But once they understand that you are 
there to help them, then, it’s okay.  #00:14:18-8#  
ME: And you also said that you actually //ahm// make like a bridge between the Chinese 
companies or the Chinese organisations and the African counterparts? #00:14:30-6#  
I: Yes. What we want to do is that we want the Chinese companies to become members of the 
local African employers’ organisations.  #00:14:37-5#  
ME: //mhm// #00:14:36-6#  
I: So, like in Uganda, they also. They have two kinds of membership, either through the Chinese 
business organisation or direct members. So, if you are a direct member, you are treated on 
equal terms as a Ugandan company or a company from my country being a member. And then 
you can get free legal council from the organisation. For example, the African, the Ugandan 
employers’ organisation is called Federation of Ugandan employers and //ahm// the head of 
this organisation, she had helped many Chinese companies in avoiding strikes and labour con-
flicts.  #00:15:16-9#  
ME: //mhm// #00:15:17-7#  
I: So, then you are into their system into being helped and of being advised upon different 
labour laws and how you should treat your employees, how you should follow government 
rules, etcetera, etcetera.  #00:15:32-4#  
ME: Okay. //mhm//. And do you generally see from the Chinese a willingness to cooperate 
with you or also with these African counterparts?  #00:15:41-9# #00:15:42-5#  
I: Yes. Once they know who you are and once they can trust you, they are very much willing to 
cooperate because they see it’s a big benefit.  #00:15:53-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:15:54-5#  
I: They admit that there is a lot of problems with understanding labour culture and //ahm// 
and they see that it’s it’s a great benefit for them to become members.  #00:16:07-5#  
ME: //mhm// Okay //ahm// #00:16:10-3#  
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I: For example, in Kenya, just a month ago, over one hundred Chinese companies came to a 
seminar we had on //ahm// security and //ahm// on //ahm// a lot of problems also with 
the visa, the working permits. So, then we facilitated a meeting with the //ahm// the police 
and the authorities in Kenya and the Chinese community.  #00:16:38-0#  
ME: //mhm// #00:16:39-3#  
I: So, that you have a direct communication in understanding the government.  #00:16:43-1#  
ME://mhm// #00:16:44-3#  
I: And this is very, very helpful.  #00:16:46-2#  
ME: Yeah, that sounds very useful. And generally, what would you make out of the Chinese 
engagement, because there have been lots of debates in academia that there is a difference be-
tween traditional engagements, like that of your country or the EU, and that of China, that it’s 
more business oriented etcetera. Do you see any differences like that on the ground? Or is it in 
your field of work, is it just rather another actor that joins the group, basically? #00:17:17-2#  
I: (.) I mean they are different. Chinese, of course, are different.  #00:17:20-9#  
ME: //mhm// #00:17:21-6#  
I: We visited a lot of different Chinese companies in Eastern Africa and some of the companies 
are very well organised //ahm//. Just some weeks ago we went to a shoe factory in Ethiopia, 
they had over 3000 local employees, everything was very clean, very organised, they got good 
salaries above the //ahm// lowest rate and they had good canteens, they were paid three meals 
a day, they had free transportations. They were very good factory, very impressive.  #00:18:05-
4#  
ME: //mhm// #00:18:05-4#  
I: I think, //ahm// of course, they have another experience when it comes to labour.  
#00:18:13-9#  
ME: Yes.  #00:18:17-2#  
I: So, we have to understand that they come from a communist background.  #00:18:19-3#  
ME: //mhm// #00:18:20-3#  
I: And where they are there are one billion people, I mean, if you are a company in my country 
and we are used to [relavitevly small number of] people. And we have another democratic tra-
dition and a very different hierarchy at work. //ahm// Different relations between, //ahm// 
to our bosses //ahm// And if you are a small company coming from a province in the Western 
region in China and you have never been out of your country and you come to Ethiopia, you 
open up a factory and you employ twenty local employees. Of course, there will be challenges. 
So, there is a big difference.  #00:19:04-3#  
ME: //mhm// Yes, of course. #00:19:04-3#  
I: We have seen a very big difference between the big professional international companies and 
the smaller companies that don’t have this experience. And they want, you know, they want 
people. Especially, they want people to work more efficiently.  #00:19:22-4#  
ME: //mhm// #00:19:23-1#  
I: And then, you know, when people don’t come to work. There is a lot of. Many of them have 
problems with stealing. And, //ahm// you know, labour relations problems [laughs]... 
#00:19:39-1#  
ME: Are generally very difficult to manage. Yeah.  #00:19:43-0#  
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I: When you ask, we asked some people in Ethiopia. And we asked them if if you can choose 
between working in a European company, Indian company or Chinese company. What would 
you prefer. So, they said, of course, European company because they treat you better. And then 
the Chinese company, and then the Indian, and the Indian company.  #00:20:02-2#  
ME: Okay, that is interesting.  #00:20:05-8#  
I: But it’s more related to labour relations.  #00:20:07-1#  
ME: //mhm// Yeah.  #00:20:08-8#  
I: But of course, this is if you can choose. Then we have to remember that the Chinese are 
creating a lot of local jobs.  #00:20:16-2#  
ME: //mhm// #00:20:16-9#  
I: So, //ahm// of course, if you could choose, there is no company [from my country] for shoe 
factory employing 10000 local employees, you know. So, it’s //ahm//. There is a lot of prob-
lems with labour conflicts, but //ahm// they also create jobs. So, I think they need experiences. 
And they need to understand how it works, and that you. Yeah.  #00:20:47-4#  
ME: Yeah, to get integrated basically into the African context, I think.  #00:20:50-6#  
I: Yes.  #00:20:51-5#  
ME: When you mentioned India, do you have any contact with the Indian labour groups as 
well? Or?  #00:20:59-0#  
I: No, we don’t.  #00:21:01-1#  
ME: Not at all, okay. //mhm// But you noticed that there is an involvement? Do you notice 
that, or? #00:21:06-2#  
I: The Indians have been there for many years. So they are already members, some of them are 
members of the employers’ organisations from before.  #00:21:16-1#  
ME: //mhm// #00:21:18-8#  
I: But these companies, you know, they are often family based companies and they have been 
there for maybe two hundred years. So, that’s different. They are already integrated in the local 
community. At the same time, in some countries they stick to the Indian, //ahm// kind of 
group. But still they are more integrated. The Chinese are very new.  #00:21:39-8#  
ME: Yes.  #00:21:40-8#  
I: So, it’s different.  #00:21:43-6#  
ME: And, just one question, why is it that your institution focusses on Eastern African coun-
tries? Does that have a historical reason, or? #00:21:56-7#  
I: We we wanted to //ahm// to see the kind of synergy with what we do. //ahm// With this 
project supported by our development cooperation agency and our member companies invest-
ing in Africa.  #00:22:14-7#  
ME: //mhm// #00:22:15-4#  
I: So, of course, we wanted to be in those countries where also there are some companies of my 
country. And officially, [my country] has had a lot of contact through the missionaries, you 
know, in Eastern Africa.  #00:22:30-1#  
ME: Okay.  #00:22:31-3#  
I: And because of the language, so you know, West Africa is with the French, so that’s not really 
close to us.  #00:22:39-4#  
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ME: Yes.  #00:22:40-7#  
I: But of course, Angola and Nigeria where the oil is also important countries.  #00:22:47-9#  
ME: But you stopped cooperating with Nigeria, you said? #00:22:52-8#  
I: We did, we did, yeah. We have stopped the project. It came to an end. But it was very suc-
cessful.  #00:23:00-2#  
ME: Interesting. Quite generally, you said a big advantage of China, also as a so-called emerging 
donor getting involved in Africa, is that there is an explosion of jobs //ahm/ for the locals. Do 
you see any risks as well related to your work?  #00:23:19-3#  
I: (.) You mean companies of my country? Or our? #00:23:23-5#  
ME: Yes.  #00:23:24-8#  
I: Yes, of course. Some companies have already lost a lot of contracts. I, we spoke to one com-
pany that was building roads and infrastructure.  #00:23:35-9#  
ME: //mhm// #00:23:36-6#  
I: They had a lot of work until 2010, after that nothing. They lost all the bidding.  #00:23:44-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:23:45-7#  
I: So, of course some of the companies, they can’t compete with the Chinese companies, while 
other companies, yes, they can do.  #00:23:56-1#  
ME: Okay.  #00:23:57-1#  
I: Like, of course the oil companies is in a very different group and we have a lot of oil compa-
nies and also sub-contractors for the oil industry. They are still competitive. //ahm// But, in 
some sectors, especially in the infrastructure sector, [companies from my country] can no longer 
compete.  #00:24:22-6#  
ME: And is that something where you say, maybe there should be more funding for companies 
from your country when they engage in Africa because it is important projects or it is important 
work. Or do you think, oh well, that’s competition and your companies now no longer have the 
best price maybe? #00:24:40-1#  
I: I think, you need competition.  #00:24:43-4#  
ME: //ahm// #00:24:43-4#  
I: I mean the African country should get the cheapest project of course. I mean, you shouldn't 
tie the aid, or tying the //ahm// investment projects, I think that’s wrong. It should be open 
market. But I think it’s very important that it is an equal market. And that it is an equal level 
playing field for all the businesses. So of course, if Chinese companies have a lot of government 
funding, and the rest of the international companies are on completely commercial basis, then 
it will not be an equal level playing field.  #00:25:28-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:25:29-4#  
I: So, I think it’s important that the African companies also realise that it’s important with that 
there is equal terms. And some of the Chinese companies of course, you know, they build things 
for free and then they get maybe an advantage of the next bidding. So, I think there are... I think 
the transparency is very important.  #00:25:55-1#  
ME: Yes.  #00:25:55-9#  
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I: So, transparency and //ahm// equal terms and level playing field for business, it’s important. 
I don’t think our companies need any government money or aid money. It should be on com-
mercial competitive ground. But, of course, there is some very difficult countries, difficult mar-
kets, and poor countries, you maybe need some funds for the first feasibility study or the first 
phase of the investment.  #00:26:30-1#  
ME: Can you give us an example of such a country where you think maybe some initial help 
would be needed?  #00:26:39-2#  
I: For example, South Sudan.  #00:26:39-3#  
ME: Yes.  #00:26:41-1#  
I: Could be one country where you need some special condition.  #00:26:43-8#  
ME: Yeah. #00:26:46-0#  
I: In Kenya, Ethiopia, Angola, no.  #00:26:47-9#  
ME: //mhm// Okay, very interesting. //ahm// And you also participated in the DAC-China 
group, I saw your name on that list. Can you maybe give us a short insight into what was dis-
cussed at that - if you can remember, I think it was in 2010 or so? #00:27:15-3#  
I: Yes, some years ago. We studied how China had been fighting poverty and if that model could 
be used in Africa. Or if that model is interesting, not to copy, but to study for Africa.  #00:27:30-
8#  
ME: Okay.  #00:27:31-9#  
I: So, we conducted five conferences and for each conference we had a special topic. If I re-
member correctly, it was infrastructure, agriculture, //ahm// and one for business cooperation 
which I took part in or organised, and I think the first one was how to cooperate with, let’s see 
(.), I can’t remember the first one but I can find the papers if you are //ahm// interested.  
#00:28:10-6#  
ME: That would be very interesting for me because it is difficult to access some. #00:28:14-6#  
I: And the last one was the more the summing up of //ahm// the (.). And then we started, we 
had some //ahm// Chinese researchers, some Africans, we were represented by different do-
nor countries.  #00:28:39-9#  
ME: Yes. #00:28:39-9#  
I: It was very interesting and and //ahm// we studied how did China fight poverty through the 
agricultural reforms in the 1970s.  #00:28:49-4#  
ME: Yes.  #00:28:50-8#  
I: And then how they opened up for business and then how the small and medium-sized com-
panies were encouraged, how they were having access to financing, to technology transfer and 
also how China used Japan’s investment in infrastructure. And the model this cooperation 
//ahm// was done in the 1970s and 1980s is the same way as China is using in Africa today.  
#00:29:22-5#  
ME: Yes, exactly. So the purpose of the study was also to see whether this is a valid approach 
or.  #00:29:33-8# #00:29:33-8#  
I: Yeah.  #00:29:33-8#  
ME: Very interesting. //ahm// And maybe generally, you said that the Chinese are eager to 
join these African corporations in order to get more insights into the African labour structures 
and so on, they are also eager to cooperate with you. Do you think, generally, //ahm// we 
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talked also about the maybe imbalance regarding the Chinese still funding their companies 
strongly whereas others don’t get money from states. Do you think there will be, China will 
rather convert to, I call it, Western model, maybe? Or do you think they will continue to do 
their own policies? #00:30:11-3#  
I: I think the smaller medium-sized Chinese companies, they don’t get any funding from the 
government, they are there on commercial terms.  #00:30:22-3#  
ME: //mhm// #00:30:23-0#  
I: And many of them are there. Also, like this shoe factory we visited with 3000 employees, they 
didn’t get any government funding. But of course, if you are building the AU building in Addis 
#00:30:38-5#  
ME: Yes.  #00:30:39-5#  
I: This is government money. So, //ahm// I think //ahm// the Chinese will also get more and 
more on the commercial side. Yeah, I think so. (.) It's difficult to say, I mean.  #00:30:59-2#  
ME: Obviously. It was just to get a general impression whether it is rather going in that way or 
if you have the feeling that they are further isolating themselves. But from what you said it didn’t 
seem that way.  #00:31:13-7#  
I: I don’t think so. I think you will get more and more private companies coming because there 
are so many good opportunities and if China is glowing down a little bit, I think you will find 
more of these medium-sized companies investing in Africa on commercial terms.  #00:31:31-
5#  
ME: //mhm// #00:31:32-4#  
I: But, once you know, once you have a family member there or you have some contact, they 
are, you know, very dependent on each other, so if one is making good money in Ethiopia in 
producing shoes, soon you will have more people coming.  #00:31:48-0#  
ME: Yes, of course that is always the story. It’s the same for us or our companies.  #00:31:53-
4#  
I: Yeah. So, I think there are many, and they are very good entrepreneurs. It’s like when we 
studied the OECD DAC group, the entrepreneurial spirit of China was very instrumental in the 
fighting of poverty. So of course, the Chinese are very very good entrepreneurs.  #00:32:18-5#  
ME: Yes.  #00:32:19-8#  
I: This is of course helping them.  #00:32:23-1#  
ME: And might also be helpful or insightful for African companies.  #00:32:26-7#  
I: Yeah, very much. And I think many of them feel that they can handle the level they come to. 
You know if a company from my country comes to South Sudan or to Angola, no, to Uganda, 
maybe they will feel a little bit lost because it is on another level in many ways.  #00:32:47-3#  
ME: Yes.  #00:32:47-3#  
I: Even if you have very, you know, a lot of good things and a number of high educated people, 
but still the Chinese they match more or less the same level.  #00:32:58-7#  
ME: //mhm// #00:32:59-4#  
I: //ahm// Don’t misunderstand. But I think it’s easier for them in many ways to settle there 




ME: Yes, obviously it is a different background simply. If you also come from a country that 
did develop itself or that has gone through that process recently and that still lives in poverty 
for big parts of it, //ahm// you have obviously more facility to adapt.  #00:33:36-7#  
I: Of course, yeah. And I think they welcome the Chinese in a certain way. Even if there are a 
lot of questions about how they work and how they manage people. They have a trust that they 
are doing a good job. And even, you know, I was there when Obama was launching the new 
//ahm// the new funds for Africa, new investments, so we asked them, So this is good, you 
know, what do you think about now the Americans will come, and they were there: No, we 
don’t trust them, they take so long time and it will, you know. But when the Chinese say they 
will do it, they do it.  #00:34:19-5#  
ME: Yes.  #00:34:20-5#  
I: And then they come and in one week you have a new highway. You know, instead of Amer-
icans, it would take years.  #00:34:27-8#  
ME: Yeah, I have heard that from several people, that it is simply faster.  #00:34:34-3#  
I: I mean it’s true that it takes longer time when you need to prepare and you need to do a lot 
of feasibilities and things, but the Chinese, they do it.  #00:34:46-1#  
ME: Yes, hands-on approach definitely. //ahm// I think I have already taken more than half 
an hour and I promised that I would be rather short. Is there something that I have completely 
left out and that you thought would come up in that interview? #00:35:01-9#   
I: //ahm// No, I can’t think of anything just now. //ahm// I can send you the old paper from 
the OECD DAC, I can send them to you.  #00:35:19-4#  
ME: That would be absolutely brilliant if you could do that as they are not all available online, 
so it’s quite difficult to get access to them.  #00:35:25-1#  
I: At least there was a main lesson from the last. #00:35:29-8#  
ME: Yes, that would be brilliant if you could send me that. That would be very good. One 
further questions, [question about further contacts]. And I thank you very very much for your 
time and your interesting insights.  #00:36:24-9#   




9.5.3 Interview IX 
Interview conducted on 9 October 2014; ME: Interviewer; I: Interviewed; Text in brackets: anonymised  
Introductions #00:01:03-3#  
ME: Then maybe if you could start by telling me what exactly it is you do within [donor insti-
tution] so that I have an overview of the activities that you do in your job. #00:01:17-3#  
I: Okay, //ahm// I am //ahm// working in the sections for economic development, gender 
and governance. That is the name of the department. Within that there is a section called private 
sector development. #00:01:38-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:01:39-3#  
I: And I work in there. #00:01:39-7#  
ME: //mhm// #00:01:40-4#  
I: And my, //ahm// what we are doing is that we are administrating certain application-based 
schemes for support for private sector development. #00:01:53-1#  
ME: //mhm// #00:01:54-1#  
I: //ahm// And my duty is to //ahm// //ahm// make sure those //ahm// projects we em-
bark on are //ahm// you know, are of most //ahm// good quality. #00:02:10-3#  
ME: Okay, so quality assessment of the project. //mhm// #00:02:16-5#  
I: Yeah. Project assessment of whatever projects we embark on. #00:02:20-9#  
ME: //mhm// #00:02:22-0#  
I: And what else do I do? I support basically the //ahm// the various people working in the 
section, or mostly doing the //ahm// work. And //ahm// I also assist in, you know, various 
processes in the house with respect to all kinds of issues with, related to, how we should perform 
better, how we should learn from our experiences. #00:02:51-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:02:52-2#  
I: And mistakes. And, you know, try to //ahm// assist as best as I can to ensure that we are, 
use the funds efficiently. For the ones we engage in with respect to development assistance, but 
also that we also are efficient in our use of resources when assessing projects and programmes. 
#00:03:18-1#  
ME: //mhm// So all in the, in the name of aid efficiency generally? #00:03:24-4#  
I: You can say so. You know there is a more and more //ahm// requirements of development 
assistance that it shall comply with all kind of //ahm// cross-cutting issues and have safeguards. 
So it’s actually in many ways getting //ahm// more complex than it used to be. #00:03:48-3#  
ME: //mhm// #00:03:48-8#  
I: So there are more considerations to take into account. #00:03:49-7#  
ME: //mhm// #00:03:50-2#  
I: //ahm// And therefore I also need to be //ahm// to make sure I am compliant with other 
//ahm// issues which are handled by other departments within the [donor institution] that 
depends on the size of the application in question. #00:04:11-9#  
ME: //mhm// What other departments are you talking about or where do you have the most 
//ahm// issues when it comes to compliance of projects? #00:04:21-8#  
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I: Well, there are other departments here which are specialised in energy and climate and for 
instance in gender and //ahm// energy and climate is the priority for [country’s] development 
assistance. #00:04:39-7#  
ME: Yes. #00:04:39-7#  
I: So we are trying to //ahm// you know, in many ways //ahm// have //ahm// kind of a 
//ahm// compliance with what they are thinking with respect to at least environment. 
#00:04:55-1#  
ME: //mhm// #00:04:55-3#  
I: And if it so happens that we have projects which are energy related we would ask for assistance 
in assessing those projects. #00:05:05-4#  
ME: //mhm// #00:05:07-3#  
I: Yeah, you know, we are prone to receive applications from all sectors. #00:05:11-5#  
ME: Okay. #00:05:12-5#  
I: So that’s only should there be applications which are related to climate or energy, then I would 
also ask them. Or if there is, you know, a particular dimension of //ahm// of //ahm// gender 
or human rights or any of the other ones, other cross-cutting issue then we have to take into 
account, then I will ask from advice from elsewhere. #00:05:35-9#  
ME: //mhm// Yes, of course, yeah. And you are largely, or your section is largely approached 
by the private sector or do you also approach the private sector yourselves? #00:05:47-2#  
I: No, we are application-based which means people have to approach us, so companies ap-
proach us. #00:05:53-6#  
ME: //mhm// #00:05:54-6#  
I: We also engage with //ahm// institutional cooperation #00:06:00-2#  
ME: //mhm// #00:06:01-0#  
I: Or, you know, capacity building. #00:06:03-3#  
ME: //mhm// #00:06:03-9#  
I: And //ahm// although that’s also application-based, there might be instance where we also 
kind of //ahm// basically //ahm// assist in finding //ahm// institutional cooperation pro-
grammes. #00:06:22-9#  
ME: //mhm// And //ahm// do you have these contacts with [country’s] private sector or 
with //ahm// the private sector of recipient countries? #00:06:34-5#  
I: //ahm// #00:06:35-4#  
ME: Or both? #00:06:36-6#  
I: Our schemes are untied. So anybody can actually apply. #00:06:40-4#  
ME: Okay. #00:06:41-3#  
I: From wherever. But you know, we, we, in practice it is mostly [country’s] companies which 
apply. With respect to capacity building or institutional cooperation we might use [country’s] as 
well as we might use //ahm// international or national institutions. #00:07:04-7#  
ME: Okay. #00:07:06-0#  




ME: //mhm//. Okay. And, as you know, my project asks the question whether //ahm// the 
emergence of so-called new donors, which aren’t new of course, like China and India, does have 
any implications //ahm// for the work that more traditional donors like [country] are doing in 
development cooperation. And regarding to this, do you have any, in your field of work, did 
you have any //ahm// contact with Chinese or Indian or Brazilian //ahm// donor capacities 
or //ahm// do you largely approach them as potential partners in development cooperation? 
#00:07:56-6#  
I: Yeah, well. We don’t have, we are not in much contact with them. #00:08:02-3#  
ME: //mhm// #00:08:03-2#  
I: You know, in our section. But we are not in any way, not wanting to have any cooperation 
with them. #00:08:12-7#  
ME: //mhm// #00:08:13-3#  
I: So, we don't mind cooperating with them, but I think it’s //ahm// hasn’t been a natural thing 
for us to do so far. #00:08:19-6#  
ME: //mhm// #00:08:20-3#  
I: It hasn't kind of, you know, the setting where this seems to be appropriate. So, //ahm//, we 
continue, you know, with our approach as we have done before. We are of course aware of their 
//ahm//, you know, entrance or their presence on, you know, where we operate, but //ahm// 
we don't have any kind of //ahm// //ahm//, you know, declared aim of doing this or that 
basically with respect to any way we shall look upon or handle their presence in, yeah. #00:09:03-
4#  
ME: //mhm//. Can you recall when was the first time that the issue or simply the topic of 
//ahm// emerging donors appeared in the discussions in your department, in your section. 
Generally, where was, when was it that this topic actually //ahm// was discussed? Or was it 
always discussed? #00:09:27-4#  
I: I couldn’t remember exactly when. #00:09:27-1#  
ME: //mhm// #00:09:28-6#  
I: It became apparent that //ahm// I guess, especially the Chinese were active in //ahm// 
various countries as they do in Africa. And of course, we were aware and became aware of their 
way of doing things. And and, you know, at the beginning it was, might have been felt as unor-
thodox or a bit of a stretch, in a sense that they have this kind of non-interference kind of 
approach. #00:10:01-4#  
ME: Yes. #00:10:01-6#  
I: But, you know, as of today, I think that, many also look upon it as being refreshing. #00:10:07-
3#  
ME: //mhm// #00:10:07-8#  
I: In a sense that they have an approach which //ahm//, you know, which makes us having to 
think //ahm// maybe twice on what we are doing. But //ahm// it is my impression that, you 
know, //ahm// there hasn’t been much of an impact on us as to what they are doing. We are 
not any less prudent in our approach than we used to be. #00:10:34-9#  
ME: //mhm// #00:10:34-9#  
I: We are as right-based //ahm// as we used to be, if not more. #00:10:37-9#  
ME: //mhm// #00:10:38-4#  
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I: //ahm// So, so //ahm//, I feel that //ahm// we respect their presence and and //ahm// 
but we don’t necessarily //ahm//, you know, have the same //ahm// approach. #00:10:51-
8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:10:51-8#  
I: And and so far, as far as I know, it hasn’t really presented us with within the particularly 
//ahm// conflict of interests or any issues basically. #00:10:59-1#  
ME: //mhm// So, both approaches, if you want, coexist more or less? #00:11:07-6#  
I: You know, it might be that we are operating in different areas of //ahm// development 
assistance. You know, they are pretty much into infrastructure, I think, and we are not particu-
larly into infrastructure. #00:11:17-5#  
ME: //mhm// #00:11:18-0#  
I: Well, we are, but not as much as they are, you know. We are, you know, much more into 
softer sectors but I don’t know really, I haven’t personally had the challenge or experience of 
//ahm// having to sit down and scratch my head and try to find out where this is, how to 
perceive their presence. #00:11:42-8#  
ME: //mhm// Yes. #00:11:42-8#  
I: You know, I haven’t //ahm//. That hasn’t had any implications in my work. #00:11:48-7#  
ME: //mhm// Okay. //ahm// You said that [country] follows a right-based approach maybe 
even more right-based approach. Can you a little bit develop on that? What exactly do you mean 
by rights-based approach? #00:12:04-7#  
I: I mean that there are more and more considerations which we have to take into account, you 
know. We are having those cross-cutting themes like //ahm// gender, gender balance, gender 
equity. We have environmental issues which we want to be present in all our appraisals of pro-
jects. #00:12:26-7#  
ME: //mhm// #00:12:27-3#  
I: We are looking into //ahm//, you know, ethnic or minorities, you know. I can’t recall all of 
them, but //ahm//, you know, we are preoccupied with the ILO conventions on decent work, 
we are //ahm// looking into having, a do-no-harm-kind of approach. #00:12:49-0#  
ME: //mhm// #00:12:49-5#  
I: So, so, our approach hasn’t in my view, experience, hasn’t, has not really changed much 
//ahm// by the fact that the Chinese or whatever the Brazilians are present //ahm// on our 
//ahm//, in the same countries as we operate. And those issues haven’t been less prominent 
now than they used to be. On the contrary, we are even more preoccupied with trying to 
//ahm// make sure that our projects do no harm, basically and actually follow those best prac-
tices and follow those considerations which I just told you about.  #00:13:36-3#  
ME: //mhm// Do you, do you think that has largely to do with the whole process that was 
internationally launched as well with the aid effectiveness debate around the Paris Declaration 
2005 and all the follow-up meetings and generally a tendency for aid agencies to be very con-
cerned about what kind of impact do their projects really have on the ground. #00:14:03-0#  
I: You know, we are more and more into impact, you know. We //ahm// are preoccupied with 
making sure that //ahm// there is impact which means results and and //ahm//, you know, 
to justify [country's] engagement we are expected to bring about results. #00:14:23-5#  
ME: Yes. #00:14:24-4#  
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I: That's more and more prevalent. //ahm// And expected from us. So, so we are trying to be 
concerned with the //ahm// looking at it from the development partners’ perspective. 
//ahm// #00:14:36-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:14:37-4#  
I: Trying to make sure what we are doing really is in accordance with their priorities and fitting 
in their development plan. #00:14:47-9#  
ME: //mhm// #00:14:46-3#  
I: //ahm//, you know, more or less. You know, sometimes we are good at doing so, sometimes 
we are less good. But at least there is a more //ahm// recognition of that approach //ahm// 
compared to before and, and yes, we are basically willing to cooperate with anybody. #00:15:09-
0#  
ME: Yes. #00:15:09-9#  
I: We don't have any, any //ahm// we don’t exclude anybody. So that’s on a case by case basis, 
you know. It depends on that particular case but in practice, I guess that we are somehow more 
prone to cooperate with //ahm// what is called like-minded which is a group of donors which 
probably //ahm// restore from historical background have had more or less of the same ap-
proach.  #00:15:38-9#  
ME: //mhm// Yes, of course, that’s only natural, I mean. //mhm// #00:15:42-0#  
I: Yeah. So, so. But you know, I don’t think we have any //ahm// issues with whom we coop-
erate. We could cooperate with the Chinese if the occasion presented itself. #00:15:52-5#  
ME: //mhm//. But //ahm// as you know, so far there is no triangular cooperation going on 
between [country], the Chinese and some recipient country. #00:16:03-6#  
I: As far as I know, I don’t know of anyone. But I just represent a small section, so. #00:16:10-
3#  
ME: Yes. #00:16:11-1#  
I: My portfolio is small compared to the total //ahm// budget of development assistance, I 
couldn’t guarantee that //ahm// there aren’t any other institutions cooperating with them. 
#00:16:20-9#  
ME: Yes, of course, but in your experience... #00:16:23-3#  
I: Yes, not in my experience. #00:16:23-9#  
ME: //mhm// Okay, you’re also and //ahm// your section is also about economic develop-
ment, governance and //ahm// gender, you said, the, your overall department. #00:16:39-9#  
I: Yes. #00:16:39-9#  
ME: Do you have anything to do with the governance part as well //ahm// when you deal with 
private partners? #00:16:43-3#  
I: Yeah. With private partners we are //ahm// preoccupied that, especially if they are from 
[country] that they follow a code of standards. You know, ethics, if you want, which is, which 
is of high quality. #00:17:02-2#  
ME: Yes. #00:17:03-1#  
I: So, we would. We encourage them to do so and we actually willing to support any additional 
cost about national standards, you know, in our project countries, so that they can uplift to 
[country’s] standards, you know, should that [country's] standard, which it usually is, is of a 
higher level. #00:17:23-3#  
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ME: Yes. #00:17:25-0#  
I: So, we are concerned with CSR, corporate social responsibility. #00:17:29-0#  
ME: //mhm// #00:17:29-6#  
I: We are concerned with //ahm// tax revenues for the countries and, and a transparent ap-
proach and //ahm// so forth and so forth. #00:17:38-3#  
ME: Yes. //ahm// Did that increase or stay more or less on the same level that it has stayed 
since, let’s say, 2000, or 2005, or since your work experience? Did these kind of concerns to 
include governance issues of any kind //ahm// in the relationships with recipients... #00:17:59-
8#  
I: I would say it has increased. That’s why it has become much, more complex. #00:18:04-2#  
ME: //mhm// #00:18:04-8#  
I: than it used to. We are trying to, you know, and that’s an issue in itself in a sense that we have 
to look at how we work, you know, and also worry about efficiency, you know, in our work. 
Because since we have so many considerations to look into it kind of forces us, basically to 
//ahm// look into how the way we work and maybe also forces us to try and work on larger 
projects which can justify //ahm// the use of resources. Because sometimes, you might say 
that a small project is as time consuming as a big project. #00:18:45-8#  
ME: //mhm// Okay. #00:18:47-3#  
I: And that’s the realisation that we are, at least I am doing. #00:18:50-2#  
ME: //mhm// #00:18:50-7#  
I: I am not sure that we have fully, //ahm//, you know, taking that into account, but I hope 
we will, because //ahm// administrating application-based schemes over small values it be-
comes time-consuming and inefficient //ahm// compared to //ahm// dealing with larger pro-
jects. That is my personal opinion. #00:19:17-1#  
ME: Where then the money could go more directly to the people in need and less to admin-
istration in a way. #00:19:22-7#  
I: You know, comparatively speaking, that much more work to be done if we hand in, I don’t 
know, let’s say a million [currency] compared to half a million [currency] project //ahm//, you 
know, that works a hundred times more and we don’t use 100 times more amount of time for 
the large project. So that means that, and since we, we are, you know, we are not many people 
//ahm// compared to Germany for instance, right? You know, in Germany you have GIZ with 
16 000 persons or something at times, you know, we are at most 400 at [institution]. #00:20:01-
9#  
ME: Yes. #00:20:01-6#  
I: dealing with private sector schemes and civil society schemes and other schemes. So therefore, 
we are forced to think in the future, it hasn’t really dawned upon us, but I think it will. #00:20:20-
3#  
ME: [Laughs] Yes. #00:20:21-3#  
I: There is a need to rationalise our resources. #00:20:23-7#  
ME: Yeah. To be more economic, economical there. #00:20:27-9#  
I: I would say so. #00:20:27-9#  
ME: //mhm// Ok. //ahm// And //ahm// maybe in that same vein, does development aid 
also need to deliver more results for the, not only for your institution in order to justify your 
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funding //ahm// but also for the voters, I mean for the government? Do they, or is the [coun-
try’s] public generally concerned with how the aid money is spent or does that not really matter 
that much? #00:20:59-4#  
I: Well, the interesting thing is that there has always been //ahm// appreciation by the [coun-
try’s] public for development assistance. #00:21:08-5#  
ME: //mhm// #00:21:08-5#  
I: And the [country’s] parliament has approved, you know, a rather large budget, compared to, 
comparatively speaking //ahm// without much questioning. #00:21:21-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:21:21-8#  
I: And therefore, by default the public, if you, if you know what I mean. But then, there is 
obviously, now that the amounts are even larger as the [country’s] economy has been growing 
#00:21:35-9#  
ME: Yes. #00:21:37-0#  
I: There has been a certain awareness within the [country’s] public as to, you know, whether the 
results are there which has specially come about, maybe the last ten years in a more predominant 
//ahm// way. #00:21:53-0#  
ME: //mhm// #00:21:54-0#  
I: And //ahm// and rightly so, I would say. Because //ahm// it is a lot of money and //ahm// 
the [country] needs to make sure that it has an impact and and the sense of impact has also 
//ahm// got a lot of attention as to way you make or measure impact. #00:22:17-3#  
ME: //mhm// #00:22:18-0#  
I: So, a lot of discussion around that as well. #00:22:22-4#  
ME: Yes. #00:22:23-3#  
I: //ahm// Which is good but then the, the impact has, has to be, you know, primarly has to 
be in the developing country itself but of course within that there is a debate between the lines 
as to whether one donor, I mean the donor country should have an impact as well #00:22:47-
5#  
ME: Yes. #00:22:48-5#  
I: Or how should we go about making sure there are //ahm// some opportunities for a win-
win based #00:22:55-7#  
ME: Yes. #00:22:56-7#  
I: right? if you see what I mean. #00:22:57-7#  
ME: Yes. #00:22:56-8#  
I: So, so we are trying to juggle with all these considerations and depends who you ask. Some 
people are saying that that’s secondary. #00:23:05-5#  
ME: //mhm// #00:23:06-2#  
I: You know, that there are win-win for [country’s] society. Some will say that if you don't have 
it, you might lose interest //ahm// from the public. So it depends who you speak to. #00:23:14-
9#  
ME: //mhm// #00:23:15-6#  
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I: And it depends what kind of, you know, conviction you have with respect to how you go 
about doing //ahm// development assistance, you know, if it’s health or education or private 
sector, you know, it depends who you speak to. #00:23:29-7#  
ME: Yes, of course. And the win-win situation is actually a rhetoric that the Chinese are very 
proud to present because they say when we do development aid, we want something back. And 
they do it very openly and actually it results in, generally in //ahm// the recipient country in a 
kind of relief because it’s open, it’s transparent //ahm// they know what they are dealing with 
and... #00:23:54-1#  
I: Yes. In many ways yes, I think that’s clear on the side there. They want a piece of hospital 
being delivered, they will get it to your hospital being delivered. But sometimes, my impression 
is that the lack of involvement of the local, //ahm// of the country. #00:24:17-0#  
ME: Yes. #00:24:17-0#  
I: might be //ahm// something which might //ahm// become a //ahm//, what you call it, 
//ahm// a caveat. #00:24:28-6#  
ME: Yes, yes. //mhm// #00:24:28-6#  
I: Yeah. So, we especially, I think [country] is at least preoccupied with trying to transfer skills 
rather than to transfer a block of hospital. #00:24:39-0#  
ME: Yes, [laughs] which then makes obviously a huge difference //ahm// probably also in the 
eyes of recipients, both are valuable but they are just different approaches and you get different 
benefits out of each approach, I would say. #00:24:54-0#  
I: If I may, you know, I know about GIZ, you know, usually, you know, in many ways executes 
#00:25:04-1#  
ME: //mhm// #00:25:05-1#  
I: projects themselves. #00:25:06-7#  
ME: Yes, they do. #00:25:07-8#  
I: We don’t. We make sure we have partners who execute and we are also of the opinion that 
it’s important that local //ahm// partners acquire knowledge however a long time that takes, 
because that’s, you know, how we build up knowledge in the country. #00:25:27-5#  
ME: //mhm// Yes, so very true ownership-based approach that you describe there. #00:25:34-
3#  
I: Yes, pretty much occupied with what they call recipient responsibility. #00:25:37-6#  
ME: Yes. #00:25:38-7#  
I: Which means that they, you know, we have to listen to their priorities, and we have to have 
their participation. #00:25:45-4#  
ME: //mhm// #00:25:45-4#  
I: This is at least how it is supposed to be done in theory, #00:25:51-6#  
ME: Yes, of course, well between theory and practice there is always a gap. #00:25:55-7#  
I: There is always a gap, yes. #00:25:57-1#  
ME: That’s a, yeah. But //ahm//. Wait, now I forgot what I wanted to ask you. //ahm// 
#00:26:05-7#  
I: That’s okay. #00:26:06-0#  
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ME: It was related //ahm// to the thing you said before about the GIZ //ahm// having an 
approach where they actually have their own project implementers in the country and you ac-
tually really just employ local communities and local projects, local firms, if you... #00:26:25-9#  
I: Unless you can really prove or justify using [country’s] expertise. #00:26:33-2#  
ME: Yes. #00:26:33-2#  
I: That’s actually something also debatable, that we should focus on what we are presumably 
good at. #00:26:40-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:26:41-0#  
I: You know, for instance being energy, you know. You know we are presumably good at oil 
exploration, oil and gaz, or //ahm// or hydropower for that matter. #00:26:51-4#  
ME: //mhm// #00:26:51-7#  
I: And in there we feel that we can //ahm// come up with some good //ahm// institutional 
//ahm// experience and //ahm// that we can help them setting up an enabling environment 
which will safeguard that, the //ahm// windfall revenues from natural resources is //ahm// 
used in a good way, for instance, right? #00:27:17-5#  
ME: //mhm// #00:27:17-5#  
I: For instance; with respect to //ahm// taxes, equitable institutions and so forth. So that's 
something we do at the programme, we have something called [name of programme anony-
mised]. #00:27:27-5#  
ME: //mhm// #00:27:28-4#  
I: where we assist countries where, which discover oil and gas to, to, if they want to, to //ahm// 
to set up //ahm// institutional and legal framework which we believe has benefitted us 
//ahm// and which doesn’t, you know, //ahm// and which channels it to the public more 
than to the elite. #00:27:52-6#  
ME: Yes. #00:27:53-8#  
I: Basically, yeah. #00:27:56-0#  
ME: And, you are not working for the [name of programme anonymised], so it is probably 
difficult for you to judge or to answer that question, //ahm// because in oil, you might have 
some competition with the Chinese. Do you know anything about that or discussions going on? 
#00:28:10-8#  
I: We are trying be, to separate, you know, when we //ahm// the [name of the programme 
anonymised] #00:28:16-6#  
ME: //mhm// #00:28:17-4#  
I: It is very obvious that people might think that we are there to try and exploit opportunities 
to have our [country’s] oil companies come and //ahm// take it to business. #00:28:28-8#  
ME: //mhm// #00:28:28-8#  
I: So we are very much preoccupied that that’s not the case, so there is no //ahm// there is no 
commercial interest of [country] //ahm// within [name of the programme anonymised]. 
#00:28:43-3#  
ME: //mhm// Yes, of course. #00:28:46-5#  
I: Well, that’s not of course, if you are trying to apply that principle. #00:28:50-6#  
ME: Yes, yes. #00:28:52-0#  
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I: Yeah. #00:28:54-1#  
ME: //ahm// #00:28:55-2#  
I: I am not sure what your question was but //ahm// #00:28:57-7#  
ME: No, no, that answered the question. Thank you. //ahm// I think we are nearly approach-
ing the 30 minutes timeframe I set for this interview as well. So, do you, maybe you have some-
thing that what you thought about would come up during this interview or what we have ne-
glected now or what do you want to point out in the end of the interview? Maybe something? 
#00:29:25-8#  
I: No, I think we covered quite a lot of ground. //ahm// I think development assistance is a 
complex business. #00:29:31-9#  
ME: Definitely [laughs] yes. #00:29:33-9#  
I: So there is no right or wrong answer, you know. There might be good reason to accept the 
Chinese //ahm// way of doing things as opposed to ours which are demanding a lot of things 
#00:29:44-4#  
ME: //mhm// #00:29:46-1#  
I: on the part of the recipients, you know, with respect to abiding conventions and other things 
which //ahm// might make things very complicated. #00:29:56-0#  
ME: //mhm// #00:29:56-4#  
I: And maybe not justified there and then so, so. I don’t have any, you know, true answers, but 
I have, I think there are some flaws in the Chinese approach in the sense that they have built 
//ahm// things which haven’t been well suited to the needs. #00:30:17-0#  
ME: Yes. #00:30:18-0#  
I: Sometimes. So I hope the Chinese will learn from that but //ahm// there seems to be more 
of a //ahm// kind of //ahm// sort of study of what they are doing because to me it seems 
that they are quite open about their intentions. #00:30:35-8#  
ME: Yes. #00:30:36-6#  
I: They want to enter into contracts for //ahm//, you know, especially mineral provision 
//ahm// but sometimes I think that they are not doing sufficient ground work to make sure 
what they are kind of providing in return so to speak, is //ahm// adequately //ahm// thought 
for and based on needs. #00:31:01-7#  
ME: Yes. #00:31:00-9#  
I: That’s my thing. //ahm// Secondly, I think that //ahm// there should be more cooperation 
amongst donors. #00:31:15-6#  
ME: Yes. #00:31:16-8#  
I: We are, although there are, there is this Paris Declaration and that stuff, it is not really 
//ahm// applied in practice. There aren’t that many programmes and projects which truly have 
//ahm// kind of //ahm// a joint approach amongst our donors. There seems to be in many 
instances an agenda somehow. #00:31:42-7#  
ME: A national agenda? #00:31:45-4#  
I: Yes, a national interest agenda somewhere and that //ahm// might be coming back depend-




ME: Yes. #00:31:58-3#  
I: That kind of selfish or whatever it is called approach, is not prevalent in bad times and I guess 
rightly so, because it has to be justified towards your tax payers #00:32:13-1#  
ME: Yes #00:32:13-1#  
I: and //ahm// unfortunately that makes the Paris Declaration a bit hollow in many ways. 
#00:32:19-8#  
ME: //mhm// So stronger implementation of the real principles behind it. #00:32:26-5#  
I: Yeah, there should be. It doesn’t seem to happen. And I don’t know how to make it happen 
but, but //ahm// that would be probably more efficient //ahm//, you know, if we were able 
to think long term what would be best for all of us in long term rather than having short term 
approaches. #00:32:48-1#  
ME: Yeah short term national interest-based approaches. #00:32:50-6#  
I: Short term national interest based approaches, yes. #00:32:51-9#  
ME: //mhm// I agree with you there [laughs] #00:32:59-4#  
I: [Laughs] #00:32:59-4#  
ME: Okay, good. Thank you very much for your time. And as I thought it would be interesting, 
it was very interesting for me //ahm//. Thank you for making the time //ahm// thank you 
also for calling back. #00:33:11-5#  
I: No problem. #00:33:13-7#  





9.6 Aid statistics for eleven selected countries (chapter 6) 
9.6.1 Aid statistics for the United States in the eleven selected recipient countries 
      Table 9-1: Table indicating the percentage of overall U.S. aid distributed to selected 11 recipients 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Afghanistan 4.8 5.2 6.6 8.0 9.0 11.8 11.3 11.2 10.6 6.4 7.0 
DRC 1.2 0.6 4.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 4.7 1.1 1.2 1.4 
Ethiopia 2.5 2.4 1.5 2.0 3.5 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.4 
Malawi 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 
Mozambique 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.6 2.1 1.4 
Nigeria 0.7 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.6 2.1 1.8 
Sudan 2.3 3.0 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.8 2.7 2.4 1.8 2.7 0.9 
South Sudan ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 0.2 1.5 1.6 2.9 
Tanzania 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 1.9 
Uganda  1.3 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7 
Zambia 0.5 0.4 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 2.2 




      Table 9-2: Overall amount spent by the USA on selected 11 recipients 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Afghanistan 932 1529 1580 1661 2271 3180 3099 3146 2753 1694 1898 
DRC 227 167 944 145 212 254 287 1326 283 318 379 
Ethiopia 482 706 355 408 873 775 846 681 703 679 654 
Malawi 68 65 72 87 94 119 1125 157 182 200 179 
Mozambique 132 99 123 168 244 273 272 390 418 541 389 
Nigeria 144 115 886 264 392 378 466 418 421 544 478 
Sudan 452 880 832 779 912 1019 734 680 461 714 252 
South Sudan ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 58 387 410 784 
Tanzania 107 109 137 183 266 303 481 550 570 735 501 
Uganda  249 265 277 331 380 392 361 405 386 459 463 
Zambia 98 128 349 181 244 247 241 284 307 313 316 





9.6.2 Aid statistics for Norway in the eleven selected recipient countries 
     Table 9-3. Table indicating the percentage of overall Norwegian aid distributed to selected 11 recipients 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Afghanistan 4.4 2.9 3.2 3.3 4.2 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.6 2.9 3.1 
DRC 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 
Ethiopia 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.5 
Malawi 1.8 2.4 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.5 2.2 
Mozambique 4.0 3.3 3.0 2.8 3.1 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.4 1.2 1.5 
Nigeria 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Sudan 3.7 4.8 4.9 4.1 3.9 2.9 3.5 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.7 
South Sudan ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.4 1.7 
Tanzania 4.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.1 3.7 3.7 3.2 2.6 2.3 1.8 
Uganda  2.7 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Zambia 2.4 2.4 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.0 1.6 2.2 1.5 1.1 0.8 




     Table 9-4: Overall amount spent by Norway on selected 11 recipients 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Afghanistan 119 93 99 118 142 148 139 140 128 127 128 
DRC 32 30 29 29 38 36 33 32 33 45 38 
Ethiopia 57 59 59 43 41 48 38 29 40 61 64 
Malawi 47 76 71 69 71 81 75 67 71 107 90 
Mozambique 108 105 91 100 106 103 85 85 88 51 61 
Nigeria 10 5 4 4 7 12 16 12 10 10 13 
Sudan 101 152 151 150 132 118 135 47 34 34 29 
South Sudan ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 61 75 91 101 
Tanzania 105 93 107 143 141 149 144 115 94 99 76 
Uganda  73 70 71 88 83 86 83 82 53 70 69 
Zambia 66 76 94 93 81 80 63 80 53 49 32 




9.6.3 Aid statistics for the United Kingdom in the eleven selected recipient countries 
     Table 9-5. Table indicating the percentage of overall UK aid distributed to selected 11 recipients 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Afghanistan 4.2 2.7 2.8 4.8 4.4 4.4 2.9 5.0 5.0 3.1 2.9 
DRC 5.6 0.9 1.6 2.2 2.6 3.1 3.1 4.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 
Ethiopia 2.7 0.9 1.9 5.2 3.5 4.6 5.1 6.5 4.9 4.9 4.7 
Malawi 2.2 1.2 2.0 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.2 2.3 1.7 0.9 
Mozambique 1.2 1.0 1.1 2.1 2.7 0.7 1.3 2.2 1.5 1.2 1.2 
Nigeria 2.4 26.9 36.5 5.1 0.6 2.6 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.5 
Sudan 2.2 2.4 2.5 3.7 2.7 4.0 1.5 1.9 0.9 1.0 0.7 
South Sudan ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 1.0 
Tanzania 4.0 2.7 2.5 4.1 3.5 2.9 3.0 1.9 2.9 2.3 2.2 
Uganda  2.0 0.7 2.5 3.0 0.9 1.6 2.2 1.7 1.7 0.9 1.2 
Zambia 5.3 2.0 1.0 1.3 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.3 
                                                                                                                                                          Source: Own calculations based on  (OECD Stat 2015b) 
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     Table 9-6. Overall amount spent by the United Kingdom on selected 11 recipients 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Afghanistan 237 228 246 240 309 354 251 427 435 331 303 
DRC 319 81 140 108 185 246 268 386 221 253 256 
Ethiopia 156 78 165 260 243 373 435 557 422 515 493 
Malawi 127 106 171 119 141 122 158 105 198 177 93 
Mozambique 70 84 99 103 190 60 112 188 130 123 129 
Nigeria 134 2287 3184 256 45 206 283 301 314 389 363 
Sudan 123 204 215 184 191 319 127 159 82 108 77 
South Sudan ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 84 173 213 256 
Tanzania 228 229 219 206 244 236 258 160 251 238 229 
Uganda  114 58 214 148 63 128 192 144 150 91 127 
Zambia 299 172 87 66 59 80 85 93 85 94 140 
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